Mazour, R. v

THE VICE PRESIDENT: On 30th November 2006 the appellant pleaded guilty on rearraignment to causing death by dangerous driving and on 7th December 2006 was sentenced to six-and-a-half years' imprisonment with a direction under section 240 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 relating to the short period spent in custody on remand. He appeals against his sentence with leave of the single judge.

Like almost every single case of causing death by dangerous driving, this is a story of tragedy both for the family of the young man who was killed by the driving of the appellant and tragedy for the appellant himself. We have to consider whether or not, as this judge clearly considered this case to be, it was a very serious case of dangerous driving or whether the judge, even though he was right to conclude that it was, failed to give adequate credit to the appellant for his plea of guilty and his undoubted good character.

The appellant was 21 years old at the time of this accident. He is now 23. The young man, Charlie Green, who was killed was also 21 years of age. The appellant is a young man with every advantage. He has had a privileged education of which he took full advantage. He is extremely intelligent and was at the time an undergraduate at Cambridge University.

On the night in question, which was the night of 5th/6th November 2005, the appellant and a group of friends had been to a party in Harley Street and the appellant had driven there from his address in Kensington in his Mitsubishi Lancer motor vehicle which was a very particular model which has been described as an Evo VIII. It is essentially a car with rally specification but modified so as to be capable of being driven on ordinary roads. Nonetheless it had fierce acceleration and a very high top speed. There is no doubt that the appellant was extremely fond of motor cars, because this was not his only motorcar, and of fast driving. The car was fitted with what could be described as a black box which recorded the activity of the driver by recording, first the RPM of the engine, secondly the percentage of throttle that was being applied from time to time, thirdly the speed over the ground, and finally, the gear which was engaged at any particular time.

It is apparent from the record which was recovered after the fatal accident that bearing in mind all the relevant journeys were within the metropolitan area, and therefore subject to a 30 mph speed limit, this appellant was driving without regard for the speed limit. When he went from Kensington to Harley Street on a significant number of occasions he drove at a speed above the speed limit - on two occasions touching 60 mph. At Harley Street he and his friends were at a party, as we have indicated, and when they came to leave the appellant again drove and drove back to Kensington. On that particular journey he accelerated fiercely it would appear on at least two occasions up to 60 mph - one witness described him as showing off the accelerating capabilities of the car - and at another point in the journey the recording indicated that he touched 90 mph.

From Pembridge Gardens he drove to Sloan Street to a club with his friends. When he came to leave the club it is said that the girlfriend of the deceased asked him not to drive or at least not to drive fast - that may have been by reason of the experience that she had on one of the other journeys to which we have referred. Be that as it may, she got into the car into the rear seat. Charlie Green got into the front passenger seat. They were intending to drive into the Piccadilly area; and accordingly the appellant drove up Sloane Street and turned right to go through the Piccadilly underpass. From the recording of speed it is apparent that the car ultimately reached a speed in excess of 80 mph and it was at that point that the appellant lost control of the vehicle and the fatal accident occurred. The car struck a lamp standard at precisely the place where the deceased was sitting; and it was in those circumstances that he was killed. Miraculously, Miss Grove, the girl in the back seat, received virtually no injuries. The appellant himself was significantly injured.

The car crossed the central reservation and came into contact with a BMW being driven in the opposite direction which itself crashed and a Mercedes vehicle behind that also crashed. Six people in those vehicles were significantly or seriously injured. It was a devastating piece of driving with devastating consequences.

The judge considered that using the criteria set out in Cooksley, as modified by this court in the recent judgment of Richardson [2006] EWCA Crim. 3186, the case fell into the most serious culpability category and ultimately from the note of the sentencing remarks it would appear as though the judge concluded that had the appellant been convicted after trial he would have sentenced the appellant to nine years' imprisonment. He concluded that he could give credit for the plea of guilty and he referred to the other matters of mitigation which had undoubtedly been put before him fully and persuasively by Mr Sturman, as Mr Sturman has done to us today.

Mr Sturman's submission essentially is that if it be right that nine years was the appropriate starting point, the judge has failed to give adequate credit for the matters that he indicated he was giving credit for. He submits to us that the plea of guilty was only one part of the matters which required the judge to consider a significant discount. The appellant, as we have said, was a young man of impeccable character, great ability with no convictions, in particular of any driving offences -- in other words this is not a young man who had, whatever may have been the driving on the night in question, persistently offended against the road traffic laws. He submits that the effect of imprisonment on a young man like this has to be borne in mind. We have material before us now to indicate what a significant effect imprisonment has had on him and the way in which his treatment in prison has undoubtedly caused him significant distress. He submits to us that we should take into account the fact that despite the matters to which we have just referred as to the effect of prison on him, nonetheless he is making full use of his time in prison. He is undertaking academic studies at a high level and is working in the prison as well in a way which redounds to his credit.

We are urged to take into account also the fact that the accident followed by the conviction and the sentence of imprisonment have all had a dramatic effect on his father and mother and it is important to put that in the context of the fact that this appellant had an older brother who was killed in a road traffic accident. All that, Mr Sturman submits, indicates that the judge by discounting by only two-and-a-half years from his starting point which simply did not give proper effect to all those mitigating features.

We, however, have to look at what the culpability of this young man was in the circumstances of this case. After he was arrested he gave a sample of blood which indicated that he was one-and-a-half times over the alcohol limit. He drove at a greatly excessive speed. He was showing off. There was evidence which justified the judge in concluding that he was given a warning at least by Miss Grove, Charlie Green's girlfriend. There was material to suggest that this particular piece of driving fitted into a pattern of persistent excessive speed during the course of other aspects of the driving that night and it follows, it seems to us, that the judge was bound to conclude that this was a case which fell within the category of the highest culpability.

In Richardson the appropriate bracket for sentences for such driving was between seven years and the maximum of 14 years. The effect of his driving was to cause the death of a bright, able young man. It is clearly part of the tragedy that that young man was a great friend of the appellant and that certainly is a matter which has to be taken into consideration. But the effects of the accident did not merely result in the death of Charlie Green; there were substantial injuries to six other people and we have statements from them outlining the significant effects those injuries have had on their lives.

Bearing all those matters in mind, it seems to us that the judge took as his starting point a sentence which was at the bottom of the appropriate bracket. In those circumstances it seems to us that the amount of credit that was given was well judged. The position in this case was that there was a relatively late plea. The fact is that he did not put forward a plea of guilty, and accept responsibility on the basis that he had driven dangerously, until relatively soon before the trial itself. It follows that the amount of credit that should be given for that plea must be moderated.

As far as his good character is concerned, it is certainly a matter which the court could and should take into account; but the extent to which it can do so in cases involving such seriously bad driving as this is bound to be tempered by the fact that this is an offence which is committed, sadly, on many occasions by those with impeccable characters and that is one of the tragedies which this court sees time and time again.

We have to apply the test of whether or not at the end of the day the sentence imposed was wrong in principle or manifestly excessive. In choosing the figure of nine years as the starting point, the judge did not err in principle. As far as the overall sentence of six-and-a-half years' imprisonment is concerned, bearing in mind the matters of mitigation to which we have referred, we cannot say that that is manifestly excessive for this particular driving on that desperately sad night. Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed.