Dudley Metropolitan Borough Council v Shurvinton & Ors

This is a second stage appeal, brought by leave granted by Pitchford LJ, from a decision of the Upper Tribunal (Administrative Appeals Chamber) dated 11^th February 2011. It involves a consideration of the relationship, in the context of special educational needs, between the provisions contained in Part IV of the Education Act 1996 as amended (“the 1996 Act”) and the provisions contained in Part IX of the 1996 Act relating to school transport.

It is said that the points arising are of general public importance. As may appear from what I say below I am not quite so sure that they are.

The background facts can be shortly stated and are these.

The respondents’ son, J, was born on 10 July 2005. He has a diagnosis of autism. Formal testing had not been possible but it was considered that J had moderate learning difficulties. He also had a degree of speech and language impairment. At pre-school he found it difficult to follow an adult led agenda and was described as living in his own world. He was described as happy and affectionate at home, although his behaviour was sometimes difficult. He had, at the relevant time, very little spoken language.

J had at the age of 4 begun a very gradual integration into reception class at a school called The Brier School, a special school for pupils with moderate learning difficulties and other more complex difficulties. He seemed happy there and his parents wished him to attend there. That was their preference, and they said so.

It seems that the appellant local authority has a policy on the provision of free transport from home to school to the effect that, for children with special educational needs, free transport is generally provided only to the nearest suitable school.

There is another local school called Halesbury School, also equipped to cater for those with special educational needs, which is some 1.1 miles closer than The Brier School to the home of J’s family. It was estimated that the extra costs of transport for J to The Brier School as compared to Halesbury School would be between £195 (shared transport) and £312 (individual transport) per year. It was not maintained that J could be expected to walk to either school.

The appellant provided a Statement of Special Educational Needs (“SSEN”) in respect of J dated the 7^th April 2009. In Part 4 of the SSEN (relating to Placement) the following was stated:

The Local Authority would consider that [J’s] needs could be met in his nearest special school for pupils with moderate learning difficulties, namely Halesbury School…[The parents] have expressed a preference for The Brier School…which has been agreed. However in accordance with the Local Authority’s home to school transport policy [the parents] will be responsible for all travelling expenses and arrangements”.

The parents appealed to the First Tier Tribunal (“FTT”) under s.326 of the 1996 Act against that decision. They sought a decision that Part 4 should specify The Brier School and no other school. One consequence of that, if upheld, would have been that the appellant would have been obliged to pay the costs of transporting J to The Brier School. The parents’ appeal also, it may be noted, related to other aspects of the SSEN: but those are not relevant for present purposes.

The appeal duly came before the FTT. The FTT upheld the parents’ appeal. It ordered, as to Part 4 of the SSEN, that the local authority should specify The Brier School (alone).

As part of their appeal, it is to be observed, the parents had argued that Halesbury School could not meet J’s needs. Having assessed the evidence, the FTT rejected that and expressly concluded that J’s needs could be met at Halesbury School and that it was an appropriate placement for him. The FTT then went on to record the local authority’s acceptance that The Brier School could also meet J’s needs; indeed he had a place there. It was recorded that “the barrier to acceding to parental preference was the costs of transport which, the LA says, would be an inefficient use of resources.” The FTT considered that it was reasonable for it to take account of other circumstances impinging on the issues of parental preference and efficient use of resources. The FTT balanced the difference in transport costs with all of the circumstances of J’s school attendance. It was found that J’s mother was unable to drive for medical reasons (his father apparently was at work at the relevant times of day). An “established communication peer group” at The Brier School was also assessed as being potentially a “very significant advantage” to J. The FTT concluded in this way:

“These factors must be weighed in the balance with the relative costs. Given the very small difference in this case between the cost of transporting [J] (in shared or individual transport) to Halesbury or The Brier we concluded that a decision to name The Brier would not constitute an inefficient use of recourses. We concluded therefore that The Brier should be named at Part 4 of [J’s SSEN].”

An appeal was made by the appellant to the Upper Tribunal (“UT”). The grounds were much to the like effect as advanced in this court. A strongly constituted UT – comprising Judge Pearl, Judge Mesher and Judge Lane – dismissed the appeal by a detailed and thorough reserved decision dated 11^th February 2011.

It will be necessary in due course to refer to aspects of that decision. But to give it context it is convenient first to set out the relevant statutory provisions at this stage.

Section 9 of the 1996 Act is in these terms:

“Pupils to be educated in accordance with parents’ wishes

9.

In exercising or performing all their respective powers and duties under the Education Acts, the Secretary of State and local education authorities shall have regard to the general principle that pupils are to be educated in accordance with the wishes of their parents, so far as that is compatible with the provision of efficient instruction and training and the avoidance of unreasonable public expenditure.”

It may be noted that although the section is headed “Pupils to be educated in accordance with parents’ wishes” what the section actually provides, of course, is that the Secretary of State and local authorities are to “have regard to” the general principle there set out, so far as compatible with the matters there set out.

Part IV of the 1996 Act relates to children with special educational needs: defined in s.312. Section 313 provides for the issuance of a code of practice. Section 324 relates to the making and maintaining of a SSEN. In the relevant respects it provides as follows:

“324(1) If, in the light of an assessment under section 323 of any child’s educational needs and of any representations made by the child’s parent in pursuance of Schedule 27, it is necessary for the local education authority to determine the special educational provision which any learning difficulty he may have calls for, the authority shall make and maintain a statement of his special educational needs.

(2)

The statement shall be in such form and contain such information as may be prescribed.

(3)

In particular, the statement shall –

(a)

give details of the authority’s assessment of the child’s special educational needs, and

(b)

specify the special educational provision to be made for the purpose of meeting those needs, including the particulars required by subsection (4).

(4)

The statement shall –

(a)

specify the type of school or other institution which the local education authority consider would be appropriate for the child,

(b)

if they are not required under Schedule 27 to specify the name of any school in the statement, specify the name of any school or institution (whether in the United Kingdom or elsewhere) which they consider would be appropriate for the child and should be specified in the statement, and,

(c)

specify any provision for the child for which they make arrangements under section 319 and which they consider should be specified in the statement.

….

(5)(a) unless the child’s parent has made suitable arrangements, the authority –

(i)

shall arrange that the special educational provision specified in the statement is made for the child, and

(ii)

may arrange that any non-educational provision specified in the statement is made for him in such manner as they consider appropriate, and

….”

Section 326 provides for appeals against the contents of a SSEN. In particular:

“326 (1) The parents of a child for whom a local education authority maintain a statement under section 324 may appeal to the Tribunal-

(a)

when the statement is first made,

(b)

if an amendment is made to the statement, or

(c)

if, after conducting an assessment under section 323, the local education authority determine not to amend the statement.

(IA) An appeal under this section may be against any of the following –

(a)

the description in the statement of the local education authority’s assessment of the child’s special educational needs,

(b)

the special educational provision specified in the statement (including the name of a school so specified),

(c)

if no school is specified in the statement, that fact.

….

(3)

On an appeal under this section, the Tribunal may –

(a)

dismiss the appeal,

(d)

order the authority to amend the statement, so far as it describes the authority’s assessment of the child’s special educational needs or specifies the special educational provision, and make such other consequential amendments to the statement as the Tribunal think fit, or

(c)

order the authority to cease to maintain the statement.

….”

Paragraph 3 of Schedule 27 (which is headed “Choice of School”) is of particular importance for the purposes of this appeal. In the relevant respects Schedule 27 provides as follows:

“3(1) Every local education authority shall make arrangements for enabling a parent –

(a)

on whom a copy of a proposed statement has been served under paragraph 2,

(b)

on whom a copy of a proposed amended statement has been served under paragraph 2A, or

(c)

on whom an amendment notice has been served under paragraph 2A which contains a proposed amendment about –

(i)

the type or name of a school or institution, or

(ii)

the provision made for the child concerned under arrangements made under section 319,

to be specified in the statement, to express a preference as to the maintained school at which he wishes education to be provided for his child and to give reasons for his preference.

….

(3)

Where a local education authority make a statement in a case where the parent of the child concerned has expressed a preference in pursuance of such arrangements as to the school at which he wishes education to be provided for his child, they shall specify the name of that school in the statement unless –

(a)

the school is unsuitable to the child’s age, ability or aptitude or to his special educational needs, or

(b)

the attendance of the child at the school would be incompatible with the provision of efficient education for the children with whom he would be educated or the efficient use of resources.”

Part IX of the 1996 Act is the part which deals with the provision of transport. Section 508 B is, in the relevant respects, in these terms:

“508B(1) A local authority in England must make, in the case of an eligible child in the authority’s area to whom subsection (2) applies, such travel arrangements as they consider necessary in order to secure that suitable home to school travel arrangements, for the purpose of facilitating the child’s attendance at the relevant educational establishment in relation to him, are made and provided free of charge in relation to the child.

(2)

This subsection applies to an eligible child if –

(a)

no travel arrangements relating to travel in either direction between his home and the relevant educational establishment in relation to him, or in both directions, are provided free of charge in relation to him by any person who is not the authority, or

(b)

such travel arrangements are provided free of charge in relation to him by any person who is not the authority but those arrangements, taken together with any other such travel arrangements which are so provided, do not provide suitable home to school travel arrangements for the purpose of facilitating his attendance at the relevant educational establishment in relation to him.

….

(10)

References to a “relevant educational establishment”, in relation to an eligible child, are references to—

(a)

in the case of a child who is an eligible child by virtue of falling within any of paragraph 2, 4, 6, 9, 11 and 12 of Schedule 35B, the qualifying school (within the meaning of that Schedule) at which the child is a registered pupil referred to in the paragraph in question, and

(b)

in the case of a child who is an eligible child by virtue of falling within any of paragraphs 3, 5, 7, 10 and 13 of Schedule 35B, the place other than a school, where the child is receiving education by virtue of arrangements made in pursuance of section 19(1), referred to in the paragraph in question.

….”

Section 508C in part provides this:

“508C (1) A [local authority] in England may make such school travel arrangements as they consider necessary, in relation to any child in the authority’s area to whom this section applies, for the purpose of facilitating the child’s attendance at any relevant educational establishment in relation to the child.

(2)

This section applies to a child who is not an eligible child for the purposes of section 508B.

….”

Schedule 35B (incorporated by s.508 B(9)) provides at paragraphs 2 and 6:

“2.

A child falls within this paragraph if—

(a)

he is of compulsory school age and is any of the following—

a child with special educational needs;

a disabled child;

a child with mobility problems,

(b)

he is a registered pupil at a qualifying school which is within walking distance of his home,

(c)

no suitable arrangements have been made by the [local authority] for enabling him to become a registered pupil at a qualifying school nearer to his home, and

(d)

having regard to whichever of the following are relevant—

his special educational needs;

his disability;

his mobility problems,

he cannot reasonably be expected to walk to school mentioned in paragraph (b)

…

6.

A child falls within this paragraph if---

(a)

he is of compulsory school age and is a registered pupil at a qualifying school which is not within walking distance of his home,

(b)

no suitable arrangements have been made by the [local authority] for boarding accommodation for him at or near the school, and

(c)

no suitable arrangements have been made by the [local authority] for enabling him to become a registered pupil at a qualifying school nearer to his home.”

Paragraph 15 of Schedule 35B contains provisions as to the definitions of a “qualifying school”. It should be added, in the present case, that it was common ground that both schools are local authority maintained schools.

Both before the UT and before us a number of other matters were common ground.

The first is that, so far as J and his parents are concerned, the issues had become, and remain, academic. By the time the matter reached the UT, the appellant had agreed (we were told pursuant to its powers under s508C) to pay J’s transport costs to The Brier School, where he was placed. However, the UT considered that it was appropriate to decide the issues raised, given their perceived general importance. Leave having now been given to appeal to this court, it would also hardly be helpful for us to decline to deal with the appeal on the basis that it was academic as between the parties: and that, moreover, notwithstanding that – as Mr Holland told us on the day of the hearing of this appeal – J and his family have apparently now gone to live in Australia.

Other matters accepted by Mr Holland on behalf of the respondent parents were as follows:

(1)

It is recognised that Part IX of the 1996 Act contains a separate statutory regime in respect of transport; and there is no right of appeal to a FTT under s.326 in respect of a decision made under s.508B and Schedule 35B (in Part IX). The remedy, if a challenge is made to a decision under Part IX, is to be sought by way of judicial review application to the High Court.

(2)

Transport, in itself, will not normally be an educational need for a FTT to consider.

(3)

A SSEN may properly name more than one school, with a condition that, so far as the parents’ preferred school is concerned, the parents are to be responsible for transport.

The written skeleton argument of Mr McManus QC (leading Mr Auburn) for the appellant extended to 96 paragraphs, and there was also detailed oral argument. But the essence of the appellant’s case (considerably foreshortened) is as follows:

(1) With regard to placement, parental preference is to be acceded to and the preferred school is to be named in the SSEN, under paragraph 3(3) of Schedule 27, unless the school is unsuitable or the attendance would be incompatible with the provision of efficient education for the children with whom he would be educated or with the efficient use of resources.

For his part, Mr Holland on behalf of the respondent parents in essence submitted as follows:

We were referred to a number of authorities. However only one (a decision of the UT in another case) is on all fours with the point raised before us and I do not myself think it necessary to refer to all the authorities cited to us.

On one reading of the wording of the statute there might have been some issue as to whether more than one school may be named in Part 4 of a SSEN. But it has become established practice, and as is consistent with para 8.87 of the issued code of practice and as has been endorsed by authority, that more than one school may indeed be named in a SSEN, where one of them is named with a view to respecting the parents’ preference on condition of their paying the transport costs: see R v Essex County Council ex parte C [1994] ELR 54; [1994] ELR 273 (a decision under the Education Act 1981); R(M) v Sutton London Borough Council [2008] ELR 123; [2007] EWCA Civ 1205 (a decision under 1996 Act). I would add that, before us, there was raised in argument a point as to whether it could be appropriate or permissible that two (or more) schools could be so named without any condition attaching. The obiter observations of Sedley J in R v London Borough of Havering ex parte K [1998] ELR 402 at p.404 might indicate that was permissible. Since that point does not arise here for decision, I think it better to express no view on that.

Some authority in support of Mr Holland’s approach is perhaps to be found in the decision of Gibbs J in the case of Essex County Council v Sendist and S [2006] ELR 452; [2006] EWHC 1105 (Admin). There the court, on an appeal under s.326, clearly considered that regard could be had to the issue of transport costs in deciding, as part of the balancing exercise, whether a specified placement was compatible with the efficient use of resources. In the case of O v London Borough of Lewisham [2007] EWHC 2130 (Admin) Mr Andrew Nicol QC, sitting as a deputy Judge of the High Court, said this (albeit in a context not entirely the same as the present) at paragraph 40 of his judgment:

“Although the Tribunal’s focus is on a child’s educational needs, his or her non-educational requirements are not concepts which are alien to it. The Tribunal may have to grapple with these for the purpose of deciding what should be included in Parts III and IV of the statement…as far as possible and consistently with the legislative framework it is desirable that a Tribunal inform itself of the “full picture” and adopt a “holistic” approach”.

Those remarks seem, to me, in general terms, to be eminent good sense and of obvious force: but Mr McManus is, of course, entitled to draw attention to the deputy Judge’s emphasis on the requirement of consistency with the legislative framework.

Mr McManus submitted that authorities such as R v Essex County Council (ex p. C) and the Sutton case did not purport to limit the use of dual wording to situations where there would otherwise be an incompatibility with efficient use of resources if parental preference was acceded to. That may be so: but the point did not arise for decision in those cases, although, as it seems to me, some of Moore-Bick LJ’s remarks in Sutton (at paragraph 19 and 20 of his judgment) in fact can be read, pace Mr McManus, as telling against Mr McManus’ present argument on jurisdiction. As to Essex County Council v Sendist Mr McManus, who accepted the correctness of that decision, also stressed that that was a case where suitability of the nearer school was very much in issue: and I agree that is a distinction (in the light of the findings here of the FTT) from the present case. Even so, it seems to me to underline how narrow an approach the appellant is advancing in this case: since the acceptance acknowledges - rightly in my view - that there are at least some circumstances whereby transport costs can properly feature for the purpose of Schedule 27.

Mr McManus also referred us, among other authorities, to a decision of Judge Ward, sitting in the UT, in the case of MH v Nottinghamshire CC [2009] UKUT 178 (AAC). There, in circumstances comparable to the present, Judge Ward held that the provision of transport is not educational provision; that there is nothing in the legislation (or authorities) which stipulates that the naming of a school in Part 4 of a SSEN carries with it the right to transport to that school; and that the FTT “does not have jurisdiction as such to order that transport be provided” (paragraph 8). The Judge went on to conclude that, once a nearer school had been assessed as suitable and had been specified accordingly, the FTT in that case “should have stopped there and by proceeding to rule on the relative transport costs the tribunal was straying beyond its jurisdiction and was thereby in error of law”: see paragraph 15 and 17. He indicated (presumably having in mind the Essex County Council v Sendist case) that had it been the case where the local authority was overriding parental preference then a comparison of costs, including transport, would have been necessary: but it was not. The tribunal thus, as he decided, had had no jurisdiction to consider transport costs when all other matters had been determined.

That authority is directly in point for present purposes and lends support to Mr McManus’ argument (indeed the argument presented by Mr Auburn in the MH case corresponds to the argument advanced by Mr McManus, leading Mr Auburn, in this case). However it is, of course, not a decision binding on us. Moreover the appellant parents in that case were not legally represented and so Judge Ward did not have the benefit of full adversarial argument.

In the present case the UT ([2011] UKUT 67 (AAC)) decided not to follow the decision of Judge Ward in MH. The UT set out the relevant statutory provisions. Having made some highly pertinent observations in paragraph 34 of its decision the UT said this in paragraph 35:

“35.

It is therefore crucial to identify the circumstances when a LA, or a tribunal on appeal, is required or empowered to specify only one school in Part 4 of a Statement of SEN and the circumstances when it is required or empowered to name more than one school or an additional type of school, whether on a conditional basis or not. We discuss this issue in the particular context of comparisons of transport costs to the schools concerned and without at this stage any consideration of the existing case-law.”

The core reasoning of the UT is to be found in these subsequent paragraphs:

“40.

In our view, the first stage must be to consider the additional travel costs that would be incurred if the parents’ preferred school were to be specified alone in Part 4 of the Statement and the LA accordingly came under a duty under s.508B to fund travel arrangements. If the tribunal concludes either that the additional cost is not incompatible with the efficient use of resources at all or that any prima facie incompatibility is outweighed by the educational and other advantages to the child of attending the parents’ preferred school (we do not need to consider at this point exactly how or at what point balancing exercises are to be carried out), then in our judgment the consequence must be that only the parents’ preferred school is to be specified in Part 4 of the Statement. Even if the tribunal considers that a nearer school or type of school put forward by the LA is educationally suitable for the child, it should not in these circumstances be specified in the Statement.

41.

If, when the parents have “won” on para 3(3), the LA were allowed to put a condition on the child’s attendance at the parents’ preferred school, such as that the parents be responsible for transport, with the nearer school specified if that condition is not met, that would undermine the primacy given by Schedule 27, para 3(3) to the parents’ expressed preference and would be inconsistent with the conclusion that it would not be incompatible with the efficient use of resources for the LA to meet the transport costs.

42.

If the tribunal concludes that there would be an incompatibility with the efficient use of resources for the LA to meet the additional transport costs to the parent’s preferred school, then there is no requirement to specify the latter. The tribunal should then consider whether that school should nonetheless be specified taking account of the duty to have regard to parental preference under s.9. If the conclusion is to that effect after taking into account transport costs to the parents’ preferred school as in paragraph 40 above (and applying the potentially broader calculus of “unreasonable public expenditure”: see the illuminating judgment of Mr Andrew Nicol QC as he then was, in O v London Borough of Lewisham and SENDIST [2007] EWHC 2130 (Admin)), then for the same reasons the parents’ preferred school alone should be named in Part 4 of the Statement.

43.

If the parents’ preferred school has not been named at the first stage, under either statutory basis, the tribunal should go on to consider a further stage of enquiry, by asking whether, if the LA did not have to meet the additional transport costs, the parental preference could to that extent be accommodated without incompatibility with the efficient use of recourses. If so, then there is the authority of the Court of Appeal in Sutton, binding on the Upper Tribunal, that the parents’ preferred school can be specified in Part 4 of the Statement on the condition that the parents take responsibility for the costs of transport to and from the school. Moore-Bick LJ said there that:

“Paragraph 8:87 of the [Special Educational Needs] Code of Practice [issued by the Secretary of State for Education and Skills] proceeds on the assumption that it is lawful for a local authority to name a school preferred by the child’s parents on condition that they agree to meet al or part of the transport costs and in my view a condition nomination of that kind is consistent with the statutory provisions, provided that the authority also complies with its obligation to specify the type of school or, if it considers it appropriate to do so, the specific school, which it considers to be suitable for the child.”

In our judgment, that does not apply when a parental preference has primacy at the first stage of enquiry (paragraphs 39 to 42 above).”

The UT went on to accept that the decision of Gibbs J in the Essex County Council v Sendist case had been a case of the local authority overriding parental preference; but stated that it was not authority for the proposition that that was the only situation in which consideration of efficient use of resources could arise. So far as the decision of Judge Ward in MH was concerned, the UT considered that it should not be followed. The UT concluded that the FTT had thus been “entitled and obliged” to consider the potential incompatibility of attendance at The Brier School, on the basis of the local authority having responsibility for transport costs, with the efficient use of resources. The decision of the FTT, which had weighed the advantages of attendance at The Brier School against the relative costs, was that it would not be an inefficient use of resources. Thus the FTT was entitled to direct that only The Brier School be named in Part 4, even though Halesbury School had also been assessed as suitable.

For my part I am in no real doubt that the UT reached the right conclusion: and did so (subject to one reservation expressed below) for the right reasons. Accordingly, and intending no disrespect to the very detailed arguments we received, I would propose to deal with the matter quite shortly.

As I see it, two very strong objections to the whole approach of the appellant can be noted at the outset.

The first is that Mr McManus’ argument necessarily proceeds on the footing that there was no relevant contest between the parents and the local authority and there was no overriding of parental preference. Indeed he went so far as to submit that the original decision of the appellant, in completing Part 4 of the SSEN on placement as it did, was “favourable” to the parents. He said that both schools were thereafter assessed by the FTT as suitable and the appellant had indeed (by including The Brier School) specified the parents’ preferred school in Part 4 of the SSEN: that being the starting point for his further argument that purported analysis of comparative resources then related only to the provision of free transport: which, the argument went on, was not of itself a matter of educational provision for the purposes of s.324(5) or for the purposes of s.326(IA).

That, in my view, is simply an incorrect starting point. There was, and continued to be, a contest as to placement. J’s parents wanted the name of The Brier School to be specified. The appellant wanted to specify the name of Halesbury School: but was prepared also to specify in Part 4 the name of The Brier School (accepted as suitable) on the stated condition that the parents pay for transport. That result does not truly reflect the parental preference as to the school at which they wished education to be provided to J. It is wrong, in my view, to present this kind of case as one where the only remaining issue was transport costs and where there was no continuing issue as to placement. There was; and that remained so notwithstanding that both schools were assessed by the FTT as suitable.

Although Mr McManus did not accept the point put to him in argument by the Master of the Rolls that his approach was one of form over substance, in my view it is form over substance. What is the dividing line between the local authority saying: “No, we will not specify the name of your preferred school, unless you pay the transport costs” and “Yes, we will specify the name of your preferred school provided you pay the transport costs”? In truth there is a contest as to the school to be specified. That that is so is, to my mind, confirmed by the following consideration. A condition as to transport costs of the kind imposed here may be one which parents are simply not able to meet. But if they are not able to meet it then on any view the child will not be able to attend the school of parental preference. Parental preference will thus have been denied. I think that also tells strongly against Mr McManus’ starting point. I find it difficult to see a principled basis, as a matter of statutory interpretation, for saying that a dual worded placement contained in Part 4 of a SSEN of the kind used in the present case is or is not a matter of educational provision, depending on whether or not the parents are able to pay the transport costs or otherwise arrange the transport.

Thus, in my view, such a contest is as to placement and does relate to a matter of educational provision. As such, it is within the ambit of s.326(IA)(b) of the 1996 Act.

There is a further, though related, objection. Mr McManus did not dispute that the FTT in effect “stands in the [local authority’s] shoes, reevaluating the available information in order if necessary to recast the statement”: see per Sedley LJ in Bromley LBC v Special Educational Needs Tribunal [1999] 3 All ER 587 at p.594. But in the present case, in completing Part 4 of the SSEN as it did, the appellant here was giving effect to its policy regarding the payment of transport costs. That self-evidently, to my way of thinking, brings into play factors of efficient use of resources. In such circumstances it was inevitable that, in evaluating the available information, the FTT – standing in the shoes of the appellant – would need to have regard to that. As the FTT itself rightly noted: “The barrier to acceding to parental preference is the cost of transport which, as the LA says, would be an inefficient use of resources”. That was the reality: and that is why the FTT necessarily engaged in the comparative exercise – the advantageous circumstances of J’s attendance at The Brier School set against the difference in costs between naming Halesbury School and naming The Brier School.

As the UT crisply put it at paragraph 39 of its decision:

“…where, as in the present case, a tribunal finds all the schools put forward to be suitable, comparative travel costs must be considered if that issue has been put into play by the LA. Here, travel costs plainly were put in play by the form of statement under appeal.”

I agree with those remarks.

I therefore would reject Mr McManus’ argument to the effect that the reality was that the FTT had purported to deal with a “naked” transport issue (as he put it), properly falling only within Part IX of the 1996 Act. I think the reality is the opposite: the FTT was necessarily dealing with a matter of educational provision as to which school was to be specified in Part 4 of the SSEN, having due regard to paragraph 3(3) of Schedule 27 for that purpose. It cannot be disputed that The Brier School (alone) was the parental preferred choice. By virtue of paragraph 3 of Schedule 27 the name of that school had to be specified unless, among other things, attendance of J at that school would be incompatible with the efficient use of resources. It is contrary to the approach adopted by the appellant itself, in completing Part 4 of his SSEN, and it is contrary to the wording of paragraph 3(3)(b) of Schedule 27 to remove the cost of transport from the reach of the consideration by a FTT on the issue of incompatibility with the efficient use of resources.

In my view, therefore, the acceptance of jurisdiction by, and the approach of, the FTT and of the UT is not, pace Mr McManus’ submissions, contrary to the wording of s.326(IA) or paragraph 3 of Schedule 27. Mr McManus in fact also complained – as a further variation on his original theme – that the UT, at a later stage of its decision, found that the specification in Part 4 of the SSEN had not given “full effect to the parental preference, which was for The Brier School to be specified alone and unconditionally….”. He said that this was a new concept, which misconstrued the concept of parental preference, did not fit well with the decision in Sutton and was not borne out of the statutory provisions. He said that it operated to collapse the distinction between preference as to placement and transport. As will be gathered, I do not agree with this at all. In my view, the UT’s remark accords both with the reality of the position and with the statutory scheme.

It may well be, of course, that the decision that the name of The Brier School (alone) be specified in Part 4 of the SSEN has the consequence that the appellant must pay the transport costs (by reason of s.508B). But that is no reason for not giving paragraph 3(3) its proper effect. The consequence arises just because, after weighing the relevant factors, the balance has come down in favour of specifying the name of a school – the parents’ preferred school – which is not the nearest school.

Mr McManus submitted that such a conclusion would undermine or wrongly restrict the now quite common use of dual wording in Part 4 of a SSEN (of the type deployed in the present case). I do not see why it should. If consideration of the efficient use of resources, including transport costs, justifiably tells against the school of parental choice then – as the UT in effect pointed out in paragraph 43 of its decision – the practice (whereby that school is named with a condition as to transport costs imposed) continues to have real value. And if in any given case such a statement by a local authority is justifiable on grounds of incompatibility with efficient use of resources then FTTs can be trusted to uphold the local authority’s statement if there is any challenge on appeal.

I appreciate, of course, that questions of jurisdiction cannot be decided by consideration of convenience. But this conclusion not only accords with the statutory provisions it also gives rise, in my view, to a thoroughly sensible result. Disputes of this kind are much better decided through the relatively quick and informal procedures available within the tribunal system and where the tribunals are specialist: and it is sensible that such tribunals are available to decide disputes of the present kind.

For these reasons I would uphold the UT’s decision and its reasoning, save for one matter. I do have reservations as to the reasoning of the UT in paragraph 42 of its decision, in formulating a second stage of the required process. The general principle set out in s.9 of the 1996 Act does not have primacy, as it were, over the specific provisions of paragraph 3 of Schedule 27. As stated by Lord Slynn (with whom the other members of the House of Lords agreed) in B v Harrow LBC [2000] 1 WLR 223 at p.229:

“I do not consider that section 9 of the Act means that parental preference is to prevail unless it involves unreasonable public expenditure. In dealing with special schools the authority must also observe the specific provisions of paragraph 3(3) of Schedule 27. This does not mean that the parent loses the right to express a preference. A preference may be expressed but it is subject to the qualifications set out in paragraphs 3(3), one of which is the efficient use of resources – in my opinion, the responsible local education authority’s resources. It may be as a result that a child seeking to go to a special school out of his own local education authority’s area may have more difficulty in doing so than a child seeking to go to another school. But that is what, in my view, Parliament has clearly provided.”

However, that reservation does not affect the outcome of this case. The reasoning and approach of the UT in paragraphs 40, 41 and 43 of the decision in my view is correct and is conclusive on the point arising in this case. In my view, the FTT therefore had been justified in weighing the transport costs involved in sending J to The Brier School as part of the matters requiring consideration under paragraph 3 of Schedule 27 to the 1996 Act; its conclusion that a decision to specify the name of The Brier School in Part 4 of the SSEN would not constitute an inefficient use of resources was properly open to it; and the UT’s decision that the FTT had jurisdiction under s.326 so to decide, and that the FTT’s conclusion involved no error of law, was correct.

I therefore would dismiss the appeal.

I agree.

I also agree.