Capita (Banstead 2011) Ltd & Anor v RFIB Group Ltd

This appeal relates to a claim under an indemnity clause contained in a share purchase agreement. It raises the question whether, if the seller of shares in a company undertakes to indemnify the purchaser in respect of liabilities which the purchaser may incur as a result of negligently performed services provided by the company to a recipient before the transfer date of the shares (“the Transfer Date”) and the company provides services to a customer both before and after the Transfer Date, it is appropriate, as between the seller and the purchaser of the shares, to apportion the liability incurred to that customer by reference to the time when that liability is incurred or by reference to some other criteria and, if so, what.

In the present case the company (by one of its employees Mr Le Cras) negligently provided pension services and advice to the Trustees (“the Trustees”) of the Queen Elizabeth’s Foundation for Disabled People Pension and Assurance Scheme (“the Scheme”) and to the principal employer under the Scheme, the Queen Elizabeth’s Foundation for Disabled People (“QEF”), by failing to inform the Trustees and QEF that amendments to the pension plan for the Scheme’s members could only be made by the Trustees’ execution of a formal document and that, save in a small respect, any amendment could not be retrospective. He later represented to the Trustees and QEF that the appropriate amendments were in place. Apart from the later representations, these failures first occurred before the Transfer Date but their effects continued after the Transfer Date. On Popplewell J’s view of the matter, the failures were a continuing breach of contract since the company had a general retainer and duty to assist in ensuring that the Trustees’ instructions were implemented. He concluded that some of the loss incurred by the Scheme and thus some of the liability arose after the Transfer Date and apportioned the claim to indemnity brought by the purchaser against the seller accordingly. The question in this appeal is whether he was right.

RFIB Group Ltd (“RFIB”), the original defendant and respondent to this appeal, were the sellers of the shares in Capita Hartshead Benefit Consultants (“CHBC”) who, under their previous name of Robert Fleming Benefit Consultants Ltd (“RFBC”), provided pension management and advisory services to QEF. The contract pursuant to which these services were provided was made in September 1995 and called a Services and Fee Agreement. For an agreed sum of £7500 per annum, increasing annually by reference to the national Average Earnings Index for employees in the banking, finance and insurance sector, RFBC were to supply the services contained in Section 2.1 of the agreement. Section 2.2 set out non-core services for which fees would be assessed and paid on a quarterly basis in accordance with RFBC’s standard scales. Additional services could be requested and would then be undertaken at extra cost (Section 1.3). Section 2 of the agreement specified what it called the “consultancy service” as including

“Core Services

2.1.1

Advice & Guidance on Scheme Design & Legislative Trends

•

Guidance and recommendations about the design of the Scheme, benefit structure, eligibility criteria, and the specific needs of the Scheme membership.

•

Providing information and recommendations about social and political trends affecting the provision of pensions and employee benefits.

•

Supplying information and tailored advice regarding the effect and specification of all relevant legislation, regulations and practice of the Pension Scheme Office of the Inland Revenue, the Occupational Pensions Board and the Department of Social Security.

…

2.1.6

Trusteeship Advice

•

Offering advice, as necessary to the Trustees on their main duties and discretionary powers.

•

Assisting the Trustees in the conduct of their duties.

2.1.7

The Pension Bill/Act

•

Advice, guidance and recommendations on the effects of the Pensions Bill ….”

The judge, towards the end of paragraph 11 of his judgment, described this retainer as including “a duty to assist in maintaining a state of affairs, namely that the Scheme in force from time to time should reflect the decisions of the Trustees” of the Scheme. This is not explicitly stated in the Services Agreement and I am not clear how the judge came to describe it in those terms. To the extent that he makes it sound as if there was an absolute duty to assist in maintaining a particular state of affairs, I do not think he can be correct but it may be that his shorthand should be read to mean that RFBC/CHBC were under a duty to comply with the instructions of the Trustees so far as they were lawful and were obliged to take care in and about the implementation of those instructions. That would, I think, be a fair summary of RFIB’s duties so far as relevant for the purpose of determining the issues in this appeal and is, in any event, much the same as the duty stated earlier in paragraph 11 of the judgment namely to advise and assist the Trustees and QEF and in particular to consider the implementation of the proposed amendments in the context of dealing with the Trustees. It is difficult to spell even this duty from the Core Services to be performed by RFIB but it could perhaps be said to derive from a combination of Sections 2.1.6 and 2.1.7. Otherwise it would have to be part of the additional services which QEF or the Trustees were entitled to request under Section 1.3.

By a share purchase agreement of 28th April 2004 RFIB sold the entire share capital of CHBC to Capita (Banstead 2011) Ltd (“Capita”). The Transfer Date under that agreement was 30th April 2004; the agreement also provided:-

“5.8

The Seller undertakes to indemnify and keep indemnified the Buyer on behalf of itself and the Company … from any liabilities costs claims demands or expenses which any of them may suffer or incur arising directly or indirectly from …

5.8.5

any services or products supplied by the Company … or any advice provided by the Company (or any of its employees or agents) prior to the Transfer Date.”

The claim by QEF and the Trustees was set out in a Protocol letter from their solicitors of 16th April 2010. The gist of the QEF Claim was that it and its trustees were advised on all aspects of the day-to-day management of the Scheme by CHBC. CHBC’s employee, Anthony Le Cras, was the consultant dealing with QEF between 2000 and 2006. The Trustees, in consultation with CHBC, acting through Mr Le Cras, decided to make various amendments to the Scheme with the objective of reducing liabilities to members and therefore the cost of funding those liabilities. Those amendments were announced to members and ought to have taken effect on various dates between 6th April 2000 and 1st April 2004. The amendments and the dates on which they ought to have taken effect were:

Formal amendments to the rules of the Scheme, signed by the Trustees, were required in order to implement the proposed changes, so that the mere announcements issued to the members of the Scheme were legally ineffective to achieve their purpose. CHBC was negligent and in breach of contract in failing to ensure that the amendments were made. In addition, from April 2004 (if not earlier) CHBC, acting through Mr Le Cras, came to appreciate that formal amendments to the Scheme rules were required, so that, in making subsequent representations that the amendments were in place, he was said to be guilty of deceit or, at the very least, negligent misrepresentation. The failure to make the changes in the required manner was only appreciated by QEF in October 2007 and amendments to the Scheme rules were effected on 30th July 2008. Because of the effect of s. 67 of the Pensions Act 1995, these changes could only be made prospectively, save for the increase in contributions from 5% to 7%. Save in the latter respect, as a result of CHBC’s wrongdoing, the liabilities of the Scheme between 1st April 2000 and 30th July 2008 were substantially greater than would have been the case if the required amendments to the rules of the Scheme had been properly made in a timely fashion. This had in turn increased the cost of funding the Scheme. The amount was estimated at £4.2 million. In addition approximately £88,000 was claimed in respect of costs. QEF’s and the Trustees’ claim against CHBC was settled by mediation for £3,850,000, a sum which is now agreed to have been a reasonable settlement. It is that sum together with costs which Capita and CHBC claimed to recover from RFIB in the present proceedings.

The judge held that, by the Transfer Date, 30th April 2004, CHBC had been in breach of contract and duty in respect of all the amendments in failing to ensure that they were effectively made by a formal amendment to the Scheme rules prior to the date on which they were intended to have effect i.e. 6th April 2000, 1st July 2001 and 1st April 2004 respectively. He further held that CHBC was also in continuing breach of duty in this respect from day to day throughout the period from the Transfer Date to December 2007.

The misrepresentation claim was based on the information acquired by Mr Le Cras in the course of correspondence between Mr Le Cras and Burges Salmon, the solicitors acting for QEF and/or the Trustees and/or CHBC. By letter of 14th April 2004, Burges Salmon had advised that the 2004 amendments (which at that stage were the only ones they had been asked to include in a deed of amendment to the Scheme rules) could not become effective before the deed of amendment was signed because of the effect of section 67 of the Pensions Act 1995. On 22^nd April 2004 Mr Le Cras wrote to Burges Salmon making it clear that he wanted the deed of amendment to include the March 2000 and January 2001 amendments and that there had been recent changes to the identity of the Trustees. In Burges Salmon’s letter of 10th May 2004 enclosing a draft deed of amendment for approval, they recorded that they had drafted the deed in a form which purported to make the changes retrospective (now including the 2000 and 2001 changes) notwithstanding that they had expressed reservations about the efficacy of that approach in the light of s. 67 of the Pensions Act 1995; and that they had done so on the instructions of Mr Le Cras who had confirmed that the Scheme actuary was prepared to provide a certificate. There was no evidence that the Scheme actuary was prepared to or did provide any such certificate, and it is common ground that he could not properly have done so. The judge said it was strongly arguable that Mr Le Cras must, at least from 10^th May 2004, have been aware that the proposed changes had not been effectively made and could only be made effective prospectively by a formal amendment to the Scheme rules (with the exception of the 5% to 7% increase in contributions amendment which Burges Salmon correctly advised could be made retrospectively). In fact he was clearly so aware by 19^th April but I do not think it matters. The judge then held (paragraph 12) that Mr Le Cras’s first misrepresentation (that the amendments had been made) was made by producing in late 2004 or 2005 an updated version of a guidance booklet issued to members of the Scheme purporting to state the position at September 2004. He described the allegation of deceit as “a strong one”.

On the basis of these facts and in the light of RFIB’s argument that misconduct of Mr Le Cras occurred after, as well as before, the Transfer Date the judge referred to the well-known judgment of the Privy Council in Canada Steamship Lines Ltd v R [1952] A.C. 192, that a clause is not to be construed as exempting a party to a contract from negligence if there is any other potential basis of liability which falls within its wording. This had been applied to indemnity clauses in Smith v South Wales Switchgear Co Ltd [1978] 1 WLR 165 and later cases had also considered it, in particular, Ailsa Craig Fishing Co Ltd v Malvern Fishing Co Ltd [1983] 1 WLR 964, HIH Casualty and General Insurance Ltd v Chase Manhattan Bank [2003] 1 All E.R. (Comm) 349 and Lictor Anstalt v Mir Steel UK Ltd [2013] 2 All E.R. (Comm) 54. From these authorities he derived the following principles which I do not understand to be in dispute and have in any event now received the imprimatur of Sir Kim Lewison in The Interpretation of Contracts, (2^nd supplement 12.06).

“1.

A clear intention must appear from the words used before the Court will reach the conclusion that one party has agreed to exempt the other from the consequences of his own negligence or indemnify him against losses so caused. The underlying rationale is that clear words are needed because it is inherently improbable that one party should agree to assume responsibility for the consequences of the other’s negligence: Smith at p. 168D-E; Ailsa Craig at p.970; HIH at [11], [63]; Lictor at [36].

2.

The Canada Steamship principles are not to be applied mechanistically and ought to be considered as no more than guidelines; the task is always to ascertain what the parties intended in their particular commercial context in accordance with the established principles of construction: Smith at p. 177; Ailsa Craig at p. 970; HIH at [11], [61]-[63], [116]; Lictor at [35]. They nevertheless form a useful guide to the approach where the commercial context makes it improbable that in the absence of clear words one party would have agreed to assume responsibility for the relevant negligence of the other.

3.

These principles apply with even greater force to dishonest wrongdoing, because of the inherent improbability of one party assuming responsibility for the consequences of dishonest wrongdoing by the other. The law, on public policy grounds, does not permit a party to exclude liability for the consequences of his own fraud; and if the consequences of fraudulent or dishonest misrepresentation or deceit by his agent are to be excluded, such intention must be expressed in clear and unmistakeable terms on the face of the contract. General words will not serve. The language must be such as will alert a commercial party to the extraordinary bargain he is invited to make because in the absence of words which expressly refer to dishonesty the common assumption is that the parties will act honestly: HIH at [16], [68]-[75], [97].”

The judge then reached the following conclusions:-

Mr Adam Tolley QC for Capita and CHBC made three main complaints about the judgment. He submitted:-

I cannot accept that post-Transfer Date conduct cannot be relevant. The judge was, with respect, right to say that the scheme of the indemnity was to allocate losses caused by pre-Transfer Date conduct to the seller and losses caused by post-Transfer Date conduct to the purchaser and that CHBC could not expect to receive an indemnity in respect of loss caused by the negligence or fraud of its own employees in such circumstances. Mr Le Cras continued to be an employee of CHBC after 30^th April 2004 and, on any view, CHBC could not expect to recover in respect of losses caused by separate (or fresh) negligence or by deceit after the Transfer Date. (It is true that Capita, the first appellant to the appeal, was not technically Mr Le Cras’s employer but Capita (as the holding company of CHBC) and CHBC have to be treated as having a common interest and, in any event, CHBC has been held to have title to pursue the claim, a matter which is no longer challenged). Mr Tolley’s argument under this head amounts to saying that the post-Transfer Date losses exclusively arose because of Mr Le Cras’s pre-Transfer Date conduct which is the “but for” causation argument; that is an argument which the judge rightly rejected. The true question is whether the post-Transfer Date conduct of Mr Le Cras was indeed a concurrent cause of the post-Transfer Date losses.

Here the judge’s conclusion depends on whether he was right to say that there was a breach of contract or duty every day after the Transfer Date. He held that there was, because Mr Le Cras’s conduct fell on what he called the Midland Bank side of the line rather than the Bell v Peter Browne Co or Nouri v Marvi side of the line.

The trouble with this is that it is a very elusive line. In Midland Bank Trust Co v Hett Stubbs & Kemp [1979] Ch 384 Oliver J held that a family solicitor was under a continuing duty to take steps to register a son’s 10 year option to purchase his father’s farm every day after the deed granting the option had been executed until the 10 years had elapsed. This was because (438 D-F) the solicitors had retained the document, opened (but not closed) a file relating to the option and were consulted by the son on the question whether he should exercise the option from time to time between its grant and the time when the option became incapable of exercise because the father had transferred the farm elsewhere. The son’s claim against the solicitors was not therefore statute-barred. In Bell v Peter Browne & Co [1990] 2 QB 495 a divorcing husband agreed that the matrimonial house could be transferred to his wife and that, when it was sold, he should have one-sixth of the proceeds to be protected by either a trust deed or a mortgage. He executed a transfer but his solicitors took no steps to prepare or have executed any declaration of trust or mortgage or otherwise register the husband’s interest in the house. The wife sold the house and spent the proceeds. The Court of Appeal held that the husband had a single cause of action accruing at the time of the failure to protect his interests not a cause of action accruing day by day thereafter and that his claim against the solicitors was therefore statute-barred. Nicholls LJ distinguished Midland Bank on the basis that, once the divorce proceedings were concluded, the husband and the solicitors had no further contact and the solicitors were thus, as the learned lord justice put it, functi officio. It is, however, difficult, with respect, to see that the failure to protect the husband’s interest was inherently different from the solicitor’s failure to protect the son’s interest in Midland Bank. Beldam LJ’s judgment can only be understood as saying implicitly that Midland Bank was wrongly decided (see Maharaj v Johnson [2015] PNLR 553 at para 32 per Lord Wilson and para 55 per Lord Clarke dissenting). Mustill LJ (page 512F) could contemplate the theoretical possibility that a solicitor could have a continuing retainer which could be construed as requiring the solicitor to be constantly on watch for new sources of potential danger and to take immediate steps to nip them in the bud. But he found it impossible to imply such “a strange obligation” from the mundane facts of Bell

“and equally improbable to suppose that if it did exist the obligation would be broken at any time other than when the mistake should have been discovered and put right: namely straightaway.”

This also seems to be saying implicitly that Midland Bank was wrongly decided, unless it could be distinguished from Bell on its facts (as to which Mustill LJ presumably agreed with Nicholls LJ, having expressed his entire agreement with Nicholls LJ’s judgment “as regards the breach of contract” at page 511F).

Nouri v Marvi [2009] EWCA Civ 1107; [2011] PNLR 100 was a case similar to Bell in which this court held that there were no special facts to suggest that any duty survived completion of the sale of the flat which the solicitors were instructed to undertake.

Likewise in Maharaj v Johnson [2015] UKPC 28; [2015] PNLR 553 the Privy Council, on appeal from the Court of Appeal in Trinidad and Tobago, held that solicitors who had acted for the purchasers of a property and accepted a defective title on his behalf were not liable day by day after completion of the transaction to take steps to correct the defect of title, even though it would have been perfectly easy to do so. This was because (para 34) their fees had been paid and their file had been closed. There was no reference in the contract of retainer to any obligation to procure execution of a deed of rectification which in any event could not have been procured without the consent of a third party, unlike the unilateral ability of a solicitor to register an option (as in Midland Bank) or a caution (as in Bell). The judges who formed the majority of the Judicial Committee accepted that Beldam LJ may have been right to regard the facts in Bell as indistinguishable from Midland but declined to decide whether it was Midland Bank or Bell which was correct because they did not regard the case before them as a case of non-feasance; rather it was a case where the contract had been negligently and wrongly performed.

Mr Neil Kitchener QC for RFIB submitted that the present case was much more similar to Midland Bank than to Bell, Nouri and Maharaj because there was undoubtedly a continuing retainer with a yearly fee and Mr Le Cras was in correspondence with the solicitors for the Trustees of the Scheme after 30^th April 2004 just as much as before. That is, of course, true but that makes it necessary to reach a conclusion on the question whether Midland Bank was correctly decided. If, as the Privy Council recognised in Maharaj, Bell and Midland Bank are inconsistent which is the authority which should be followed?

As to that the first question is whether the distinction from Midland Bank referred to in the subsequent cases, namely that there was a continuing retainer because the file had not been closed and further advice was sought and obtained, is a distinction of principle rather than of incidental fact. In my opinion it is a factually incidental distinction rather than a distinction of principle. The obtaining and receiving of advice after a mistake has been made (even if the mistake can be easily rectified) cannot to my mind mean that an obligation to correct one’s mistake or negligence continues to accrue and give a fresh cause of action every day after the mistake has been made. As Mustill LJ pointed out in Bell, it would be unusual for there to be an express term in the average retainer contract (or the average pension adviser contract) requiring the adviser to exercise continuing vigilance to discover any mistakes he may have made and then to busy himself to put them right. Moreover it cannot be right to imply what he called such “a strange obligation” into an apparently usual form of contract.

Once it is clear that there is no principled distinction between Midland Bank and Bell, it is clear that our obligation is to follow Bell as a decision of this court. If Midland Bank is to be preferred, that must be for a higher court to decide.

I would therefore conclude that despite the existence of a continuing retainer on the part of CHBC, it does not follow that fresh acts of negligence occurred, in respect of each of the amendments, of failing to secure the Trustees’ formal adoption of the amendments in a signed document and failing to inform them that the amendments could not be retrospective. These were original acts of negligence which occurred before 30^th April 2004 and are accordingly not acts of negligence for which Capita/CHBC are responsible under the indemnity, even though Mr Le Cras made no attempt to repair his omission thereafter.

It is, of course, true that all the above cases were decided in the context of arguments about limitation and that courts are not supportive of long and ill-defined periods elapsing before a cause of action has arisen. It is also true that the limitation problem has, since Midland Bank and Bell were decided, been largely avoided in England (though not in Trinidad and Tobago) by section 14A of the Limitation Act 1980 inserted by section 1 of the Latent Damage Act 1986. But the fact that the problem no longer arises so often in England and Wales is no reason for resolving it differently when it does arise in, for example the context of an indemnity clause in share purchase agreements. The judge thought the cases apposite to the problem in this case and, to that extent, I agree with him.

But I cannot agree that Mr Le Cras’s continuing failure after 30^th April 2004 to remedy his previous acts of negligence constituted a fresh cause of action accruing day by day entitling QEF and the Trustees to sue CHBC. Nor, therefore, can I agree that continuing negligence was a cause of the loss suffered by Capita or CHBC, which operated concurrently with the undoubted causative negligence which occurred before the Transfer Date. A failure to correct previous acts of negligence is not, to my mind, concurrently causative of losses caused by the original acts of negligence.

The position in relation to Mr Le Cras’s later representations is, however, different. These representations undoubtedly did give rise to new causes of action. The judge correctly held that the first operative misrepresentation was the production in late 2004 or 2005 of an updated version of the guidance booklet issued to members of the Scheme (and thus incidentally to the Trustees) purporting to state that the amendments had been effected as at September 2004. The judge was reluctant to make an actual finding of deceit against Mr Le Cras who did not give evidence before him but held, again correctly, that QEF’s deceit claim was “strongly arguable”; on any view it was a negligent misrepresentation which would give rise to a fresh cause of action. That representation, whether correctly characterised as negligent or fraudulent, can legitimately be said to be a concurrent cause of the loss which followed after the issue of the guidance booklet. There was a subsequent representation that the amendments had not only been done but had retrospective effect, but the first concurrent cause is the operative concurrent cause for the present purposes.

The judge concluded that the indemnity could not be relied on, if a concurrent cause of loss was the misconduct of Mr Le Cras after the Transfer Date. He derived considerable support from EE Caledonia Ltd v Orbit Value Co Europe [1994] 1 W.L.R. 221 (Hobhouse J) and 1515 (CA). In that case the operator of the Piper Alpha Platform sought to recover in respect of its liability to the estate of a service engineer, Mr Quinn, who had died in the disastrous fire. Mr Quinn was an employee of the defendant company which had contracted to provide his services. The operator and the services provider had each agreed in a mutual exemption and indemnity clause to assume responsibility for losses consequent on the personal injury or death of its own employees. On the face of it therefore the defendant should have been the party liable for Mr Quinn’s death but both Hobhouse J and this court held that, since the operator had itself been negligent, it could not recover from his employer in respect of the amounts which it had had to pay in respect of Mr Quinn’s death. It was argued that the operator was not only negligent but also in breach of statutory duty (a strict liability). Even if, therefore, the clause precluded recovery in case of negligence, it should apply to liability for breach of statutory duty. Hobhouse J said (231H):-

“I consider that the plaintiffs’ arguments cannot be accepted. Where there are concurrent causes, each cause is a cause of the consequent event. If the event would have occurred in the absence of a particular fault, that fault is not a cause of the event. Accordingly, it is not correct to say in the present case that the plaintiffs were liable in respect of the death of Mr Quinn because of the breaches of statutory duty; they were liable because of the breaches of statutory duty and the negligence of their servant. It was the concurrent effect of both those causes that gave rise to the death of Mr Quinn and without either of those causes that death would not have occurred and the plaintiffs would not have been liable. Therefore the correct question remains whether the plaintiffs have a right to an indemnity from the defendants in respect of a liability of which a cause was the negligence of one of their servants. It is still necessary to ask whether, as a matter of the construction of the clause, it does cover such liability.

For the purposes of considering the first question I have already quoted from judgments which state the principle to be applied. The principle is that in the absence of clear words the parties to a contract are not to be taken to have intended that an exemption or indemnity clause should apply to the consequences of a party’s negligence. Applying that principle and adopting a correct understanding of causation, the parties to a contract such as that with which I am concerned should not be taken to have intended that a party whose servant has been negligent should be entitled to an exemption or an indemnity although there has also been, as a concurrent cause of the relevant loss, a breach of a strict statutory duty.”

In this court Steyn LJ (with whom the other members of this court agreed) said that the relevant clause of the contract:-

“…should be construed as providing that the indemnities are not applicable if the event in question has been caused not only by a party’s breach of statutory duty but also by his negligence. The short point is that the plaintiffs have contractually assumed the risk of their own negligence and cannot seek to avoid the consequences of that assumption of risk by seeking to rely on a breach of statutory duty.”

I agree with the judge that this authority supports the conclusion that, where there are concurrent causes of the loss to which an indemnity apparently applies, one of which is negligence (or deliberate action) and the other of which is non-negligent, there can be no recovery because it is not intended that the clause should apply to losses caused by the claimant’s negligence. That principle is well-established for indemnity cases; it is similar to the principle applicable in insurance cases that in cases of concurrent loss in which one cause is covered by the policy and one cause is excepted by the policy, the insurer is not liable because, even if the clause granting cover applies, the loss is still caused by the excepted cause, see Wayne Tank v Employers’ Liability Assurance [1974] QB 57.
.

In this respect, therefore, I would uphold the judge but, differing as I do on the question whether failure to correct previous negligence can be a concurrent cause of loss, I would hold that it is only post 31st December 2004 losses that are irrecoverable under the indemnity. That will (or may) require a (no doubt) modest adjustment to the apportionment, there being no appeal against the judge’s general reasoning as to how the apportionment is to be achieved. If the parties cannot resolve this question by agreement before hand down of the judgment, I would remit the matter to the judge for re-assessment.

I agree with Longmore LJ, for the reasons which he sets out in his judgment, that the judge was correct to conclude, on the basis of the construction of clause 5.8.5 of the SPA and by analogy with the decision in EE Caledonia Ltd v Orbit Value Co Europe [1994] 1 W.L.R. 221 and [1994] 1 W.L.R. 1515 (CA), that, where there are concurrent effective causes of the loss, one being wrongdoing before the Transfer Date and the other wrongdoing after that date, the indemnity in the clause under consideration in the present case does not cover losses caused by the latter: see paragraphs 25-28 of the judge’s judgment.

However, I do not, with respect, agree with Longmore LJ’s conclusions:

The starting point in my view as to whether CHBC was under a continuing contractual obligation, and therefore was in continuing breach of contract or duty after the Transfer Date, must be the nature of CHBC’s obligations under the terms of the Services Agreement; see e.g. per Dyson J in New Islington and Hackney Housing Association Ltd v Pollard Thomas & Edwards [2001] P.N.L.R. 20, at para 13 (Footnote: ¹); and per Lord Clarke in Maharaj v Johnson [2015] UKPC 28; [2015] PNLR 553, at paragraph 54. The Services Agreement, under which CHBC was to provide wider-ranging consultancy services and advice for the Scheme on an ongoing basis, is a very different type of contract from the solicitors’ contracts of retainer under consideration in cases such as Bell, Nouri and Maharaj.

In the latter three cases, the solicitors were retained to act effectively in relation to one transaction. By contrast, in the present case, the range of CHBC’s duties as defined in the Services Agreement was extremely wide. The fact that it received fees paid quarterly in arrear supports the concept of an ongoing, day to day, retainer. Although Longmore LJ has already set out the more relevant duties, I reproduce Section 2 of the Services Agreement in full to emphasise the point that clearly CHBC was expected to be proactive in the provision of its advice and consultancy services on a rolling basis. Thus, for example, the evidence showed that not only was CHBC required to attend Trustees’ meetings four times a year, but it was also required to draft the agendas for such meetings; in other words the obligation was on CHBC to identify and raise the issues which required discussion, resolution and action.

“SECTION 2 - CONSULTANCY SERVICE SPECIFICATION

2.1

Core Services

2.1.1.

Advice & Guidance on Scheme Design & Legislative Trends

•

Guidance and recommendations about the design of the Scheme, benefit structure, eligibility criteria, and the specific needs of the Scheme membership.

•

Providing information and recommendation about social and political trends affecting the provision of pensions and employee benefits.

•

Supplying information and tailored advice regarding the effect and specification of all relevant legislation, regulations and practice of the Pension Schemes Office of the Inland Revenue, the Occupational Pensions Board and the Department of Social Security.

2.1.2.

Investment Advice

•

Advising the Trustees about the attributes and suitability of the Scheme’s investments.

•

Monitoring and reporting on the investment performance of the scheme’s investment manager.

•

Providing advice and recommendations about suitable investment vehicles for members’ additional voluntary contributions.

2.1.3.

Scheme Communications

•

Issue of a periodical Newsletter to the Trustees providing information upon benefit trends and pensions practice.

2.1.4.

Broking

•

Conducting periodic assessments of the competitiveness of the insurance companies with which the Death in Service benefits risks are placed.

•

If pensions are to be secured by purchasing annuities, ensuring that competitive rates consistent with security are obtained from the annuity market place.

2.1.5.

Meetings

•

Attendance at meetings with the Trustees or the Employer as necessary.

•

Attending up to four formal Trustees meetings per year.

2.1.6

Trusteeship Advice

•

Offering advice, as necessary, to the Trustees on their main duties and discretionary powers.

•

Assisting the Trustees in the conduct of their duties.

2.1.7.

The Pensions Bill/Act

•

Advice, guidance and recommendations on the effects of the Pensions Bill.

2.2

Non-Core Service

2.2.1.

Investment Advice

•

Assisting the Trustees in the assessment and selection of investment managers.

2.2.2.

Scheme Communications

•

Drafting, designing and arranging the production of:

a.

The Trustees Report and Accounts (to audit stage)

b.

A simplified version of the Trustees Report and Accounts for distribution to members.

c.

Advising the Trustees about the requirements of the Disclosure of Information Regulations.

2.2.3.

Member Communications and Advice

•

At the Trustees request, giving presentations to members and prospective members regarding the benefits provided by the Scheme.

•

Attending meetings with individual employees in connection with any matters arising from their membership or prospective membership of the scheme.

•

Advising individual members on the exercise of any option under the Scheme.

2.2.4.

Actuarial Advice

•

Advice and recommendation for the development of the most appropriate funding strategy.

•

Providing assessments of the cost of individual or bulk augmentations of benefits.

•

Advice on scheme solvency.

2.2.5.

Pension Bill/Act

•

Preparation of a Scheme “audit” to renew the likely effect of forthcoming legislation.

2.2.6.

Other Projects

•

Non-specified projects that fall outside of the services offered under the core service.”

In paragraph 5 of his judgment, the judge set out details from the QEF Particulars of Claim. For present purposes the relevant paragraphs are paragraphs 24 to 32 of the Particulars of Claim. They read as follows (all emphasis supplied):

“24.

On 6 April 2004 Mr Le Cras instructed Burges Salmon to prepare a deed of amendment in relation to the Scheme to reflect the contribution and benefit changes announced to members in March 2004.

25.

On 14 April 2004 Burges Salmon sent a letter to Mr Le Cras advising him, amongst other things, as follows:

“In relation to the effective date for the changes, I should mention at this stage that, in my view, the earliest date these changes can become effective is the date on which the deed of amendment is signed. To give the deed retrospective effect would require the consent of the members under section 67 of the Pensions Act 1995 due to the adverse effect the amendment would have on rights and entitlements accrued in respect of members prior to the date of the amendment...”

26.

Thus by 14 April 2004 Mr Le Cras was aware (if he was not so aware before) that (a) intended changes to benefits could not be made by way of announcement to members and (b) the rules could not be amended with retrospective effect so as to adversely affect members’ existing rights without raising section 67 issues. Mr Le Cras should have but failed to immediately (on receiving this advice) advise the Trustees of the same and further failed to advise them that the 2000/2001 amendments had not in fact been effected.

27.

On 22 April 2004 Mr Le Cras provided Burges Salmon with, amongst other things, copies of the Announcements to Members dated March 2000 and January 2001 together with details of the further changes intended to have been effected in July 2001. He requested that Burges Salmon include such changes in the Deed of Amendment which they were preparing. He further requested that Burges Salmon delete or amend Clause 5 of the then existing draft Deed of Amendment which related to the effective date of the changes.

28.

On 10 May 2004 Burges Salmon sent a revised draft deed of amendment to Mr Le Cras for his approval under cover of a letter which stated, amongst other things, as follows:

“...the effective dates for the amendments in the deed are those stipulated in the announcements in accordance with your instructions..,.

...As you know we have expressed reservations about making the amendments retrospective in view of section 67 of the Pensions Act 1995 but you have instructed us to make the amendments retrospective. You have also confirmed that the actuary has said he is prepared to give a certificate. We have drafted the amendments on that basis but express no view as to whether they are legally watertight”

29.

Mr Le Cras again failed to forward the above letter to the Foundation and the Trustees and omitted to inform them of the content of the above advice.

30.

During June and July 2004 Burges Salmon sent four further drafts of the proposed deed of amendment to Mr Le Cras. On the basis of the documentation provided to the Claimants to date, this correspondence culminated in an email dated 5th July 2004 from Burges Salmon to Mr Le Cras confirming that the changes requested by him had been made and requesting his instructions in relation to two outstanding issues (namely whether there were any Dorincourt members and the potential payment period for childrens’ pensions).

31.

The Claimants have not to date been provided with any documentation to show that Mr Le Cras responded to the above request for instructions (as he ought to have done). Further the draft Deed was not provided to the Foundation and the Trustees so as to enable the changes to the Scheme to be effected nor were the Foundation and the Trustees provided with any advice in relation to the effect of the failure to execute the Deed. Instead, as set out in paragraphs 32 and 33 below, Mr Le Cras continued to make positive representations to the Foundation, the Trustees and Members that the intended changes had been validly made (when he was expressly aware that this was not the case).

Material Events after 2004

32.

At all material times after July 2004 until he left RFBC’s employment, Mr Le Cras continued to falsely, alternatively negligently, misrepresent that the changes to the Scheme referred to in paragraph 12 above had been validly made.”

The judge analysed Mr Le Cras and CHBC’s continuing breach of duty as follows:

“11.

CHBC was also in continuing breach of duty in this respect from day to day throughout the period from the Transfer Date to December 2007. The nature of CHBC’s retainer, set out in a Services and Fees Agreement dated 1 July 1995, was that it had a continuing role in advising and assisting the trustees and QEF in relation to the Scheme, which included considering the changes previously made, or purportedly made, and considering the implementation of the amendments in the context of subsequent dealings with the trustees. This is apparent from the activity which founded QEF’s misrepresentation claim, which involved Mr Le Cras adverting to the previous changes for the purposes of subsequent dealings with the trustees and members of the Scheme. It is also apparent from the activity in the period immediately before and shortly after the Transfer Date. From the end of March 2004 Mr Le Cras had liaised with Burges Salmon who were instructed to include the April 2004 amendments in a draft deed of amendment to the Scheme rules to be executed by the trustees. By 19 April 2004 his instructions included the drafting of amendments to reflect the 2000 and 2001 changes. Discussions with Burges Salmon continued sporadically until July 2004. The last relevant communication appears to have been a letter of 20 September 2004 from Burges Salmon in which the latter notified Mr Le Cras that the partner previously handling the matter had left the firm and asking whether the draft deed of amendment he had sent by email on 5 July was ready to be finalised or whether any further changes were necessary. This is a case which falls on the Midland Bank side of the line (Midland Bank Trust Co Ltd v Hett Stubbs & Kemp [1979] Ch 384) as distinct from one concerned with a retainer to advise on, or carry out, a single transaction such as that in Bell v Peter Browne Co [1990] 2 QB 495 or Nouri v Marvi [2011] PNLR 7. CHBC’s retainer included a duty to assist in maintaining a state of affairs, namely that the scheme in force from time to time should reflect the decisions of the Trustees. As such it involved a continuing duty in the sense explained by Dixon J in Larking v Great Western (Nepean) Gravel Ltd [1940] HCA 37; (1940) 64 CLR 221 at 236:

“If a covenantor undertakes that he will do a definite act and omits to do it within the time allowed for the purpose, he has broken his covenant finally and his continued failure to do the act is nothing but a failure to remedy his past breach and not the commission of any further breach of his covenant. His duty is not considered as persisting and, so to speak, being forever renewed until he actually does that which he promised. On the other hand, if his covenant is to maintain a state or condition of affairs, as, for instance, maintaining a building in repair, keeping the insurance of a life on foot, or affording a particular kind of lateral or vertical support to a tenement, then a further breach arises in every successive moment of time during which the state or condition is not as promised, during which, to pursue the examples, the building is out of repair, the life uninsured, or the particular support unprovided. The distinction may be difficult of application in a given case but it must be regarded as one depending upon the meaning of the covenant.” (Emphasis supplied.)

I agree with this analysis. The revised draft deed of amendment, enclosed with Burges Salmon’s letter dated 10th May 2004, gave effect for the first time in the drafting process to Mr Le Cras’ instructions in his fax dated 22nd April 2004 to state that the effective dates for the relevant amendments were those stipulated in the announcements, as opposed to the date on which the amendment deed was signed. In those circumstances, in my judgment, in May 2004 Mr Le Cras clearly had an ongoing contractual obligation under the Services Agreement to circulate the draft deed to the Trustees for their signature and to inform them of the doubts which Burges Salmon had expressed as to whether the purported retrospective implementation from the announcement dates would be effective. Mr Le Cras’ failure to do either of those things, in particular when he was specifically dealing with the draft deeds of amendment in the period May to September 2004, in my view clearly amounted to continuing breaches of his ongoing contractual duties. Indeed at this stage there was an additional breach of duty in that, although he apparently had intended the Trustees to sign the draft deed of amendment, he appears, whether deliberately or negligently, to have decided at some time during the summer months of 2004 not to provide them with the draft at all.

This analysis is supported by the approach taken by Dyson J in New Islington and Hackney Housing Association Ltd v Pollard Thomas & Edwards supra in relation to the ongoing obligations (if any) of an architect who had designed the foundations of the building. Dyson J said this at paragraphs 15 to 21:

“15 But it is necessary to consider the scope of that duty in a little more detail. What does the duty to review the design entail? In what circumstances will an architect be in breach of that duty? I find it convenient to consider an example. Let us suppose that an architect is engaged on the standard RIBA Conditions of Engagement to provide the full service (as PTE were in the present case), including administering a building contract in a standard JCT form of contract. Suppose that he designs the foundations of a building (a large office block), the foundations are constructed in accordance with his design, and several years later, practical completion is achieved. Let us further suppose that the design of the foundations is defective and one which no reasonably competent architect would have produced: in other words, the architect was negligent. There can be no doubt that the architect commits a breach of contract when he completes the design and gives instructions to the contractor to construct the foundations in accordance with it. But in what sense and to what extent is the architect under a duty to review his negligent design once the foundations have been designed and constructed?

16 In my view, in the absence of an express term or express instructions, he is not under a duty specifically to review the design of the foundations, unless something occurs to make it necessary, or at least prudent, for a reasonably competent architect to do so. For example, a specific duty might arise if, before completion, the inadequacy of the foundations causes the building to show signs of distress; or if the architect reads an article which shows that the materials that he has specified for the foundations are not fit for their purpose; or if he learns from some other source that the design is dangerous. In such circumstances, I am in no doubt that the architect would be under a duty to review the design, and, if necessary, issue variation instructions to the contractor to remedy the problem. But in the absence of some reason such as this, I do not think that an architect who has designed and supervised the construction of foundations is thereafter under an obligation to review his design.

17 I do not accept that in every case where an architect has negligently introduced a defective design into a building, he is also by the same token in breach of a continuing breach of a contractual obligation to review his design. In Midland Bank Trust Co. Ltd v. Hett, Stubbs & Kemp [1979] Ch 384, 503C, Oliver J. said:

“It is not seriously arguable that a solicitor who or whose firm has acted negligently comes under a continuing duty to take care to remind himself of the negligence of which, ex hypothesi, he is unaware.”

18 In my view, that observation is as apt to apply to an architect as it is to a solicitor. The position is quite different where the architect (or solicitor) knows, or ought to know, of his earlier negligence. When that occurs, then he may well be under a contractual obligation to review his earlier performance, and advise his client honestly and competently of his opinion. Whether he is in fact under such a duty when he has actual or constructive knowledge of his earlier breach of contract will depend on whether the contract is still being performed. If the contract has been discharged (for whatever reason), then the professional person may be under a duty in tort to advise his client of his earlier breach of contract, but it is difficult to see how he can be under any contractual duty to do so.

19 The foundation for the statement in the cases that an architect is under a continuing duty to review his design is the dictum of Sachs L.J. in Brickfield Properties Ltd v Newton [1971] 1 W.L.R. 862, 973F: *522

“The architect is under a continuing duty to check that his design will work in practice and to correct any errors which may emerge. It savours of the ridiculous for the architect to be able to say, as it was here suggested that he could say: ‘true, my design was faulty, but, of course, I saw to it that the contractors followed it faithfully’ and be enabled on that ground to succeed in the action.”

20 But Sachs L.J. was not concerned to explore the scope of an architect's continuing duty to review his design. In my judgment, the duty does not require the architect to review any particular aspect of the design that he has already completed unless he has good reason for so doing. What is a good reason must be determined objectively, and the standard is set by reference to what a reasonably competent architect would do in the circumstances.” (Emphasis supplied.)

In that case, applying the appropriate objective standard, Dyson J held that the architect concerned was under no continuing duty. However, in my judgment, on the facts of the present case both the terms of CHBC’s continuing obligations under the Services Agreement and the circumstances which had specifically brought the problems of retrospective implementation to Mr Le Cras’ attention, made it incumbent upon him, applying an objective standard as discussed by Dyson J, to bring the matter to the Trustees’ attention throughout the period from the Transfer Date to the end of 2004. Indeed, his failure to do so, in the light of his knowledge that, on any basis a draft amendment deed was required, and his failure in the summer of 2004 after the Transfer Date even to circulate the draft deed of amendment to the Trustees, has all the hallmarks of dishonest concealment (i.e. deceit), in circumstances where CHBC was clearly under an obligation to inform the Trustees and QEF of the advice which it had received.

The judge decided that, when looked at holistically, CHBC’s duties included the ongoing obligation to take reasonable steps to ensure that the Scheme in force adequately reflected the Trustees’ decisions from time to time and that they were provided with any legal advice which CHBC had obtained and for which they and/or QEF were obliged to pay. I agree. These duties and their breach in relation to the relevant period from the Transfer Date to the end of 2004 were pleaded against CHBC in the QEF Claim. This was not simply the case of a continued failure to remedy a past remediable breach. This was a case where Mr Le Cras had continuing obligations after the Transfer Date and under the Services Agreement to keep the Trustees and QEF advised in relation to the status of the Scheme.

Nor do I consider that there is any need for this Court on this occasion to rationalise the difference in approach between Midland Bank on the one hand and Bell, Nouri and Maharaj on the other. That is for a number of reasons.

First of all, as I have already said, the terms of the contract in the present case, the nature of the continuing contractual relationship between the parties and the particular circumstances giving rise to the breach are wholly distinguishable on the facts from the “one off” conveyancing transactions, and their aftermath, which formed the subject matter of Midland Bank, Bell, Nouri and Maharaj.

Second, I do not accept, if that indeed be the implication of Longmore LJ’s judgment, that whether or not a continuing obligation, or a continuing breach of duty, exists as a matter of law in the present case is somehow predicated by the analysis in Bell, Nouri and Maharaj as to whether a continuing obligation exists in the context of a failure to register a conveyancing transaction or as to when a breach occurred in the context of a fraudulent conveyancing transaction. That point was expressly recognised by Nicholls LJ in Bell at 500-501, where he said:

“It is, of course, true that the solicitor's breach of contract in 1978 did not discharge his obligations. Had the plaintiff learned, a year or two later, of what had happened, he would still have been entitled to go back to his former solicitor and require him to carry out, belatedly, his contractual obligations so far as they could still be performed. For example, lodging a caution. Despite this, it was in 1978 that the breach occurred. Failure thereafter to make good the omission did not constitute a further breach. The position after 1978 was simply that, in breach of contract, the solicitor had failed to do what he ought to have done in 1978 and, year after year, that breach remained unremedied. Nor would the position have been different if in, say, 1980 the plaintiff's solicitor had been asked to remedy his breach of contract and he had failed to do so. His failure to make good his existing breach of contract on request would not have constituted a further breach of contract: it would not have set a new six-year limitation period running. Once again, the position would have been simply that the solicitor remained in breach. Nor, finally, is the position any different because, in respect of lodging a caution, the breach remained remediable until 1986 when the house was sold. A remediable breach is just as much a breach of contract when it occurs as an irremediable breach, although the practical consequences are likely to be less serious if the breach comes to light in time to take remedial action. Were the law otherwise, in any of these instances, the effect would be to frustrate the purpose of the statutes of limitation, for it would mean that breaches of contract would never become statute-barred unless the innocent party chose to accept the defaulting party's conduct as a repudiation or, perhaps, performance ceased to be possible.

     For completeness I add that the above observations are directed at the normal case where a contract provides for something to be done, and the defaulting party fails to fulfill his contractual obligation in that regard at the time when performance is due under the contract. In such a case there is a single breach of contract. By way of contrast are the exceptional cases where, on the true construction of the contract, the defaulting party's obligation is a continuing contractual obligation. In such cases the obligation is not breached once and for all, but it is a contractual obligation which arises anew for performance day after day, so that on each successive day there is a fresh breach. A familiar example of this is the usual form of repairing clause in a tenancy agreement. Non-repair for six years does not result in the repairing obligation becoming statute-barred while the tenancy still subsists. The obligation of the tenant or the landlord to keep the property in repair is broken afresh every day the property is out of repair, as Bramwell B. observed in Spoor v. Green (1874) L.R. 9 Ex.  99, 111.” (Emphasis supplied.)

To similar effect was Mustill LJ at page 512 F- 513A where he recognised that a solicitor may indeed have a continuing retainer in appropriate circumstances.

Likewise in Carlton v Fulchers [1997] PNLR 337 at 342, Waller LJ said;

“As it seems to me, the passage in Oliver J.'s judgment in Midland Bank v. Hett, Stubbs & Kemp [1979] 1 Ch. 384 at 438 to which we were referred holds that, in a case where there is a continuous contractual obligation, the limitation period does not begin to run until the contract finally becomes impossible of performance. In the case of want of prosecution by a solicitor for example, it would be wholly unsatisfactory to contemplate defining the date of breach for limitation purposes by reference to a solicitor's first failure to take out the summons for directions for the reasons given by Oliver J. Nothing, as I see it, in Bell v. Peter Browne & Co. [1990] 2 Q.B. 495, criticises that aspect of the judgment in a continuing duty case. Indeed as I see it, Nichols L.J. at 501 and Mustill L.J. at 512, seem to recognise that the continuing retainer type of case both exists and will bring a different result from the situation being dealt with in Bell v. Browne. There was, as I see it, clearly a continuing duty on Mr Fulcher up to October 4. His retainer was to make all attempts to preserve the plaintiff's cause of action, including making a section 33 application. That was capable of performance up to the termination of his retainer by the October 4 letter; not before that date should any period of limitation in my view begin to run.”

In other words I do not accept that the mere fact that, in the present case, the original pre-Transfer Date breach was to some extent remediable has the result that Bell, Nouri and Maharaj require an outcome, as a matter of law, that CHBC was not in continuing breach of its continuing obligations.

Third, it is thus irrelevant for present purposes whether Midland can be distinguished on its facts, or on any principled basis, from Bell, Nouri and Maharaj and this court does not need to decide between them. Certainly in Nouri the Court of Appeal regarded the Court of Appeal in Bell as having treated the decision of Oliver J in Midland as very much dependent on its own facts: see per Patten LJ at paragraph 36, with whom Rix LJ and Sir Mark Waller agreed. I also agree. Moreover the critical issue in Midland was Oliver J’s definition of the relevant contractual duty as an obligation requiring the solicitors to register the option before a 3^rd party acquired an interest in the land: see e.g. page 434A. That was what the judges in the subsequent decisions, perhaps not surprisingly, had difficulty in accepting. And that articulation of the duty of a solicitor in a conveyancing context may well not be correct in the light of Bell, Nouri and Maharaj. But the extent to which Oliver J’s articulation of the duty survives, if at all, in my judgment has nothing to do with the correct outcome of this appeal.

Accordingly I would uphold the judgment of Popplewell J to its full extent. I would hold that losses incurred in the period from 1st May 2004 to 31st December 2004 are irrecoverable under the indemnity, because Mr Le Cras’ conduct post the Transfer Date (i.e. from 1st May 2004) undoubtedly did give rise to new causes of action, both for breach of contractual duty and probably also for misrepresentation and/or deceit. I would not remit the matter to the judge for further assessment of the sums due under the indemnity.

I agree with the reasoning and conclusions of Longmore LJ in his judgment, which I have had the opportunity of reading in draft. Accordingly, I too would hold that it is only losses after 31^st December 2004 that are irrecoverable under the indemnity. The losses incurred before that date were in my judgment caused wholly by CHBC’s breaches of duty before the Transfer Date, which remained unremedied. Those losses therefore fell squarely within the wording of clause 5.8 of the Share Purchase Agreement, being referable to claims which arose “directly or indirectly from … services … supplied by the Company [CHBC] … prior to the Transfer Date”.

In respect of losses incurred after 1 January 2005, the causative potency of CHBC’s original breaches of duty continued with undiminished force until the date when the judge held that QEF and the Trustees should have remedied the position for the future by procuring formal amendments to the Scheme rules, namely 1 December 2007. The difference is that, in respect of this later period of loss, there was also a concurrent cause in the form of Mr Le Cras’s negligent or fraudulent representations that the necessary amendments of the Scheme had been put in place by September 2004. The existence of this concurrent cause engages (by close analogy, if not directly) the principles applied by Hobhouse J and this court in E E Caledonia, whereby recovery under an indemnity is normally taken to be precluded, as a matter of construction, where a concurrent cause of the relevant loss is negligence (or, a fortiori, fraud) on the part of the claimant.

My Lady Gloster LJ, in her judgment which I have also had the benefit of reading in draft, gives powerful reasons for disagreeing with Longmore LJ’s conclusion that CHBC was not in continuing breach of contract on a day to day basis after the Transfer Date. I must therefore explain why, with the greatest respect, I am unpersuaded by her views and prefer the analysis of Longmore LJ.

The central point, to my mind, is that CHBC was instructed by the Trustees to ensure that the necessary amendments to the Scheme were made with effect from specified dates falling between 6 April 2000 and 1 April 2004. Owing to the negligence of CHBC, those instructions were never effectively implemented. CHBC was under a contractual duty to ensure that the amendments were made in due time, but it failed to fulfil that duty. CHBC was therefore in breach of contract, at the latest when each of the specified dates for performance arrived and nothing effective had been done.

Those breaches remained unremedied, but an unremedied breach of contract is just that: a breach of contract which has not been remedied. In the normal way, it is impossible to construct a continuing contractual obligation, in the sense of one which gives rise to a fresh breach on a daily basis, from the mere failure to perform the original obligation in due time. This remains the case, as Nicholls LJ explained in Bell, even if the party in breach is asked to make good his default but fails to do so. As Nicholls LJ said, at 501A:

“His failure to make good his existing breach of contract on request would not have constituted a further breach of contract: it would not have set a new six-year limitation period running. Once again, the position would have been simply that the solicitor remained in breach.”

Conceptually, there is of course a class of contractual duties which do give rise to a continuing obligation to perform them which arises afresh from day to day. Examples are given by Nicholls LJ in Bell at 501D-E (repairing clauses in a lease), and by Dixon J in Larking v Great Western (Nepean) Gravel Ltd [1940] HCA 37, (1940) 64 CLR 221 at 236, cited by the judge at the end of paragraph 11 of his judgment. To quote Dixon J, a duty of this nature is one “to maintain a state or condition of affairs”.

The judge clearly had this passage in mind when, just before his citation from Larking, he described CHBC’s retainer as including “a duty to assist in maintaining a state of affairs, namely that the scheme in force from time to time should reflect the decisions of the Trustees”. With respect, however, I do not consider that to be an accurate description of any of the duties of CHBC under the Services Agreement, and it is certainly not an accurate description of the obligations which CHBC undertook to ensure that the necessary amendments to the Scheme were made by the specified dates. It seems to me that these were probably “additional services” falling within paragraph 1.3 of section 1 of the Services Agreement, as they do not sit comfortably within any of the core or non-core services specified in section 2 (unless, possibly, they fall within paragraph 2.2.6 as “other projects”, which again would not in my view import a continuing duty). I therefore think the judge was wrong to characterise these obligations to perform specific tasks by specific dates as importing a duty to maintain a state or condition of affairs, and he may have been over-influenced by a wish to bring the facts of the present case within the very different kind of continuing duty recognised by Dixon J and Nicholls LJ.

If my analysis is right thus far, I do not think the position was significantly altered by Mr Le Cras’s failure around the time of the Transfer Date to ensure that the misgivings expressed by Burges Salmon in their letter of 14 April 2004 were passed on to the Trustees, or that the draft deed of amendment which he instructed Burges Salmon to prepare on 22 April 2004 was approved and signed by the Trustees. Reprehensible though these failures may have been, I see them as essentially failures by Mr Le Cras to make good the existing breaches of contract of which he must by then have been fully aware.