Dundas-Jones & Ors v R

These applications and appeals arise out of proceedings at the Snaresbrook Crown Court upon a composite indictment charging seventeen defendants on 24 counts. Twelve of the seventeen are applicants or appellants before us. In broadest outline the case concerned what the Crown was to call the United Kingdom limb of an international conspiracy to smuggle cocaine from the Caribbean into the United States, Canada, various destinations in Europe, and the United Kingdom. Once in this country the drugs were manufactured into crack cocaine, which as is well known is an especially addictive preparation.

The United Kingdom investigation commenced in April 2004. The conspiracy came to light following the arrest in France of a number of couriers bound for London carrying cocaine from the Caribbean in liquid, paste or powder form at between 70% and 100% purity. The drugs were professionally concealed in various ways. Various participants, here, in France, and in the Caribbean took different roles. Some recruited couriers. There were of course the couriers themselves. There were “meeters and greeters”, manufacturers or “chefs”, suppliers, and launderers of the proceeds. For the sake of economy we will refer to the various defendants by their surnames (we mean no discourtesy) save for Sandra Dundas-Jones, to whom we will refer as Mrs Dundas-Jones to distinguish her from her husband, the applicant Dundas-Jones.

Charges were brought against the defendants from time to time as the investigation proceeded. At length on 31 January 2005 HHJ King gave leave to prefer a consolidated indictment which gathered all the charges in 24 counts. We need only refer to those upon which there have been convictions (or pleas) leading to process in this court. Counts 1, 2, 3, 4 and 19 charged five conspiracies. Count 1 charged all the defendants save for Jones and Rowe-Hartley (the latter is not a party before us) with conspiracy to import cocaine. We may call this the “courier conspiracy”. Its modus operandi consisted in importations by courier from the Caribbean via France or Holland to the UK. Count 2 charged Mrs Dundas-Jones, Dundas-Jones, Clarke, Bennett and Alleyne with conspiracy to manufacture crack cocaine: the “manufacture conspiracy”. Count 3 charged all the defendants save for Jones and Rowe-Hartley with conspiracy to supply crack cocaine: the “supply conspiracy”. Count 4 charged all the defendants save for Farrow, Antoine, Rowe-Hartley and Jones with conspiracy to become concerned in facilitating the acquisition, retention, use or control of criminal property: the “money-laundering conspiracy”. Like Rowe-Hartley, Farrow and Antoine are not parties before us. Count 19 charged Dundas-Jones, Miranda and Fisher with another offence of conspiracy to import cocaine, which we may call the “DHL conspiracy”. Its modus operandi consisted in importations by means of the international parcel delivery service operated by DHL, using false addresses on the DHL delivery route.

Of the remaining counts in the indictment we need only refer to the following. Count 12 charged Fisher with possession of cocaine with intent to supply. Count 20 charged Dundas-Jones, Miranda and Fisher with a further conspiracy to supply crack cocaine. Count 22 charged Jones with importing cocaine on 9 March 2005, and count 23 charged her with being knowingly concerned in another importation (which has been referred to as the “Dwen” importation after Desmond Dwen, who was the courier on that occasion. He is not a party before us.) Lastly count 24 charged Benjamin with an offence of removing criminal property.

For reasons of case management the indictment was split so that there were two trials at Snaresbrook on the counts that were contested. The first was conducted before HHJ King. Unhappily he fell ill and was unable to take the second trial, which was accordingly conducted before HHJ Kennedy. Before explaining those it is convenient first to identify the pleas of guilty that were entered, and the sentences accordingly passed, so far as they have led to applications for leave to appeal against sentence in this court. We should say that having regard to the guilty pleas entered (and, where there were contests, the convictions returned by the juries) not all counts were proceeded with against all the defendants charged; but it is not necessary to identify each case where a count was left on the file.

On 19 April 2005, before HHJ King, Clarke pleaded guilty to counts 2 and 3 (the manufacture and supply conspiracies), Bennett pleaded guilty to counts 2 and 4 (the manufacture and money-laundering conspiracies) and Stephens pleaded guilty to count 3 (the supply conspiracy). On 2 August 2005 Miranda pleaded guilty before HHJ King to counts 1 and 20 (the courier conspiracy and the further conspiracy to supply). On 10 October 2005 Jones pleaded guilty before HHJ Kennedy to counts 22 and 23. On 18 October 2005 Benjamin pleaded guilty before HHJ Kennedy to count 1 (the courier conspiracy) and to count 24.

Now we may turn to the trials. Before HHJ King Dundas-Jones, Anderson and Mrs Dundas-Jones contested the case on count 1. Dundas-Jones also contested counts 2, 3 and 19. Alleyne contested counts 2 and 3. Fisher contested counts 12 and 19. On 16 September 2005 the jury convicted Dundas-Jones, Anderson, Mrs Dundas-Jones, Alleyne and Fisher on all the counts contested by them.

Before HHJ Kennedy Blackman, Williams and Antoine contested count 1. Blackman also contested count 4 (It was renumbered count 2: to avoid confusion we shall continue to refer to it as count 4). Williams (not a party before us) also contested count 4, as did Rowe-Hartley. On 8 December 2005 Blackman was convicted on counts 1 and 4, Williams was convicted on count 4 but acquitted on count 1, and Antoine and Rowe-Hartley were acquitted on counts 1 and 4 respectively.

On 27 February 2006 HHJ King and HHJ Kennedy passed sentence upon all the defendants who had respectively been convicted before them, whether by plea or verdict of the jury. In making their sentencing remarks both judges indicated that they had conferred with each other so as to achieve a consistent approach.

The relevant sentences passed by HHJ King were as follows. Dundas-Jones was sentenced to 27 years imprisonment on count 1 (the courier conspiracy), 27 years concurrent on count 2 (the manufacture conspiracy), 25 years concurrent on count 3 (the supply conspiracy) and 22 years concurrent on count 19 (the DHL conspiracy). He was also recommended for deportation. Clarke was sentenced to 18 years for the manufacture conspiracy and 14 years concurrent for the supply conspiracy, and recommended for deportation. Bennett was sentenced to 18 years for the courier conspiracy and 4 years concurrent on count 4 (the money-laundering conspiracy) and recommended for deportation. Miranda was sentenced to 16 years for the courier conspiracy and 14 years concurrent for the DHL conspiracy. Alleyne received 14 years for the manufacture conspiracy. (There seems to have been no separate sentence passed on the supply conspiracy, of which he was also convicted. We assume this was an oversight. No doubt any such sentence would in any event have been concurrent.) Fisher was sentenced to 14 years for the DHL conspiracy, and 4 years concurrent on count 12. Stephens was sentenced to 12 years for the supply conspiracy. Mrs Dundas-Jones was sentenced to 10 years for the courier conspiracy. Anderson was sentenced to 8 years on the courier conspiracy and recommended for deportation.

We turn to the relevant sentences passed by HHJ Kennedy. Benjamin was sentenced to 12 years for the courier conspiracy and 8 years concurrent on count 24 and recommended for deportation. Blackman was sentenced to 10 years for the courier conspiracy and 6 years concurrent for the money-laundering conspiracy. The judge also directed that a copy of his Sentencing Remarks be forwarded to the Secretary of State so that he might consider whether Blackman’s leave to remain in the UK be withdrawn as having been fraudulently obtained. Williams was sentenced to two years six months for the money-laundering conspiracy. (As we have said she is not a party in these proceedings, but her sentence is relevant to two disparity arguments: one run by Miss Bonsu on behalf of Blackman, and the other by Sir Ivan Lawrence QC for Benjamin.) Jones was sentenced to 10 years on count 22 and 8 years concurrent on count 23.

The proceedings before us consist in an appeal against conviction brought by Mrs Dundas-Jones with leave of the single judge, renewed applications for leave to appeal against conviction brought by Anderson and Blackman following refusal by the single judge, and renewed applications for leave to appeal against sentence brought by Mrs Dundas-Jones, Anderson, Clarke, Bennett, Stephens, Miranda, Dundas-Jones, Alleyne, Fisher, Jones and Benjamin following refusal by the single judge. Blackman’s application for leave to appeal against sentence is also before us having been referred to the full court by the Registrar.

What follows is an overall sketch of the facts. So far as necessary we shall travel into greater detail when we come to consider the individual cases before us both in relation to conviction and sentence. The respective parts played by some of the defendants are of particular importance in light of submissions complaining of disparity in sentencing.

We referred at the outset to the Crown’s description of the case as the United Kingdom limb of an international conspiracy to smuggle cocaine from the Caribbean into the United States, Canada, various destinations in Europe, and the United Kingdom. Passing sentence on 27 February 2006 HHJ King observed (transcript vol. V 3D) that the case arose “from the activities of a multinational, organised crime syndicate”. By 27 February 2006 twenty-five members of the conspiracy had been convicted and sentenced in France, ten in the United States, nine in Canada and four in the Caribbean. Sentences passed in these foreign jurisdictions ranged from 30 years to eighteen months (imposed on a courier who had assisted the authorities). In this jurisdiction there were twenty-five arrests. Of those arrested seventeen, as we have indicated, were prosecuted to conviction by plea or jury verdict in these proceedings. Two others, to whom we shall refer in passing, were dealt with in other Crown Courts on separate indictments.

Obviously enough the courier, manufacture, supply, money-laundering and DHL conspiracies were all linked. The courier and DHL conspiracies were the means by which cocaine was imported into the UK. An average importation was about 2 kg of cocaine at between 76% and 88% purity. After import the raw drugs were transported to premises at 6 Bream Gardens in Newham, east London. This was the “crack factory”, where the cocaine was processed into crack: hence the manufacture conspiracy. It was then distributed onto the market: the supply conspiracy. A 2 kg importation, turned into crack, would produce about £1m income. The sale value of the drugs imported over the period specified in the indictment (1 October 2003 to 13 January 2005) was estimated by the Crown at about £48m. (In his Sentencing Remarks on 27 February 2006 HHJ King said that he disregarded this figure as speculative.) Proceeds of the sales of crack were transferred abroad, for example to Guyana and Antigua: the money-laundering conspiracy.

The evidence disclosed four importations within the courier conspiracy. The first took place in February 2004. This was the Dwen importation to which we have referred. (Dwen was prosecuted on a separate indictment at the Coventry Crown Court and was sentenced on his plea of guilty to 12 years imprisonment for his part in the importation.) It involved 8 kg of cocaine. Jones lent assistance, having paid for Dwen’s flight ticket. Her part in the importation was reflected by count 23. (Count 22, to which as we have said Jones also pleaded guilty, represented an individual importation by her on 9 March 2005.)

The second importation within the courier conspiracy took place on 20 April 2004 when Antoine arrived in London from the West Indies with four rum bottles found to contain concentrated solutions of cocaine. Benjamin met her at Victoria Coach Station with a Citroen car, which belonged to Blackman who was his sister. However police officers had been waiting. Benjamin was arrested after a short chase.

The third courier importation was on 23 June 2004 when Farrow arrived at Gatwick with 1.83 kg of cocaine at 75% purity in the false lining of a suitcase. This was the only courier importation with which on the evidence Dundas-Jones was specifically connected (a fact upon which, as we shall show, Mr Suckling QC laid particular emphasis in presenting Dundas-Jones’ renewed application for leave to appeal against sentence). He orchestrated it, to use the judge’s expression in passing sentence. Mrs Dundas-Jones was also alleged to have been involved, as were Anderson and Miranda.

The final importation within the courier conspiracy took place on 8 July 2004, when Natalie Smith was intercepted at Heathrow carrying cocaine. She pleaded guilty to her part in separate proceedings at the Isleworth Crown Court on 20 January 2005.

It is convenient to turn next to the DHL conspiracy (count 19) since it and the courier conspiracy between them reflect the fact and means of importation of cocaine into the UK as opposed to what followed: the manufacture and distribution of crack and the laundering of the trade’s proceeds.

As we have indicated Dundas-Jones, Miranda and Fisher were involved in the DHL conspiracy. Again it was Dundas-Jones who orchestrated it. Fisher was a driver employed by DHL. He was recruited to the conspiracy by Dundas-Jones. His task was to intercept packages whose airway bill number had earlier been notified to him by Dundas-Jones and to pass them or their contents on to Dundas-Jones or Miranda. The first importation using this method was in late May or early June 2004, but no drugs were actually found. The second, also in early June 2004 involved two packages which were however intercepted by US Customs officials. The final DHL shipment was on the evidence sent from Guyana on 21 June 2004. Dundas-Jones had been arrested two days before. The package was opened at the DHL Lambeth depot and found to contain 246 gr. of cocaine at 76% purity.

We turn next to the manufacture conspiracy. As HHJ King said (vol. V 5H) the object of both the courier and the DHL importations was to maintain a “steady supply” of cocaine to the address at 6 Bream Gardens. The crack factory established there was operational between autumn 2003 and 22 June 2004, when the police raided the premises and found materials used for the manufacture of crack and newly manufactured blocks of the drug. The amount of crack cocaine so discovered amounted to about 5 kg at 100% purity. Dundas-Jones was the “overall controller or managing director” (vol. V 7E-F). Clarke and Bennett were responsible for the day-to-day running of the factory. They had rented the premises for the purpose.

There is little to say about the supply conspiracy. Though it involved more defendants it was closely linked to the manufacture conspiracy, for obvious reasons. In his summing-up to the jury HHJ King observed (transcript vol. III 71C-D):

“The prosecution contend that those who were involved in the processing of the imported cocaine into... crack cocaine were inevitably also involved in an agreement that the finished product should be supplied to end users.”

The money-laundering conspiracy involved collecting the proceeds of crack sales and transferring them abroad or elsewhere. In part the money was used to finance the purchase of more drugs. Blackman was on the Crown case heavily involved in such transfers. We shall refer to some of the detail in addressing her application for leave to appeal against conviction. Williams and Benjamin (who as we have said pleaded guilty to count 24, a substantive offence of removing criminal property) also made many Western Union transfers.

We need not take time at this stage with the remaining substantive counts in relation to which sentences were passed now sought to be appealed before us. They were ancillary or tangential to the linked conspiracies we have described. We turn to the appeal and the applications before us, and deal first with the matters relating to conviction.

As we have said Mrs Dundas-Jones was convicted before HHJ King on count 1, the courier conspiracy. She appeals against her conviction by leave of the single judge. The case against her depended on evidence that on 11 June 2004 she made the telephone call to a firm called A & M Travel to book airline tickets for Farrow, the courier on the third importation within the courier conspiracy. She did not give evidence on her own behalf.

We should note that there was evidence that Dundas-Jones had asked the applicant Anderson (who was his mistress) to make the call to A & M Travel, but, so Anderson said in interview, she had been unable to get through. There was also evidence that despite the welter of testimony showing telephone contact between conspirators there was none to demonstrate such contact between Mrs Dundas-Jones and the others; nor any evidence of high living on her part or unexplained wealth. Mr Ryder QC for Mrs Dundas-Jones accepts that these matters are relevant only as background. However they isolate and emphasise the particular importance, from the Crown’s perspective, of the evidence about the telephone call.

Jenny Saffray was a booking agent with A & M Travel. She gave evidence that during the morning of 11 June 2004 she took the call by which Farrow’s tickets were booked. There was also evidence, from telephone records, that a call had been made from Mrs Dundas-Jones’ mobile phone to A & M at 9-37 am for 3 minutes and 27 seconds. The Crown said this was the call by which the booking was made. They said it was Mrs Dundas-Jones who made the call, which the records show was immediately preceded and succeeded by contact on the phone with her husband, Dundas-Jones.

It was not disputed on Mrs Dundas-Jones’ behalf that on 11 June Mrs Saffray received the call booking Farrow’s tickets. Her case was that it must have been done by a different call from that recorded as having been made from her phone at 9-37, although there was no evidence before the jury of any other call made to A & M that morning. The basis for the defence assertion consists in answers given by Mrs Saffray about the length of time it would take to make such an airline ticket booking over the telephone, given that the 9-37 call was shown to have lasted only 3 minutes and 27 seconds. In her evidence in chief Mrs Saffray estimated the duration of the call in which the booking was made at ten minutes. In cross-examination she said that the process of taking such a booking “could take 10 minutes or it could take 15 minutes”. She said she did not think “it would take any travel clerk three minutes to book a flight, no”.

The Crown say that Mrs Saffray’s evidence was hedged about with “should” and “think”, and she was never directly asked whether it would be impossible for a telephone booking to take less than 10 to 15 minutes. However it is in our judgment plain that there was a proper foundation in her evidence upon which the defence was entitled to suggest to the jury that the call making the Farrow booking may have been a different one from that recorded as being made from Mrs Dundas-Jones’ mobile at 9-37.

The appeal point, on which the single judge gave leave, principally turns on certain interventions by HHJ King in the course of defence counsel Mr Ryder’s closing speech to the jury on behalf of Mrs Dundas-Jones on 14 September 2005. What the judge had to say was, so to speak, prefaced by exchanges with counsel the day before. The judge then said (transcript vol. I 6D-E):

“But there was only one call made to her office – according to her evidence – that morning for this call (sic). So it seems to me that to suggest to the jury that the call that came from your client’s telephone lasting three and a half minutes might have been upon some other topic is purely speculative. I shall have something to say about it in my summing-up so it is just as well that you know about it.”

Addressing the jury the next day Mr Ryder made it very clear the he relied on Jenny Saffray’s evidence about 10 to 15 minutes to make a telephone booking to support his argument that (transcript vol. II 4A) “the call on Sandra Dundas-Jones’ mobile simply cannot have been the call which booked those tickets”. At this point the judge interrupted. He said (4B ff):

“For you to invite the jury to conclude that it must have been another telephone call would be to invite them to speculate and I shall be directing them that that is one thing they must [not] do and, in any event, I consulted my note as to the evidence of Jenny Saffray who was specific in saying that she took the call requesting a booking for a flight to Antigua for Amy Anne Farrow.

[Counsel] Yes. Your Honour, I don’t dispute that. Of course she took the call and the call she took was 10 to 15 minutes long.

[The Judge] She said it was about ten minutes long.

[Counsel] Well she said in answer to me 10 to 15 minutes long and she agreed that –

[The Judge] No, no, if you are going to quote the evidence, I am sorry, but you must do it accurately. She said that the phone call, as she recalled it, was about ten minutes long. She said later she would normally expect a booking by telephone to take about 10 to 15 minutes...”

A little later, still in the presence of the jury, the judge said (5C-D):

“There is not evidence of any other call having been taken by Jenny Saffray or any other employee of A & M Travel in connection with this booking and for you to suggest that there was or must have been would be to invite the jury to conjecture.

[Counsel] No, your Honour. I –

[The Judge] Don’t dispute it with me. That will be my direction to the jury.”

Counsel protested and explained – the jury being present throughout – why he said that the booking had not been made by the 9-37 call. The judge intervened again (6C-D):

“You can make what points you will. I shall be telling the jury in the clearest of terms that they may not speculate about any matter which ranges outside of the evidence and for them to suppose or conclude that some other telephone call was responsible for this booking would be to do just that and I shall instruct them that they must not.”

It seems to us that the judge, especially in the passage last quoted, evinced an intention in effect to withdraw Mrs Dundas-Jones’ defence from the jury. We have said that the case against her depended on the evidence about the telephone booking; and that there was a proper foundation in Mrs Saffray’s testimony upon which the defence was entitled to suggest to the jury that the call making the booking may have been a different one from that recorded as being made from Mrs Dundas-Jones’ mobile at 9-37. What the jury might make of such a suggestion is, very obviously, quite another matter. But as Mr Ryder was at pains to emphasise this point was crucial to her defence. Yet here was the judge roundly announcing in the presence of the jury and in the course of defence counsel’s final speech that he would direct the jury not to consider it. That was unfair and misconceived. Unless in the summing-up the judge disavowed what he had said, and did so in the most unequivocal terms, Mrs Dundas-Jones’ conviction must be condemned as unsafe.

We turn then to the summing-up. It is right to say that the judge did not in terms direct the jury as he had said he would. He gave general directions about the need not to speculate (vol. III 10C-E):

“But what I must, please, ask you not to do is to conjecture or to speculate about matters which range outside of the evidence... You must confine yourselves to the evidence and what arises from the evidence and not engage in conjecture.”

The judge does not repeat that direction so as to apply it expressly to the defence contention about the telephone call. Indeed Mr Mitchell QC for the Crown submits that in the following passage (vol. III 46B ff) the judge properly put the defence case to the jury:

“Has Mrs Saffray made a mistake in her recollection of the time that it took to take down the details to make the booking?... Or could there be some other explanation for her understanding of how long a telephone booking would normally last and did last, she thinks, in this case.

Put it this way, members of the jury. There is no evidence of any other telephone call to A & M Travel in connection with this booking. The only telephone call that we do know about is that which was received by Mrs Saffray in connection with the booking. Is it a coincidence that Sandra Dundas-Jones’ telephone... called A & M travel that morning? If so, to whom did she speak if it was her? About what did she speak? Of course, she has not given evidence and we cannot otherwise know if it was a different phone call.”

Then the judge reminded the jury of the calls to Dundas-Jones made just before and just after the 9-37 call. At 47B-C he said this:

“As I say, as Mrs Saffray recalls, the call was probably no more than three or four minutes in duration. In fact, she recalled it as being about ten minutes. But we know it was three and a half minutes. Although she would have expected a telephone call she would have expected a booking to take 10 to 15 minutes. But was it this call from Sandra Dundas-Jones’ mobile telephone that triggered the booking. We have no evidence of any other call that could have done. There it is.”

Then this (48B-D):

“Sandra Dundas-Jones’ case is that she played no part, either on her own account or that of her husband, in the importation of a controlled drug or any arrangements for such an importation. In particular she asserts that she had nothing to do with the booking of Amy Anne Farrow’s flight to or from Barbados, through the offices of A & M Travel and their employee Mrs Saffray. Of course you will be mindful of the criticisms of Mrs Saffray’s evidence ventured before your delectation [sic] – if that is the right word – by Mr Ryder yesterday in fairly forceful and perhaps almost pugnacious terms. But that is a matter for you.”

If the judge had not interrupted defence counsel’s speech in the way he did, and had then summed up to the jury as in fact he did, Mrs Dundas-Jones could in our judgment have no complaint. It is true that the judge’s observations, hostile to her case, were strong; and he should not have spoken of “delectation” because it was not his business to be sarcastic. Even so, what he said would have been within the rightly generous ambit of comment which a trial judge enjoys. The question is whether the summing-up sufficiently dispelled the taint of his wholly misplaced interruptions the day before.

We do not consider that it did. The general directions as to the need not to speculate as likely as not will have recalled to the jury’s mind the judge’s trenchant remarks of the previous day. Linked with those general directions his specific directions on the telephone call issue, referring more than once to the absence of any evidence of a second call by which the booking might have been made, may in the circumstances have served to underline rather than negate those same remarks. The judge did not disavow what he had said, unequivocally or otherwise. There is a real possibility that because of the way the judge approached the matter (taking his interruption and his summing-up together) the jury felt constrained to sideline or even to ignore the defence argument about the phone call rather than to consider it fair and square.

In those circumstances Mrs Dundas-Jones’ conviction on count 1 is unsafe and her appeal will be allowed. Her renewed application for leave to appeal against sentence accordingly falls away.

As we have indicated, this is a renewed application for leave to appeal against Anderson’s conviction on count 1 following refusal by the single judge. There are three written grounds of appeal. At the hearing Mr Akinsanya on her behalf concentrated on the first, the existence of fresh evidence, and so shall we.

Anderson did not give evidence at the trial. The case against her on the courier conspiracy, like that against Mrs Dundas-Jones, depended on evidence concerning the third importation on 23 June 2004 when Farrow arrived at Gatwick with 1.83 kg of cocaine at 75% purity. The Crown said she was a knowing party to this importation. She accepted in interview that Dundas-Jones (as we have said, she was his mistress) had asked her to book Farrow’s tickets, but she had been unable to get through. More particularly the Crown’s case was that she went to Gatwick to meet Farrow. She accepted this too; though she said that in the event she did not make the rendezvous. When her home was searched on 25 June 2004 and she was arrested, a small envelope was found with this writing on it: “Amy Ann Farrow, 2 weeks barb tomorrow, Virgin BA” then a telephone number. Anderson accepted she was the author of this rather jumbled message: it was a note of Dundas-Jones’ instructions (a fact denied by Dundas-Jones).

Anderson’s case was that from first to last she had no knowledge that any of this activity had anything to do with the illegal importation of drugs. This was the essence of the issue joined between her and the Crown.

The new evidence sought to be relied on came to light in the shape of a fax message sent to defence counsel Mr Akinsanya’s chambers on Tuesday 20 September 2005, four days after Anderson and others were convicted by the jury before HHJ King. It came from Michael Hawkins, a prison custody officer employed at the Snaresbrook Crown Court since 1994. In the fax he set out what he claimed was his recollection of a conversation overheard by him between Anderson and Dundas-Jones during the first few days of the trial. In the fax Mr Hawkins gave what purported to be a word-for-word account of the exchange, set out as follows:

“Ian Dundas-Jones: ‘Are you not talking to me?’

Nekeisha Anderson: ‘I have been in custody 13 months because of you, if you had told me you were going to collect drugs I would not have gone. If you were a man you would tell the truth. All you are interested in is saving your own ass.’

[D-J] ‘I should have told you, I am sorry.’

[A] ‘You are only sorry you got caught, don’t talk to me.’”

On 21 September a trainee with Anderson’s solicitors went to see Mr Hawkins and took a statement which was signed and dated 8 October 2005. In the statement Mr Hawkins repeated the conversation in quotation marks. He said that he had in fact overheard it on the first Friday of the trial, 5 August 2005. It was at the lunch break, when in company with another officer he was escorting the defendants from the court to the cells. He said he understood at the time that what he was hearing was important. He had heard most of the prosecution opening. However he felt that “it was not my place to say anything and I did not have the courage to do so”. He added that he was on holiday from 5 September until Monday 19 September 2005. On his return he heard that Anderson had been convicted. “It was because of hearing that conversation that I felt sure Miss Anderson was innocent”. So he sent the fax the next day.

Mr Hawkins was called to give live evidence before us. His testimony was obviously receivable under s.23 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968, whose terms we need not recite. He repeated his account of the overheard conversation. He was cross-examined by Mr Mitchell and much taxed with the fact that he had given a verbatim quotation. How could he be sure of the exact words? He said he had written it down straight away – during the lunch hour on 5 August. He kept the note while he was on holiday. He returned home on Thursday 15 September and learnt of Anderson’s conviction by telephone from a colleague on Friday 16 September: the day, as we have said, when the jury returned their verdicts. Over the weekend, on the Sunday, he wrote out a statement, relying on the note. This statement was the document he sent by fax on Tuesday 20 September. He produced the original. He did not keep the contemporary note. He spoke to the resident judge, Judge Radford, about the matter.

Mr Mitchell quite properly set out to test Mr Hawkins’ evidence. We have no doubt, however, but that his evidence was honest and accurate.

As we have said, the essence of the Crown’s case against Anderson was that she was a knowing party to the third importation on 23 June 2004. The exchange between her and Dundas-Jones on 5 August 2005 greatly undermines that case. It tends to show that Dundas-Jones had said nothing to her about the purpose of meeting Farrow at Gatwick. The evidence about it, which we have held to be honest and accurate, comes from a wholly untainted source, Mr Hawkins, who revealed it after the trial because he had a bad conscience for having said nothing earlier. There is no reason to suppose that what either Anderson or Dundas-Jones said, in a conversation both must have thought private, was anything other than a reflection of their actual state of mind.

We grant leave to appeal against conviction on the new evidence ground. We treat the hearing of the leave application as the substantive appeal, which we allow. The impact of Mr Hawkins’ evidence renders Anderson’s conviction unsafe. As in Mrs Dundas-Jones’ case, Anderson’s renewed application for leave to appeal against sentence accordingly falls away.

We should add that there was also before the court an application by Anderson for an order for disclosure of a letter written by Dundas-Jones to the trial judge. Anderson’s counsel understood from what had been said by HHJ King before he heard mitigation that the letter exculpated Anderson. As we have allowed her appeal without recourse to or reliance on the letter, the disclosure application is moot for the purposes of these appeal proceedings.

We were not impressed by the proposed grounds of appeal against conviction other than that relating to Mr Hawkins’ evidence, but in the circumstances it is unnecessary to say anything more about them.

As we have indicated, this too is a renewed application for leave to appeal against conviction following refusal by the single judge. Blackman was convicted on counts 1 and 4. Four grounds are sought to be argued. The first is that HHJ Kennedy in his summing-up conflated her defence to count 1 with her defence to count 4. The second is that the judge placed “a disproportionate amount of weight” on evidence given for the Crown by the applicant Jones. The third is that the judge failed to put certain aspects of her defence to the jury. The fourth is that the judge failed to draw the jury’s specific attention to a document on which Blackman relied.

We turn to the first ground. The judge directed the jury as follows (summing-up transcript) 44F – 45C):

“The Crown’s case against Candy Blackman on Count 1 is that she was an integral part of the organization of the conspiracy with her brother [sc. Benjamin] and others. The Crown say that you can be sure that she transferred monies to enable the conspiracy to continue to import and plan to import, drugs into this country and was fully involved with her named conspirators in facilitating those importations.

In relation to Count [4], the disposal of these proceedings [sic] is, say the Crown, evident from her physical activities in the sending of various transfers and evidenced by her list of monies spent an distributed.”

In particular in relation to count 1 the Crown relied on the proximity of the dates of certain money transfers to Guyana and Antigua, said to have been effected by Blackman, to the dates of actual importations. Money transfers to the same destinations were integral also to the case against her on count 4. On count 1, it was said that the transfers were for the purchase of drugs and the recruitment of couriers. On count 4, they were to launder the proceeds of the resulting importations. Though the counts were of course legally distinct, the facts said to support them tended to merge.

After Blackman’s arrest on 11 May 2004 her property was searched. She was found to have been in possession of Western Union money transfer forms and an address book/diary documenting expenditure of more than £334,000. When she was interviewed she accepted responsibility for the transfer of some £11,400 between January and May 2004: this against a claimed income of no more than £8,000 a year. In making the transfers she had given no less than nine different addresses as her place of residence; in fact she had lived at none of them. When she gave evidence she said she had lied in interview about the transfers. She now accepted, or asserted, that she had made transfers only to members of her family and to her co-defendant Graham. She had lied “to protect her brother’s back” (summing-up transcript 63D).

The judge recounted Blackman’s evidence to the jury in considerable detail: 46B ff. In particular he described her testimony about the money transfers which she admitted: 51E – 54C. Insofar as there was a difference between her defence to count 1 and her defence to count 4, it could only relate to particular transfers on particular dates; and indeed at the hearing before us Miss Bonsu’s submission on this ground of appeal was that the judge should have clarified the specific dates to the jury.

In our judgment there is nothing in this. In reality, as we have said, the case against Blackman on counts 1 and 4 merged. The judge described her response by summarising her evidence. Moreover on a fair reading of the transcript there is no force in subsidiary complaints advanced under ground 1 which are canvassed in counsel’s advice: whether any transfers had been sent to a recipient called Terence Lagadeau, whether the judge dealt with her motive for lying in interview (to protect her brother), and as to the expert handwriting evidence.

The second ground, as we have said, relates to Jones’ evidence. Jones was called by the Crown, with the judge’s leave, to rebut an element of the defence put forward by Williams which the Crown said was fabricated. However her evidence touched Blackman’s case. She was to say that the day after she had entered her pleas of guilty (thus on 11 October 2005) she received a message in Holloway Prison that Blackman wanted to see her. They met at the prison church service on 16 October. Jones said that Blackman tried to persuade her to testify to the effect that a particular document, a receipt bearing Williams’ fingerprints which was said to implicate Williams in the Dwen importation, had fallen out of her handbag in Benjamin’s car. It will be remembered that Benjamin was Blackman’s sister. The suggestion (according to Jones) was that she, Jones, should pretend she was having an affair with Benjamin. The concocted story might go some way to explain how in the circumstances Williams’ fingerprints got onto the document. Williams was Benjamin’s girlfriend and the mother of his child.

The only complaint about this advanced on behalf of Blackman is that the alleged episode in the church was marginal to her case and she was prejudiced by the fact that the judge went into it at such length in the summing-up: 45 minutes and 11 pages, as Miss Bonsu put it in her oral submissions.

Certainly the judge described this evidence fully. Then he said this (85F – 86B):

“[If] you are not sure that that was indeed said by Miss Blackman, then you will dismiss it from your minds. The evidence of Miss Jones would, therefore, be of no importance whatsoever. If, on the other hand, you are sure that such an incident took place, you will, no doubt, move to consider its significance in the wider aspects of this indictment.”

That was perfectly proper. This ground of appeal is to say the least nebulous. There is no basis whatever for supposing that the jury might have taken an over-critical or unfair view of Blackman’s case by reason of the judge’s treatment of Jones’ evidence.

We may take the last two grounds together. Between them they alleged that the judge was at fault in not referring specifically to the evidence of a handwriting expert to the effect that a particular document or documents could not conclusively be attributed to Blackman, and that it was part of her case that she could not have been in two places at once. But these were uncontentious facts. Quite early in the summing-up (32C-E) the judge invited the jury to look first at the agreed materials, if they thought that would be helpful.

There is no more in this than in Blackman’s other grounds of appeal against conviction for which, accordingly, we refuse leave.

As we have indicated, all the sentence cases are renewed applications for leave to appeal. At the hearing on 23 November 2006 we granted leave to Benjamin.

As we have said Dundas-Jones was convicted by the jury before HHJ King on counts 1, 2, 3 and 19 and was sentenced to 27 years imprisonment on count 1, 27 years concurrent on count 2, 25 years concurrent on count 3 and 22 years concurrent on count 19, and was recommended for deportation. He is 37. He has a previous conviction in 1994 in Guyana, for a drug trafficking offence. The argument which Mr Suckling has advanced on this application is that the judge has sentenced him on a mistaken basis of fact, by attributing to him a role in the conspiracy (or linked conspiracies) greater than the evidence in fact justified; his actual role did not warrant the sentences passed.

Mr Suckling takes specific points on each of the counts on which Dundas-Jones was convicted. On the courier conspiracy, he submits that the judge sentenced him on the footing that he was involved in multiple importations, whereas (as we have said) the evidence associated him only with one, namely the third, on 23 June 2004. On the manufacture and supply conspiracies, the judge held that Dundas-Jones was “overseeing” the manufacture of crack (and arranging for its distribution), whereas the factory at 6 Bream Gardens was actually operated by Clarke and Bennett and there was no evidence that Dundas-Jones ever went to the address. On the DHL conspiracy, Mr Suckling underlines the fact that the parcels contained only small amounts of cocaine: the three that were intercepted by the authorities between them contained at most 303 gr. at 100% purity.

Taking these points together, Mr Suckling says that the evidence overall did not place Dundas-Jones’ level of criminality in the exceptional category where sentences of over 20 years may be justified. He referred to Richardson 15 CAR(S) 876, De Four [1996] 2 CAR(S) 106 and Gill & De Leest (unreported, 16 June 1997). We need not with respect cite the texts.

Mr Suckling’s specific factual points, if one takes them in isolation, are correct. Passing sentence on Dundas-Jones the judge referred (vol. V 8E) to “multiple importations of cocaine”, but it is clear from passages in the summing-up (see in particular vol. III 34F, 35G, 38B) that the evidence on the courier conspiracy demonstrated a specific link between Dundas-Jones and the third importation only. It was not proved that he had been to 6 Bream Gardens. The quantities of cocaine recovered from the intercepted DHL parcels were as Mr Suckling submitted.

There are however considerable difficulties and dangers inherent in this court’s judging for itself what a defendant’s role has been in a complex crime or series of crimes, where the trial judge has sat through a lengthy contested trial and formed his own assessment. As has often been said, generally the trial judge is in a much better position than we are to carry out such an exercise. Of course, if it is shown that the judge made a mistake this court will interfere if justice in sentencing the defendant requires the mistake to be corrected. If in this case the judge’s reference to “multiple importations of cocaine” was intended to refer only to the courier conspiracy, and he meant to indicate there was direct evidence linking Dundas-Jones with more than the third importation, then that was a mistake.

In our judgment, however, Mr Suckling’s argument (in relation to the courier conspiracy and generally) betrays an approach to the material before the judge which is altogether too narrow and compartmentalised. We have already described the international nature of the overall conspiracy. The judge (vol. V 2F) referred to a “global conspiracy to import manufacture and supply cocaine into and within the United Kingdom on one of the largest scales yet detected within these shores”. There was evidence of contact between Dundas-Jones and conspirators in other countries. At 7F-G, addressing Dundas-Jones, the judge said this:

“Your role... at the crack factory was that of overall controller or managing director.Both the courier and DHL conspiracies, as well as operations at 6 Bream Gardens, were conducted against the backdrop of prolific and revealing mobile telephone activity between you... and the others involved – and on their part to each other and to you – from which it is possible to discern your supervisory and controlling role with a considerable degree of certainty.”

Then at 8D-G:

“There is an abundance of evidence from which I have been able to conclude that you were responsible for organising the following specific activities: multiple importations of cocaine into the UK, transfer of funds abroad, recruiting and meeting and greeting couriers – as well as the recruitment of... Fisher when he was employed by DHL – overseeing the manufacture of imported cocaine into crack and then arranging the distribution of the same. To put it in the vernacular, IDJ, you were a top player.”

The telephone evidence showed in particular prolific contact between Dundas-Jones and Clarke and Bennett who, as we have said, were responsible for the day-to-day running of the factory. It demonstrated a range of activity on the part of Dundas-Jones across the linked conspiracies of which he was convicted. He was arrested in possession of several mobile phones and Sim cards. One of the phones was established to be Miranda’s. One of the Sim cards was for Farrow’s contact number to use on her arrival. He recruited Fisher.We have heard nothing to displace the judge’s inference of a “supervisory and controlling role”.

The judge’s reference to multiple importations may have been intended to encompass Dundas-Jones’ part in the DHL, as well as the courier conspiracy. But even if it was not, and the judge made a mistake as to what the evidence directly demonstrated vis-à-vis the courier conspiracy, in the circumstances that cannot in our judgment undermine the justice of the sentences passed on this applicant. His part in the overall conspiracy was at a strategic level. The gravity of the conspiracy is exacerbated by its international nature and, within the United Kingdom, by the manufacture and onward supply of crack. We consider this was an exceptionally bad case and the sentences passed on Dundas-Jones were well justified. The recommendation for deportation is not challenged. His application for leave to appeal against sentence is refused.

Clarke is just turned 32. He has a previous conviction in Guyana for burglary. At the time of sentence, according to the bad character notice served by the Crown, he faced other outstanding matters. As we have said he pleaded guilty before HHJ King to the manufacture and supply conspiracies. He was sentenced to concurrent terms of 18 and 14 years respectively, and recommended for deportation. Mr Spens QC has four principal points. (1) If Dundas-Jones’ sentence was too high, then given Clarke’s lesser role, his sentence should be reduced proportionately. (2) There should in any event have been a greater disparity between Dundas-Jones’ sentence and Clarke’s. Not only was Clarke’s role a lesser one, but in contrast to Dundas-Jones he pleaded guilty and the judge stated (vol. V 10H-11A) that he was to have full credit for plea. (3) 18 years was in any event too much for Clarke’s role, limited as it was to manufacture and supply. He was not involved in the importation conspiracies. (4) As a separate matter 14 years was too high on count 3, which Mr Spens said consisted in the “purely consequential act” of passing on what he had manufactured.

There are some other points in the written grounds. Clarke has a low IQ and psychological difficulties. Before he was sentenced he had already progressed well in prison: the judge described him as “a compliant, model prisoner”.

Mr Spens’ first point, which unsurprisingly was also taken by other applicants, depends of course on Dundas-Jones’ application getting a fair wind. As we have dismissed that application, the argument falls away. Points (2) and (3) may be considered together. In counsel’s advice it is stated (paragraph 5):

“The applicant’s role was plainly central to the conspiracy, but it was essentially confined to manufacture.”

Central it certainly was. When police searched the house which Clarke and Bennett shared they found £150,000 in cash in different currencies and £300,000 worth of designer goods and other assets. The judge said (vol. V 10G-H) that this fact underpinned the level of their involvement “at the heart of the conspiracy”. As we have indicated Clarke and Bennett were running the factory day by day. As the judge noted (vol. V 7C-D) Clarke accepted in his written basis of plea that he was concerned in most of the manufacture of crack between December 2003 and 22 June 2004.

The manufacture and onward supply of crack were as we have stated an aggravating feature of the overall conspiracy, and plainly were a central feature of the UK enterprise. We can see no ground on which we should re-evaluate the judge’s implicit assessment of the relative culpability of Dundas-Jones and Clarke. The sentence of 18 years for the manufacture conspiracy is neither wrong in principle nor manifestly excessive. Mr Spens’ point (4) is a tribute to his ingenuity: it appears to deploy his client’s guilt on count 2 as mitigation on count 3. Clarke’s involvement in supplying crack well merited 14 years. There is no challenge to the recommendation for deportation. Clarke’s application for leave to appeal against sentence is refused.

Bennett is 40. She has no previous convictions but at the time of sentence was apparently awaiting trial in Guyana for other drug-related offences. It will be recalled that she pleaded guilty to counts 2 and 4 before HHJ King. The judge made it clear (vol. V 11F) that he drew no distinction between her and Clarke as regards the manufacture conspiracy, and so like Clarke she was sentenced to 18 years on count 2. The judge passed a concurrent sentence of four years on count 4. He recommended that she should be deported.

We may deal first with a distinct point which relates to the recommendation for deportation. In the course of his Sentencing Remarks the judge referred to evidence given by Bennett’s husband from which he concluded that the marriage was a sham (12G). The judge took this into account (together with the fact that children which Bennett had in the United Kingdom were in care) in deciding to recommend deportation. This is said to have been unfair because the judge had curtailed the Crown’s cross-examination of the husband. We have not been referred to a transcript of this evidence, but the point is anyway insubstantial. No factual submission is made that Bennett’s family circumstances militate against a recommendation for deportation. In any event it will be for the Secretary of State to decide in due course whether to act on the recommendation.

There is nothing in the other grounds put forward. In the course of argument Mr Burgess on Bennett’s behalf stated in terms that he had “little complaint of the judge’s assessment of her role”. A point is made to the effect that her plea of not guilty to the supply conspiracy was accepted, but Clarke pleaded guilty to it. But that does not undermine the judge’s view that there was nothing to choose between them as regards the manufacture conspiracy.

Bennett’s application for leave to appeal against sentence is refused.

Alleyne is 37 and is of previous good character. He was convicted before HHJ King of the manufacture and supply conspiracies and sentenced to 14 years imprisonment for the former. He was acquitted on count 1 on the judge’s direction. The judge said (vol. V 14H – 15A) that he was “an occasional rather than frequent” visitor to 6 Bream Gardens: Mrs Hollis QC on his behalf said there were three visits over a four week period. The judge proceeded to describe his role thus (15B-C):

“I consider that albeit your role was not a managerial one, it was nonetheless highly supportive of the operation going on at 6 Bream Gardens. You were an able assistant to ... Clarke and ... Bennett, being at times an errand boy and at times a factory hand and yet again at other times a facilitator.”

Mrs Hollis submits, first, that the judge exaggerated Alleyne’s role. We do not accept that. No sufficient basis is shown to justify our overturning the trial judge’s assessment. It is to be noted that the mobile phone evidence showed nearly 300 contacts between Alleyne and Clarke between 1 April and 22 June 2004. It is simply unreal to isolate the direct evidence of no more than three visits to the factory and then seek to define the extent of Alleyne’s role by reference to that circumstance. And his acquittal on count 1, which Mrs Hollis prayed in aid, does not as a matter of ordinary logic tend to diminish his role in the manufacture and supply conspiracies.

In the context of this argument as to her client’s role Mrs Hollis also submitted that his case should be compared with that of Blackman, who received ten years (compared with his 14) although she was convicted on count 1, and had been responsible for a large number of money transfers. The two cases are very different and we have concluded there is no basis for a disparity argument, based on an apprehension of an objective sense of injustice on Alleyne’s part.

It is next said that some credit should have been given for the fact that Alleyne, though he fought the case, was prepared to make substantial admissions in the course of the trial so that a good deal of time was saved. This is a novel submission. We are not prepared to hold on the facts here that the admissions should have ranked as a distinct self-standing mitigating factor.

Alleyne suffers from bad health. He is HIV positive and has had to spend time in hospital including a spell in intensive care. He has had other serious medical problems, including tuberculosis and psychiatric difficulties. There is a letter from his mother, dated 13 October 2006, which shows how greatly troubled she has been by reason of his medical condition. The letter betrays no sense of shame at her son’s grave crime. In our judgment any special problems which Alleyne may face in prison because of his bad health may readily be addressed by resources within the prison system. The Secretary of State enjoys a discretion to direct early release if exceptionally he concludes that such a course is warranted.

Alleyne’s application for leave to appeal against sentence is refused.

Fisher is 30 years old and has no previous convictions. He was as we have said sentenced to 14 years for the DHL conspiracy, and 4 years concurrent on count 12 (possession of crack cocaine with intent to supply), having contested both. Mr Gassman lays particular emphasis on what he says was the limited duration of Fisher’s involvement – the schedule shows he was first telephoned by Dundas-Jones on 1 April 2004; the relatively modest extent of his profit, and of the quantity of drugs he was involved with (said to be no more than 300 gr.); pressure put on him by Dundas Jones; HHJ King’s reliance (vol. V 17E) on his acquisition of a new Mercedes car as showing “greed” as a motive; and disparity of sentence between him and Alleyne (who also got fourteen years though he was concerned in the manufacture conspiracy) and Blackman (who received ten years though she was convicted of the courier and money-laundering conspiracies: HHJ Kennedy described her (sentence transcript 7B) as a “main participant” in the former).

It is clear that in passing sentence Judge King was particularly influenced by the fact that Fisher was a corrupt employee of DHL: “[a] greater corruption of your position is difficult to imagine” (vol. V 17A). It seems to us that he was perfectly entitled to regard this as an especially grave factor. Moreover the discrete offence of which Fisher was convicted on count 12 is not to be ignored. He discarded a package at the police station which was found to contain ten wraps with 7.38 gr. of cocaine, obviously intended for supply. He might properly have received a consecutive sentence.

Fisher was one of the defendants who contested the indictment before the jury. His application for leave particularly engages a recurrent and important theme in the case, which we have already described and which is very familiar from other cases: the trial judge, having sat through a lengthy contested trial and formed his own assessment, is generally in a much better position than this court to judge what a defendant’s role has been in a complex crime or series of crimes. There is nothing in Fisher’s case to show that the judge mistook the evidence. Neither the duration of his involvement, nor the length of his profit, nor the amount of the drugs with which he was overtly associated is any kind of litmus test which this court can sensibly apply to displace the judge’s assessment of his relative culpability. There is nothing in the accusation of pressure by Dundas-Jones. There was no plea of duress, and the complaint of pressure came, as we understand it, solely from Fisher’s evidence. The judge was plainly entitled to state (vol. V 16G):

“I regard this with some circumspection and in any event, this pressure, if there was such pressure, stopped very far short of amounting to duress...”

Nor is there anything in the disparity submission. The DHL conspiracy may not, in the events which happened, have yielded as much fruit as was hoped, but it was a principal dimension in the British section of this international conspiracy and Fisher was a principal player in it. Comparisons with Alleyne and Blackman provide no proper ground for a disparity argument.

Fisher’s application for leave to appeal against sentence is refused.

Stephens is 33. He has a conviction for taking a vehicle without consent. As we have said he pleaded guilty to the supply conspiracy and was sentenced to 12 years. By his written basis of plea he accepted (as HHJ King noted: vol. V 7A – B) that he had made collections of crack cocaine from the factory at 6 Bream Gardens over a period of six weeks on four separate occasions in quantities amounting altogether to some 3 kg., and (16A) “taking those collections to the Birmingham area for onward transmission and distribution”.

Stephens’ essential case was that he was a courier only, a domestic one at that, and gained little from the offence. He had some personal mitigation which is set out at paragraph 15 of the grounds. Mr Rowlands on his behalf relies on Aranguren (1994) 99 CAR 347, which indicates sentences of 10 to 14 years after trial in relation to quantities of class A drugs between ½ kg. and 5 kg. at 100% purity. He says that given full credit for Stephens’ plea of guilty (which HHJ King acknowledged: vol. V 16B), the judge must have taken 18 years as the starting-point for sentence, and on any view that was way beyond the guideline and there was no reasoned justification for that being done.

Stephens obtained the cocaine he supplied at source, from the factory. The objective evidence showed contacts between him and Clarke, Benjamin, Jones, and the man Lagadeau, and this is perfectly consistent with his written basis of plea. He was arrested on 22 June 2004, after being seen leaving the factory, effectively red-handed: he was carrying ¾ kg. of crack in 27 wraps. In all the circumstances we are not prepared to hold that the sentence, though at the top edge of what the facts justify, was so at odds with the guideline as to warrant this court’s interference on that ground.

However Mr Rowlands also has a disparity argument. In particular he refers to the sentence passed on Benjamin, which was also twelve years. It will be recalled that Benjamin (whose own application we consider below) pleaded guilty before HHJ Kennedy to the courier conspiracy and to count 24, an offence of removing criminal property. His plea on 18 October 2005 was at the last minute, after the jury had been sworn. Passing sentence upon him Judge Kennedy said this (sentence transcript 5H – 6A):

“Benjamin, a nine year overstayer, has been described by the Crown as an organizer, a ‘meeter and greeter’, a recruiter and a salesman. He, without doubt, on the evidence fulfilled to a greater or lesser extent some or all of those roles.”

As we have indicated, there is evidence showing contacts between Stephens and other conspirators to which the court may properly have regard consistently with his written basis of plea. However the written basis of plea, not having been challenged below or here, no doubt constitutes the essential factual foundation for a just sentence. Approaching the case on that basis, we are not persuaded that Stephens entertains a legitimate sense of grievance at having received the same sentence as Benjamin. Their roles were different. In our opinion neither Judge King’s view of Stephens’ role nor Judge Kennedy’s view of Benjamin’s can realistically be faulted. It is perhaps a misfortune that the case had to be split between the two judges; this is of course no criticism, since as we have said Judge King unhappily fell ill so that Judge Kennedy had to conduct the second trial. But it meant that the sentences passed were not the product of a single judicial mind overseeing the whole case. However, their respective judgments in Stephens’ and Benjamin’s cases sit together with no injustice to Stephens.

Stephens’ application for leave to appeal against sentence is accordingly refused.

Miranda is 26. He is a British national of Guyanan descent. He has a number of convictions (in the United Kingdom) for possession of crack cocaine. As we have said he pleaded guilty to the courier conspiracy and to the further conspiracy to supply crack cocaine charged at count 20, and was sentenced by HHJ King to concurrent terms of 16 and 14 years respectively. The judge made a mistake when he passed sentence: he referred (vol. V 13D) to count 19 (the DHL conspiracy) when he meant count 20. The mistake was picked up by junior counsel for the Crown. The judge accepted the correction and said (22A):

“I do not think that the sentence, in those circumstances, varies upon my understanding of his criminal involvement in the DHL importations. Rather than Count 19, I should specify it is Count 20.”

There was a written basis of plea in Miranda’s case. It referred in terms to the third courier importation on 23 June 2004, and asserted that Miranda’s role “was to facilitate the travel of the courier... Farrow here and abroad and this exemplifies his role in the conspiracy”. Counsel in the grounds of appeal accepts (inevitably) that Miranda’s part in the courier conspiracy did not begin and end with the June importation. The judge, who of course had heard all the evidence relating to that conspiracy that had been called in the trial of those contesting count 1, said this (vol. V 13E – 14A):

“It is clear... that you made an important contribution to the aims and objectives of these conspiracies. It seems to me that you were... Dundas-Jones’ right-hand man as an organizer, a manager and a meeter and greeter of couriers.

...[Y]ou assisted in the arrangements for the importation of cocaine... by... Farrow and in the arrangements for the postal package importations by DHL.

Mobile telephone analysis – and I note some ten mobile telephones were found in your possession at the time of your arrest – showed prolific contact between you,... Dundas-Jones and George Shanks, as well as... Fisher and other members of these conspiracies.”

The references to the DHL conspiracy are of course misplaced, because of the judge’s mistake. But in relation to the courier conspiracy his remarks are consistent with the basis of plea and cannot be faulted. Accordingly Miranda was properly treated as a major player at least in that conspiracy. As for count 20, the basis of plea is rather more vague:

“...[H]e was aware of a source of supply of cocaine different from Count 1 in respect of which he agreed to become concerned in the supply.”

It may not, we think, matter much whether this other source of supply was in fact the DHL conspiracy or some further source, though our understanding is that it was the former. In any event the plea to count 20 shows a substantial involvement in the supply of crack cocaine in circumstances other than those pertaining to the courier conspiracy.

Mr Anders submits in his written grounds that the sentence of 16 years on count 1 may have been influenced by the judge’s misapprehension that Miranda was pleading to two importation conspiracies; and in his oral argument he submitted that, given the judge expressly accorded his client full discount for his plea of guilty (vol. V 14C), he took too high a starting-point for the courier conspiracy – 24 years. And for good measure he says the sentence of 14 years on count 20 was too high.

We do not accept these arguments. In dealing with Dundas-Jones we have already stated our view that the gravity of the overall conspiracy here is exacerbated by its international nature and, within the United Kingdom, by the manufacture and onward supply of crack. As we have said, this was an exceptionally bad case. We acknowledge there is nothing to connect Miranda with the factory at 6 Bream Gardens; but the nature and level of his involvement in the courier conspiracy, against the case’s general background, in our opinion amply justified the sentence of 16 years even given full credit for plea. Nor is there any basis for overturning the sentence of 14 years passed on count 20, which was of course ordered to run concurrently with the sentence on count 1.

Miranda’s application for leave to appeal against sentence is refused.

Blackman is 33 and has no previous convictions. She is Benjamin’s sister. She was convicted before HHJ Kennedy of the courier and money-laundering conspiracies. She was sentenced to 10 years imprisonment for the former and 6 years concurrent for the latter. As we have shown in dealing with her application for leave to appeal against conviction, the Crown case against her on each of the charges was closely intertwined with its case on the other. In particular in relation to the courier conspiracy the Crown relied on the proximity of the dates of certain money transfers to Guyana and Antigua, said to have been effected by Blackman, to the dates of actual importations. Money transfers to the same destinations were integral also to the case against her on the money-laundering conspiracy. As for the former, it was said that the transfers were for the purchase of drugs and the recruitment of couriers. As for the latter, they were to launder the proceeds of the resulting importations. Overall she was shown to have made a large number of Western Union money transfers.

The Crown described Blackman as a “primitive accountant”. Miss Bonsu’s primary submission is that the judge exaggerated her role. She said that her client “played a minor role at the end of the conspiracy”. She also has a disparity argument: she submits that the sentence of 6 years for Blackman’s part in the money-laundering conspiracy cannot stand with that of two and a half years passed on Williams for the same offence.

HHJ Kennedy said this (sentence transcript 7A – D):

“... Blackman was a book-keeper – a money launderer – and on the verdict of the jury, both a main participant in the conspiracy to import and one of those who moved on its proceeds... [S]he was, on the evidence, someone on whom reliance was placed to keep the finances of the conspirators abroad topped up as necessary.

There is no evidence that she physically handled drugs, but full participation in the conspiracy can – as the jury demonstrated by their verdict – be achieved simply by greasing its wheels...”

We have already said that when Blackman’s property was searched it was found that she had been in possession of Western Union money transfer forms and an address book/diary documenting expenditure of more than £334,000 though she accepted responsibility for far less. In making the transfers she had given nine different addresses as her place of residence; in fact she had lived at none of them. When she gave evidence she said she had lied in interview about the transfers.

In Blackman’s case particular weight is to be given to the judge’s assessment of her culpability, because she was one of the defendants who contested the indictment and the judge of course had to sum up the case against her and her defence. We can see no basis on which his appraisal falls arguably to be undermined. Having regard to her substantial “accounting” activities he was perfectly entitled to describe her as a main participant in the (courier) conspiracy. The essence of her part in the money-laundering conspiracy is patent on the evidence of the money transfers. As for the claimed disparity with the sentence passed on Williams, we were told by counsel for the Crown that the basis of Williams’ conviction was that she was living at a rate of £20,000 in excess of her legitimate means. She was acquitted on count 1. Her role was limited to dealing with the proceeds of drugs sales. In the circumstances we do not consider that Blackman entertains any legitimate sense of grievance by reason of the difference between her sentence on count 4 and that passed on Williams.

We should add that in the written grounds of appeal counsel also advances a disparity argument in relation to the sentences passed on Benjamin and Jones. There is nothing in that. Their roles were not comparable to that of Blackman. Nor is there anything in counsel’s reliance on Blackman’s previous good character.

Blackman’s application for leave to appeal against sentence is refused.

Benjamin is 31 and has no previous convictions. He pleaded guilty before HHJ Kennedy to count 1 (the courier conspiracy) and to count 24, which it will be remembered charged him with an offence of removing criminal property. He was sentenced to 12 years imprisonment on count 1 and 8 years concurrent on count 24. Sir Ivan Lawrence’s principal submission is one of disparity with the sentences passed on Blackman, though he also advances a like argument in relation to Williams. He submits (thought it is, with respect, now elementary) that the fact that these comparator defendants are female cannot of itself justify any disparity.

Thus the nature of Benjamin’s role is all-important. His involvement ceased on 20 April 2004, when as we have already said he was arrested. He was specifically concerned in two of the four importations which went to prove the courier conspiracy – the Dwen importation in February 2004 (he was concerned in the payment of money to Jones, who bought Dwen’s flight ticket), and the second importation when he met Antoine at the Victoria Coach Station. In a passage we have already cited in part, HHJ Kennedy said (sentence transcript 5G – 7A):

“... Benjamin, a nine years overstayer, has been described by the Crown as an organizer, a ‘meeter and greeter’, a recruiter and a salesman. He, without doubt, on the evidence fulfilled to a greater or lesser extent some or all of those roles. He is, I hear, remorseful now...

It was accepted by his counsel, entirely properly on the evidence, that there is evidence of criminality by him, but not necessarily involvement in a drugs conspiracy from October 2003. But I accept that upon his arrest in April 2004, his capacity to remain practically involved then ceased...

Benjamin acknowledges his part in the payment of the monies to... Jones, which secured the ticket purchase for... Dwen. He was the collector... of... Antoine and the cocaine which she carried and would, no doubt, have arranged for the delivery of that cocaine elsewhere.

He discharged a vital function for the life of this conspiracy on those two occasions as a facilitator of the importation and intended distribution of significant quantities of cocaine of high purity.”

Nothing we have seen begins to displace these conclusions. The Dwen importation involved 8 kg. of cocaine. And apart from his direct role in the courier conspiracy, by his plea to count 24 Benjamin admitted transferring drug money abroad.

Now it is plainly right that Blackman received a lesser sentence after contesting the case and seems to have been involved over a longer period than Benjamin; and the judge made it clear – 6B – that he would give Benjamin full credit for plea. Moreover Williams, as we have said, was sentenced to no more than two and a half years. However Sir Ivan faces what to our mind is the formidable difficulty that Benjamin’s involvement was of a different nature than that of either Blackman or Williams. The judge clearly took the view that the function of “meeter and greeter” or “facilitator”, as on the evidence it was carried out by Benjamin, involved a graver degree of culpability than Blackman’s “accounting” activities.

We should note that in the written grounds Sir Ivan also submitted that the judge had passed sentence on a mistaken factual basis, namely that the Dwen importation involved 12, not 8, kg. of cocaine. There is indeed a reference to 12 kg. at 3H of the sentence transcript, but the correct amount is given at 8A. In our judgment it is not shown that the judge proceeded on a false premise.

Though at the hearing we granted Benjamin leave to appeal against sentence, we have not been persuaded that HHJ Kennedy was not entitled to sentence Benjamin as he did. Benjamin’s appeal is dismissed.

Jones is 39. She has previous convictions for obtaining property by deception. She has five children. As we have said she pleaded guilty before HHJ Kennedy to counts 22 (importing cocaine on 9 March 2005) and 23 (being knowingly concerned in the Dwen importation: it was accepted that she was unaware of the amount of drugs being imported by Dwen). She was sentenced to 10 years and 8 years imprisonment respectively, to be served concurrently. It appears that after the judge had passed sentence Jones’ representatives considered that he may have made a mistake, and applied to re-open the sentencing exercise under the slip rule. HHJ Kennedy said (sentence transcript 13H – 14B):

“I am sorry to disappoint. The sentence I passed was precisely the sentence that I intended. I had to maintain a reasoned matrix with the other defendants. I cannot alter it under the slip rule, because I do not believe that I have made a slip...”

Jones was arrested shortly after Dwen had been intercepted. However proceedings against her for her part in the Dwen importation were discontinued; and as HHJ Kennedy said (sentence transcript 8D), “[o]ne would have imagined that that would have been the end of her involvement in these matters”. Not so. On 9 March 2005 she was arrested again, in the presence of her six year old son. At Belgravia Police Station cocaine was found in her luggage. She was questioned both in relation to that (count 22) and in relation to the Dwen importation.

She gave Crown evidence. We have given some account of that in dealing with Blackman’s application for leave to appeal against conviction. HHJ Kennedy referred to her testimony about Blackman’s approach to her in prison, and continued (sentence transcript 8E-F):

“[I]t should be noted that at no stage was she prepared to assist the police in any other way concerning those involved in the importation of the drugs with which she was concerned.”

In a note which was placed before both Judge King and Judge Kennedy when they came to pass sentence on 27 February 2006, the Crown described Jones’ role as “slightly more involved than that of mere courier”.

It is said that given her offering Crown evidence, and the limited nature of her involvement in the Dwen importation, there should have been a greater distance between Jones’ sentence and those imposed on Blackman and Mrs Dundas-Jones for the courier conspiracy (10 years in each case); and that the respective terms of 8 years and 10 years are in any event excessive.

We do not consider there is any good disparity argument to be got out of the sentences passed for the Dwen importation and the courier conspiracy, notwithstanding that Blackman and Mrs Dundas-Jones, unlike Jones, contested the case. The nature of the three women’s respective involvement was quite different. Jones’ Crown evidence was of limited scope. As for count 22, the amount of cocaine involved apparently amounted to just below 1 kg. at 100% purity. Given that Jones was entitled to maximum credit for plea, it is contended that the sentence of 10 years was above the guideline range, taken to be 10 to 14 years for importations of 500 gr. to 5 kg. after a trial. But the reality is that Jones might well have received consecutive sentences on counts 22 and 23. They reflected wholly separate crimes. As we have shown, she had first been arrested for her part in the Dwen importation before she ever carried out the separate importation charged at count 22.

It is also said that HHJ Kennedy failed to accord Jones full credit for her plea of guilty in relation to her own importation, though he had said he would do so. We are not satisfied that any greater credit should have been given. The sentence passed on count 22 was of course ordered to run concurrently with that passed on count 23. The real question here is whether the totality of the sentences passed on Jones was excessive so as to justify this court’s interference. In our judgment it was not. Though (as with Benjamin) we granted Jones leave to appeal against sentence at the hearing, we are not in the event persuaded that there is any basis on which this court ought to interfere with the sentences imposed upon her.

In the result Mrs Dundas-Jones’ and Anderson’s appeals against conviction are allowed. All the other applications (and Benjamin’s and Jones’ appeals) are dismissed.