DM v Secretary of State for Justice

This is an appeal by the Secretary of State for Justice (“the SSJ”) from the judgment of Bean J, dated 30^th July, 2010, [2010] EWHC 2013 (Admin) (“the Judgment”), allowing the Respondent’s claim for Judicial Review of the refusal by the Category A Review Team (“CART”) to convene an oral hearing before the SSJ’s re-categorisation decision on the 26^th November, 2009 and quashing the decision thus made (“the 26^th November decision”).

The grounds of appeal are that Bean J erred:

For completeness, Bean J heard the Respondent’s claim for Judicial Review together with a broadly similar claim by another prisoner serving life imprisonment, one McLuckie. Nothing turns on the Judge’s decision in respect of McLuckie, so no further reference will be made to that claim.

Turning to the facts, I gratefully adopt the learned Judge’s summary, set out at [19] – [25] of the Judgment.

“ 19. Donald Mackay was convicted of murder in December 1989 and sentenced to life imprisonment with a tariff set at 20 years. The offence came to light when police discovered the decomposing remains of the victim in a bin-bag in the Claimant’s flat. She was a prostitute who had visited his flat sometime earlier. Death was due to asphyxiation following the infliction of multiple injuries to the face and severe injuries to the other parts of the body. The police had called at Mr. Mackay’s flat following a complaint of assault, false imprisonment and forcible buggery from another prostitute who had come to the flat after the death of his first victim; he was also convicted of offences against her.

20.

At the trial his defence to the murder charge was that the victim had arrived at his flat complaining of assault by a client. He went out to the shop in the morning and returned to find her dead. In the case of the complaints by the prostitute who survived he denies committing offences against her. He alleged that they had intercourse by consent.

21.

Mr. Mackay had previous convictions for offences of violence culminating in a conviction for manslaughter in 1984; he had killed a man with a sword in a drunken brawl and was sentenced to five years imprisonment.

22.

In Mr. Mackay’s case….there was an oral hearing before a panel of the Parole Board in 2009. The Board had before them a report commissioned by the Claimant’s solicitor from a consultant psychiatrist, Dr David Somekh, who considered that there was no good evidence to support the notion that the Claimant should remain in category A conditions. They also heard oral evidence from Mr. Mackay himself, a psychologist, Tracey Brookes, and his offender supervisor, Karen Ferraby. The Claimant was represented by his solicitor, Mr. Michael Purdon, who also acts for him in this court and who has substantial experience of prison law. Mr. Purdon did not seek a direction for release or a recommendation for transfer to open conditions: neither of these propositions would have been realistic given that Mr. Mackay still had a Category A classification…. Mr. Purdon did, however, invite the Panel to comment on his client’s progress.

23.

The Board wrote to Mr. Mackay on 23 July 2009 with a decision (unsurprisingly) that he should remain in closed conditions. They wrote:-

‘You are an enhanced level prisoner and have been adjudication free for many years.

You have consistently denied your guilt for the index offences, saying that the deceased victim died of natural causes.

In relation to the second victim you claimed that all sexual activity was consensual.

The panel were concerned that, during your evidence, whilst accepting some of the facts of the case, your own description of events minimised your culpability to a disturbing degree.

Similarly, your accounts of your previous offending showed a lack of insight into the nature and degree of your violent behaviour.

The panel were also of the view that you saw yourself as the principal victim of events are concerned that such grievance thinking may impact on your motivation to change.

Whilst acknowledging that since the last review period you have done some work to address some of your risk factors and have behaved well in prison the panel felt that there has been no significant reduction in your level of risk.

Ms. Brookes informed the panel that the criteria for admission to the core SOTP had changed so that a denial of sexual offending was no longer a barrier as long as there was some acceptance of sexual contact.

The panel would support any work that might be achieved in this area.

Ms. Ferraby said that she supported a proposal that you be moved to a Category B training prison.

The panel felt that this may be a constructive move.

In conclusion the panel concluded for the reasons set out above that you should remain in closed conditions to complete more work aimed at reducing your risk.’

24.

Following the Parole Board’s review a sentence planning review was held. It concluded that the only fresh offending behaviour work needed to undertake was the SOTP. It noted that the Claimant had previously refused to undertake that program as he maintained that he was not a sex offender. However, it appeared that he was now willing to discuss the possibility with a psychologist. (I was told by Mr. Southey QC that Mr. Mackay has more recently been assessed as unsuitable for the SOTP.

25.

In advance of the sentence planning review the Claimant’s solicitors argued that an oral hearing should be held. By a decision of 26^th November 2009 the Secretary of State rejected the representations made in support of re-categorisation and decided that the Claimant should remain at Category A. The letter stated:-

‘The Category A Team noted your representations requested an oral hearing, but was satisfied there were no special circumstances that warranted such an exceptional procedure…. The Category A Team noted Parole Board reviews relate to your suitability for supervised release or transfer to open conditions. It noted that they are also perhaps dynamic or idealistic in nature and will seek to promote a prisoner progress through testing in less secure conditions.’ ”

Pausing there, in the next paragraph of the Judgment, Bean J was somewhat critical of this passage in the SSJ’s 26^th November decision, saying:

“ 26. The sentence just quoted seems to me to show a rather patronising attitude to the Parole Board…..”

With respect and though nothing of significance may turn on it, I am not sure that stricture was justified. The sentence in question needs to be read together with the passage in the SSJ’s decision which next followed:

“ The Category A Team noted your security category reviews however in contrast relate directly to the conditions of security in which you should be held, based on an objective assessment of the risk you would pose if unlawfully at large. It considered that an appropriate reduction in your risk must precede your downgrading, and that your downgrading could not be approved solely to test you in less secure conditions.”

To my mind, despite its rather awkward drafting, this passage serves to contrast the role of the Parole Board on the one hand, with that of CART on the other; read as a whole, it dispels the element of apparent condescension that the preceding sentence (in isolation) may otherwise have conveyed.

Very little needs to be added as to the facts. The letter from the Respondent’s solicitors, dated 21^st October, 2009, accompanying the representations for an oral hearing, founded the application on the basis of an “impasse” created by the Respondent maintaining that he was not guilty of the offences for which he had been convicted.

The question of the Respondent’s categorisation was considered by the local prison Category A Advisory Panel (“the Advisory Panel”). Its recommendation of the 19^th November, 2009 (“the 19^th November recommendation”) was unequivocal:

“ Mr. Mackay’s insight into his offending behaviour still warrants further development and he has a long term target to address his sexual offending behaviour. Should Mr. Mackay escape from lawful custody, no matter how unlikely that may be, he will still pose a significant risk to the public.

Mr. Mackay should remain Cat A.”

As to “areas of risk”, these included but were not confined to “alcohol misuse”. Other areas of risk identified were accommodation, emotional well-being, thinking and behaviour and attitudes. It was said that the “sexual and violent” elements of the Respondent’s offending still warranted further exploration. It may be noted that Ms Brookes, a psychologist who had given evidence at the Parole Board’s oral hearing, was an “attendee” at the Advisory Panel.

The reasoning of the SSJ’s 26^th November decision proceeded as follows. The CART noted that the Respondent had been provided with copies of the relevant reports. Further, the CART had taken into account various matters telling in the Respondent’s favour, including his conduct, educational achievements and the work he had done (at least in secure conditions) to address alcohol abuse. That said:

“ The Category A Team was however satisfied the overall assessment showed you had still to achieve significant progress, either in acknowledging full responsibility for your present offences, or in achieving insight and change in relation to your use of extreme violence.

The Category A Team did not accept that your alcohol abuse alone provided a full or convincing explanation for the serious nature of your present offences…….

The Category A Team was therefore satisfied that your good custodial behaviour and work to address your alcohol problems could not alone provide evidence of a significantly reduced risk of re-offending in a similar manner. ”

The CART accordingly supported the conclusions of the Advisory Panel as to the need for further intervention work and assessments “to fully explore and amend the risk factors relating to your use of extreme violence”. There were, in the CART’s view, no special circumstances warranting the “exceptional procedure” of an oral hearing. In this regard, it was noted, inter alia, that the Advisory Panel had not recommended downgrading from Category A. There then followed the passages from the 26^th November decision set out in the Judgment and above. As to the suggestion of an impasse, the CART said this:

“ The Category A Team was also satisfied that there was no impasse in relation to your ability to address and reduce your level of risk. It noted recommended intervention work was fully available to you in your present security category, and was satisfied that your downgrading was not necessary to allow you to take part in such work. It considered that your current unsuitability for intervention work to address your capacity for extreme violence against females was self-imposed by your unwillingness or inability to acknowledge and discuss the related issues. ”

The CART’s conclusion was that the Respondent posed a “high level of potential risk if unlawfully at large” and that there needed to be clear or convincing evidence of a significant reduction in this risk before downgrading from Category A could be justified. The CART’s (and thus the SSJ’s) conclusion was as follows:

“ The Category A Team considered that your current progress, even though maintained over some years, was insufficient on its own to show you had significantly reduced your capacity to act in the same way given the opportunity. On that basis it was satisfied that convincing evidence of significant risk reduction if unlawfully at large was not available, and you should remain in category A at this time. ”

In the event, following an appropriate letter before action from the Respondent’s solicitors, dated 13^th January, 2010, proceedings came to be issued.

Reverting to the Judgment, the principles of law were not in dispute before Bean J and were concisely summarised by the learned Judge as follows:

“ 27. There was no dispute between counsel about the principles to be applied. The common law duty of procedural fairness may require the decision makers to hold an oral hearing. Such a hearing is not required in every case, and what fairness requires in a particular case is fact specific. It is for the court to decide what fairness requires, and the issue on judicial review is whether the refusal of an oral hearing was wrong, not whether it was unreasonable or irrational.”

In the paragraphs which followed (at [27] – [32]), Bean J referred to a number of authorities, to some of which I shall return. It was common ground that cases requiring an oral hearing would be few and far between; in that sense, they were exceptional – rather than in the sense that exceptional circumstances needed to be shown to justify such a hearing. Thereafter (at [33] – [34]), Bean J referred to authority on the “impasse issue”, namely the situation which arises when the convicted prisoner continues to deny commission of the offence/s in question. In broad terms (see further below), the authorities to which the Judge had regard suggested that the impasse issue could give rise to real difficulty in a number of respects, raising conflicting considerations; while in almost any case it would be wrong to treat the prisoner’s denial as irrelevant it would also be wrong to treat the prisoner’s denial as conclusive against parole.

Bean J’s essential reasoning was contained at [37] – [39] of the Judgment:

“ 37. Mr. Mackay is …a post-tariff lifer in Category A whose further progress is being hampered by a degree of impasse. ….. Mr. Mackay has already had an oral hearing before the Parole Board; and the Board, after hearing oral evidence and considering Dr. Somekh’s [a pscyhiatrist’s] report, has expressed the view that a down-grading of his categorisation would be a ‘constructive move’.

38.

Mr. Slater [counsel for the SSJ] submits that inconsistencies of decision between the Parole Board and CART are far from exceptional. He points to the observation of Judge LJ in Williams that such inconsistencies are an inevitable consequence of the two distinct processes of the Board and CART. That is, of course, correct; but, in the passage to which Mr. Slater refers, Judge LJ was considering inconsistencies of outcome. For present purposes I am concerned with fairness of the process, not of the outcome.

39.

It is not for me to say on this judicial review that CART are bound to downgrade Mr. Mackay’s categorisation; Mr. Southey [counsel for the then Claimant, now Respondent on the appeal] has not contended that they are. But I do hold that the circumstances of Mr. Mackay’s case, in particular the view expressed by the Board, make it necessary that CART should hold an oral hearing at which the Claimant will have the opportunity to put his case for re-categorisation. (I agree with what Cranston J said in H about the nature of that hearing.) ”

Accordingly, Bean J held that the (now) Respondent’s claim for judicial review succeeded.

At the outset of the hearing before this Court, Mr. Slater, representing the SSJ, informed us that CART had conducted a further review of the Respondent’s Category A status, resulting in a determination by the SSJ of the 21^st March, 2011 (“the 2011 determination”). It was understood that the 2011 determination had concluded that the Respondent should not be re-categorised. No oral hearing had been held.

On the face of it, the fact that CART (and, hence, the SSJ) had proceeded to make a fresh determination without holding an oral hearing flew in the face of Bean J’s decision and raised very grave concerns – possibly extending to contempt of court. The explanation given by Mr. Slater, on instructions, was manifestly inadequate. He said that it had not been understood – it is not apparent whether by the Treasury Solicitor, CART or the SSJ – that the order of Bean J quashing the 26^th November decision required “his client to re-take the decision given that an appeal was pending”. It may well be that the order of Bean J did not require the 26^th November decision to be re-taken pending the appeal; but that explanation holds good only so far as it goes – and it does not go very far at all. It was or ought to have been plain beyond peradventure that if a fresh determination was to be conducted, then the order of Bean J required an oral hearing to be convened prior to the decision being made. The Judgment is of course binding unless or until reversed on appeal. That the order made by Bean J was couched, understandably, in terms of quashing the 26^th November decision is nothing to the point. Suffice to say, I am, with respect, at a loss to understand how there was room for any such misunderstanding. For my part, I deprecate the course so unfortunately taken.

The consequence of the 2011 determination (if left standing) would be to render this appeal academic. Even if we dismissed the appeal from Bean J, the 26^th November decision would have been overtaken by the subsequent 2011 determination. It followed that an obvious and salutary course would have been for this Court, without more, to decline to entertain the SSJ’s appeal, on terms of a suitable and stringent order for costs against the SSJ.

Upon reflection, however, we were not disposed to take that course, for one principal reason. The upshot would in due course have been proceedings seeking to quash the 2011 determination, raising essentially the same point as is now before this Court but at yet further public expense.

Accordingly – if without detracting at all from the displeasure of the Court already expressed – the most constructive solution, at least cost to the public purse, is the following. As indicated to the parties, we would proceed with the present appeal on the SSJ undertaking that, in the event of the appeal being dismissed, the 2011 determination would be vacated or abandoned. For his part, Mr. Slater, on specific instructions, indicated the SSJ’s acceptance of this course. We therefore continued to hear the appeal on its merits.

I add only this. If the error was in any way attributable to some fixed timetable for Category A reviews, then consideration should urgently be given to the taking of requisite remedial measures, so as to ensure that a debacle of the nature presented to us does not recur.

I turn to the rival cases on the merits of the present appeal. For the SSJ, Mr. Slater submitted that procedural fairness required an oral hearing in some but not all cases where there was a dispute of fact materially affecting the question of risk assessment. Oral hearings would be few and far between. Although the Judge had applied the right test, he had failed to have regard to the Parole Board’s report as a whole, focussing instead on a single expression of view – and aside from that single expression of view, there was nothing else to justify an oral hearing. It may be that the Judge was led astray by the error of fact in mischaracterising the force given by the Parole Board to that expression of view. There was no material dispute of fact between the Parole Board and CART in this case and no basis for an oral hearing. Looked at as a whole, there had been no recommendation by the Parole Board, let alone any unequivocal recommendation; but if there had been, CART had done its duty by considering it; CART was not bound by the Parole Board’s view. The starting point for CART was the verdict of the jury; in cases where guilt was not admitted, which did indeed give rise to difficulty, there would some times be an impasse but, as explained by CART, there was no impasse here. An oral hearing was not required to get to the bottom of the views of the authors of the various reports. The Judge had erred in law and logic; the test for this Court was simply whether the Judge was wrong.

For the Respondent, Mr. Southey QC contended that the Judge’s error of fact was immaterial. The real issue, as put by Mr. Southey, was whether the Judge:

“ …erred by concluding that the inconsistency between the Parole Board’s decision and that of the Secretary of State is sufficient to justify holding an oral hearing.”

Bean J had correctly decided that it was. The present context called for a high standard of procedural fairness; moreover, there was an impasse. An oral hearing would not only assist the quality of decision-making by CART (and the SSJ) but it would also assist in the resolution of the impasse.

Although oral hearings were few and far between, such a hearing was warranted here. The Respondent had completed his minimum term; the question of his liberty was at stake. This would be the first oral hearing in connection with the Respondent. Just as the Parole Board benefited by having the report writers present, so CART would benefit from being exposed to those who had direct dealings with the Respondent. Moreover, the Parole Board was constrained by its terms of reference; accordingly, that it had expressed a view (in favour of downgrading the Respondent’s categorisation) was itself noteworthy – it had gone as far as it could go. The Parole Board’s decision, reached after an oral hearing, itself demonstrated the value of an oral hearing.

For present purposes, the legal framework may be set out as follows. First, it is necessary to outline the significance of categorisation as a Category A prisoner. A Category A prisoner is defined in Prison Service Order 1010 (“PSO 1010”) as:

“ …. A prisoner whose escape would be highly dangerous to the public or the police or the security of the State and for whom the aim must be to make escape impossible. ”

Self evidently, categorisation as a Category A prisoner has serious consequences for the prisoner. Not only is he subject to a more restrictive regime and higher conditions of security than prisoners in other categories but, given the meaning of categorisation as a Category A prisoner, so long as he remains such, his prospects of release on parole are nil: see, R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Duggan [1994] 3 All ER 277, esp., at pp. 280 and 288, per Rose LJ. Accordingly, the decision as to continued classification of the prisoner as Category A has a direct impact on the liberty of the subject and calls for a high degree of procedural fairness.

Secondly, it is important to differentiate between the Parole Board and CART. While they are linked and both address the issue of public safety, there is a difference of substance between them. As authoritatively explained by Judge LJ (as he then was), the Parole Board is concerned with the protection of the public following a prisoner’s supervised and conditional release; by contrast, CART is concerned with the risks to the public in the event of an escape. See: R (Williams) v Home Secretary [2002] EWCA Civ 498; [2002] 1 WLR 2264, at [27]. The Parole Board does not have “some supervisory function or authority over the categorisation decision”: ibid. As Judge LJ continued:

“29.

The views of the panel [i.e., the Parole Board] on categorisation, however strongly expressed, are not and cannot be determinative of the categorisation decision…..

30.

This does not produce the lamentable consequences that the recommendations of the panel are irrelevant to the categorisation decision, or indeed the decision-making process. It was rightly accepted that these must always be considered by the review team [i.e., CART]…..

31.

Apart from the disquieting impression that the two decision-making bodies concerned with this claimant were not working with the same material, the risk highlighted by this appeal is circularity. The post-tariff discretionary life prisoner may be trapped in an unending process. This risk is mitigated by recognising that there are exceptional cases in which (subject to public immunity issues) the material available to the review team, in particular the reports on him, rather than their gist, should be disclosed and the prisoner permitted an oral hearing.

32.

……Once notice of the panel’s decision had been received, the review team should have recognised an obvious prospect of a major inconsistency between their respective conclusions. An oral hearing would have enabled the reasons for the contradictory views to be examined on behalf of the claimant and for the contents of any adverse reports to be directly addressed. In the final analysis the review team would, of course, have reached its own decision, but an oral hearing, and proper disclosure, would have ensured that the decision was the result of a better informed process, and the conclusions, and the reasons for them, would then have been received with correspondingly greater confidence. ”

Thirdly, reference has already been made to the concerns occasioned by the impasse capable of arising in the case of a prisoner who maintains a denial that he committed the offences of which he has been convicted. On the one hand, he may need to complete various courses to satisfy CART that the risk to the public has been significantly reduced were he to be unlawfully at large; on the other hand, he may be ineligible or unsuitable for participation in such courses while he continues to deny guilt. While, plainly, continued denial of guilt cannot of itself preclude re-categorisation, a matter which would compound injustice in the case of anyone wrongly convicted of (necessarily in this context) grave offending, denial of guilt will very likely be relevant as undermining any acceptance of responsibility for the harm done. Moreover, the CART’s starting point can only be the correctness of the jury’s verdict. Still further and realistically, there will be “very, very, many more occasions” where prisoners “deny guilt for offences which they have in fact committed”: see, Elias J (as he then was), in R (Roberts) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] EWHC 679 (Admin), at [42], in the course of a most valuable discussion of this particular concern, at [39] – [42]. As it seems to me, it is necessary to be alert to the possibility of injustice occasioned by an impasse of this nature; but, it must be accepted that on occasions such impasses will, unavoidably, occur – given the important public interest in risk reduction before an offender is released on a controlled basis into the community or a re-categorisation decision is taken increasing the risk of an escape. As Elias J observed in Roberts, again at [42]:

“ …by being in denial they [i.e., prisoners] limit – and in many cases severely limit – the practical opportunity of demonstrating that the risk has diminished. Indeed, their denial demonstrates that they have not accepted that the risk was ever present.”

Fourthly, the common law duty of procedural fairness will some times require CART to convene an oral hearing when considering whether or not to downgrade a Category A prisoner. As Bean J rightly observed (at [27] of the Judgment), it is for the court to decide what fairness requires, so that the issue on judicial review is whether the refusal of an oral hearing was wrong; not whether it was unreasonable or irrational. Whether an oral hearing is required in an individual case will be fact specific. Given the rationale of procedural fairness, there is no requirement that exceptional circumstances should be demonstrated – there will be occasions when procedural fairness will require an oral hearing regardless of the absence of exceptional circumstances. But oral hearings are plainly not required in all cases; indeed, oral hearings will be few and far between. Advantages may be improved decision-making, bringing CART into contact with those who have direct dealings with the offender and the offender himself; an oral hearing may also assist in the resolution of disputed issues. Conversely, considerations of cost and efficiency may well tell against an oral hearing. There can be no single or even general rule, save, perhaps, for the recognition that oral hearings will be rare. By way of brief amplification:

From the preceding discussion it is plain that the common law duty of procedural fairness will some times require CART to convene an oral hearing when considering whether or not to downgrade a Category A prisoner. The critical question, to which the answer must be fact specific, is whether this was such a case.

For my part, if with two qualifications, I would accept that Mr. Southey has posed the correct question; to repeat, whether the Judge:

“ …erred by concluding that the inconsistency between the Parole Board’s decision and that of the Secretary of State is sufficient to justify holding an oral hearing.”

The two qualifications are:

Although Bean J had regard to all the circumstances of the Respondent’s case, it seems plain that the key to his decision that an oral hearing was required lay in “the view expressed by the [Parole] Board” (at [39] of the Judgment) that “a down-grading of his categorisation would be a ‘constructive move’” (at [37] of the Judgment). Realistically, no other feature of the case was capable of justifying the requirement for an oral hearing.

It is accordingly necessary to look rather more closely as to what the Parole Board did say. Unsurprisingly, as Bean J remarked, the Parole Board was of the view that the Respondent should remain in closed conditions; there was not and could not have been any realistic prospect of a recommendation that the Respondent be moved to open conditions. In a telling series of observations, the Parole Board commented on the Respondent’s minimising his own culpability, on his lack of insight into the “nature and degree” of his violent behaviour and on seeing himself as “the principal victim” of events; the Parole Board expressed concern that “such grievance thinking may impact on your motivation to change”. Pulling these threads together, the Parole Board concluded:

“ Whilst acknowledging that since the last review period you have done some work to address some of your risk factors and have behaved well in prison the panel felt that there has been no significant reduction in your level of risk.”

Thus far there is nothing whatever in the Parole Board’s observations to support the case for an oral hearing (or indeed, though not a matter for the Parole Board, for re-categorisation). However, one contributor to the discussion, Ms Ferraby, who had dealings with the Respondent as a probation officer seconded to the prison, is then recorded as saying that she “supported a proposal” that the Respondent be moved to a Category B training prison. In this regard:

“The panel felt that this may be a constructive move.”

As already highlighted, it is upon this single observation that Bean J’s conclusion essentially rested.

It is here that, very respectfully and with some regret, I find myself parting company with Bean J. To my mind, the sense of the Parole Board’s decision, taken as a whole, was clear: there had been no significant reduction in the risk attaching to the Respondent. At the most, there was a tentative rider as to the benefits of downgrading the Respondent’s security categorisation. I am unable to accept that this isolated rider provides any or sufficient foundation for concluding that this case should be one of those few in which an oral hearing is required. Unlike Williams (supra), there was no clear recommendation in the Respondent’s favour from the Parole Board; nor was there any disclosure issue – all the relevant reports were available to the Respondent in the present case. Further and by contrast with H (supra), there was no disagreement between the (local) Advisory Panel and CART; in this case, the Advisory Panel’s conclusion (set out above) was unequivocal and adverse to the Respondent.

Further still, once the Parole Board’s 23^rd July decision is considered as a whole, it is difficult to discern any or any significant inconsistency with the CART (or SSJ’s) 26^th November decision. It will be recollected that in the 26^th November decision, CART acknowledged various matters favourable to the Respondent but concluded that alcohol abuse (a matter which had been addressed, at least in secure conditions) could not alone provide a full or convincing explanation for the grave offences of which the Respondent had been convicted. In agreement with the Advisory Panel’s 19^th November recommendation, CART supported the need for further intervention to reduce the level of risk as to extreme violence presented by the Respondent. No oral hearing was warranted and absent “convincing evidence of significant risk reduction”, CART opposed any downgrading of the Respondent’s security categorisation. In my judgment, if and insofar as there was any inconsistency between the Parole Board and CART it went no further than that inherent in their different spheres of interest – the Parole Board focussing on controlled, conditional relaxation or release and the measures necessary to achieve that, while CART necessarily concentrated upon the risk posed by the Respondent in the event of an escape from custody.

The matter is if anything even clearer if the question is addressed prospectively (see, Williams, supra, at [32]) – i.e., prior to the 26^th November decision: what was there in the Parole Board’s 23^rd July decision which should have prompted CART to convene an oral hearing as part of its November decision-making process? For my part, I would answer that question, “nothing or nothing sufficient” and I would decline to treat the Parole Board’s isolated and tentative rider as by itself suggesting otherwise.

This conclusion has essentially been guided by a straightforward consideration of the 23^rd July decision, the 19^th November recommendation and the 26^th November decision. I should, however, underline that in reaching it I have also taken into account the variety of matters which follow:

In all these circumstances, in my judgment, this is not one of those few cases in which CART was required to convene an oral hearing before coming to a decision on security re-categorisation. It was only capable of becoming such a case if undue significance was attached to the single equivocal reference (already amply highlighted) contained in the Parole Board’s 23^rd July decision, at the expense of concentrating on that decision as a whole.

It follows that I am driven to the conclusion that the Judge erred in law in ruling that procedural fairness required CART to convene an oral hearing before the SSJ’s 26^th November decision refusing re-categorisation. I take some comfort from the consideration that this Court is in as good a position to decide the question in issue as was the Judge. On this ground, therefore, I would allow the appeal.

For completeness, as to the error of fact relied upon by the SSJ, there would have been nothing in it had it stood alone. Its significance, such as it may be, is that it may have contributed to the error of law already discussed. No more need be said of it.

I agree.

I agree that this appeal should be allowed for the reasons given by Gross LJ.