SM & Ors (Somalia) v Entry Clearance Officer (Addis Ababa)

The five appellants are nationals of Somalia and were born on 4 December 1993, 8 May 1994, 15 July 1996 and 19 May 1995 and 18 November 1995 respectively. The first, third and fourth appellants are children of the United Kingdom sponsor. The second and fifth appellants are her niece and nephew respectively.

The United Kingdom sponsor was born on 1 January 1959. She arrived in the United Kingdom in 2004 with leave to enter as a spouse. In April 2009 the appellants applied for leave to enter as the dependants of the United Kingdom sponsor. Their applications were refused by an Entry Clearance Officer (“ECO”) in June 2009. The ECO found that the appellants did not meet the requirements of the Immigration Rules for entry as family members and there is no longer an appeal against that decision. As to article 8, the refusal letter stated:

“Although there may be perceived interference with your right to family life under Article 8, such interference is justified for the purpose of maintaining an effective immigration control, is proportionate to that aim and does not therefore breach your convention rights. I can see no insurmountable obstacles to your sponsor returning to Addis to maintain family ties and I note that she has now divorced her husband in the UK; the reason for her going to settle in the UK is therefore no longer relevant.”

The claimants appealed to the First-Tier Tribunal (“FTT”). The case was heard by Immigration Judge (“IJ”) Wiseman. In his determination promulgated on 29March 2010 he summarised the relevant facts as follows:

“The sponsor was born on 1 January 1959 and first married Sharif Salim but they were divorced in 1991. She then married her second husband Nur Muse in Mogadishu in July 1992. Three of the appellants were children of that marriage, but the sponsor was divorced again in 1996, her second last having been heard of as being at sea.

The sponsor's half brother, Mohammed Sabriye and his wife were divorced in 1996 and she has not seen him since. From that time onwards the sponsor and Mohamed Sabriye helped each other to look after the three children and his two children together. They shared a home and their responsibilities.

In 1997 the sponsor remarried her first husband Salim, and he came to the United Kingdom in January 2003. In 2004 he applied for the appellant [the sponsor] to join him in the United Kingdom. The sponsor believed that the children were part of that application. She didn’t speak English and could not follow any documents. She was never interviewed and when she was issued with a visa and not her children she spoke to her husband. He explained that it was impossible to bring all of them here at the same time and that they would apply later for the children to come. On this basis she agreed to leave her children with Sabriye and his children until she could apply for them. When she got here her husband insisted that he was not going to apply for them as they were not his children and he did not want to look after somebody else's children. The sponsor and her husband divorced under Islamic law in 2006; one of the main reasons leading to that was the fact she regarded him as having tricked her into leaving her children behind and then would not apply for them to come here.

In 2008 Sabriye (who was looking after all five children at the time) was killed tragically. A neighbour, Farah, immediately took care of the children and contacted the sponsor whom he already knew as they were neighbours before she left for the United Kingdom. He told her he was leaving for Ethiopia to flee the violence and killing and asked the sponsor if there was anyone else he could take the children to. There was no such person, and she pleaded with him to take the children with him to Ethiopia so that she could apply to have them join her in the United Kingdom. The neighbour had more than done enough as a friend of the family but could not look after them for any further length of time.

The sponsor regarded the niece and nephew as her de facto adopted children. She could not join the appellants in Ethiopia because she had no status there, nor indeed did they. She could not join them in Somalia as she was still in danger of persecution. There had been no formal adoption procedure in relation to the children of her half brother. There were not the facilities for that in Somalia.

In the sponsor's witness statement she said that on 10 September 2008, a month after her brother's death, the children arrived in Addis Ababa with Farah. They were arrested by Ethiopian police on the day of their arrival and were held in cells for 18 days before being released. They were threatened with deportation. They told the police that they had come to Ethiopia to apply to join the sponsor in the United Kingdom. She also said that they had no legal status in Ethiopia and could be removed back to Somalia at any time. They did not go to school and spent all their time in one room accommodation. They could not venture outside because they were abused by local Ethiopian youths. They were very vulnerable and needed her love, care and support.

She applied for the children to come here after meeting her legal advisor in April 2009. If she had found out the position sooner she would have applied at any earlier date. DNA evidence has established the relationship between herself and her own children and the children of her half brother. She has never lost contact with the children. She called them at least twice a week on the telephone using disposable telephone cards.

She had visited the children twice since coming to the United Kingdom; she went to Djibouti on 1 May 2008 and stayed with the children for six weeks on that occasion, corning back to this country on 13 June 2008. Her half brother was still alive at that time. She visited the children again on 21 July 2009 in Addis Ababa and by then her half brother had been dead for almost a year. She was there for one month as that was the only accrued holiday time she was able to take. She had returned to the United Kingdom on 21 August 2009.

She had been sending money to the children for their maintenance ever since she arrived in the United Kingdom in December 2004. She had not needed to send so much money while her half brother was still alive and able to cover most of their living costs. Once she started working in August 2009 as a cleaner she was able to send her children money from her own income. She and her other half brother Sabriye were the only ones who sent money to the appellants. Their money was sent to a neighbour who had helped so that he could collect the money; if they were able to do so themselves they would be beaten and mugged by local Ethiopian youths. Her remaining brother would give £100 a week for the children's maintenance if they were in the United Kingdom. Her half brother was a Dutch national working and residing in the United Kingdom. He earned about £1040 a month after tax and he had savings of £4000. She worked full time as a cleaner and had £1400 in savings."

IJ Wiseman dismissed the appeal on all grounds. The claimants sought and were granted permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal (“UT”) which dismissed their appeals on 19 January 2011. They applied for and were granted leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal on two grounds. The first ground related to whether it was reasonable to expect the sponsor to move to Ethiopia and settle there with the applicants. The second ground concerned whether sufficient weight had been given to the best interests of the minor children.

On 18 January 2012, this court allowed the appeal and remitted the matter to the FTT for a fresh hearing. Toulson LJ (with whom Etherton and Kitchin LJJ agreed) said:

“The case law at Strasbourg and in the UK places a high value on the ability of families to live together. It is well established that in this regard there is both a positive and a negative obligation under article 8. The positive obligation requires the state, in particular, to admit to its territory children of settled immigrants who are minors unless there are sufficiently strong countervailing reasons to make it proportionate to refuse entry. In the leading case of Huang [2007] UKHL 11, [2007] 2 AC 167 Lord Bingham said at para 20:”

“In an article 8 case where this question [i.e. the question of proportionality] is reached, the ultimate question for the appellate immigration authority is whether the refusal of leave to enter or remain, in circumstances where the life of the family cannot reasonably be expected to be enjoyed elsewhere, taking full account of all considerations weighing in favour of the refusal, prejudices to the family life of the applicant in a manner sufficiently serious to amount to a breach of the fundamental right protected by article 8. If the answer to this question is affirmative, the refusal is unlawful and the authority must so decide.”

In stating that principle he drew no distinction between refusal of leave to enter and refusal of leave to remain. However, that is not to say that, in the application of the principle, the question of proportionality between proper immigration control and proper respect for family life need be answered in the same way (a) in a case of refusal of entry which is sought for the purpose of family reunion and (b) in a case of removal which would break up a family. Each case has to be considered on its own facts.

The trauma of breaking up a family and thereby rupturing family ties may be significantly greater than the effect of not facilitating the reunion of a family whose members have become accustomed to living apart following a decision by part of the family to live elsewhere. [emphasis added]

Where entry is sought for the purpose of family reunion the Immigration Rules, laid before Parliament, represent an attempt by the government to strike a fair balance between respect for family life and immigration control, which includes economic considerations. Different Rules apply to a child seeking leave to enter the UK in order to join a parent who has refugee status (352 D) and a child who seeks leave to enter the UK as the child of a parent or relative in the UK who does not have refugee status (297). …………The authorities provide examples of cases which fall outside the rules where the positive obligation of the state under article 8 requires the giving of leave to enter. Such cases are often difficult and require close analysis of the facts. In all such cases the best interests of the children involved are a consideration of high importance, but are not necessarily determinative of the outcome. It has been said that they are “a primary consideration” but not “the primary” or paramount consideration. They are important, but, depending on the facts of the case, in the final evaluation other considerations may carry greater weight. ……..

This was a difficult case. The question whether it would be reasonable to expect a person to relocate sounds straightforward, but, between cases where the facts render an obvious negative or affirmative answer, there may be cases where the harshness of such an expectation is a matter of degree which forms part of an overall evaluation whether or not a decision refusing entry would be disproportionate. There may be cases where one would hesitate to say that a person could reasonably be “expected” to relocate (because they would have very understandable reasons for not doing so), but where an evaluation of all the relevant factors might nevertheless properly result in a refusal of leave to enter, despite the degree of hardship which would be involved in relocation. Such cases call for particularly careful evaluation. In this case I do not think that para 99 (“Although circumstances and status can hardly be suggested to be favourable, she can clearly gain entrance to Ethiopia (she has already done) and presumably her position there would be no better or worse than the children themselves”) was sufficient. By way of example, the sponsor had made the point that in Ethiopia she would have no income. In argument Ms Chan suggested that the sponsor’s other half-brother, who lives in the UK and presently sends money to the appellants, might be expected to continue to do so and that this would provide some family support. However, the immigration judge did not consider the question of her support.

Ms Chan also sought to uphold the determination on the ground that at least the sponsor would be able to maintain the same degree of family contact that she had enjoyed during the years since she left Somalia, and that the immigration judge was entitled to find that a decision to refuse entry to the appellants was not disproportionate in all the circumstances. However, that approach is open to the same criticism that, if it was important to his reasoning, it was not expressed in his determination.

This was a difficult and unusual case, which called for a careful analysis. I am not persuaded that on full analysis the appellants’ appeals must necessarily have succeeded and I would therefore remit the case for rehearing by a fresh immigration judge. It is a striking feature of the case that there was no objective country evidence before the immigration judge. Under section 85 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 the tribunal considering the case will be limited to considering the circumstances appertaining at the time of the decisions to refuse entry, which may include any objective evidence which applied at the time of the decision to refuse entry."

Thus at the remitted hearing the FTT in 2012, and on appeal from it the UT in 2013, were, and this court in 2015 is, bound to proceed as if the clock had stopped on the day of the ECO’s decision, 2 June 2009. The particular significance of this is that the appellants were then all children, aged between 13 and 15. They are now all adults. But we have to examine whether the decision to refuse them entry was right when it was made. If it was wrong, they are entitled to enter the UK now even though a fresh application by them in 2015 would have no prospect of success.

The rehearing in the FTT took place before Immigration Judge Devittie. No dispute arose as to the credibility of the sponsor. The evidence she had given in the previous hearings (consisting of two witness statements and oral evidence) was accepted as credible and she was not required to testify afresh. It was agreed that the sponsor’s evidence had been fairly summarised in the previous determination by IJ Wiseman.

The absence of country expert evidence referred to by Toulson LJ was remedied at the remitted hearing before IJ Devittie. The appellants filed a report from Dr Gunter Schroder, a respected expert who had given evidence before the Tribunal in two country guidance cases on Ethiopia. Dr Schroder, like the sponsor, was not required to give oral evidence. The most significant part of his report was summarised by Judge Devittie as follows:

“Thousands of Somalis live in Ethiopia. Many do not have formal registration but there is tacit acceptance of their non-legal residence by the authorities. Over the last two decades there have been successive waves of Somalis migrating to Ethiopia. Some have been registered and it is estimated that in Addis Ababa and the urban areas the number could be as high as 40 000. In Addis Ababa alone it is estimated that there are 20 000 Somalis who live with friends and family. It is not uncommon for as many as 7 people to share one room. Somalis in Addis Ababa have established a strong community with its own social and cultural niche. It is dubbed "little Mogadishu" For a significant number of the urban Somalis the quality of life is more than tolerable, with many engaged in trade and running business centres. There is an organised network of compatriots who live off remittances from abroad. For those living in the camps however and without resources and networks, however, life can be bleak. ”

In his determination IJ Devittie (”the judge”) said that he had come to the conclusion that the appellants and the sponsor could reasonably be expected to enjoy family life in Ethiopia for these reasons;

He continued:

“I am satisfied that it would be reasonable to expect the sponsor to return to Ethiopia to establish family life there with the appellants. I am further satisfied that even if I were to hold that it would not be reasonable to expect the sponsor and the appellants to enjoy family life in Ethiopia, the continued separation of the appellants from the sponsor would not prejudice their family life in a manner sufficiently serious to amount to a breach of the fundamental right protected by article 8, having regard to the factors in favour of refusal. These are my reasons:

UT Judge Goldstein gave permission to appeal to the UT. On appeal an Upper Tribunal panel comprised of Judges McGeachy and Kebede dismissed the appeal. Sullivan LJ granted permission to appeal to this court. On the question of whether the second appeals test was satisfied he observed that “[the] arguable defects in IJ Devittie’s determination can fairly be said not to give rise to any point of principle, save for his reliance on the sponsor’s ability to remain in Ethiopia as an unlawful overstayer. This case is very much a fact specific case and, as the Court of Appeal noted [in 2012], the facts are most unusual.”

Mr Collins relies first on what Sullivan LJ described as the point of principle. The sponsor has no legal status in Ethiopia. She could visit the appellants there, entering on a visitors’ visa, but could not lawfully obtain permission to live there permanently. So in order to gain entry to Ethiopia and remain there to look after the appellants in 2009 she would have had to lie in her visa application. He submits that it cannot be reasonable to expect someone to relocate to another country if they would have to use deception in order to do so, and refers to the decision of the Supreme Court in RT (Zimbabwe) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2013] 1 AC 152.

It is unnecessary to decide the point in this case, since Ms Chan conceded it. She resisted the appeal on the alternative basis of the judge’s finding that “even if I were to hold that it would not be reasonable to expect the sponsor and the appellants to enjoy family life in Ethiopia, the continued separation of the appellants from the sponsor would not prejudice their family life in a manner sufficiently serious to amount to a breach of the fundamental right protected by article 8, having regard to the factors in favour of refusal”.

As to that, Mr Collins submitted that the refusal of entry clearance was plainly a disproportionate interference with family life; that on the accepted evidence of the sponsor about being tricked by her husband it cannot fairly be said that she made a “conscious decision” to leave the children behind, which in any event is an approach making the children suffer for the decisions of their mother; that there was no evidence before the FTT that if admitted to the UK the appellants would impose a significant burden on public funds; and that the judge failed to give sufficient weight to the best interests of the children in the balancing exercise.

I accept that Article 8 is engaged in the present case, but it is far from clear that the refusal of entry clearance to the appellants in 2009 constituted serious interference with their family life at all. The fact is that since 2004, when the youngest was 8 and the oldest was 10, the children had not been living with the sponsor, the mother of three of them and the aunt of the two others. She had left them in the care of her half brother Mohammed Sabriye both for the two years leading up to her divorce in 2006 and for the two years thereafter until he was killed in 2008, and maintained regular contact with them. By the time the application for entry clearance was made the youngest of the children was 13 and the oldest was 15. The case is quite different from the more typical one where the status quo before the refusal of entry clearance or the proposed removal was or is a united family. As Toulson LJ observed the last time the case was before this court in the passage italicised above, the trauma of breaking up a family and thereby rupturing family ties may be significantly greater than the effect of not facilitating the reunion of a family whose members have become accustomed to living apart following a decision by part of the family to live elsewhere.

Mr Collins focusses on the judge’s use of the phrase “conscious decision” to describe what the sponsor did in 2004. For my part I do not read it as involving a moral judgment or a criticism. It is simply a correct description of what occurred. The sponsor could have refused to accompany her husband to the UK without the children, or sought to return to join them when she discovered that she had been tricked, or on her divorce. She did not, and instead maintained contact by regular visits and provided financial support. I accept that it was a difficult decision, or series of decisions, which can be seen in hindsight to have been a mistake. But it was nevertheless, to use Toulson LJ’s words, a decision by part of the family to live elsewhere.

As to the issue of whether there was evidence that admitting the appellants would have placed a burden on public funds and services, Mr Collins realistically recognised that this was not his strongest point. Neither the sponsor nor the children spoke English. The children had been unable to go to school in Ethiopia. It is plain that in terms of education and housing alone the burden on public services would have been substantial.

This is a sad and difficult case. As Judge Devittie said, the best interests of the children were a consideration of high importance even though this was an entry clearance case, and they had a strong emotional need to reunite with the sponsor who had a maternal bond with all of them. The appellants’ quality of life would be greatly enhanced in the UK. But, like the judges in the UT, I consider that the conclusion which the FTT judge reached on proportionality on the alternative basis was fully open to him. Accordingly I would dismiss this appeal.

I agree with Bean LJ that these appeals should be dismissed for the reasons he has given. I would like to make two observations concerning the point of principle identified by Sullivan LJ as the reason for giving permission, which, as a result of the Secretary of State's concession, we do not have to decide.

First, in the particular circumstances of this case, there may be an advantage in not having to decide the point. During the hearing it was suggested that it might not be necessary for the sponsor, the appellants' mother and aunt, to deceive the Ethiopian authorities in order to relocate to that country. There is some uncertainty as to the factual position, although Ms Chan was unable to suggest how, if the sponsor was travelling to Ethiopia so as to live there with the appellants, she would be able to enter the country without deception. The result of the Secretary of State's concession means that we do not have to decide a fact-sensitive matter in a case where the factual position is not entirely clear.

Secondly, like Elias LJ, I doubt that it is reasonable for the immigration authorities in this country to tell a person lawfully here that she can live with her children by relocating to another country in circumstances where she can only do that by deceiving the authorities in that country. Apart from the position as a matter of legal principle, to regard such deception as reasonable sits very uneasily with principles of international comity between friendly states. What would the Secretary of State for the Home Department say if her opposite number in another country, or a judge in that country, said that a person lawfully in that country should relocate to the United Kingdom to have a family life with her children who are in this country without leave because there are at present a significant number of people present in the United Kingdom with no leave and no status?

I agree with Bean LJ that the appeal should be dismissed for the reasons he gives. In the light of the concession by the Secretary of State that it was not reasonable to expect the appellant to live with her family in Ethiopia, the decision could be upheld only on the alternative ground advanced by the judge. This was that whilst the article 8 rights of the appellants were engaged, the refusal to allow them entry was a proportionate interference with their family life. As the Upper Tribunal held, in my view rightly, IJ Devittie in the FTT did not misdirect himself as to the relevant law and reached a conclusion open to him on the evidence.

In view of the concession, we do not have to decide whether the judge was right to find that the appellant could reasonably be expected to live in Ethiopia. But I confess that if she were required to deceive the Ethiopian immigration authorities and to reside illegally in Ethiopia in order to live with her children, I very much doubt whether it would be reasonable to expect her to move there.

The judge also held that even if she could reasonably be expected to live in Ethiopia, her article 8 rights were engaged by the refusal to allow her children leave to enter. I do not agree. In my view if she can reasonably be expected to live there with her family, then article 8 rights are not engaged because family life is not adversely affected by the Secretary of State’s decision but only by her unwillingness to move. She has no article 8 right to choose to live with her family in the UK rather than Ethiopia. This was essentially the analysis of the Court of Appeal in PG (USA) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2015] EWCA Civ 118 per Fulford LJ at para.23 and I respectfully agree with it.