AJ (Gambia) v Secretary of State for the Home Department

This is a renewed oral application for permission to appeal.

The First-tier Tribunal considered the appellant’s application for asylum in a decision dated 26 August 2014. The Tribunal examined the evidence as to whether the appellant was married to a Colonel Cham who had been involved in a coup attempt in the Gambia, which the appellant maintained was the basis on which she would face a risk of ill-treatment if she was returned to the Gambia. The Tribunal judge concluded:

“In summary, I find no credible or reliable evidence to suggest that the appellant was married to Colonel Cham or was linked as sister to the ex-accountant general of the Gambia.”

On that basis the Tribunal concluded that the appellant was not in need of humanitarian protection. The Tribunal concluded that there was no other basis, including under Article 8, on which the appellant would have an entitlement to remain in the United Kingdom.

The Upper Tribunal in a decision promulgated on 30 January 2015 rejected the appellant’s appeal. The Upper Tribunal found that there was a proper basis in the evidence for the findings of fact made by the First-tier Tribunal.

The appellant has appeared before me today assisted by an interpreter to contend that she should be granted permission to appeal. The thrust of the points that she has made today is that the First-tier Tribunal was wrong to make the findings it did regarding her marriage to Colonel Cham.

When Longmore LJ considered the appellant’s application for permission to appeal on the papers he said:

“Permission to appeal refused. First Tier Tribunal Judge Lever was right to consider the evidence of marriage to be important and to be very weak. In any event that was not the only element in his decision, which was overall carefully considered and is not susceptible to a second appeal.”

The test which I have to apply is the second appeals test. As I have explained in the course of the hearing to the appellant, I should not give permission unless I consider that the appeal would raise an important point of principle or practice or there is some other compelling reason for the Court of Appeal to hear it. In my view the decision of the First-tier Tribunal was a proper and legitimate decision for that Tribunal to make on the basis of the evidence it heard and as explained in the reasons it gave. I do not consider that there is any real prospect of success on appeal. The appeal would give rise to no important of principle or practice since it turns essentially on assessment of the facts.

There is no other compelling reason for the Court of Appeal to hear the appeal. I agree with the reasons given by Longmore LJ. Accordingly this application is dismissed.