Virgin Atlantic Airways Ltd v Premium Aircraft Interiors UK Ltd & Anor

This is an application by Premium Aircraft Interiors UK Limited (which trades as and is commonly referred to as Contour) to vary the order which this Court made on 12^th January 2010 following the handing down of its judgment on the appeal by Virgin Atlantic Airways Limited (“Virgin”) against an earlier decision of Lewison J.

Contour designs and manufactures seats for use in the first and business-class cabins of passenger aircraft. In November 2003 Virgin introduced a flat-bed seat in the Upper Class cabins of its long haul aircraft. These units (known as the Upper Class Suite (“UCS”)) were manufactured and supplied by Contour. They were also protected by patent EP (UK) 1,495,908 (“the Patent”) which included claims both for the seat units themselves (claims 13-19) and for a seating system for an aircraft in which flat-bed seat units are installed in what is described as an inward-facing herringbone arrangement.

In July 2007 Virgin commenced proceedings in which it alleged that Contour had infringed both the Patent and unregistered design rights by the manufacture of a business-class seat called “Solar Eclipse” which it was producing for a number of airlines including Delta and Air Canada.

In his judgment ([2009] EWHC 26 (Pat)) Lewison J held that the design of the UCS had not been copied and that there had been no infringement of the Patent. But he rejected an attack by Contour on the validity of the Patent based, inter alia, on its anticipation by a British Airways’ UK Patent Application No. 2,326,824A (“the BA Patent Application”).

The issue of whether the Patent had been infringed turned principally on the construction of the words “each seat unit … further comprising means forming or being configurable for forming a substantially flat bed” which appeared in both claim 1 and in claim 13. The design of the UCS required the back rest to flip over so as to utilise the reverse side as part of the flat bed. This is not a feature of the Solar Eclipse. It was therefore common ground that if claims 1 and 13 of the Patent were restricted to a seat unit which incorporated the flip-over feature when in bed mode Contour had not infringed.

Lewison J held that it was so limited but this Court reversed his decision on this point: see [2009] EWCA Civ 1062. The Court also dismissed Contour’s cross-appeal against the rejection of its case on validity. All that therefore remained was to settle the terms of the order and the parties were invited in the usual way to provide submissions in writing about this and any other consequential matters.

In February 2008 Contour had filed an opposition to the Patent at the European Patent Office (“EPO”). The Opposition Division decided in March 2009 to maintain the Patent in a slightly amended form but both sides appealed against this decision to the Technical Board of Appeal (“TBA”). As of 22^nd October 2009 when the Court handed down its judgment on the appeal, the TBA had yet to determine the appeals in the opposition proceedings. Contour wished therefore to preserve the position in the English proceedings by inviting this Court to stay the making of its order on the appeal until the outcome of the proceedings before the TBA was known.

The reasons for this are explained by Jacob LJ in his judgment in Unilin Beheer BV v Berry Floor NV [2007] EWCA Civ 364. In short, a finding by the national court that the patent is valid does not preclude a subsequent determination by the EPO in opposition proceedings that the patent is either invalid or must be amended. But at least in these courts any such determination is limited in its effect. Procedural law is a matter for national courts and our national rules as to res judicata apply. Although the revocation of the patent will lead to the discharge of any injunction still in force, it will not justify setting aside either an award of damages for infringement or a perfected order for an inquiry. The cause of action based on the patent will merge in the judgment and the patentee will be entitled to enforce its judgment for damages regardless of the subsequent revocation or amendment of the patent.

In Unilin the claimant’s patent was held to be valid and infringed. The court made a declaration to that effect but also gave permission to Unilin to amend its patent by limiting the claims. This led to further proceedings as required under s.63(2) of the Patents Act 1977 (“the PA”) in order to determine whether the specification had been framed in good faith and with reasonable skill and knowledge and whether the infringement proceedings were brought in good faith. Unilin succeeded on these issues with the result that the Court then made unconditional orders in its favour for an inquiry as to damages or an account of profits.

At the directions stage in the inquiry the defendants applied for a stay of further proceedings pending the outcome of opposition proceedings in the EPO. The judge (HH Judge Fysh QC) held that Unilin’s entitlement to damages or an account of profits was not res judicata but nonetheless decided as a matter of discretion to refuse a stay.

The Court of Appeal allowed Unilin’s appeal on the issue of res judicata. After reviewing the authorities Jacob LJ said this:

“49.

Now it is true that in an inquiry as to damages or account of profits the patentee is allowed to claim relief for types of alleged infringement not ruled on by the trial court. This saves the formal issuance of fresh proceedings in respect of these and is permitted as a matter of convenience, see General Tire v Firestone [1975] RPC 203 at p.207). And of course if, in the inquiry or account, the patentee alleges a type of infringement not considered by the trial court, the court conducting the inquiry or account will have to rule on whether it falls within the scope of the patent. But so far as the originally pleaded and proved type of infringement is concerned the matter is res judicata not merely as to an issue but as a cause of action in respect of that type of infringement.

50.

Applying that to this case, it has not only been decided that the patent is valid, but also that the two types of infringement pleaded, "Snap-Fit" and "Berry" infringe. So, as Arden LJ pointed out in the course of argument, the cause of action for infringement has now merged with the judgment. At least for the infringements prior to the judgment (and there are none thereafter), Unilin simply no longer has any cause of action for infringement. It has a judgment instead.

....

80.

The flaw in the argument is that it is obviously wrong to regard the first instance decision as "final". It was not. It was under appeal - the very negation of it being final. As Mummery LJ said in the course of argument: "an appeal is just a continuation of existing proceedings. Res judicata does not get a look in." The fact that certain grounds originally relied upon were no longer relied upon is not enough to make the decision below final. I think the Inner House would be astonished to be told that its decision had a bearing on the point we have to decide.”

One of the earlier authorities relied on was the decision of this Court in Coflexip v Stolt (No 2) [2004] FSR 34. The patent in that case had been held to be valid and infringed and an inquiry as to damages was ordered. Before any hearing took place the patent was ordered to be revoked in separate proceedings which had been brought by another party relying on some different prior art. The issue therefore arose as to whether Coflexip was entitled to proceed with the inquiry in the first action. The Court of Appeal (Neuberger LJ dissenting) held that the defendants were estopped by the judgment from raising the invalidity of the patent as a defence in the inquiry.

The majority affirmed as still good law the earlier decision of the Court of Appeal in Poulton v Adjustable Cover and Boiler Block Co [1908] 25 RPC where the patent was also revoked after a finding of infringement and the making of an order for an inquiry as to damages. Both Parker J and the Court of Appeal held that the Master conducting the inquiry was not entitled to find that the patentee had suffered no damage because its patent was invalid and had been revoked. Vaughan Williams LJ at page 663 said that:

“The question here is whether this estoppel, as between the Plaintiff and the Defendant, remains a living and effective estoppel, notwithstanding the subsequent revocation of the Patent, so as to prevent the Defendant from reopening this question, which, as between him and the Plaintiff, has been decided once and for all. In my opinion that remains a good estoppel, and there is no estoppel on an estoppel as suggested by Mr Walter, and the appeal must be dismissed.”

Fletcher-Moulton LJ at page 663 said that:

“The judgment obtained by the Plaintiff against the Defendant settled for ever, as res judicata between those two parties, that this Patent was valid and that it was infringed during the period that it was valid. So far as those issues are concerned the cause was terminated, but an inquiry was necessary to ascertain the damages. In fact such an inquiry takes time, but for all legal consequences it may be supposed to be instantaneous and to take place at the moment when the judgment is pronounced.”

At page 664 Buckley LJ said that:

“A Patentee sued a Defendant for infringement, and he succeeded, and obtained a judgment, the substance of which was that his Patent was valid, and an inquiry was directed as to damages sustained by the Defendant’s wrongful infringement of that valid Patent. As between those parties there was a complete estoppel. It was res judicata, subject to two exceptions. In the first place, of course, it was not an estoppel, if the Defendant appealed. However, he did not appeal. Secondly, it was not an estoppel, if he presented a Petition for revocation of the Patent. That was decided, I think, in Deeley’s Patent 12 RPC 192. He did present a Petition for revocation of the Patent. The material thing to notice is that he did that, not in his own character – the character in which he had been sued as a Defendant for infringement – but as a representative person. For that purpose he was the public, and he said that the Patent ought not to remain in existence. He succeeded in getting the Patent revoked. The question then is, - in the inquiry as to damages which had been directed in the action, is the Patentee estopped from denying the invalidity of the Patent as established by the judgment in the Petition for revocation?

I am not so clear upon this question, I confess, as my learned brothers are, but I can see a reason for answering the question in the same direction, and my reasons for concurring in the judgment are these.”

The issue which divided the Court of Appeal in Coflexip was whether the estoppel created by the judgment in the action should be modified or excluded by the subsequent revocation of the patent. That argument (which was rejected in Poulton) fell to be re-considered in the light of the decisions of the House of Lords in Johnson v Gore Wood and Co [2002] 2 AC 1 and Arnold v Westminster Bank plc [1991] 2 AC 93 which establish that the principle of res judicata (except when it is based on cause of action estoppel) may admit of exceptions in appropriate cases.

The majority (Peter Gibson LJ and Sir Martin Nourse) rejected an argument that Poulton ought to be re-considered in the light of these developments in the law. There were, they said, good policy reasons for preserving the decision that subsequent revocation of the patent is not a bar to the enforcement of an existing judgment. They also held that there was nothing in Johnson v Gore Wood to suggest that a more flexible approach to res judicata had any application to cases of cause of action as opposed to issue estoppel. Poulton therefore remains good law.

Contour was therefore well advised to seek a stay in relation to the making of the order and not merely a stay of the inquiry. Once an order for an inquiry is made and sealed it has the effect of an immediate judgment for damages with all the consequences described in Unilin and the earlier authorities I have referred to. It was not therefore possible for the parties to agree an order and a further hearing took place to consider whether there should be some form of stay.

This Court took the view that it would be wrong to adjourn the making of the order until after the decision of the TBA in the opposition proceedings. The reasons are set out in the judgment of Jacob LJ ([2009] EWCA Civ 1513) given on 21^st December 2009. He said:

“6.

Miss Pickard advanced another reason why there should be a stay of the inquiry. Currently the patent in suit is under opposition by Contour and others in the European Patent Office. The opposition division has dismissed the opposition, but there is an appeal to the Technical Board of Appeal currently due to be heard on 20 April next year. Suppose, she said, the appeal is successful. It would be wrong for Contour to have to pay any damages, so a stay should be granted to allow for that contingency.

7.

There are two answers to that contention. The first is quite conventional. I see no reason why, even if the decision with the Technical Board of Appeal could have the effect of completely annulling our decision, just like a reversal by the Supreme Court, the general rule entitling a successful patentee to pursue his inquiry at his own risk as to costs while an appeal is pending should not apply.

8.

The second reason is equally valid. A subsequent revocation of a patent by the Technical Board of Appeal does not have the effect of completely annulling a final earlier order to the contrary in our national court. This court held in Unilin Beheer BV v Berry Floor NV [2007] EWHC Civ 364; [2007] FSR 625 that where the issues of infringement and validity had been finally determined in our courts the matter is res judicata as between the parties. If the patent is subsequently revoked in proceedings in the EPO, that affects the future, in that any injunction restraining infringement for the patent would lapse when the patent is revoked. But the entitlement to damages remains because it is res judicata in our courts as between the parties.

9.

Miss Pickard realistically accepted that that was the effect of Unilin. And that meant there was no basis for a stay of the inquiry because of the pending EPO appeal. So she changed tack. If there was to be no stay because of the rule in Unilin, then she wanted leave to appeal to the Supreme Court to attack that rule. I would refuse that application.

10.

The rule in Unilin effectively stretches back to the Poulton v Adjustable Cover [1908] 2 Ch 430. Moreover, if the position were otherwise the Patents Court would be partially emasculated. No truly final order could be made until the very often long drawn-out EPO opposition procedure was over. Business could not know in a reasonable time where it stood. Things would be provisional for far too long. Wary or perhaps well-advised inventors might indeed eschew the European Patent Office altogether and apply for a national patent instead -- there is no opposition procedure here -- for fear that an EPO opposition would make their patents only incompletely or contingently enforceable for the whole period of the opposition.”

The other matter to be considered was the claim for an injunction. As mentioned earlier, Contour had entered into a contract with Delta for the supply of Solar Eclipse seats. These are assembled at its factory in South Wales and then airfreighted to the place where the aircraft is being fitted out. The evidence was that the factory delivers the seats in what are called ship-sets: i.e. a delivery of all the units and fittings necessary to complete the installation of the relevant aircraft cabin.

The Court was told that Contour had already supplied 2,800 seats and that the outstanding orders from Delta related to two new aircraft and a further seven extended range Boeing 777 aircraft which were to be refitted with the new seats. All these aircraft were designed to fly on routes across the Pacific and not on transatlantic routes to London which is the market which Virgin is most anxious to protect. It was said that the Solar Eclipse was due to be superseded or discontinued so that the completion of the Delta orders would be the last deliveries of the infringing products. About 400 seat units remained to be delivered by the end of June 2010.

Contour could not and did not oppose the grant of an injunction to prevent further acts of infringement. But it asked the Court to sanction a carve-out from the injunction to permit the completion of the orders. It sought to justify this both on the basis that an appeal to the Supreme Court or the appeal to the TBA might be successful and on the usual basis of a run-off. A limited carve-out was not opposed by Virgin at least until April 2010 by which time the outcome of the appeals to the Supreme Court and the TBA would be known. But the supply of the remaining seats should be, it submitted, subject to three conditions which were that:

The Court decided that the carve-out should be authorised for the period up to the end of June 2010 on the conditions sought by Virgin. In rejecting Contour’s objection that the payment of £10,000 per seat was excessive, Jacob LJ at paragraph 34 said that:

“My reasons briefly are as follows. The £10,000 per seat sum is indeed substantial. It will amount to £4 million. There may well be some force in saying it is too high judging by the Air New Zealand rate as a comparison, but this is no place to make any evaluation of that. Mr Meade submitted that the patent was fundamental. He may be right. On the other hand Air New Zealand’s main interest may have been the flipover bed which is supposed to be particularly comfortable. I am not impressed by Miss Pickard’s “more than the profit” point. Contour negotiated the contract with Delta knowing the risk if it priced that too low and without regard to Virgin Atlantic’s intellectual property rights. That explains but does not justify the position it finds itself in. Besides if the sum is too much compared with the sum ultimately held appropriate, on the inquiry to damages not only would Virgin Atlantic be able to repay but more significantly that inquiry would also cover the 2,800 seats already supplied. Any overpayment on the 400 will most likely not amount to an overpayment altogether, so in a way the overpayment, if such it proved to be, would be in the nature of interim damages.”

The parties were then left to draw up the order which was eventually made on 12^th January 2010. I have set out the full text of the order in the appendix to this judgment. It includes a declaration of infringement by reference to the re-amended particulars of infringement; an injunction and an order for delivery up subject to the carve-out for existing contractual orders from Delta; an order for an inquiry as to damages; and the refusal of permission to appeal to the Supreme Court in relation to infringement and validity and in relation to the application of the decision in Unilin.

On 9^th June 2010 the Supreme Court dismissed Contour’s application for permission to appeal.

The TBA was due to hear the appeal in the opposition proceedings on 20^th April 2010 but, due to the restrictions on air travel imposed as a result of the volcanic eruptions in Iceland, the hearing did not take place until 9^th September. The TBA indicated at the hearing that it considered (contrary to our own view) that claim 1 of the Patent lacked novelty over the BA Patent Application. It also decided that the seat unit claims (13-19) as granted by the EPO were not clear in the light of the proposed amendments. The result was that Virgin agreed to delete all of the seat unit claims and to amend the seating system claims. Those amended claims were accepted by the TBA.

The present application has both a legal and a commercial imperative. Contour submit that the amendment of the Patent (which, under s.77(4) and s.75(3) of the PA, has retrospective effect) operates as a matter of law to prevent Virgin from enforcing the order it obtained on 12^th January 2010. At a preliminary hearing on 1^st December 2010 Virgin accepted that it could no longer rely on the injunction in the order to prevent further acts of infringement in relation to the amended claims and it consented to the discharge of the injunction. But it reserved its position in respect of the other parts of the order and, in particular, the order for an inquiry as to damages. It contends that the effect of an amendment to the Patent cannot be more disadvantageous to the patentee than an order for revocation and that, as a matter of authority, its entitlement to proceed with the inquiry is governed by the decisions of this Court in Poulton, Coflexip and Unilin.

The application is commercially important to Contour because if the application succeeds and the order for the inquiry is set aside Contour will avoid a liability in damages for past sales which Virgin has estimated to amount to something in excess of £49 million. The position has also changed in respect of the market for the Solar Eclipse seats. Although we were told that the design was redundant, it now appears that there has been a resurgence of interest in the product from a number of existing customers and the possibility of significant further orders.

Contour therefore seeks a variation of the order of 12^th January 2010 in three respects:

Virgin opposes each of these amendments to the 12^th January order. It also takes a point about the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain the application under CPR 52.17 or (in the case of the first undertaking) under CPR 40.12.

Contour bases this part of its application on what was said by Aldous J in PLG Research v Ardon International Limited [1993] FSR 698 about the effect of an amendment to a patent on existing proceedings for infringement. In that case, claim 1 of the patent in suit was found to be valid and infringed but the plaintiffs then sought amendment of that and the other claims. The judge gave permission for the patent to be amended but then had to consider whether the plaintiffs were entitled to an injunction and an inquiry as to damages in respect of the infringement. Although the requirements of s.63 of the PA were satisfied, the defendants submitted that the effect of the amendment to claim 1 was that the claim which had been found to have been infringed no longer existed and that there had been no finding of validity or infringement in respect of the amended claim.

The plaintiffs in fact withdrew their application for an injunction and an inquiry as to damages based on the earlier findings of infringement and the only issue for the judge was whether they were entitled to recover the costs of the action. But in that context Aldous J (at page 701) said this:

“At first sight, the effect of the amendments to claim 1 would not appear to make any difference on infringement or validity. Even so, the position is that there has been no conclusion as to infringement or validity of amended claim 1. In my view, it cannot be right to grant an injunction to restrain infringement of an amended claim where there has been no finding of infringement, nor would it be right to grant an inquiry as to damages on the same basis.

The problem of relief when a patent is amended is not new (see Dudgeon v. Thomson (1877) 3 App. Cas. 34 , and Kenrick & Jefferson Ltd.'s Patent (1912) 29 R.P.C. 25 ). The practice of this court is that, after amendment, a patentee must start a fresh action rather than seek to enforce any relief he has obtained in a previous action. That practice is based upon the fact that there has been no judgment on infringement and validity in relation to the amended patent.”

Mr Vanhegan QC for Contour fastens on the words “rather than to enforce any relief he has obtained in a previous action”. That was not the situation which Aldous J had to deal with in PLG nor was it the position which existed in this Court in December 2009. In both cases there had been findings of validity and infringement but no relief had yet been granted. It is, I think, common ground that the amendment of the Virgin Patent prior to the making of the order would have required the Court to go on and decide whether the Solar Eclipse seats infringed the amended claims before either an injunction or damages could be awarded. The retrospective effect of amendment under s.75(3) requires the Court to treat the amended claims as having always existed in that form from the date of grant. The effective amendment of the Patent would therefore have deprived Virgin of its cause of action based on the unamended claims and this Court on the hearing of the appeal would have had to consider only the amended claims: see Palmaz’s European Patents (UK) [2000] RPC 631 at paragraph 9. But Contour has to go further than this and demonstrate that the effect of the amendment is also to prevent Virgin from enforcing not its cause of action but rather the judgment for damages which it has obtained.

One therefore needs to examine Aldous J’s reference to enforcing “any relief [the claimant] has obtained in a previous action” by looking at the authorities it is said to be based on. The most important of these is the decision of the House of Lords in Dudgeon v Thomson (1877) 3 App Cas 34.

In 1873 the appellant in that case obtained an interdict against the respondent which prevented him from infringing a patent granted in 1866. In 1875 the patent was amended. Subsequently the appellant brought a new action against the respondent for infringement of the amended patent but that action was stayed and the appellant sought instead to enforce the original interdict obtained from the Court of Session in the first action. The House of Lords took the point that the infringement of the amended patent should have been decided in new proceedings and that the Court should not allow the original interdict granted in respect of the unamended patent to be used to prevent alleged infringements of the amended claims which had not yet been adjudicated upon. Lord Cairns LC at page 38 said that:

“The original specification may have complied with all the exigencies of the law, and been such as is requisite in the case of every patent, but the amended specification may be wanting in all those qualities which are required by the statute. And yet not one of those issues has been decided against the Respondents in this case; nay more, not one of those issues could be decided in the present proceedings, because, when the Appellant appeals to the Court to enforce its interdict granted in the former action, the Respondents are obliged to confess that in that former action the questions of novelty, of utility, and of sufficiency of the specification are all res judicata, already decided against them. My Lords, without going beyond that, and pointing out that upon the factum of infringement that which would be an infringement of the old specification may be none whatever of the new specification, the former considerations alone would satisfy your Lordships, I think, how extremely irregular it was in those who were engaged in this proceeding in Scotland to suppose that after the memorandum of alteration and the disclaimer the question of enforcing the old interdict could be entertained by the Court.”

The decision is therefore authority for the proposition that the Court will not enforce an injunction obtained prior to the amendment as a means of preventing future alleged infringements of the amended patent. The patentee must commence new proceedings and obtain a judgment based on the amended patent. But there is nothing in Dudgeon to suggest that an amendment also has the effect of preventing the successful patentee from enforcing the judgment for damages which he has obtained in respect of the acts of infringement in relation to the unamended patent. Although he could not have sued upon the unamended patent following the amendment, it seems to me that he could only be deprived of his property in the judgment by an express statutory provision to that effect. There is nothing of this kind in s.73 of the PA. The rule of natural justice referred to by the Lord Chancellor in part of his speech in Dudgeon which is adopted by Mr Vanhegan as the legal basis for his argument that the order for an inquiry should not be enforced is directed at the injustice of seeking to prohibit alleged infringements of the amended patent without allowing the defendant the opportunity of raising any defences to that claim. In the present case, the parties have had the benefit of a trial and the appeal process before judgment was entered in favour of Virgin. At that time the Patent remained unamended and all of Contour’s available defences had been adjudicated upon.

I can see nothing therefore in Dudgeon which casts any doubt upon the decision of this Court in Unilin or suggests that it was decided per incuriam. It is also clear that the reference by Aldous J in PLG to “any relief” is not supported by the authorities he relies on if (which I doubt) he was referring to anything but injunctive relief. The feature of a permanent injunction which distinguishes it from an award of damages is its prospective effect. It will operate to prevent further infringements of the patent by the same defendant. Once the patent is amended the unamended claims have gone and there is nothing left which the injunction can properly protect. It should therefore be discharged. If the patentee wishes to prevent an infringement of the amended claims he must sue in new proceedings and obtain a fresh injunction.

But the inquiry as to damages is not an attempt to enforce the new claim. It is merely the quantification of the amount payable under an already perfected judgment. There may be serious arguments as to why the estoppel created by that judgment should not be enforced given the subsequent amendment or revocation of the patent. But those arguments are not open to Contour in this Court following the decisions in Coflexip and Unilin.

As an alternative to their primary argument based on Dudgeon, Contour submit that Unilin and Coflexip can be distinguished because they were concerned with cases of revocation rather than amendment. In this case the amendment was voluntary (although doubtless influenced by the indications about validity given by the TBA) and results, it is said, in a patent that is still in force which the patentee can rely on to obtain injunctive relief and damages in new proceedings.

I do not consider that these points are sufficient to disapply the decision in Unilin in the present case. Both revocation and amendment are retrospective in effect and it is difficult to see why the patentee who amends should be in a worse position in relation to the enforcement of a judgment than the patentee whose patent is revoked. It is an essential part of Contour’s argument that the effect of amendment is to destroy the original claims ab initio. No meaningful distinction can be made between the effect of the two processes in relation to the enforcement of a pre-existing judgment for damages. I think Mr Meade QC for Virgin is also right to point out that Jacob LJ had the possibility of an amendment of the claims firmly in mind in his judgment in Unilin. Patents are frequently rescued in that way.

For these reasons, I would dismiss the application insofar as it seeks the discharge of the order for an inquiry as to damages. That leaves the order for delivery up. The legal basis for such relief is now s.61(1)(b) of the PA but delivery up is made in order to prevent further use of already manufactured infringing articles or their means of production and so to re-inforce the effectiveness of the injunction. In this case the order is limited in terms to infringing material. The delivery of the 9 ship-sets to Delta has been sanctioned under the terms of the carve-out and I am not aware of anything else to which paragraph 5 of the order could apply. The order therefore seems to me to be redundant. There are no follow-through claims to be considered in the light of the amendment and, the order should therefore stand or fall with the injunction. This is particularly so if its retention is designed to catch articles which will only infringe the Patent in the future after the date of its amendment. Subject to Mr Meade’s points about procedure and jurisdiction, which I will come to shortly, I would therefore vary the order by deleting paragraph 5.

Contour’s primary argument is that the second and third undertakings should be released along with the order for an inquiry as to damages. If the latter goes Virgin, they say, should be required to repay the £3.6 million because it can no longer be held as an interim payment on account of damages which is what Jacob LJ contemplated in the passage from his judgment quoted in paragraph 21 above.

On that basis it must follow from my rejection of the application to discharge the order for an inquiry that the application for an order for the return of the £3.6 million also fails. I can also see no reason to discharge the undertaking in respect of the Seton House guarantee which has now been given. So the only remaining issue is the release of the third undertaking by which Contour have agreed to pay £10,000 per seat to Virgin in respect of each of the 9 ship-sets delivered under the existing contract with Delta.

The third undertaking remains effective only in respect of the last of the 9 ship-sets which awaits delivery. Contour will be obliged to pay a further £450,000 unless the undertaking is released. As an alternative to his argument based on Dudgeon, Mr Vanhegan submits that the undertaking should be treated as co-terminous with the injunction and should therefore be discharged. That cannot be right. The undertaking was given to satisfy one of Virgin’s conditions for permitting the Delta ship-sets to be delivered free of the injunction which Contour accepted would otherwise have applied to those orders. The Solar Eclipse seats infringed the unamended Patent. If excepted from the injunction and the order for delivery up they must then give rise to a claim for damages. The enforcement of the undertaking therefore depends not on the continued existence of the injunction but on whether Virgin remains entitled to damages in these proceedings for the sale and delivery of the ship-sets to Delta. If so, then the payments fall to be treated as interim payments on account of damages in respect of those infringements.

Therefore the only relevant dispute between the parties is whether the ship-sets fall within the scope of the inquiry that has been ordered. Mr Vanhegan’s argument is that Virgin is seeking to enforce the third undertaking in relation to alleged acts of infringement which have or will occur after judgment and after the date of the Patent’s amendment. He submits that any estoppel created by the judgment and the order for an inquiry cannot apply to these subsequent acts. If Virgin wishes to obtain an award of damages in respect of them it must bring fresh proceedings and establish that they infringe the amended claims.

It is, of course, common practice in many actions for infringement for the unsuccessful defendant to agree to the inquiry covering infringing acts which post-date the order. This avoids the costs involved in the issue of further proceedings in which the issue of infringement will be res judicata against the defendant. But the claimant patentee is, strictly speaking, limited in its claim for damages to the infringing acts which it relies on in its particulars of infringement and which pre-date the judgment in the action. Its protection against further acts of infringement by the same defendant lies in the injunction.

The order of 12^th January 2010 includes a declaration of infringement in respect of the activities set out in the Re-Amended particulars of infringement. These include the disposal or offer to dispose of the 9 ship-sets which are the subject of a contract entered into prior to judgment in the action. The inquiry as to damages will therefore cover those acts of infringement and that part of the claim is unaffected by the fact that actual delivery of the ship-sets or even their manufacture will post-date the Court’s order. But I accept that the acts of manufacture and supply, if they have occurred after the date of the order, will not be part of the inquiry. Virgin will be entitled to damages in those cases only in respect of the contract of sale which was prior to the court order and thus subject to res judicata. I express no view as to whether the quantum of damages for the offer and contract would be any different from damages for the actual manufacture and delivery.

The position therefore is that Virgin will at the very least recover damages in the inquiry for the sale of the 9 ship-sets including the one set yet to be delivered. Mr Vanhegan submits that the £10,000 per seat payable on delivery of the units was intended to compensate Virgin not for the loss which it has suffered as a result of the sale but for its loss attributable to manufacture and supply which is what the injunction would have prevented. Damages for those acts could only be awarded in new proceedings based on the amended patent. It is therefore wrong to allow the undertaking to be enforced so as to provide security for a damages claim which has not been adjudicated upon in the existing proceedings. This argument is also deployed as an alternative reason for ordering the repayment of the £3.6 million.

If that is the correct premise then I am sympathetic to that submission. But I am not satisfied that it is. The third undertaking does not specify that the payments should be limited to providing an advance payment of damages only in respect of any infringing acts of manufacture and supply. It is general in its terms and the payments are equally attributable to the claims based on the offer to sell which are undoubtedly within the scope of the inquiry. Support for this view can, I think, be found in the second undertaking which stipulates that the guarantee from Contour’s parent should cover damages awarded in the inquiry in relation to the carve-out “in particular in relation to each of the 9 ship-sets identified as contractual obligations under the Delta Airlines contract”. Jacob LJ made it clear in the passage I have quoted that the payments of £10,000 per seat would be treated as interim damages in respect of the whole claim. For these reasons, I would refuse to discharge the second and third undertakings or to order repayment of the £3.6 million.

My decision on the merits of the application considerably reduces the importance of the points taken about jurisdiction and I propose to deal with them quite shortly. I will consider the submissions about the ambit of the slip rule when I come to the application in respect of the first undertaking.

Contour’s application was advanced initially as an application under CPR 52.17. Jacob LJ expressed doubts about this but gave permission for the application to proceed to a hearing and postponed argument on the point until then. Mr Vanhegan now relies upon the inherent jurisdiction of the Court to supervise the amendment and enforcement of its orders and, in the alternative, upon CPR 52.17.

This is not in my view an application which can properly be made under CPR 52.17. This Court has recently re-affirmed the extremely limited nature of this part of its jurisdiction in Guy v Barclays Bank plc [2010] EWCA Civ 1396 and it is unnecessary to repeat that here. Suffice it to say that CPR 52.17 does not exist to allow unsuccessful litigants to re-argue the correctness of the earlier decision as a matter of law. Its only purpose is to enable an earlier hearing to be re-opened where it can be shown that there has been a serious defect in the integrity of those proceedings. Nothing like that can be said to have occurred in this case.

I also have some doubts (though much less severe ones) as to whether the application to discharge the order for the inquiry should have been made to this Court. It is put on the basis that the enforceability of parts of our order has been affected by the subsequent amendment of the Patent. Although the Court can re-visit its orders either under CPR 3.1(7) or under its general jurisdiction contained in s.15 of the Senior Courts Act 1981 where there has been a material change of circumstances affecting the enforceability of its order, the more obvious and appropriate course to have taken would have been to have raised the consequences of the amendment as a defence in the inquiry. If the correct view of the law had been that the amendment of the Patent has rendered the order for the inquiry unenforceable and that no estoppel based on the judgment can be relied on then, there would be no impediment to the point being raised in those proceedings. The formal amendment or discharge of the order for the inquiry is strictly unnecessary. That said, I consider that this Court does have jurisdiction to entertain the application under s.15 and to consider what (if any) amendments to our order should be made in the particular circumstances relied upon by Contour. This applies particularly to the injunction and the order for delivery up which have a continuing effect and which (absent an appeal) can only be discharged or varied by this Court.

This imposes on Contour the obligation to procure a contractual undertaking from Delta not to use an aircraft installed with any of the 9 ship-sets on its transatlantic routes to the UK. The evidence is that Delta has given to Virgin an undertaking which covers all 9 ship-sets and is expressed to last “for so long as European Patent (UK) No. 1 495 908 shall be in force”.

The first undertaking is therefore spent and Contour’s only purpose in seeking an amendment to the concluding words is to assist Delta in obtaining rectification of its own contract with Virgin.

The first question is whether the undertaking contains an error and thereby fails to give effect to what this Court intended when it made the order. Mr Vanhegan submits that the intention was that this and the other parts of the carve-out (i.e. Virgin’s three conditions) should remain in effect for only so long as the injunction remained in force. I have already explained why I think that is inaccurate in respect of the second and third undertakings but, in relation to the first, the issue is slightly different.

All three conditions were intended to apply to the 9 ship-sets which were to be excluded from the effect of the injunction. The first undertaking contemplates the giving of the contractual undertaking referred to which was to continue to bind Delta “whilst the patent remains in force”. Virgin will have realised that it would not be possible to bring proceedings for infringement against Delta based on the temporary use of the planes on flights into and out of the UK. It therefore sought protection by imposing a contractual embargo on the use of the planes in competition with its own on its most valuable route.

Although the procuring of the undertaking from Delta was part of the carve-out, it does not necessarily follow that the parties intended that the restriction on Delta’s use of the planes should be co-terminous with the injunction. Had that been the position the parties could have said so. Instead the formula they adopted was one geared to the life of the Patent. If the opposition proceedings resulted in revocation then the undertaking would cease to be effective.

What is not clear is what was intended to happen if the Patent survived but in an amended form. Mr Vanhegan says that the parties and consequently the Court intended that the restriction should last only so long as the use of the Solar Eclipse seats would remain an infringement, Mr Meade, on the other hand, says that his clients agreed to the words used because they wanted to avoid any future dispute about whether the amendment would take away their right to enforce the restriction. They wanted the certainty that it would subsist for the life of the Patent whether amended or not.

Both sides, I think, accept that the Patent “remains in force” notwithstanding its amendment. The wording of Delta’s contractual undertaking which refers in terms to the Patent make this clear. We have not therefore been asked to resolve this issue by a process of construction.

As to whether this Court intended to achieve anything other than the effect of the words actually used, there is no material to go on beyond what appears in the judgments delivered on 12^th January 2010. It is evident from these that there was no active consideration of this point by the Court and that we were content to leave it to the parties to agree the wording which would go into the Delta undertaking.

In these circumstances, any dispute about the form of the contractual undertaking will have to be resolved in proceedings between those responsible for drafting and agreeing it. We do not have the material on this application to try a claim for rectification of a contract, one of whose parties is not even before the Court. I would therefore decline to amend the first undertaking. In the circumstances, it is unnecessary to consider the opposing submissions about the scope of CPR 40.12.

The application will therefore be dismissed except in relation to the order in paragraph 5 for delivery up. This will be deleted from the order of 12^th January 2010.

I agree.

I also agree.