West v HM Prison Bure

This is an appeal against the judgment of Silber J on 7 August 2012 refusing the appellant Mr Russell West's application for habeas corpus.

A certain amount of background is essential for an understanding of Mr West's submissions, for which I for one am grateful. On 17 May 2010 in the Glasgow High Court Mr West was convicted of indecent behaviour toward a girl contrary to section 6 of the Criminal Law (Consolidation) Act 1995 (the Glasgow conviction). On 14 June 2010 in the Edinburgh High Court under section 210A of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995, there was imposed an extended sentence of five-and-a-half years (the Edinburgh sentence), its custodial term two-and-a-half years, its extension period three years. On expiry of the custodial term the appellant would remain on licence for a further three years (section 210A(2)(b)). The extension period was subject to sections 26A(3) and (4) and to section 17 of the Prisoners and Criminal Proceedings (Scotland) Act 1993.

On 18 January 2011, having served half the custodial term, the appellant was released on licence to remain in force until the expiry of his extended sentence (section 26A(4) of the Prisoners and Criminal Proceedings (Scotland) Act 1993).

I must deal, before moving on, with the position as understood before Silber J. Rather than a formal order under the Crimes (Sentences) Act 1997, informal arrangements for transfer to England of the appellant's supervision allowed him during his licence to live in England. He abided by one condition of release, in that he reported to a hostel in Ipswich, but a breach of his reporting conditions was subsequently notified by Essex Probation Services to the Scottish Government.

On 1 February 2011 the Parole Board of Scotland revoked his licence and directed he be re-detained. He had failed to keep in touch with his supervising officer, to inform him of changes to residence or employment and to live in supported and then in approved accommodation. He stayed at the approved hostel on the night of 17 January 2011 at least. The next day he met his offender manager and public protection officers, signed the Sex Offender Register, but thereafter failed to report back to the hostel and became an absconder.

The licence remained in force until the end of the extension period. The 1 February 2011 decision of the Parole Board of Scotland under section 17 revoked it in relation to the whole period.

On 14 March 2011 the appellant was arrested in Southend in Essex. The relevant Parole Board report recites that, wearing a knuckleduster-type ring, he punched a police officer in the face. The following day magistrates convicted him of possession of an offensive weapon and of assaulting a police constable, committed him to the Crown Court at Basildon for sentence and there, on 4 April 2011, he was sentenced to nine months' imprisonment (the Basildon sentence) concurrent with any other existing period of imprisonment. Since that date he has been a prisoner at Her Majesty's Prison Bure in Norfolk.

By 19 August 2011 he had served half the Basildon sentence, and it expired on 3 January 2012. Absent any other sentence or custodial requirement, he would have been released on 19 August. However, he remains imprisoned serving the balance of the Edinburgh sentence after revocation of his licence.

On 11 October 2011, having considered the matter, the Parole Board for Scotland did not order his immediate release. After the hearing before Silber J, on 30 October 2012 it considered the appellant's case again and in a letter dated 9 November 2012 explained to him its decision that he should continue to be confined for the protection of the public from serious harm. He remains liable to be detained until his sentence expiry date of 28 May 2015 unless his earlier release is directed by the Parole Board or by the Secretary of State for Justice.

His argument is that the custodial element, two-and-a-half years, of his sentence having expired, he is in the three-year extension period and he should, as the sentencing judge had in mind he contends, be released for "supervision in the community", the very purpose of the sentence period.

Although I readily understand why Mr West has made the submissions he does, that is a misreading of the legislation and a misconstruction of the sentencing remarks and particularly of their power.

Section 26A(3) of the Criminal Proceedings (Scotland) Act 1993 provides that on release on licence, in this case January 2011, the appellant's licence remained in force until the end of the extension period, subject to revocation. Revocation by the Parole Board of Scotland (February 2011) left him liable to be detained until the end of the extension period.

Before Silber J, the respondent, represented today by Mr Christopher Staker, had argued that the transfer of supervision from Scotland to England was pursuant to paragraph 4, Schedule 1, of the Crimes (Sentences) Act 1997. Such a transfer could be restricted or unrestricted (paragraph 6(1) of Schedule 1). To an unrestricted transfer paragraph 15(4) of the schedule would apply. To a restricted, paragraphs 6(2)(c), paragraph 6(3) and 10(5) would apply. Without a transfer of supervision the Probation Service in Essex would have known nothing of the appellant. Had the transfer been unrestricted, then the Probation Service would have reported the breach of reporting conditions to the English authorities rather than the Scottish, and the Parole Board of Scotland would not have revoked the licence.

Each authority acted consistently with a restricted transfer. Indeed, in documents dated January 2012 the appellant had sought transfer to England for the most understandable of reasons.

Silber J was satisfied that the appellant was the subject of a restricted transfer. On that basis, the respondent argued that the Prisoners and Criminal Proceedings (Scotland) Act continued to apply in place of corresponding provisions in the law of England and Wales. The effect is that the authorities in Scotland made determinations as to the recall and release on licence pursuant to legislation in force in Scotland. That said, the appellant is imprisoned in England as if his period of supervision had been an equivalent period directed to be undergone in England and Wales.

Mr West has today conceded that there is nothing in any of his complaints based on transfer and the legislative scheme is included in this judgment for the purposes of completeness and no more.

Mr West's complaint before us centres upon Article 5 of the Human Rights Act. His submission is that since the period of the custodial term has been served, upon his release he was, by definition, within the supervision period and as such his recall and his languishing in custody is impermissible.

He relies upon Article 5(1) and 5(4) of the European Convention on Human Rights to challenge the lawfulness of his detention. He sensibly concedes that his grounds should be read as one overarching point, albeit presented in a triad.

His first ground relies on Article 5(1) which reads, where relevant:

His imprisonment to the end of the extension period following recall is in fact detention by a competent court in accordance with the procedure prescribed by the statute. In any event, a challenge in habeas corpus against the Governor of Her Majesty's Prison Bure is misconceived even were the merits with the appellant (and they are not) since he could hope to challenge only the Parole Board of Scotland. His argument is that the extension period of three years was for "supervision in the community" and that imprisonment during that extension period cannot be for this purpose (supervision in the community) and is thus not prescribed by law for the purposes of Article 5(1).

This argument is unsustainable. The legislation provides that during the extension period the appellant was on licence; his licence is revocable; and revocation is of the entire remaining period: that is, the period until the end of his extension period. Since the legislation does not state that the purpose of an extension period is to provide supervision in the community, it follows that revocation and recall are not inconsistent with the legislative purpose. It is true that in the sentencing remarks the judge made reference to a period of supervision in the community, but one judicial reference to that effect cannot override provisions of primary legislation. In any event, the sentencing judge, as a contextual reading of his remarks makes plain, was aware of the legislation and loyally followed it, as is clear from this quotation:

“The conditions of your licence will be fixed by the Secretary of State. If, during that extension period, you fail to comply with the conditions of your licence, it may be revoked and you may be returned to custody for a further period in respect of that case."

The effect of Mr West's submission is a challenge to primary legislation as inconsistent with Article 5, in reliance at least in part on Weeks v the United Kingdom [1987] 10 EHRR 293 (Weeks) and the decision of the High Court in R(Sim) v the Parole Board [2003] EWHC 152 (Admin) (Sim).

In deference to the well shaped arguments advanced by the appellant, I shall distil the competing facts of Weeks and of Sim.

Weeks was 17 and sentenced to a discretionary life term for armed robbery. The Secretary of State could thus have ordered his release once - if it were - it was concluded that he no longer posed a danger to the public. The European Court of Human Rights said:

“The intention was to make the applicant, who was qualified both by the trial judge and by the Court of Appeal as a ‘dangerous young man’, subject to a continuing security measure in the interests of public safety. The sentencing judges recognised that it was not possible for them to forecast how long his instability and personality disorders would endure… they accordingly had recourse to an ‘indeterminate sentence’: this would enable … the Home Secretary, to monitor his progress and release him back into the community when he was no longer judged to represent a danger to society or to himself… In substance, Mr. Weeks was being put at the disposal of the State because he needed continued supervision in custody for an unforeseeable length of time and, as a corollary, periodic reassessment in order to ascertain the most appropriate manner of dealing with him.

The grounds expressly relied on by the sentencing courts for ordering this form of deprivation of liberty … are by their very nature susceptible of change with the passage of time, whereas the measure will remain in force for the whole of his life. In this, his sentence differs from a life sentence imposed on a person because of the gravity of the offence."

Weeks was released on licence and recalled. He argued that his loss of liberty was satisfied upon his release, the link broken at that stage, his rights under Article 5 restored and his re-detention, fifteen months later, no longer justified under Article 5(1)(a). Rejecting his claim for violation of Article 5(1), the court said:

“As a matter of English law, it was inherent in Mr. Weeks’ life sentence that, whether he was inside or outside prison, his liberty was at the discretion of the executive for the rest of his life (subject to the controls subsequently introduced by the 1967 Act, notably the Parole Board). This the sentencing judges must be taken to have known and intended. It is not for the Court, within the context of Article 5 (art. 5), to review the appropriateness of the original sentence…

In this area, as in many others, the national authorities are to be recognised as having a certain discretion since they are better placed than the international judge to evaluate the evidence…

In view of this unstable, disturbed and aggressive behaviour, there were grounds for the Home Secretary to have considered that the applicant’s continued liberty would constitute a danger to the public and to himself. The Minister’s decision to re-detain remained within the bounds of the margin of appreciation available …it cannot be regarded as arbitrary or unreasonable in terms of the objectives of the sentence imposed…

In the Court’s view, therefore, a sufficient connection, for the purposes of sub-paragraph (a) of Article 5 para. 1 existed between his conviction in 1966 and his recall to prison in 1977.”

In Mr West's case the objective of the extension period was to put in place an extended period of licence, during which, as I have explained, he might be recalled if necessary. His licence was revoked in part because he absconded the day after release. In October 2011 when the Parole Board for Scotland declined to order his re-release it did so because (a) he had been unlawfully at large until arrest; (b) on arrest he assaulted a police officer; (c) he was assessed as presenting a high risk of harm to children; (d), he had done no work to address the risk; and (e) the risk was unacceptable and could not be managed in the community.

There is, in my view, a plain connection between his recall and the intention of the sentencer.

Mr West also relies upon Sim. Sim was a sex offender on whom an extended sentence had been imposed and he was recalled after release on licence. At first instance, considering whether Article 5(1) applied to a decision to recall in those circumstances, Elias J said:

On appeal, R(Sim) v the Parole Board [2003] EWCA Civ 1845, Keene LJ said:

His second Ground is that the Edinburgh sentencing judge was not entitled to impose an extension period because the requirements of section 210A of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 went unsatisfied. That section mandates an extension period where the court considers that the period for which the offender would otherwise be subject to a licence would not be adequate for the purpose of protecting the public from serious harm from him.

The appellant argues that the sentencer was not entitled to conclude that he posed a risk of "serious harm" to the public. He has developed that point today by reference to the degree of the harm involved in the offences for which he variously answered. He has four examples. He remarked that although assaulting a police officer, he concedes, confronts him with a difficulty, the harm he caused was far nearer the offence of common assault than that of assault occasioning actual bodily harm, let alone of grievous bodily harm. Indeed, the originating offence, sexual impropriety, did not within it contain any suggestion of violence, and he reminds us there has been no suggestion of sexual impropriety after release.

This Ground amounts to a challenge on the merits to the Edinburgh sentence. It should have been brought in an appeal against the sentence in the relevant court and in Scotland. Mr West has told us of the chronicle of appeals he has mounted, every one of them unsuccessful. An appeal against sentence cannot be brought by way of habeas corpus against the Governor of the prison in which it is currently served. The sentencing judge said:

Although I think I understand Mr West's cast of mind and the route that leads him to express this particular grievance, nevertheless he has not established any error of law in the sentencer's conclusion that any period of licence to which Mr West would otherwise be subject would not be adequate for the protection of the public from serious harm from him. Consequently, the sentence is squarely within the meaning of section 210A of the Criminal Procedures (Scotland) Act 1995, and leaving aside Mr West's contentions that his previous offending may have involved violence but, at the most, minor harm, and leaving aside what those comments might reveal about his level of insight, that was not the issue for the sentencer. The issue was not serious harm in the past, but a risk of serious harm in the future.

The final authority on which Mr West relies is Stafford v United Kingdom [2002] 35 EHRR 32. The court there said:

Elaborating his submissions in the light of Stafford, Mr West points out that he was recalled, as he understands it, for leaving his hostel in the first place, and for assaulting a police officer in the second. He relies on the points with which I have earlier dealt in fortifying this submission that there has been, after his initial arrest for a sexual offence, no suggestion of similar offences after release, and that he cannot, on any view, on his contention, have been said to have caused serious harm whilst on release.

There is a range of problems confronting him in this particular submission. First among them is that the degree of harm attributable to him is a matter for assessment by the Parole Board. He was recalled by the Parole Board for Scotland whilst on licence for the offence for which he had been convicted in Scotland and before his conviction in England for assault. He was therefore not re-detained because of that subsequent offence. On any view, Stafford does not assist him.

His final ground is that Article 5(4) reads:

The court went on to decide that the procedural mechanism then in existence for the Parole Board to order recall did not satisfy the requirements of Article 5(4) because the duty on the Board to act fairly had not been made out in procedure. That procedure did not allow proper participation by the individual adversely affected.

The conclusion in Stafford was reached on an assessment of law and an interpretation then prevailing as applied to the facts of the case. Here, the appellant has not identified any aspect of current powers or procedure of and deployed by the Parole Board of Scotland which were not Article 5(4) compliant. Assuming for a moment that he had succeeded, his challenge would be to the powers, procedures and one decision of the Parole Board of Scotland, not in habeas corpus proceedings against the Governor of Her Majesty's Prison Bure.

In conclusion, therefore, I have tried to follow the presentation style of Mr West, for which I am grateful, and considered his three Grounds of appeal within his overarching submissions on Article 5(4) against the factual and procedural backdrop which brought him here. For the detailed reasons I have given in this brief judgment, I am against him on every one of his submissions and I would dismiss this appeal.

I agree.

I also agree. The appeal is therefore dismissed.