Firrozmand v London Borough of Lambeth

Javed Firrozmand is a vulnerable homeless person with chronic and acute health conditions. He is a suicide risk and has chronic hypersensitivity pneumonitis; he is noise intolerant; he speaks but cannot write in English. This is an application for permission to appeal the decision of His Honour Judge Mitchell sitting in the Central London County Court on 29 January 2015. On that day, Judge Mitchell dismissed the appellant’s statutory appeal to the court from the decision the local authority made on 22 October 2014 under section 201(4) of the Housing Act 1996.

The grounds of appeal are: (a) that the decision maker and the court failed to have regard to statutory material and guidance in respect of the suitability of the appellant’s accommodation (that is the basis upon which I grant permission); and (b) that the decision maker and the court failed to take into account the diagnosis of chronic hypersensitivity pneumonitis.

The judgment of Judge Mitchell sets out the context which is that the appeal concerned temporary accommodation offered to the appellant in Kenbury Street in London. The judge dealt with procedural issues (that is the status and qualification of the decision maker) and those issues are not repeated before this court. On the merits, the judge deals with the question of whether the decision maker took into account the appellant’s chronic medical condition. He decided that, on balance, the decision maker did, albeit that the details of the condition was notified to the local authority after the first decision was made and after the date of the decision letter to which I have referred. That raises a difficult question because the nature of the diagnosis that is the effect upon this appellant of the pneumonitis would not have been clear until the letter from his consultant of 29 October 2014, which was one week after the decision maker’s letter. On its face this ground appears to be a basis for a fresh decision rather than a ground of appeal.

Mr Vanhegan has not persuaded me that this is an appropriate basis upon which to grant permission and I leave the matter open to the full court so that he may pursue it for permission; and if permission is granted, for the appeal to include that ground, bearing in mind that I am granting permission on his first basis.

The judge’s function was to identify whether there had been an error of law. The judge could have been a deal clearer in considering the terms of the decision letter of 22 October 2014 and he could have been clearer about the submissions that are repeated to this court by Mr Vanhegan this morning. In essence, the first ground is this: Section 201(1) of the Housing Act 1996 imports Parts 1 to 4 and the guidance issued by the Secretary of State in respect of what is suitable accommodation for a vulnerable person. The question arises whether a local authority is obliged to determine suitability by reference to the duty in section 201(1) and the guidance issued in accordance with the same. On the face of it, the local authority is and if a decision letter makes no reference to the matters set out in parts 1 to 4 of the Act and the guidance issued in pursuance of the same, it will be flawed.

Mr Vanhegan sets up a prima facie case that the mechanism by which a local authority has to inspect, assess and grade in numerical form the suitability of accommodation is not one addressed by this local authority and it may well be the case by local authorities generally. That is a question of some importance. It arises directly on the facts of this case because if this appellant is unable to obtain suitable accommodation because of his medical vulnerability and a local authority have failed to cross-reference the medical vulnerability with suitability in accordance with the Act, then there would be a fatal flaw in its decision making process. Accordingly, I give permission for the first ground and the matter is to be listed before a full court of three Lord or Lady Justices, one of whom is to be a specialist in housing law with a time estimate of half-a-day.

It is clear (and I say this so the appellant hears me) that mental health services need to be involved. The appellant’s problems cannot simply be laid at the door of a court. He is a man at significant risk and he needs help. He cannot just self-medicate and however expedited this court’s process, he must engage with mental health services in order to help him resolve his problems. That said, it seems to me that the matter ought to be determined either by the end of this term or no later than the middle of August so that the temporary nature of the existing problem can be resolved as quickly as possible.