Secretary of State for Work and Pensions v Slavin

The respondent is resident in a specialist care home for people with autistic spectrum disorders and similar conditions. The cost of his accommodation is paid for by the National Health Service. The home is registered as a care home, not a nursing home. Its staff are trained to meet the needs of residents but do not have any medical or nursing qualifications. The specific issue in the appeal is whether the respondent is “maintained free of charge while undergoing medical or other treatment as an in-patient … in a hospital or similar institution under [the National Health Service Act 2006]”, within the meaning of reg. 12A of the Social Security (Disability Living Allowance) Regulations 1991 (“the 1991 Regulations”), so as to be disentitled to receipt of the mobility component of disability living allowance (“DLA”) for which he was a claimant.

The background is set out clearly in the judgment of Upper Tribunal Judge Turnbull, from whose interim decision the appeal is brought:

“2.

The Claimant is a man now aged 30. He has been diagnosed … as having the following medical conditions: severe learning disability, Fragile X Syndrome (autistic traits), challenging behaviour, hay fever, gingivitis, sensitive skin and epilepsy.

3.

The most striking consequence of his condition is that his behaviour can be extremely challenging, such that he needs to be continuously supervised by at least one, and sometimes two care staff, who must be ready to intervene in order to attempt to prevent him causing damage to property or injury to himself or others. He can say basic sentences and make his basic needs known, and is able to make some simple choices such as what to eat and drink, what to wear, and whether he would like to go out. However, he needs others to assess basic risks and to protect him from harm.

4.

Until 26 November 2007 he lived at home, but with a high level of care and supervision from care workers when his father was at work. It was not safe for his mother to be at home alone with him.

5.

His behaviour eventually became too challenging for his parents to be able safely to cope with him at home, and on 26 November 2007 he moved into a care home which … I will refer to as ‘The Lodge’. It is privately owned and run. Although it is staffed by appropriately experienced and skilled care staff, it does not have any staff with medical or nursing qualifications. The very substantial fees for the Claimant’s accommodation and care there … are paid by the Bradford & Airedale Teaching Primary Care Trust (‘the Health Authority’) – i.e. in effect by the National Health Service. The Health Authority agreed to pay the whole of the cost of the Claimant’s accommodation and care following assessments under the National Framework for NHS Continuing Healthcare and NHS- funded Nursing Care.

6.

The Claimant was in receipt of the higher rate of the mobility component … and the highest rate of the care component … of [DLA] while living at home. However, on 18 February 2008 a decision was made that neither component of DLA was payable from 26 December 2007 on the ground that the Claimant was

‘being maintained free off charge while undergoing medical or other treatment as an in-patient … in a hospital or similar institution under the [National Health Service Act 2006]’

within regulations 8 (care component) and 12A (mobility component) of [the 1991 Regulations]. However, the Claimant is from time to time taken out by his parents for days out or longer holidays, and both components of DLA have apparently been paid in respect of entire days when he is not at The Lodge ….

7.

The Claimant appealed against the decision of 18 February 2008, contending that the fact that The Lodge did not have qualified nursing staff meant the Claimant was not in a ‘hospital or similar institution’ and therefore that neither reg.8 nor reg.12A applied. The Tribunal, by the decision now under appeal to me, dismissed the Claimant’s appeal, finding that The Lodge was a ‘hospital or similar institution’.”

We are told that the respondent’s appeal to the Tribunal related in fact only to the mobility component of DLA. It appears that an appeal in respect of the care component was not pursued as a result of a mistaken understanding of the effect of reg. 9 of the 1991 Regulations, considered below. But regs. 8 and 12A are in materially identical terms and in practice the arguments on the further appeal to the Upper Tribunal and to this court encompassed both regulations.

DLA is a non-contributory benefit introduced in 1991 as a successor to two earlier benefits, namely attendance allowance (introduced in 1970) and mobility allowance (introduced in 1975). It is now governed by the Social Security Contributions and Benefits Act 1992 (“the SSCBA 1992”). By s.71(1) it consists of a care component and a mobility component. The conditions for entitlement to the care component are set out in s.72; the conditions for entitlement to the mobility component are set out in s.73.

It should be noted that s.72(8) empowers the making of regulations to provide that no amount of DLA attributable to entitlement to the care component shall be payable in respect of a person for a period when he is a resident of a care home in circumstances in which any of the costs of any qualifying services provided for him are borne out of public or local funds under a specified enactment: by s.72(9), the reference to a care home is to “an establishment that provides accommodation together with nursing or personal care”. This provides the vires for reg. 9 of the 1991 Regulations (see below). There is no equivalent power under s.73 in respect of the mobility component of DLA.

The vires for regs. 8 and 12A of the 1991 Regulations are to be found in s.73(1)(b) of the Social Security Administration Act 1992 (“the SSAA 1992”), which empowers the making of regulations to provide for adjusting benefit payable to or in respect of a person, or the conditions for receipt of that benefit, where “the person is, or is treated under the regulations as, undergoing medical or other treatment as an in-patient in a hospital or similar institution”. By s.191, “‘medical treatment’ means medical, surgical or rehabilitative treatment (including any course of diet or other regimen), and references to a person receiving or submitting himself to medical treatment are to be construed accordingly”. The expression “hospital or similar institution” is not defined in the SSAA 1992, but there is authority that it should be construed as defined in the National Health Service Acts (see White v Chief Adjudication Officer (1993) WL 963025, Court of Appeal judgment of 21 July 1993, per Ralph Gibson LJ).

The National Health Service Act 2006 confers, by ss.1-3, wide powers and duties on the Secretary of State as to the promotion of a comprehensive health service and the provision of services, including: hospital accommodation; other accommodation for the purpose of any service provided under the Act; medical and nursing services; services for the prevention of illness, the care of persons suffering from illness and the after-care of persons who have suffered from illness; and such other services as are required for the diagnosis and treatment of illness.

The National Framework for NHS Continuing Healthcare and NHS-funded Nursing Care gives guidance on the respective responsibilities of the NHS (pursuant to the National Health Service Act 2006) and of local authorities (pursuant to s.21 of the National Assistance Act 1948) for meeting a person’s needs. It states in para 23 that where a person’s primary need is a health need, the NHS is regarded as responsible for providing all their needs, including accommodation if that is part of the overall need, so that they are eligible for “NHS Continuing Healthcare”, namely a package of continuing care arranged and funded solely by the NHS. An annex to the document defines “care” in very wide terms as “support provided to individuals to enable them to live as independently as possible, including anything done to help a person live with ill health, disability, physical frailty or a learning difficulty and to participate as fully as possible in social activities; this encompasses health and social care”.

The definitions in s.275(1) of the National Health Service Act 2006, as amended by the Mental Health Act 2007, include the following:

“‘hospital’ means –

(a)

any institution for the reception and treatment of persons suffering from illness,

(b)

any maternity home, and

(c)

any institution for the reception and treatment of persons during convalescence or persons requiring medical rehabilitation …

‘illness’ includes any disorder or disability of the mind and any injury or disability requiring medical or dental treatment or nursing.”

The Care Standards Act 2000, pursuant to which The Lodge is registered as a care home, contains in s.2(3) a somewhat different definition of “hospital” from that in the National Health Service Act 2006, but that definition is not of direct relevance to the 1991 Regulations and I think it unnecessary to set it out. I should, however, mention that by s.3(1)-(2) of the Care Standards Act 2000 an establishment is a “care home” for the purposes of the Act “if it provides accommodation, together with nursing or personal care, for any of the following persons”, namely persons who are or have been ill, or who have or have had a mental disorder, or who are disabled or infirm, or who are of have been dependent on alcohol or drugs; but by s.3(4)(a) an establishment in England is not a care home if it is a hospital within the meaning of the National Health Service Act 2006.

The relevant provisions of the 1991 Regulations, as they existed at the material time, are regs. 8, 9 and 12A, which read in material part as follows:

“8.

Hospitalisation

(1)

Subject to regulation 10, it shall be a condition for the receipt of a disability living allowance which is attributable to entitlement to the care component for any period in respect of any person that during that period he is not maintained free of charge while undergoing medical or other treatment as an in-patient -

(a)

in a hospital or similar institution under the NHS Act of 1977, the NHS Act of 1978 or the NHS Act of 1990; or

(b)

in a hospital or other similar institution maintained or administered by the Defence Council.

…

9.

Persons in care homes

(1)

Except in the cases specified in paragraphs (3) to (5), and subject to regulation 10, a person shall not be paid any amount in respect of any disability living allowance which is attributable to the care component for any period where throughout that period he is a resident in a care home in circumstances where any of the costs of any qualifying services provided for him are borne out of public or local funds under a specified enactment.

…

(6)

In this regulation … references to the costs of any qualifying services shall not include the cost of -

…

(f)

services provided pursuant to the National Health Service Act 2006 ….

…

12A. Hospitalisation in mobility component cases

(1)

Subject to regulation 12B (exemption), it shall be a condition for the receipt of a disability living allowance which is attributable to entitlement to the mobility component for any period in respect of any person that during that period he is not maintained free of charge while undergoing medical or other treatment as an in-patient -

(a)

in a hospital or similar institution under the NHS Act of 1977, the NHS Act of 1978 or the NHS Act of 1990; or

(b)

in a hospital or other similar institution maintained or administered by the Defence Council ….”

I should clarify a few points about those regulations. First, nothing turns on reg. 10, referred to at the beginning of regs. 8 and 9, or on reg. 12B, referred to at the beginning of reg. 12A. Secondly, the references in reg. 8(1)(a) and reg. 12A(1)(a) to earlier National Health Service Acts are now to be read as references to the National Health Service Act 2006. Thirdly, reg. 8(1) or a provision in substantially those terms was included in the 1991 Regulations as originally made. So was reg. 9(1) or a provision in substantially those terms; but the exclusion, by reg. 9(6)(f), of services provided pursuant to the National Health Service Acts was first introduced by amendment in 2002 (it appears that the reason why an appeal against the decision in respect of the care component of DLA was not pursued was that this exclusion was not noticed at the time, so that it was mistakenly believed that reg. 9 operated to exclude the respondent while resident in a care home). Reg. 12A(1), on the other hand was first introduced by amendment in 1996. There has never been any equivalent to reg. 9 in relation to the mobility component of DLA.

It is convenient to refer at this stage to a number of authorities around which the decision below and the arguments on the appeal have revolved.

In Minister of Health v Royal Midland Counties Home for Incurables at Leamington Spa [1954] Ch 530 the issue was whether the home was a “hospital” within the meaning of the National Health Service 1946 so as to become vested in the Minister of Health. The definition of “hospital” was materially the same as in the National Health Service Act 2006 (see [9] above). The residents of the home were persons suffering from incurable diseases. It was said that by the very nature of their condition, there was no “treatment” at the home designed to cure them; there was, however, “palliative treatment” administered to about a third of them, being treatment in the nature of physiotherapy, massage and so forth, designed to alleviate suffering or arrest their disease. Medical attention and “treatment” were also available and administered in the case of those who might from time to time suffer from what were described as casual illnesses. The staff of the home included both domestic staff and nursing staff. A physician and surgeon visited the home regularly on alternate days.

An arbitrator had held that “treatment” in the Act meant medical or surgical treatment and did not include nursing. The Court of Appeal disagreed and allowed an appeal against his decision. Evershed M.R. said this (at page 541):

“I am unable to accept this narrow view of ‘treatment’. In my judgment, ‘treatment’ in the definition of ‘hospital’ includes not only medical treatment (I can leave out, for present purposes, dental treatment), in the sense that the patient is looked after and attended to by a doctor, but also nursing in the sense that the subject or patient is looked after and attended to by persons professionally trained to look after and attend to the sick. In my view, such a conclusion follows inevitably from a reading together of the two definitions of ‘hospital’ and ‘illness’; for, so read together, ‘hospital’ means (inter alia) ‘any institution for the reception and treatment of persons suffering from … any … disability requiring … nursing’. And, I add, ‘requiring nursing as distinct from medical or dental treatment.’”

He rejected a submission that the context required the exclusion of the words “or nursing”, though he acknowledged that from other sections of the Act “a distinction may be discerned between ‘treatment’ and mere ‘care’ (which I assume to comprehend ‘looking after’ by persons not professionally trained for such purpose)” (page 542). That distinction was picked up in the reasoning of Denning LJ, who was understood by the Master of the Rolls to agree with his conclusion as to the meaning properly to be attached to the word “treatment” but to disagree as to the outcome on the findings of the arbitrator. Denning LJ said this (at page 547):

“The key to the legal position lies in the fact that the Act draws a sharp distinction between ‘treatment’ and ‘care’ …. If an institution is provided for the reception and ‘treatment’ of incurables, it is a hospital and is to be taken over by the State; but if it is provided only for their reception and ‘care’ of them, it is not. Where is the line, then, to be drawn in this regard between ‘treatment’ and ‘care’? Neither is defined in the Act, but ‘treatment’ means, I think, the exercise of professional skill to remedy the disease or disability, or to lessen its ill-effects or the pain and suffering which it occasions; whereas ‘care’ is the homely art of making people comfortable and providing for their well-being so far as their condition allows. ‘Nursing’, too, is not defined; but it covers, I think, both treatment and care. Some part of it, indeed an important part of it, is the exercise of professional skill; but a goodly part, perhaps the larger part, is just kindness and attention. When the Act, therefore, defines ‘illness’ as including any disease or disability requiring [medical] or dental treatment, or nursing, it means, I think, a disability which requires the exercise of professional skill, as distinct from a disability which only requires care and attention.

Likewise, when the Act defines ‘hospital’ as an institution provided for the reception and treatment of persons suffering from illness, it means an institution provided for the exercise of professional skill upon them, as distinct from an institution provided for the care of them. There are, of course, many institutions which have both objects. Their purpose is to treat persons suffering from illness by the exercise of professional skill, and to look after them as well. The position of these institutions depends, I think, on their main purpose. If the main purpose is to treat patients for their illnesses by the exercise of professional skill, then the institution is a hospital. But if the main purpose is only to take care of them and make life more comfortable for them, then it is not a hospital but a home, and is not caught by the Acts. A subsidiary purpose may be to treat them by the exercise of professional skill, but this will not make it a hospital if the main purpose is that it should be a home for them. In an old people’s home, there are often nurses with professional qualifications, but that does not make it a hospital ….”

Romer LJ agreed in substance with the Master of the Rolls. He held that the definition of “treatment” in the statute included nursing, and that one way of putting it was that Parliament had three forms of treatment in contemplation under the Act, that is to say medical, dental and nursing, and that the last had an independent existence of its own. He went on to say that “‘nursing’ means more than mere ‘care’ of persons suffering from illness … and, presumably, refers to nursing of a professional character” (page 551), but that the nursing in the home fell within that category, as was shown by the fact that the staff consisted of 48 full-time and 29 part-time paid nurses under the general control of a matron, and under the supervision of medical practitioners, and by the further fact that about one-third of the patients received palliative treatment of various kinds which the nurses administered.

White v Chief Adjudication Officer (see citation at [6] above) concerned entitlement to income support in the case of the residents of a home registered both as a nursing home and as a residential care home. The staff included a patient care manager who was a registered general nurse and mental nurse; a deputy registered mental nurse plus 2.7 (full time equivalent) registered mental nurses; a state registered nurse and two enrolled nurses; and approximately 20 to 24 care assistants. The wording of the relevant regulations was materially the same as that of regs. 8 and 12A of the 1991 Regulations. The court followed Minister of Health v Royal Midland Counties Home for Incurables at Leamington Spa in holding that the home was a hospital and that the applicants were not entitled to income support. In the course of rejecting counsel’s attempt to distinguish that case on its facts, Ralph Gibson LJ (with whom the other members of the court agreed) said:

“… I acknowledge that if the provision of nursing by professionally trained nurses in an institution is minimal, as for example only rarely expected to be required, such an institution may not be a hospital. In this case, however, the 14 applicants are all mentally ill. They require appropriate nursing for and because of their illness. Forest Lodge has, and has agreed to maintain appropriate nurse staffing, including qualified mental nurses. Mr Day, who is in charge, is a mental nurse. All but one of the 14 patients are on medication for their illness. Forest Lodge dispenses drugs on prescription ….”

Botchett v Chief Adjudication Officer (Court of Appeal judgment dated 7 May 1996) was another income support case and the wording of the relevant regulations was again in materially the same form as that of regs. 8 and 12A of the 1991 Regulations. The appeal related to residents of a registered nursing home, all of whom were severely mentally handicapped so as to need a high degree of care and supervision in their daily lives, but it was stated that none of them was mentally ill in the sense that they needed or received treatment for mental illness. Evans LJ (with whom the other members of the court agreed) said that the argument centred on whether the appellant was “undergoing medical treatment” and whether the home was a “hospital or similar institution”, issues which he described as separate but closely linked. He referred to a distinction drawn between nursing and domestic staff, adding that the nursing staff included some who were trained and others who were “untrained”. The nature of the residents’ mental handicap was such that they were unable to make any decisions regarding choice of meals, purchase of clothing or daily activities. An appointed keyworker helped each resident to keep to his or her plan of daily activities. Evans LJ continued:

“If the social security regulations stood alone, I would be inclined to accept Mr Havers’ submission that a distinction should be made between mental illness for which professional treatment is made available in a hospital or similar institution, on the one hand, and various forms of mental handicap for which skilled but domestic care, but not medical treatment, is required and which is made available in a residential home, on the other hand. But the Regulations have to be construed with reference to the statutory definitions of ‘hospital’, ‘illness’ and ‘mental disorder’ already quoted, and these lead inexorably, in my judgment, to the conclusion that persons suffering from the degree of mental handicap to which unfortunately the appellant is subject are within the definition of mental disorder; that the care and assistance which they receive from nursing as opposed to domestic staff must be regarded as ‘medical or other treatment’ within the statutory definition; and that the home where they reside so that this can be made available to them is a ‘similar institution’ to a hospital within the meaning of regulation 2(2). The key factor, in my judgment, is that the definition of mental disorder includes ‘arrested or incomplete development of mind’ and ‘any other disorder or disability of mind’. Mr Havers submits that there is no evidence or expert opinion that this statutory phrase includes the degree of handicap which is described as ‘learning difficulties’ in the present case, but the natural and ordinary meaning of the phrase is sufficiently wide, in my judgment, to include malfunction or non-functioning of the mind not caused by illness but due to some defect in the mental processes which probably cannot be identified, let alone treated in the current state of medical knowledge.”

Evans LJ went on to say that this conclusion was supported by Minister of Health v Royal Midland Counties Home for Incurables at Leamington Spa, where the majority had concluded that the institution was within the definition of hospital “in the sense that the inmates were cared for by persons who were professionally trained to care for the sick”: once it appeared that the appellant in Botchett came within the statutory definition of ‘mental disorder’ and therefore of ‘illness’, the same conclusion followed.

All three Court of Appeal cases were considered by a tribunal of Commissioners, presided over by the then Chief Commissioner (HHJ Hickinbottom), in R (DLA) 2/06 (decision of 27 July 2005). Although both counsel referred to the decision, in particular to paras 73-79, it does not seem to me to add materially to the principles relevant to the determination of the issues before us.

Against that background I turn to consider in greater detail the facts of the present case, looking first at the respondent’s care needs and then at the way in which those needs are met by The Lodge.

An assessment carried out by a community nurse in June 2007 and updated in August 2007, while he was still living at home, described the respondent’s needs under twelve headings. By way of illustration, under “mobility” he was said to be very mobile and to have a tendency to run off, requiring 1:1 support to maintain his safety; and although he was usually redirected into an activity he sometimes had to be restrained using approved techniques. Under “eating and drinking” he was said to need constant supervision because he would eat too fast and was at risk of choking if not supervised. Under “communication” it was stated that he could say simple sentences and make his basic needs known but that he had difficulty expressing complex emotions and this was thought to be part of the reason for his challenging behaviour. As to that, it was stated under the “behaviour” heading that he had severely challenging behaviour and might cause injury to himself and others; in day care he needed three staff to maintain his safety during unsettled periods, and there had been a number of incidents in which restraint techniques had been used on him for his own protection.

Under each of the twelve headings he was assessed as needing one or two care staff. Under only two headings was he assessed as needing a registered nurse. They were “pain control”, where it was said that registered nurse input was required for pain and infection assessment; and “medical condition”, where reference was made to regular checkups at a health centre, and the August 2007 update stated that a nurse and a doctor reviewed his health and medication on a regular basis. Under “medication” he was said to be usually compliant with taking his medication unless he was in a state of high arousal, in which case the medication could not be administered until he had calmed down; the assessment was that the administration of his medication needed one care staff, not a registered nurse.

The conclusion referred to the position as at December 2006 and to the updated position as at August 2007, in these terms:

“December ’06. [He] meets level 3/5 of the Continuing Care criteria. [He] is receiving input from the Behavioural Management Team, consultant psychiatrist and other members of the clinical liaison team including Occupational Therapy. In daycare he receives intensive support from specially trained staff under the supervision of a healthcare professional due to the nature, frequency and high impact of his behaviours, which are severely challenging, self-injurious, destructive and aggressive and place him and others at significant risk. At home [he] has a tendency to target his mother and extra input is required to provide 1:1 support to keep his mother safe.

August 07 update – [his] behaviours have escalated to the extent that he now needs 2:1 support to keep him and others safe from his self-injurious and aggressive behaviour, which can occur at any time. There are also concerns about his increasing weight gain and [he] is unable to access exercising type activities such as walking and swimming unless he has 2:1 support. Some months ago [his] family made the very difficult decision of requesting residential care for [him] because they feel they can no longer cope and he is on the waiting list for a suitable placement to be found. We feel [he] now meets level 5 of the Continuing Care criteria.”

That was the basis on which he was placed at The Lodge with full NHS funding.

We were taken to two further documents which give an update on the respondent’s condition. They were described respectively as a “learning disability nursing needs assessment tool”, dated March 2009, and a National Framework “decision support tool”, dated April 2009. The former adds little to the assessment I have already considered, save that the only category where reference is made to the need for a registered nurse is “behaviour”; and in relation to the question “Which specialist assessments have been requested, or carried out, in addition to this assessment?”, it is said that the respondent sees a consultant psychiatrist, a behavioural nurse, an occupational therapist and a dentist.

The decision support tool adopts a somewhat different approach but is to the same general effect. Under “behaviour” the applicable description is “‘Challenging’ behaviour of severity and/or frequency that poses a significant risk to self and/or others. The risk assessment identifies that the impulsive nature of the behaviour and the potential for harm to self or others requires a prompt response from skilled carers and care workers to manage the frequency, intensity or duration of the behaviour and care”; and the corresponding level of need is “severe”. At the other end of the spectrum is the respondent’s categorisation under “drug therapies and medication: symptom control”, where the applicable description is “Requires supervision/ administration of and/or prompting with medication or may have a physical, mental stage or cognitive impairment requiring support to take medication, but shows concordance with medication regime”; and the corresponding level of need is “low”. Unlike the “severe” category under this heading, the “low” category does not have any requirement for administration of medication by a registered nurse or care worker specifically trained for the task.

Towards the end of the document is a summary of needs in the following terms:

“[He] needs a long term 24 hour community placement, that will meet his health and social care needs. He needs to live within easy reach of his parents who he sees on a regular basis.

[He] needs to have a structured day time activity programme, which includes home based and community activities.

[He] will continue to need support with all aspects of his care, including attention to his learning disability needs, his autistic needs, his behavioural needs, his nutritional and diet needs, his psychological and emotional needs and his medical needs.

[He] will continue to need support to access all health and medical professionals to ensure his well being.

[He] needs access to some form of transport so that he can use a vehicle when he needs it.”

The Lodge was registered by the Commission for Social Care Inspection under the Care Standards Act 2000 on 14 September 2007, with the condition that it might provide the service of “care home only” to service users of either gender within the category of “learning disability”.

A letter from The Lodge dated 10 October 2008 confirms that the service provided to the respondent is “residential and social support” and that The Lodge is not a nursing home and does not deliver any nursing care. A further letter, dated 22 October 2008, states that it provides 24 hour residential care to individuals who fall under the autistic spectrum and who may have other associated disorders and that it provides service users with community based activities; activities within the home; “[t]rained staff team trained in de-escalation tactics and physical intervention when required for challenging behaviours”; personal care, including bathing, dressing, assistance with meal preparation, assistance with household duties; an autism friendly environment, which is neutral in colour and does not over-stimulate; a vehicle to enable access in the community; medication administration; and “[r]egular medical and health care checks at local amenities, i.e. GP”. The letter goes on to say that the home does not provide nursing care and that if service users require any nursing needs, then the GP would arrange for a district nurse to visit, or the service users would visit them.

A brochure about The Lodge describes it as providing “a specialist home environment for people with Autistic Spectrum Disorders, Asperger’s Syndrome and complex needs, who require high levels of support in a homely environment. Under “staffing” it states:

“The staff team have been provided with training related to the specific needs of the service users; this is approached through an initial induction and ongoing training. The induction is designed to the Learning Disabilities Award Framework and staff are encouraged to work towards NVQs.

The home has access to a wide range of specialist staff and we are able to access GP services. Any individual specialist support will be discussed as part of the assessment undertaken upon referral to the service.”

In the course of his detailed and careful judgment, Upper Tribunal Judge Turnbull identified the issues as being (1) whether the fact that the respondent’s accommodation and care in The Lodge was paid for by the Health Authority, and that The Lodge employed appropriately experienced and skilled carers, was sufficient to cause regs. 8 and 12A to apply, notwithstanding that The Lodge had neither medically qualified nor nursing staff; (2) if not, whether regs. 8 and 12A applied (a) on the ground that the respondent received treatment from doctors, nurses and other healthcare professionals elsewhere than at The Lodge, or (b) if the respondent received treatment from doctors, nurses or other healthcare professionals at The Lodge, but who were not employed or engaged by The Lodge.

As to (1), he held that “medical or other treatment” in regs. 8 and 12A did not extend to the exercise of care and skill by trained carers with no medical or nursing qualification and that the care provided by The Lodge’s own staff did not therefore bring the respondent within the scope of either regulation.

As to (2)(a), he held that in order to fall within the regulations there had to be at least some “treatment” being received in the institution in which the respondent was an “in-patient”, and further that an ordinary care home not providing medical or nursing treatment was not a “hospital or similar institution”, and that the fact that the respondent was receiving some medical treatment outside The Lodge did not therefore bring him within the scope of either regulation.

As to (2)(b), he preferred not to decide the question without giving the parties an opportunity to consider whether to file further evidence and make further submissions in the light of that evidence. That was the reason why his decision was only an interim decision. In the event, after receiving further submissions, he decided to leave it as an interim decision, in respect of which he granted permission to appeal to this court, and to stay any further proceedings on issue (2)(b) pending the outcome of the appeal.

In my view it would have been much better for the judge to determine the outstanding issue so that an appeal to this court, if an appeal had still been necessary, could have been considered by reference to a full set of relevant facts. There is a certain artificiality in having to consider the other issues, as we were invited to do, on the assumption that the respondent does not receive treatment from doctors, nurses or other healthcare professionals at The Lodge. The application of the relevant regulations should preferably be considered in the round, by reference to the full factual picture. It is, however, common ground that we have jurisdiction to entertain an appeal against an interim decision of the Upper Tribunal, and despite the reservations I have expressed I think it right in the circumstances to proceed to determine the issues raised in the appeal.

Taking them in the order in which they were presented in the oral submissions of Mr Buley, for the Secretary of State, the issues in the appeal are these:

Strictly speaking, as I have explained, the appeal relates to reg. 12A, not to reg. 8, but the material wording is the same in the two regulations and it is sensible to refer to them both, since they feature together in the arguments advanced. I have also explained that the issues have to be decided on the assumption that the respondent does not receive treatment from doctors, nurses or other healthcare professionals at The Lodge itself.

Although the issues may be conceptually distinct, in practice there is a considerable overlap between them and I think it more useful to look at them together when summarising the parties’ submissions and setting out my conclusions.

Mr Buley submitted that the general purpose of regs. 8 and 12A points strongly towards a broad purposive meaning that would exclude entitlement to benefit in this case, and that the broad language within the regulations tends to support that conclusion. The basic purpose of the care component of DLA, pursuant to s.72 of the SSCBA 1992, is to provide for the additional care needs of those with a severe physical or mental disability. There is therefore a powerful policy argument for not giving benefit where, as here, those needs are being met already from public funds within a care home. Similar considerations apply to the mobility component, as regards time spent in the care home (and if the appellant goes home overnight, it is common ground that he is able to claim DLA for that period). The tribunal in R (DLA) 2/06, at para 78, said that part of the rationale of reg. 8 was presumably the avoidance of double provision from public funds. That there was an overlap between the benefits enjoyed by in-patients in hospital and benefits such as DLA, both involving the use of public resources, was also one of the considerations that led the court in R v Secretary of State for Social Security, ex parte Perry (Court of Appeal judgment of 30 June 1998) to hold that reg. 12A fell within the vires of s.73(1) of the SSAA 1992. The court in the present case ought therefore to approach the construction of regs. 8 and 12A with a view to the avoidance of double provision from public funds.

A further, more specific policy argument deployed by Mr Buley was that unless reg. 8 (and therefore also reg. 12A) is given a broad construction there will be an undesirable lacuna between reg. 8 and reg. 9: a person maintained free of charge by the NHS in a hospital in which all his medical and care needs are met will not be entitled to the care component of DLA (reg. 8); and a person maintained by a local authority in a care home, whether or not free of charge, will not be entitled to the care component (reg. 9); yet a person maintained free of charge by the NHS in a care home will be entitled to the care component.

As regards “medical or other treatment”, Mr Buley referred to the main authorities considered above and submitted that “nursing” is not limited to nursing by a qualified or NHS registered nurse but includes the provision of care, in connection with illness, by skilled care staff trained in dealing with autism (managing challenging behaviour, protecting a person from harming himself and others, etc.) and responsible for the administration of medication. The judge below went wrong in considering that a nursing qualification was necessary. What was decisive in the authorities was that the person was receiving a form of support the need for which was occasioned by their having an “illness” within the meaning of the statute. It is common ground that the respondent suffers from “illness” as defined in s.275(1) of the National Health Service Act 2006 (which includes disability of the mind); and since the care and assistance he receives at The Lodge is necessitated by that illness, it must follow that he is in receipt of “medical or other treatment” within regs. 8 and 12A.

Mr Buley submitted further that it is impossible to see as a matter of policy concerning entitlement to DLA why the physical location of the treatment should matter. The court should not read into the regulations any requirement as to receipt of treatment on the premises of the institution in which the person is maintained out of public funds unless that is clearly required, and no such clear requirement emerges from the wording. The judge below considered that the words “maintained free of charge while undergoing medical or other treatment as an in-patient in a hospital or similar institution” meant that at least some treatment was received in the institution in which the person was an in-patient, and that “as an in-patient in a hospital or similar institution” would otherwise have been omitted. But the judge was wrong to take that approach. The words “as an in-patient” should be read as being attached to “maintained free of charge … in a hospital or other institution”, not as qualifying the requirement of “medical or other treatment”; and in any event the wording as a whole carries no necessary statement of physical presence in the institution where the treatment is received.

If the respondent is receiving “medical or other treatment” at The Lodge, then Mr Buley submitted that The Lodge must be a “hospital or similar institution” within the meaning of the regulations. In any event, a care home is defined in s.72(9) of the SSCBA 1992 and in s.3 of the Care Standards Act 2000 in terms that cover the provision of “nursing or personal care”; but if it provides nursing it is a “hospital”, so that “similar institution” must apply to a care home providing personal care. Further, a specialist care home such as The Lodge is plainly a place for the “reception” of those with illness, even if not for the “treatment” of them.

Mr Blundell, who appeared pro bono for the respondent and is to be commended for the thoroughness with which he approached the case, submitted that the decision of the judge below was correct and in accordance with authority.

He submitted that there is no clear legislative policy to avoid double provision out of public funds, such as might be capable of informing the interpretation of the regulations. The powers and duties of the Secretary of State under the National Health Service Act 2006 are extremely broad, and the reality of NHS funding has moved on since the 1991 Regulations were made (not least, in the light of the decision in R v North and East Devon Health Authority, ex parte Coughlan [2001] QB 213). There is no relevant policy relating specifically to DLA, beyond that to be derived from the wording of the regulations themselves. As to Mr Buley’s argument that a broad interpretation is needed in order to avoid a lacuna, the lacuna in question was created by an amendment to reg. 9 in 2002 and, if thought appropriate, can be plugged by a further amendment; it should not be plugged by adopting a strained interpretation of regs. 8 and 12A.

On the issue of “medical or other treatment”, Mr Blundell submitted that it was the provision of professionally qualified nursing that was determinative in each of the main authorities and that the provision of mere care or other services by persons other than professional nurses does not amount to “medical or other treatment”. “Treatment” must not be taken out of its hospital context.

As to the location of the treatment, he submitted that the wording of the regulations is clearly against the Secretary of State. The words “as an in-patient” would be robbed of any sensible meaning if the treatment did not have to be provided on the site of the institution in question. The words “in a hospital or similar institution” also indicate the receipt of services “in” the institution: had the regulations been intended to apply to the receipt of services off-site, a different preposition would have been used. Further, one has to stand back and read the wording as a whole: the words create a link between maintenance as a resident in an institution and the undergoing of treatment there, again pointing strongly towards the receipt of services having to be at the location of the institution.

As to whether The Lodge is a “hospital or similar institution”, Mr Blundell submitted that it is plainly not a hospital, and that to be a “similar institution” an institution must share the same essential characteristics as a hospital. The judge below was right to consider that the likely explanation for the words “or similar institution” were that they were inserted to cover an institution which provides nursing but which would not in ordinary parlance be regarded as a hospital, such as a privately owned nursing home or hospice. The Lodge is not in that category.

Having set out the relevant material in some detail already, I can keep my discussion of the issues within a relatively short compass.

I take as my starting-point the fact that the respondent suffers from a “disorder or disability of the mind” falling within the definition of “illness” in s.275(1) of the National Health Service Act 2006 and that his healthcare needs qualify him for an NHS-funded residential placement at a care home where he is provided with the specialist care he requires by reason of his illness. Even so, it does not seem to me to be a natural use of language to describe him as “undergoing medical or other treatment as an in-patient … in a hospital or similar institution”, in the terms of regs. 8 and 12A. The authorities show that the condition is to be given a somewhat wider meaning than might appear at first sight, but in my view they do not lead to a construction of the condition which would bring the respondent’s situation within it.

The three main authorities considered above (Minister of Health v Royal Midland Counties Home for Incurables at Leamington Spa, White v Chief Adjudication Officer, and Botchett v Chief Adjudication Officer) establish that the expression “medical or other treatment” is to be read as including nursing as well as medical and dental treatment. The inclusion of nursing results from reading together the statutory definitions of “hospital” and “illness”, as appears most clearly from the passage quoted at [15] above from the judgment of Evershed MR in the Leamington Spa case. There is nothing in the authorities to suggest that the expression goes wider than medical, dental and nursing treatment. On the assumption we have to make for the purposes of this appeal, there is no question of medical or dental treatment being provided at The Lodge. Accordingly, the respondent can be said to be undergoing “medical or other treatment” at The Lodge only if the care provided there amounts to nursing.

What, then, is meant by “nursing” for this purpose? Each of the authorities lays stress on the possession of a professional nursing qualification or training. In the Leamington Spa case, Evershed MR referred to “nursing in the sense that the subject or patient is looked after and attended to by persons professionally trained to look after and attend the sick”; Denning LJ drew a distinction between “the exercise of professional skill” and the simple provision of care and attention; and Romer LJ said that nursing “presumably, refers to nursing of a professional character” (see [15]-[17] above). In White’s case, Ralph Gibson LJ referred to “professionally trained nurses” and to “appropriate nurse staffing, including qualified mental nurses” (see [18] above). The position is perhaps less clear in Botchett’s case. In the main part of his reasoning, Evans LJ stated that the care and assistance received “from nursing as opposed to domestic staff” must be regarded as “medical or other treatment”, drawing no distinction between the trained and untrained nursing staff at the nursing home in question; but he did go on to derive support from the Leamington Spa case and its reference to inmates being cared for by persons who were “professionally trained to care for the sick” (see [19]-[20] above). It seems to me that the various references in these cases to professional qualifications and training were fundamental to the reasoning of the court: in each case the decision turned on the fact that the staff of the institution included qualified and/or trained nurses. I acknowledge that nursing has moved on since the days of the Leamington Spa case and that much of what was done then by professionally qualified nurses is done now by nursing assistants working under the supervision of qualified nurses, but I do not think that this development undermines the basis of the decisions or calls for a different approach.

The Lodge is registered as a care home only, not as a nursing home, and it does not purport to provide nursing care. Its staff are trained to handle challenging behaviour and to support in other ways the particular needs of residents; they are given an initial induction and ongoing training and are encouraged to work towards NVQs. But they do not have professional qualifications or training as nurses, nor do they work under the supervision of qualified nurses. It is true that they look after residents who, in the case of the respondent at least, suffer from a disability of the mind amounting to “illness”, but it does not follow that the care they provide is nursing care; and in my view it can fairly be described as domestic care (or “personal” care, within the meaning of s.3(1) of the Care Standards Act 2000) rather than nursing care. There is nothing in the nature even of the “palliative treatment” referred to in the Leamington Spa case. The management of challenging behaviour is no doubt a demanding aspect of the care provided, but of itself it does not seem to me to constitute nursing. The support of residents in the administration of their medication is not sufficient to give the care a nursing rather than domestic or personal character. The situation is therefore materially different from that considered in the three main authorities.

If I am right that the care provided at The Lodge does not amount to nursing, it follows on the analysis above that the respondent is not undergoing “medical or other treatment” by reason of his residence there. Even if, contrary to the view expressed above, “medical or other treatment” has a wider scope than medical, dental and nursing treatment, I still do not think that the care provided at The Lodge amounts to “treatment” within the meaning of the expression.

I am not impressed by the policy arguments put forward by Mr Buley in support of a contrary conclusion. It is of course undesirable for double provision to be made from public funds in respect of a single set of care and mobility needs. But I do not accept that there is a sufficiently clear-cut policy behind the drafting of the regulations to justify a departure from their natural meaning as elucidated by the authorities. Nor can Mr Buley derive any assistance from the relationship between reg. 8 and reg. 9 or the argument about a lacuna between them. On the face of it, it was reg. 9 (as originally made) rather than reg. 8 that was intended to remove entitlement to the care component of DLA in the case of persons in care homes. The amendment of reg. 9 in 2002 so that it did not apply where services were funded by the NHS had no obvious policy rationale; but whatever led to it, the amendment could not alter the meaning of reg. 8 and I cannot see any reason why the court should step in to modify the consequences of the amendment by a strained interpretation of reg. 8. If the intention is to avoid payment of the care component to persons in care homes who have NHS funding, that intention can readily be achieved by reversing the amendment to reg. 9. The policy arguments are further weakened by the fact that there is no provision corresponding to reg. 9 in relation to the mobility component of DLA. It might be thought that if the intention was to remove entitlement to the mobility component in the case of some or all of those in care homes, a provision corresponding to reg. 9 would have been included for the purpose.

If the respondent is not undergoing “medical or other treatment” by reason of his residence at The Lodge, no useful purpose is served by separate consideration of whether The Lodge is “a hospital or similar institution” within the meaning of the regulations. I do not think that it is, but that is largely because it is not providing medical or other treatment to its residents (and for much the same reason I do not think that its residents can sensibly be described as “in-patients”). I might, however, have taken a different view of the matter if I had concluded that it was providing medical or other treatment to its residents. I stress in any event that, as indicated above, the issue falls to be considered on the assumption that the respondent does not receive treatment from doctors, qualified nurses or other healthcare professionals at The Lodge.

That leaves the question whether the receipt of medical or other treatment from healthcare professionals away from The Lodge can bring the respondent within the scope of the regulations. In my view, it cannot. The whole tenor of regs. 8 and 12A is that the person is undergoing treatment “in” the institution where he is maintained free of charge. That is underlined by the words “as an in-patient”. Treatment away from the institution would be treatment as an out-patient. I reject Mr Buley’s contention that the words “as an in-patient” should not be read as qualifying “medical or other treatment”. They are an integral part of the condition and qualify “medical or other treatment” just as much as they qualify “maintained free of charge … in a hospital or similar institution”.

For those reasons I would find against the Secretary of State on each of the three issues on which the appeal has been fought.

In my judgment, Upper Tribunal Judge Turnbull reached the correct decision on the issues determined by his interim decision. I would dismiss the appeal.

In my view it is legitimate to stand back and ask oneself, on the facts as found or as are required to be assumed, whether one would expect the answer “yes” to the question: “Is the respondent undergoing medical or other treatment as an in-patient in a hospital or similar institution?” I do not think one would expect such an answer.

Nevertheless the outcome of this appeal requires rather more analysis than that. That is provided in the judgment of Richards LJ (as it was in the judgment below of Judge Turnbull) and I agree with that analysis.

It is a pity that we have been required to make an assumption to the effect that the respondent does not receive treatment from or under the supervision of doctors or professionally qualified nurses at The Lodge. One would not have thought that the necessary fact gathering exercise on this subject would have been difficult or would have been likely to be contentious. It could only have assisted in the final resolution of this case as to the application of the Regulations had the full facts first been established. That said, the assumption we have been required to make is at least entirely consistent with the literature outlining the services which The Lodge provides. The documentation spells out, for example, that The Lodge does not provide “nursing care” and that it provides a “specialist home environment” for residents.

It is clear, on the wording of Regulation 8 and 12A, that the medical or other treatment must be provided in the hospital or institution in question, not away from it. I would reject Mr Buley’s argument to the contrary.

On the other issues raised, it is understandable that counsel have focused their arguments separately on the words “medical or other treatment” and “in a hospital or similar institution”. However they both (rightly) accepted that the wording is composite: that is, that each of the Regulations must be read as a whole, set in context. In that regard, I might also add, sight must not be lost of the words “undergoing” and “as an in-patient”.

In my view, on the wording of the Regulations and consistently with the authorities, for there to be medical or other treatment provided to the respondent, an element - which must be not insignificant - of care provided by, or under the supervision of, professionally qualified doctors or nurses at The Lodge is required. There is no doubt that the respondent suffers from a mental disorder or disability. Quite possibly, in times gone by, he would have been placed in a mental hospital. There is no doubt that he needs, and is being provided at The Lodge with, skilled and specialist care. But that is not enough. Mr Buley emphasised that the staff, whilst not professionally qualified, were trained in management of aggression and violence. Skilled physical restraint undertaken by a mental health nurse in a hospital or similar institution would be capable, I accept, of amounting to part of the “treatment” provided. But it does not follow that applying such restraint techniques is “treatment” for all purposes. It is not difficult to think of institutions – certain educational establishments, for example – where some staff are trained in such techniques; but no one would style use of those techniques in such a context as “treatment”.

Since, as is my view, the respondent is not “undergoing medical or other treatment” it also really follows that he is not “an in-patient…in a hospital or similar institution.” In truth, it is very strained to describe the respondent as an “in-patient”. Further, The Lodge plainly is not a hospital; and by reason of the complete lack of treatment being provided by or under the supervision of professionally qualified doctors or nurses at The Lodge, in my view it is not a “similar institution” either. But all this really underlines the need to consider the wording of Regulations 8 and 12A as a whole and not to break it down into separate or prioritised parts.

If the result reveals a lacuna in the legislation, as Mr Buley submitted, then that is the consequence of the subsequent amendment to the Regulations made in 2002. Regulations 8 and 12A cannot have one meaning before 2002 and another meaning after 2002; and it is not justifiable in such circumstances to distort the natural meaning of the words to fill an asserted lacuna.

Therefore, and in agreement with the judgment of Richards LJ, I too would dismiss the appeal.

I gratefully adopt Richards LJ’s summary of the facts, recital of the relevant statutory provisions and exposition of the principles of law involved. I agree with Richards LJ, at paragraph 37, that it would have been better if the court could have determined the present issues by reference to a full set of relevant facts, instead of having to make assumptions. It is unfortunate that the court is deciding an important question of statutory construction in the absence of facts which may be relevant to the issue. I agree with Richards LJ, at paragraph 57, in finding the policy arguments advanced on behalf of the appellant to be of little weight on this issue of statutory construction.

The authorities indicate a broad approach to the word “treatment” as used in the Regulations. While the word often suggests action to enable someone to overcome an illness, injury or disability, it can also include the care of a person with an illness or disability which is, or may be, incurable. Describing the treatment in the Leamington Spa case, Evershed M.R. stated, at page 539:

“There was, however, at the relevant date ‘palliative treatment’ being administered to about one-third of the inmates; by which I understand to be meant treatment of the nature of physiotherapy, massage and so forth, designed to alleviate suffering or arrest their disease.”

Romer LJ stated, at page 552:

“Professional nursing is, in my judgment, ‘treatment’ in relation to incurables, in the same way that it is, as I think, envisaged in the definition as ‘treatment’ in relation to convalescence.”

The Lodge is no ordinary care home. It has just four bedrooms and a number of shared rooms and provides “a specialist home environment for people with Autistic Spectrum Disorders, Asperger’s Syndrome and complex needs, who require high levels of support in a homely environment.” The respondent is seriously disabled, as described by Richards LJ at paragraphs 23-29 of his judgment, and has very considerable care needs. Intensive and specialist care is required and provided to deal with his conditions.

I agree with Richards LJ that the respondent can be said to be undergoing “medical or other treatment” at The Lodge only if the care provided there amounts to nursing. Richards LJ has cited the authorities in which this issue is considered and has referred, at paragraph 54, to expressions used in each of them.

The distinction to be drawn, as Evershed M.R. stated, in the Leamington Spa case at page 542, is:

“Between ‘treatment’ and mere ‘care’ (which I assume to comprehend ‘looking after’ by persons not professionally trained for such purpose).”

I agree with Richards LJ, at paragraph 54, that nursing should be taken to have moved on since the days of the Leamington Spa case and that much of what was then done by professionally qualified nurses is now done by nursing assistants working under the supervision of qualified nurses.

I do not find the decision whether the respondent is undergoing “medical or other treatment” by reason of his residence at The Lodge an easy one, given the seriousness of the respondent’s disability and the nature and intensity of the care he receives. It is difficult to categorise it overall as “mere care”, though much of it is. While the care staff at The Lodge are not qualified nurses, there is a strong argument that “the subject or patient is looked after and attended to by persons professionally trained to look after and attend to the sick” (Evershed M.R. in Leamington Spa at page 541).

However, I have come to the conclusion that, to come within the definition, the nursing must be of a professional character, that is, administered by, or under the direction or supervision, of a qualified doctor, nurse or nurses. (The status of trainee doctors need not now be considered). On the evidence, that was not the position in this case. I agree with the reasoning of Richards LJ at paragraph 54 and, in this case, the absence of evidence of professional involvement, in that sense, is decisive.

I agree that, on a finding that the respondent is not undergoing “medical or other treatment” by reason of his residence at The Lodge, it is not necessary to give separate consideration to whether The Lodge is a “hospital or similar institution.” A finding on that may often be determined by the finding on the treatment issue. I also agree with the analysis, by Richards LJ at paragraph 59, of the expression “as an in-patient”.

I agree that the appeal should be dismissed.