A (A Child)

This is an application by a mother for permission to appeal against an adoption order made by Mostyn J on 30 August 2012 in relation to the mother’s daughter, who I will simply call N for the purposes of this short judgment.

N was born on 27 May 2006, so she is now six years old. There is a long history to this matter, complicated by the fact that most of the decisions in relation to N’s care have been made in Scotland, the adoption order only being made in England because N’s adoptive mother lives here. N has been in foster care since she was only a few months old until she was placed with her adopter on 20 April 2011. The grounds on which she was first removed from the mother are set out in a document, prepared for the Glasgow Sheriff Court, which found those grounds established at an uncontested hearing in January 2007. The grounds included the mother failing to deal appropriately with N’s health needs, problems with housing, and the mother failing to make proper care arrangements for N, having delegated her care on a day in September 2006 when she was only a few months old to her sisters, who were then aged 11 and 14 and who were unable to look after her adequately.

Thereafter N’s position has been reviewed at children’s hearings in Scotland, and there have been appeals by the mother against some of the decisions of the children’s hearings. One of those appeals was successful. That followed a decision approving N’s placement for adoption, which had not been properly justified. The matter was investigated again with a thorough report from a safeguarder which recommended adoption. The children’s hearing approved adoption on that basis in October 2011. The mother’s appeal against that was dismissed by the Sheriff.

Moving to England, the adoption hearing before Mostyn J took place in two parts. The first part lasted for nearly a week in June 2012, during which the judge heard very lengthy oral evidence, including from the allocated social worker from Scotland, and an expert in Scottish children law. The expert in Scottish children law gave evidence because the mother challenged, and challenges in front of me today, the validity of the Scottish proceedings and the placement of her child for adoption, arguing that the Scottish proceedings were not compliant with the European Convention on Human Rights and that the proper procedures have not been adopted prior to the placement of N for adoption.

The hearing before Mostyn J then resumed in July, the Lord Advocate having taken up the judge’s invitation to intervene in the proceedings and to make submissions about the Scottish system. The judge also heard further evidence from the adopter at the second hearing in order to explore what N had told her foster sister, who had visited her, about the care that she was receiving from her adopter. The mother was represented for most of the hearing in front of Mostyn J, although she concluded the submissions herself after withdrawing her instructions from her counsel. She is representing herself today as well and has done so in an extremely articulate fashion via video link from her local court, which has worked very well. The mother also gave evidence herself at the hearing before Mostyn J, although it was largely, as it turned out, confined to evidence in chief because she declined to answer questions in cross-examination after a short time, because she said that she was too distressed and traumatised.

Mostyn J, having heard evidence from the adopter and listened to the concerns about N’s care with her, concluded that the adopter was in fact an eminently suitable person to adopt N and that she and N have a strong bond. He rejected the allegation that N had been mistreated by the adopter, whose actions he concluded were no more than normal discipline. He concluded that mother’s Convention rights were faithfully observed by the judicial and state authorities in Scotland. He had obviously been able to consider for himself the position in relation to N and whether a placement with the mother would further her best interests, and he concluded on the evidence that he had that it would not. He found in accordance with English adoption law that N’s welfare demanded that she should be adopted. He found that she had no relationship with her parents, whose only connection with her is, as the judge found, biological, and he found that A is “a true parent in every sense of the word other than biological”. The judge, therefore, dispensed with the consent of the parents and made the adoption order that was sought.

The mother wishes to appeal against that decision. She has set out very fully in writing the grounds upon which she wishes to appeal, and I have no doubt that she will forgive me if I summarise them. Today we have been through the points that have concerned her particularly in regard to the decision made by Mostyn J, and she has explained to me very clearly why she considers that his decision was wrong. She argues that adoption is not in N’s best interests and that N should have the benefit of the love of her mother, who she says is able to look after her. She is extremely anxious that N is being ill-treated where she is and she is of the view that that has not been properly investigated. She considers that Mostyn J was misled by the evidence that was put in front of him and that he could not properly find that N was safe with her adopter. She argues that the possibility of her having care of N herself has not been properly investigated. She argues that the local authority have committed perjury and that false evidence has been given to the courts and the panels in Scotland in her case, perverting the course of justice and leading to them making wrong judgments. She complains also that N’s wishes and feelings have not been properly taken into account. She argues that the placement by the Scottish authorities with her adopter was not valid as it was in breach of regulations in that the local authority in Scotland had not made an application for a permanence order or an adoption application at the time of the placement. She argues that the expert in Scottish law was not asked the right questions because her barrister was hurried by the judge or was confused.

I sense from the mother’s written skeleton argument, and from what she said today, that perhaps at the top of the list of her concerns is that the adopter is not providing properly for N and has abused her. She has explained to me the reasons why she is worried about that. However, that is something which Mostyn J explored fully, to the point of having the adopter recalled so that she could be asked questions about it. That enabled the judge to come to a clear view about what had or had not happened and he made a finding of fact about it from which there is no reasonable prospect of the mother successfully appealing to this court.

As to the other major point that the mother relies upon, that is that she could care for N herself, that is an issue which has been considered repeatedly in Scotland, and the judge, Mostyn J, investigated the reliability of the Scottish system and then no doubt gave weight to its decisions. However, that was not the limit of his consideration. I particularly note that the judge ordered the Glasgow City Council to disclose certain of its records and obtained what he described as a substantial volume of material in that way, and I think mother has said to me it was 600 pages of material. The judge received what he described as a “comprehensive” report from the Scottish social worker and she gave evidence that at all times rehabilitation was considered, but at no stage was it a realistic prospect given the history. He also heard from the guardian appointed for N in the English proceedings and received two reports from her. She had also concluded that adoption was overwhelmingly in N’s best interests. It has, of course, to be remembered in this context that the mother has not seen N at all for a considerable number of years now.

Having reviewed the decision of Mostyn J, I cannot find any reasonable argument that he adopted the wrong process in his two-part hearing or that his decisions about the adoption were outside the ambit of his discretion. In those circumstances, I cannot give the mother permission to appeal against his decision and so her application for permission will be refused.