ON APPEAL FROM THE COUNTY COURT
SITTING AT NOTTINGHAM
(HIS HONOUR JUDGE GODSMARK QC)
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand
London, WC2A 2LL
B e f o r e:
LORD JUSTICE LONGMORE
Between:
BARTON
Appellant
v
WRIGHT HASSALL SOLICITORS LLP
Respondent
DAR Transcript of the Stenograph Notes of
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Mr H Elgot (instructed by Direct Access) appeared on behalf of the Appellant
The Respondent was not present and was not represented
J U D G M E N T
LORD JUSTICE LONGMORE: I propose to give permission to appeal in this case, which is a dispute about service.
Ineffective service by e-mail was perpetrated by the Claimant on the Defendants' solicitors. The Defendants' solicitors did not point out it was ineffective. If they had, there might have been some chance of effective service being performed. So in one sense, it can be said that the Defendants here are playing games.
Mr Elgot submits that in the light of Abela and subsequent authorities, the principles as to service at any rate within CPR 6.15(2) have been very considerably relaxed and that the claim was effectively brought to the notice of the Defendants through their solicitors and the ineffective e-mail service should be deemed to be good service.
It seems to me there is something of a problem about that because the Claimant had four months within which to serve his claim form and left it until August, the last minute.
But I am persuaded in the light of at least two authorities since Abela was decided that the principles governing CPR 6.15(2) have been arguably relaxed to the extent that the judge's discretion in this case might arguably have been exercised on a wrong basis.
Those two authorities are Power v Melloy Whittle Robinson [2014] EWCA Civ 898 and Kaki v National Private Air Transport Co which is still awaiting a transcript to be approved by this court but was decided on 13 May 2015 and is recorded on Lawtel with a headnote as to what the case was about; the court saying that it was open to the court to validate alternative service where there was a good reason to do so, but exceptional circumstances were not required and one good reason only seems to have been sufficient. There is no transcript of that authority as yet, but if it is in accordance with the Lawtel narrative, then it seems to me that the Claimant may be in with an argument and that if the judge had had Power and Kaki cited to him that there might have been a different result.
So for those reasons, I do propose to give permission to appeal in this case.