Baldha & Anor, R (On the Application Of) v The Secretary of State for the Home Department

There are before the court applications in two cases with substantial similarities.

In each case:

In Dhamodharan, in the grounds of appeal to this court (settled by Mr Biggs, and dated 8 October 2018), the First Applicant submitted that Judge McGeachy erred in finding that the Secretary of State’s conclusion with regard to the First Applicant’s dishonesty was, as a matter of law, unarguably open to her to make on the evidence; but also asserted for the first time that the Secretary of State had acted with procedural unfairness. In Baldha, the grounds of appeal to this court (again settled by Mr Biggs, and dated 2 October 2018) made the first submission, but did not make any submission based on procedural fairness. It was not until paragraph 3(2) of the Applicant’s skeleton argument dated 5 June 2019 (i.e. after Balajigari had been handed down) that a proposed ground of appeal was raised in that case that the Secretary of State’s decision-making was vitiated by procedural unfairness and also engaged article 8 of the ECHR.

On 7 July 2020, well after and clearly in the light of Balajigari, in each case, draft amended grounds of appeal were filed and served, which rely upon a single ground, namely that the tribunal judge was wrong to refuse permission to proceed; but with the following particulars:

In the light of Balajigari, in each case, the Secretary of State now accepts that:

Given those concessions, it is unfortunate that the parties have been unable to agree a compromise of these appeals and underlying claims; but that have not been able to agree. Thus, the matters have been listed for hearing. Three matters remain in issue, namely (i) the application to amend the notice of appeal, (ii) the application for permission to appeal and (iii) costs.

In my view, the application to amend is crucial in the sense that the essential ground of appeal as initially and currently put is based on the narrow – and, in my respectful view, unarguable – submission that the tribunal judge below erred in law in holding that it was unarguable that the Secretary of State was not entitled to conclude that the First Applicants had been dishonest. That ground is no longer being pursued; and, in my view, rightly so.

Mr Biggs submitted that the matters considered in Balajigari, over and above this issue, were raised by the Applicants and dealt with in the various decision letters; and were therefore “in play” when the claims came before the Upper Tribunal. He referred to passages in the decision letters which, looked at in isolation, suggest that the decision-maker on behalf of the Secretary of State failed to make any finding of dishonesty at all or at least on the basis of the correct burden of proof; or, having made such a finding, failed to go on and perform the discretionary balancing exercise inherent in paragraph 322(5). I accept that the decision letters were not as focused as they no doubt would have been had the decisions been made after Balajigari; but, when the letters are looked at fairly and as a whole, I consider that the decisionmakers clearly concluded that, in making differential declarations of income, the First Appellant in each case had been dishonest, that dishonesty being the basis of the conclusion that the criteria in paragraph 322(5) were met. For example, in each decision latter, the decision-maker expressly concluded that the earnings declared in the earlier application for leave to remain were not “genuine” (see the decision letter of Baldha dated 15 December 2017 at page 3, and that in Dhamodharan dated 2 December 2017 at page 5). It is in my view noteworthy that, not only did each of the Upper Tribunal Judges treat the essential ground of challenge a Wednesbury challenge to the Secretary of State’s entitlement to make that finding of dishonesty on the evidence before her; but that was also the essential basis of the initial grounds of appeal to this court. At the time, that was treated as the basis of the refusals.

Therefore, the only substantive ground of appeal that was in play at the time of the tribunal’s decision in each case was rejected by the Upper Tribunal Judge, who was unarguably right to reject it. Without amendment of the grounds, this appeal is therefore unarguable.

Nor am I prepared to allow the grounds of appeal to be amended.

Mr Malik relied upon the application to amend being “very late”: but, although it has been a long time coming, in terms of the procedural timetable the application is still being made before the application for permission has been determined. I do not consider that mere delay is a factor of any great weight.

However, this court can only interfere with a decision if the court or tribunal below was wrong; and, as I have explained, on the grounds of challenge relied upon in the judicial review, the decisions of Upper Tribunal Judges Kebede and McGeachy were not arguably wrong. It is not simply that the Applicants seek to amend their grounds of appeal; they now wish to rely upon completely new grounds of challenge to the Secretary of State’s refusal, raised for the first time before this court. They wish to pursue an entirely different case than that which they pursued at first instance, abandoning the current case and replacing it; but under the umbrella of the same case number and in this court. In my view, in the circumstances of this case, that is neither an appropriate nor a sensible way to proceed.

The Applicants understandably wish to have their application for indefinite leave to remain lawfully determined. However, they have not foregone the opportunity to make further submissions and/or adduce further evidence on the dishonesty issue in that context: indeed, following Balajigari, a focus of their complaint is that the Secretary of State robbed them of such an opportunity in breach of the obligation to act with procedural fairness. If this claim proceeds, the best that the Applicant can achieve is to have that application redetermined by the Secretary of State under a procedure giving that opportunity. But the Secretary of State has made it quite clear that she is prepared to withdraw the original decisions and redetermine the applications by a process which includes such an opportunity.

Furthermore, following Balajigari, the Applicants understandably wish a focus of their claim for leave to remain now to be article 8 which, if refused, will give rise to a right to appeal in which the dishonesty issue will be determined by the First-tier Tribunal. An article 8 claim has been floated in each case; but it has not been particularised, and the Secretary of State (yet alone the tribunals below) has not yet had an opportunity to consider it. In my view, it would be inappropriate for that claim to be made, first, in this court; and, by denying the Applicants the opportunity to satisfy the Secretary of State and/or the First-tier Tribunal of the merit of any such claim, potentially unfair to the Applicants themselves. With regard to the issue of dishonesty, as described in Balajigari, whilst the judicial review jurisdiction is capable

Mr Biggs submits that, if I were to refuse permission to amend and appeal, that would be unfair to the Applicants; because, had the Secretary of State not refused the applications for indefinite leave to remain – in a manner in which she now accepts, she ought not to have done – then the Applicants would have been treated as having continued leave to remain under section 3C of the Immigration Act 1971. Upon their applications having been refused, and whilst their judicial review claims were being considered, they (voluntarily) left the UK as the law required them to do. They should not be penalised for complying with the law in this way: they ought to be allowed to return to the UK pending determination of their claim for leave to remain. Indeed, the draft revised grounds include, by way of relief, an application for a mandatory order requiring the Secretary of State to allow the Applicants to return to the UK prior to the challenged decisions to refuse being quashed, which would have the effect of reviving the Applicants right to remain under section 3C of the Immigration Act 1971.

Further, Mr Biggs submits that, if refused, the forthcoming article 8 claim would generate a right of appeal which, subject to certification, would be in-country if the claim were made in-country, but out-of-country of it were made out-of-country (sections 82(1)(b) and 92(3) and (4) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002). He submits that, in cases such as R (Kiarie and Byndloss) v Secretary of Statefor the Home Department [2017] UKSC 42; [2017] 1 WLR 2380 (especially at [60][78] per Lord Wilson JSC giving the judgment of the court) and R (Ahsan) vSecretary of State for the Home Department [2017] EWCA Civ 2009; [2018] HRLR

Therefore, he submits, the exclusion of the Applicants gives rise to matters of practical importance; and the appeal is far from academic or serving of no practical purpose. It should be allowed to proceed. I should grant permission to amend, quash the Upper Tribunal’s decisions to refuse permission to proceed and then either remit to the Upper Tribunal (which can then consider the application for a mandatory order for the Applicants’ return, in the context of the judicial review of the refusal decisions which the Secretary of State accepts are unlawful) or retain the matter in this court at least long enough to allow the application for that interim mandatory relief to be considered here.

However, I am unpersuaded by these submissions.

Although Mr Malik submits that the Upper Tribunal decisions challenged in this appeal were not arguably wrong, for the reasons I have given, it is common ground

Mr Biggs relies on section 3C of the Immigration Act 1971. However, section 3C(3) of the 1971 Act provides that the leave extended by that section lapses if the applicant leaves the UK, as the Applicants here have. As a result of that statutory provision, the Applicants currently have no leave to remain as at present and consequently no right to be in the UK as a result of any such leave. Their position is dealt with in the Secretary of State’s published guidance, “Leave extended by section 3C (and leave extended by section 3D in transitional cases”, which (at page 7) provides:

“Where a decision is withdrawn by the Secretary of State and the person has section 3 leave because of a pending appeal or administrative review, their section 3C leave will continue but will revert to leave under section 3C(2)(a) instead of section 3C(2)(b) as a decision on the original application will be outstanding.

Where the decision is withdrawn after a section 3C leave has come to an end withdrawal of the decision does not mean that the person once again has section 3C leave. This is because section 3C leave can arise and exist only where there is s seamless continuation of leave, either extant leave or section 3C leave. Where there is a break in leave, such that section 3C leave comes to an end, section 3C leave cannot be resurrected.

However, where a person had section 3C leave at a time a decision was made and that decision is withdrawn after section 3C leave has ended, the person should not be disadvantaged by the fact their section 3C leave has ended and cannot be resurrected. This means that the outstanding application should be considered as if the person still had section 3C leave (meaning they should not be refused on grounds they are an overstayer). Where on reconsideration of the withdrawn decision leave is then granted, the break in the person’s leave between section 3C leave coming to an end and the grant of new leave should not be held against them in any subsequent application.”

This, therefore, postulates the withdrawal of a decision by the Secretary of State – but expressly excludes section 3C continuing pending redetermination of the relevant application for leave. That guidance appears to be in line with the statutory provision which brings leave to an end when an applicant leaves the UK; indeed, in my view, a crucial point is that the bringing to an end of leave in these circumstances is the will of Parliament as expressed in section 3C(3). It brings leave to an end even where the withdrawal of leave has been legally erroneous.

As I understand it, Mr Biggs accepts all of that. However, he submits that, if the court or the Upper Tribunal were to direct the Secretary of State to allow the Applicants to return to the UK and then (once the Applicants were in the UK) quash the refusal decisions, that would enable the Applicants to take the benefit of section 3C leave and be in the UK whilst their applications for leave are being determined. By that means, the consequences otherwise flowing from section 3C and the guidance, unfairly adverse to the Applicants, can be avoided. However, I am not persuaded that the court should take that course in the circumstances of these cases.

Of course, as the guidance accepts, the affected person should not be unfairly disadvantaged by the fact that section 3C leave has ceased and cannot be reinstated. However, the cessation of section 3C leave in the manner contemplated by the statutory provisions is clearly not sufficient in itself to amount to disadvantage which would require leave to be reinstated and a person who has left the UK to be allowed to return. What matters is the disadvantage that the relevant person has in practice, in the circumstances of his or her particular case.

The Secretary of State’s proposal to end the current proceedings and move to another decision-making process, that will be in compliance with Balajigari and include any article 8 claim that the Applicants wish to make, has obvious advantages in terms of finality as well as potential savings of both cost and effort. I reemphasise that, if this appeal/claim continue, the best that the Applicants can attain is a reconsideration of their claims for leave to enter or remain on the basis of all relevant evidence and submissions including fresh evidence and submissions upon which they now wish to rely.

Given that, for the reasons set out above, the current grounds of appeal are bad in law, the appropriate focus is on the prejudice that the Applicants will or may suffer if this appeal is not allowed to be amended and to continue to enable the issue of whether the Applicants should be allowed to return to the UK immediately to be determined by this court or by the Upper Tribunal on remittal. In my view, it is unnecessary for these otherwise empty proceedings to continue for that purpose.

It is important to mark that any new process will of course be subject to the right of an applicant to access to justice, an issue referred to in both Kiarie and Byndloss and Ahsan; but it is insufficient for an applicant to assert that his or her application for leave to remain can only be properly made if he or she is in the UK; and/or that if such an application is in the future refused, then he or she has a right to an in-country appeal – and so must be allowed to stay in (or be returned to) the UK. Whether an out-of-country remedy is sufficient will depend on the circumstances of the case. As Lord Burnett of Maldon CJ emphasised recently in R (FB (Afghanistan) and MedicalJustice) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2020] EWCA Civ 1338 at [198]-[199], there are many circumstances now in which (e.g.) an out-of-country appeal in an article 8 case will be adequate to comply with the right to access to justice. It is noteworthy that, in this case, Mr Baldha and Mr Dhamodharan, far from having been “lost”, have instructed legal representatives for this remote hearing; and

For those reasons, I refuse permission to amend; and I refuse permission to appeal in each case.