Joseph Kyle v Coventry City Council

In April 2022, the respondent, Coventry City Council (“the Council”), concluded that the appellant, Mr Joseph Kyle, had become “homeless intentionally” within the meaning of section 191(1) of the Housing Act 1996 (“the 1996 Act”). That decision was confirmed on review and, on 17 February 2023, Deputy Circuit Judge Gregory (“the Judge”) dismissed an appeal. Mr Kyle now, however, appeals to this Court.

The core issue is whether it was “reasonable for [Mr Kyle] to continue to occupy” within the meaning of sections 175(3) and 191(1) of the 1996 Act accommodation which the Council had secured for him. It is the Council’s case that it was and hence that, when his behaviour there resulted in his eviction, he became intentionally homeless. Mr Kyle, on the other hand, contends that it was not “reasonable for [him] to continue to occupy” the accommodation and so that there can be no question of conduct leading to his eviction from it rendering him intentionally homeless. For the purposes of the 1996 Act, Mr Kyle maintains, he was “homeless” even when living in the accommodation that the Council had found for him.

As the Judge explained in paragraph 4 of his judgment (“the Judgment”), in November 2020 Mr Kyle was “48 years of age, and had a history of drug abuse to such an extent that he had been addicted to class A drugs, presumably heroin, and either then or during the period with which I am concerned was being assisted to break that addiction through a methadone script”.

On 3 November 2020, the Council accepted that section 188 of the 1996 Act applied and, accordingly, that it had a duty to secure that accommodation was available for Mr Kyle’s occupation. Initially, he was found a room at 18 Wren Street in Coventry, but on 19 May 2021 he was instead provided with a room at 133 Terry Road, Coventry. At that stage, the Council wrote to Mr Kyle saying that it had been told that his behaviour at 18 Wren Street had not been in line with the rules and warning him that, if he did not follow the rules of the accommodation, the duty to provide him with accommodation would end. In August 2021, Mr Kyle relocated again, to a room at 79 St Margaret Road, Coventry, after other residents at 133 Terry Road had complained about his conduct. On this occasion, the Council informed him that it had been agreed that it would move him to alternative accommodation with a final warning. The Council also said, in a letter dated 20 August 2021, that “[a]ny placement given is done so on an emergency basis so you may be asked to move to more suitable accommodation during this stay” and that its duty to Mr Kyle would be discharged if, among other things, he was “evicted from the accommodation for such things as anti-social behaviour, smoking in the property, having guests and not abiding to the establishment rules”.

The Judge said this about 79 St Margaret Road in paragraph 5 of the Judgment:

In a letter dated 2 March 2022, the Council accepted that it owed Mr Kyle the “full housing duty” under section 193 of the 1996 Act, explaining that it had decided that he was homeless, had a priority need and had not become homeless intentionally. The Council said in the letter that it “now [had] a duty to provide [him] with one suitable offer of accommodation”, that the offer had to be “suitable for [his] housing needs” and that he required “a property with 1 bedroom”. The letter also included this:

On 31 March 2022, the provider of the accommodation at 79 St Margaret Road made a request to the Council for Mr Kyle’s eviction on the basis that he had broken into, and stolen from, other rooms there. Having referred to the fact that another resident was highly vulnerable, the author said, “I do not want to keep [Mr Kyle] in that house with him.”

On 4 April 2022, the Council sent Mr Kyle a letter (dated 2 April 2022) with the heading “Re: End of main housing duty because you have become intentionally homeless from accommodation made available for your occupation”. The Council explained that it had decided that Mr Kyle had “become intentionally homeless from the accommodation that the Council made available to meet its main housing duty to [him]”. Under the heading “Whether the accommodation was reasonable to continue to occupy”, the Council said:

Mr Kyle promptly requested a review of the Council’s decision, and Central England Law Centre (“the Law Centre”) made representations on his behalf. The Law Centre advanced a number of arguments in a letter dated 8 June 2022. In part, these were based on the proposition that section 3 of the Protection from Eviction Act 1977 had applied. The Law Centre also said this in a section headed “Reasonableness to continue to occupy”:

In a subsequent section of the letter, headed “Warnings”, the Law Centre noted that the warnings which Mr Kyle had been given had been provided to him “while he was occupying the accommodation under s188(1) rather than the subsequent s193(2) duty, and between 6 and 12 months prior to the date of the end of accommodation”. The Law Centre “submit[ted] that applicant who is occupying under the interim (s188(1)) duty cannot be considered homeless intentionally from accommodation owed under this duty” and that, “[h]aving had the main duty accepted subsequently on 03^rd March 2022 [Mr Kyle] was … entitled to assume that he was entitled to further warnings in the event of allegations of breaches of occupancy rules following acceptance of the main duty”.

On 8 July 2022, the review officer sent the Law Centre a “minded to” letter so that it had an opportunity to respond to issues on which she was minded to hold against Mr Kyle. In the course of this letter, the review officer said:

The Law Centre responded in a letter dated 3 August 2022. It “reiterate[d] previous submissions that the accommodation at the Property was not reasonable to continue to occupy” and further submitted that the Council “should have sought to provide additional support to our client”. With regard to “Warnings”, the Law Centre said, among other things:

The review officer notified Mr Kyle of her decision in a letter dated 24 August 2022. She explained that she had upheld the Council’s original decision “by deciding that, while you are eligible for help (on immigration and nationality grounds), you are intentionally homeless from your s193 accommodation”. The review officer made, among others, the following comments on submissions from the Law Centre:

Mr Kyle appealed to the County Court pursuant to section 204 of the 1996 Act, but the appeal was dismissed by the Judge on 17 February 2023. In paragraph 23 of the Judgment, the Judge explained that he had come to the conclusion that “this property was not occupied by [Mr Kyle] as a dwelling house, and therefore did not attract the protection of the Protection from Eviction Act for the reasons I have already outlined, that is to say, the nature of the accommodation, the terms upon which he occupied it, and how he came to be placed there”. The Judge then moved on to consider a submission that “this was not accommodation which it would have been reasonable for [Mr Kyle] to continue to occupy, and therefore it is not possible for him to become intentionally homeless by reason of his deliberate conduct in relation to that accommodation”: see paragraph 24. Having referred to, and cited from, the decision of the House of Lords in R (Aweys) v Birmingham City Council; Moran v Manchester City Council) [2009] UKHL 36, [2009] 1 WLR 1506 (“Aweys/Moran”), the Judge said this:

Homelessness is the subject of Part VII of the 1996 Act, comprising sections 175-218. By section 184, where a local housing authority has reason to believe that a person who has applied for accommodation, or for assistance in obtaining it, may be homeless or threatened with homelessness, it is required to make such inquiries as are necessary to satisfy itself whether the applicant is eligible for assistance and, if so, whether any, and if so what, duty is owed to him under the 1996 Act. Section 184(3) stipulates that, on completing its inquiries, the authority “shall notify the applicant of their decision and, so far as any issue is decided against his interests, inform him of the reasons for their decision”.

In certain circumstances, a local housing authority will be obliged to secure that accommodation is available for an applicant while it makes the inquiries which section 184 of the 1996 Act requires. By section 188(1), headed “Interim duty to accommodate in case of apparent priority need”, if a local housing authority has reason to believe that an applicant may be homeless, have a priority need and be eligible for assistance, it “must secure that accommodation is available for the applicant’s occupation”.

Where a local housing authority arrives at the conclusion that an applicant is homeless, did not become homeless intentionally, is eligible for assistance and has a priority need, it is obliged by section 193(2) of the 1996 Act to “secure that accommodation is available for occupation by the applicant” unless it refers the application to another local housing authority in accordance with section 198. The local housing authority will, however, cease to be subject to the duty for which section 193 provides (“the main housing duty”) if, among other things, the applicant “becomes homeless intentionally from the accommodation made available for his occupation”: see section 193(6)(b).

By section 206 of the 1996 Act, a local housing authority may discharge its housing functions under Part VII:

Section 191 of the 1996 Act explains when someone “becomes homeless intentionally”. By section 191(1):

Section 175 of the 1996 Act, which deals with when someone is “homeless” or “threatened with homelessness”, is in comparable terms. Under it, a person is “homeless” if he has “no accommodation available for his occupation” and, by section 175(3), “A person shall not be treated as having accommodation unless it is accommodation which it would be reasonable for him to continue to occupy”. Section 175(4) provides that a person is “threatened with homelessness” if “it is likely that he will become homeless within 56 days”. In Aweys/Moran, Baroness Hale described section 175(3) and section 191(1) as “counterparts”: see paragraph 20.

Section 175 of the 1996 Act replaced section 58 of the Housing Act 1985 (“the 1985 Act”), which in turn superseded section 1 of the Housing (Homeless Persons) Act 1977 (“the 1977 Act”). The 1977 Act did not include anything to the same effect as section 175(3) of the 1996 Act, and neither originally did the 1985 Act. A subsection in the same terms as section 175(3) of the 1996 Act was, however, inserted into section 58 of the 1985 Act in the light of the decision in R v Hillingdon London Borough Council, ex p. Puhlhofer [1986] AC 484. The House of Lords had there held that “accommodation” had to be capable of being “properly … described as accommodation within the ordinary meaning of that word in the English language”, but that there was no requirement for it to be “appropriate” or “reasonable”: see especially per Lord Brightman, at 517.

Section 202 of the 1996 Act confers on an applicant a right to request a review of various decisions of local housing authorities. Such decisions include, by section 202(1)(b) and (f), “any decision of a local housing authority as to what duty (if any) is owed to him under sections 189B to 193C and 195 (duties to persons found to be homeless or threatened with homelessness)” and “any decision of a local housing authority as to the suitability of accommodation offered to him in discharge of their duty under any of the provisions mentioned in paragraph (b) or (e)”.

In Holmes-Moorhouse v Richmond upon Thames London Borough Council [2009] UKHL 7, [2009] 1 WLR 413, in a passage endorsed by the Supreme Court in Poshteh v Kensington and Chelsea Royal London Borough Council [2017] UKSC 36, [2017] AC 624, Lord Neuberger said this about review decisions at paragraph 50:

By section 204 of the 1996 Act, a person dissatisfied with a review decision may appeal to the County Court on “any point of law arising from the decision or, as the case may be, the original decision”. “Although the county court’s jurisdiction is appellate, it is in substance the same as that of the High Court in judicial review” (Runa Begum v Tower Hamlets London Borough Council [2003] UKHL 5, [2003] 2 AC 430, at paragraph 7, per Lord Bingham). The grounds of challenge can include “procedural error, the extent of legal powers (vires), irrationality and inadequacy of reasons”: see James v Hertsmere Borough Council [2020] EWCA Civ 489, [2020] 1 WLR 3606, at paragraph 31, per Peter Jackson LJ, and also Abdikadir v Ealing London Borough Council [2022] EWCA Civ 979, [2022] PTSR 1455, at paragraph 8, per Lewison LJ.

In excellent submissions, Mr Zia Nabi, who appeared for Mr Kyle with Mr David Cowan, argued that Mr Kyle could not have become “homeless intentionally” within the meaning of section 191(1) of the 1996 Act as 79 St Margaret Road had not been accommodation “which it would have been reasonable for him to continue to occupy”. In other words, Mr Kyle cannot have become homeless in consequence of his conduct at 79 St Margaret Road because he already was.

79 St Margaret Road, Mr Nabi said, was analogous to the women’s refuge in which, as had been held in Aweys/Moran (as I explain at paragraphs 29-30 below), Ms Moran had remained “homeless”. If, Mr Nabi argued, the review officer had directed herself correctly on the basis of Aweys/Moran, she would have concluded that Mr Kyle had likewise still been “homeless”. In the alternative, the review officer had failed to give adequate reasons for 79 St Margaret Road being accommodation which it would have been “reasonable for [Mr Kyle] to continue to occupy” when it had a no visitors policy, restricted smoking and was only available for a short period as a half-way house while other accommodation was being secured.

Mr Nabi confirmed at the beginning of his oral submissions that it was not contended that Mr Kyle had not had “accommodation” at 79 St Margaret Road, nor that it can never be “reasonable … to continue to occupy” a room in a hostel. Mr Kyle’s position, Mr Nabi explained, was that the Council erred in finding Mr Kyle to have become “homeless intentionally” on the specific facts of this case. It is also to be noted that Mr Nabi accepted that, following the Council’s acceptance of the “main housing duty” in its letter dated 2 March 2022, the accommodation at 79 St Margaret Road was provided in pursuance of that duty rather than under section 188 of the 1996 Act.

Before addressing Aweys/Moran itself, it is relevant to refer to an earlier case, R v Brent London Borough Council, ex p. Awua [1996] AC 55 (“Awua”). There, the appellant contended that she had not become homeless intentionally because the flat in the “‘short life’ house” in which she had been housed (“Flat B”) had not been “accommodation … which it would have been reasonable for [her] to continue to occupy”. The House of Lords rejected that suggestion. Lord Hoffmann, with whom Lords Goff, Jauncey, Slynn and Taylor agreed, said at 67-68:

The judgments in Aweys/Moran dealt with two appeals. One concerned Ms Moran, who had gone to a women’s refuge because of domestic violence but then been evicted from it. Baroness Hale, with whom Lords Hope, Scott, Walker and Neuberger expressed agreement, said this in paragraph 29 about the basis on which Ms Moran had been accommodated in the refuge:

Manchester City Council took the view that Ms Moran had become homeless intentionally, but the House of Lords decided otherwise on the basis that Ms Moran had remained homeless. “[I]n most cases,” Baroness Hale said in paragraph 65, “a woman who has left her home because of domestic (or other) violence within it remains homeless even if she has found a temporary haven in a women’s refuge.”

In the other case before the House of Lords in Aweys/Moran, Birmingham City Council had left families in overcrowded accommodation despite accepting that the main housing duty was owed. The House of Lords held that it was “lawful for [the Council] to decide that an applicant is homeless because it is not reasonable for him to remain in his present accommodation indefinitely but to leave him there for the short term”, while adding that the accommodation might become unsuitable long before houses became available under Birmingham’s allocation scheme: see paragraph 64.

Baroness Hale explained in paragraph 9 that both appeals raised an issue as to the meaning of the phrase “accommodation which it would be reasonable for him to continue to occupy” in section 175(3) of the 1996 Act. She went on in paragraph 9:

In paragraph 37, Baroness Hale noted that section 175(3) of the 1996 Act had been “ introduced for a case like the Puhlhofers … , who could no doubt have been expected to stay a little while longer in their cramped accommodation, but not for the length of time that they would have to stay there if the local authority did not intervene”. In the Birmingham case, Baroness Hale said in paragraph 38, an interpretation which looks to the future as well as to the present “has the advantage that the council can accept that a family is homeless even though they can actually get by where they are for a little while longer”. In paragraph 42, Baroness Hale observed that “accommodation which may be unreasonable for a person to occupy for a long period may be reasonable for him to occupy for a short period” and continued:

With regard to women’s refuges, Baroness Hale noted in paragraph 43 that a refuge “is a safe haven in which to find peace and support”, but “is not a place to live” and has “rules which are necessary for the protection of residents but make it impossible to live a normal family life”: it is “a place to gather one’s strength and one’s thoughts and to decide what to do with one’s life”. Women in a refuge, Baroness Hale said in paragraph 52, “will be homeless while they are in the refuge and remain homeless when they leave”: a woman “who loses her place there, even because of her own conduct, does not become homeless intentionally, because it would not have been reasonable for her to continue to occupy the refuge indefinitely”. As for Ms Moran, “[a]lthough there may be circumstances in which it is reasonable to continue to occupy a place in a refuge indefinitely, there is nothing to suggest that it was so in this case”: paragraph 65.

In the course of her judgment, Baroness Hale mentioned Awua a number of times: in paragraphs 14, 41, 55 and 56. While she did not comment on the decision in any detail, she did not voice any criticism of it.

One of the points that emerges from Aweys/Moran is that reasonableness and suitability are distinct concepts. Accommodation can be “suitable” even though it would not be “reasonable for [a person] to continue to occupy” it. What matters in the context of the present case, however, is not as such the relationship between reasonableness and suitability but, more specifically, the light that Aweys/Moran casts on the meaning of “reasonable … to continue to occupy”.

I touched on one aspect of this in paragraph 47 of my judgment in R (Ahamed) v Haringey London Borough Council [2023] EWCA Civ 975 (“Ahamed”), with which Sir Geoffrey Vos MR and Underhill LJ agreed. I said there:

An example might bring out the point. Suppose that I had been the tenant of a delightful flat in an excellent location at a low rent for an extended period, but the tenancy was now to expire in three months. Notwithstanding the fact that I would not be able to stay in the flat “indefinitely”, or any longer than three months, there could be no question of my being deemed to be homeless already. If, later, it appeared “likely that [I would] become homeless within 56 days” as my tenancy ended, I would at that stage be “threatened with homelessness” under section 175(4) of the 1996 Act.

Nor, I think, did Baroness Hale mean that, for it to be “reasonable for [a person] to continue to occupy” accommodation, it must be such that the person could be expected to put up with it for ever. The word “indefinitely” can, of course, signify “without a limitation as to time”. While, however, “indefinitely” featured at a number of places in Baroness Hale’s judgment, she also spoke of “for the foreseeable future” (paragraph 9), “for as long as she would occupy it if the local authority did not intervene” (paragraph 34), “the length of time that they would have to stay there if the local authority did not intervene” (paragraph 37), “for a long period” (paragraph 42), “on a relatively long-term basis, which he would have to do if the authority did not accept him as homeless” (paragraph 42) and “for as long as he or she will have to do so unless the authority take action” (paragraph 46). Baroness Hale contrasted such periods with “another night” (paragraphs 9 and 34), “a little while longer” (paragraphs 37, 38 and 46), “a short period” (paragraph 42), “a short period while the authority investigate his application and rights, and even thereafter while they look for accommodation to satisfy their continuing section 193 duty” (paragraph 42) and “a little while” (paragraph 48).

That accommodation need not be such as could be tolerated for ever is also indicated by Awua. It can be seen from the passages from his judgment quoted in paragraph 28 above that Lord Hoffmann considered that there could be circumstances in which it would at present be “reasonable for [a family] to continue to occupy” accommodation even though there would “come a time at which it is no longer reasonable to expect them to continue to occupy such accommodation”. Had it been the case that accommodation must be such as could reasonably be endured permanently, the fact that such a family could be “expected to make do for a temporary period” would not have sufficed to render the accommodation such that it would be reasonable to continue to occupy it.

It is also noteworthy that, in Awua, Lord Hoffmann primarily attached significance to physical suitability, finding it hard to imagine circumstances in which a person “cannot reasonably be expected to continue to occupy his accommodation simply because it is temporary”. On the other hand, there is of course no question of the potentially relevant matters being limited to the physical characteristics of accommodation. Aweys/Moran provides an illustration of that. The licence agreement which Ms Moran signed did not entitle her to any particular room (see Aweys/Moran at paragraph 29), but Baroness Hale also appears to have attached importance to the refuge’s “special rules” (such as “not to bring any men into the refuge or the surrounding area, not to have any visitors or to give the address to anyone, and not to have contact with the neighbours or disclose the nature of the building”), which were “necessary for the protection of residents but [made] it impossible to live a normal family life”: see Aweys/Moran at paragraph 43. The overall result was that the refuge was a “safe” or “temporary” “haven”, but not “a place to live” or one that it was “reasonable for [Ms Moran] to continue to occupy”.

To draw some threads together, it seems to me that:

For completeness, I should add that a person remains “homeless” when in accommodation secured under section 188 of the 1996 Act. In Aweys/Moran, Baroness Hale explained in paragraph 54 that it was “no longer suggested that a person who has been provided with interim accommodation under section 188(1) is no longer ‘homeless’ for the purpose of section 175(1)”. Likewise, in R (N) v Lewisham London Borough Council [2014] UKSC 62, [2015] AC 1259, Lord Hodge (with whom Lords Wilson, Clarke and Toulson agreed) noted that “a person who is given temporary accommodation under Part VII of the 1996 Act does not cease to be homeless” and, more specifically, that “under the 1996 Act a person remains homeless while he or she occupies temporary accommodation provided under sections 188(3), 190(2), 200(1) or 204(4) of the 1996 Act so long as the occupation is properly referable to the authority’s performance or exercise of those statutory duties or powers”: see paragraphs 33 and 45. This, however, is because to hold otherwise “would defeat the whole scheme of the Act” rather than as a matter of interpretation of the words “reasonable … to continue to occupy”: see Baroness Hale’s judgment at paragraph 54 and Lord Hodge’s at paragraph 33. It is also to be noted that a local housing authority which had secured accommodation for a person in accordance with section 188 might not necessarily be bound to secure alternative accommodation in circumstances in which the first accommodation had been lost as result of the person’s own conduct: compare R (Brooks) v Islington London Borough Council [2015] EWHC 2657 (Admin), [2016] PTSR 389.

As the Judge explained, 79 St Margaret Road could be called a “halfway house” “intended to provide support for recovering drug addicts”. Mr Kyle had his own bedroom there and the use of shared kitchen and other facilities. There is no suggestion that the accommodation was unaffordable or deficient in its physical characteristics (too small, say) and, by the time the provider of the accommodation asked for his eviction, Mr Kyle had lived there for more than seven months. Once, moreover, the Council had accepted in its letter dated 2 March 2022 that it owed the “main housing duty”, Mr Kyle could have expected to receive an offer of alternative accommodation in the reasonably near future.

In those circumstances, common sense suggests that the review officer was entitled to conclude that, when at 79 St Margaret Road, Mr Kyle had accommodation which it was “reasonable for him to continue to occupy”. As I have indicated, Mr Nabi argued that 79 St Margaret Road was analogous to the refuge to which Ms Moran had gone and, hence, that Mr Kyle should similarly have been seen as “homeless”. However, it seems to me, as it also did to the Judge, that Ms Moran’s refuge was significantly different from 79 St Margaret Road. Refuges such as that to which Ms Moran had resort have a particular character as “temporary” “safe haven[s]” and are not “place[s] to live”. Not only did Ms Moran have no right to any specific room, but, for very understandable reasons, the refuge had “special rules” which had no parallel at 79 St Margaret Road. The refuge forbade visitors, and 79 St Margaret Road had a prohibition on at least overnight guests. Ms Moran was, though, also barred from bringing any men into “the surrounding area”, from giving the address to anyone, from having any contact with the neighbours and from disclosing the nature of the building. There was nothing comparable at 79 St Margaret Road.

Mr Nabi further submitted that the review officer’s decision was flawed because she had failed to explain why she considered it “reasonable for [Mr Kyle] to continue to occupy” 79 St Margaret Road when “it had a no visitors policy, restricted smoking and was only available for a short period as a half-way house whilst other accommodation was secured”. However, it had not been suggested to the review officer that these matters meant that it was not “reasonable for [Mr Kyle] to continue to occupy” 79 St Margaret Road. It is true that the Law Centre had referred to “no visitors” and “no smoking” rules in its response to the review officer’s “minded to” letter, but it did so in the context of a contention that earlier warnings should be disregarded. The basis on which it was said that it was not “reasonable … to continue to occupy” 79 St Margaret Road was bias on the part of the provider of the accommodation, and the review officer addressed (and rejected) that point.

In Cramp v Hastings Borough Council [2005] HLR 48 (“Cramp”), Brooke LJ, with whom Arden and Longmore LJJ agreed, said in paragraph 14:

That the matters that a review decision must address are to an extent determined by what has been said in the course of the review can also be seen from Alibkhiet v Brent London Borough Council [2020] EWCA Civ 1522, [2021] PTSR 477 (“Alibkhiet”). It had there been argued that it was not clear from a review decision relating to a Ms Adam why the local housing authority had decided to make an offer of accommodation at the particular time that it did (see paragraph 87). Lewison LJ responded:

Mr Nabi pointed to Brooke LJ’s reference in Cramp to “an obvious matter [the review officer] should have considered” and argued that the fact that 79 St Margaret Road “had a no visitors policy, restricted smoking and was only available for a short period as a half-way house whilst other accommodation was secured” was of obvious significance to whether it was “reasonable for [Mr Kyle] to continue to occupy” his accommodation there. In my view, however, the present case is in this respect comparable to Alibkhiet. Here, as in Alibkhiet, the matters relied on were not squarely raised during the course of the review, and it was not incumbent on the review officer to address in her decision every potential sub-issue, regardless of whether the Law Centre had referred to it. The review officer said in terms that she had been provided with “no evidence as to why the property was not … reasonable to occupy”, and she dealt specifically with the question of bias. On top of that, I find it hard to see how the “no visitors” and “no smoking” rules (whatever their scope, which is not clear) or 79 St Margaret Road’s role as “as a half-way house whilst other accommodation was secured” could have detracted from the reasonableness of continued occupation. To the contrary, the prospect of Mr Kyle being re-housed relatively soon will, if anything, have tended to confirm that it was “reasonable for [Mr Kyle] to continue to occupy” it: Mr Kyle was not going to have to put up with any deficiencies in the accommodation for all that long. It is to be remembered, too, that a “benevolent approach”, and not a “nit-picking” one, is to be adopted when considering review decisions: see paragraph 23 above.

In all the circumstances, it seems to me that the review officer was amply entitled to conclude that it had been “reasonable for [Mr Kyle] to continue to occupy” 79 St Margaret Road and, hence, that he had become homeless intentionally. I do not consider that Aweys/Moran dictated a different conclusion, nor that the review officer’s decision can be impugned for failure to give adequate reasons.

I would dismiss the appeal.

I agree.

I also agree.