Mortimer v Motor Insurance Bureau, First Great Western

Today is the date fixed for the hearing of this appeal by Mrs Mortimer. She is not present in court nor in the precincts of the court to present her appeal; and that comes as no surprise. Let me in a few words explain why I would propose to my Lords that we should dismiss this appeal on a summary basis.

The appeal is from a general civil restraint order made by His Honour Judge Griggs sitting as a High Court judge as well as a county court judge, but physically in the Torquay and Newton Abbot County Court, on 14 January 2008. He ordered that Mrs Mortimer be restrained from issuing any claim or any application in the High Court or in any Devon and Cornwall county court without first obtaining his permission or, if unavailable, his deputy’s; and he provided that the general civil restraint order should remain in effect for two years, namely until 14 January 2010.

Mrs Mortimer filed notice of appeal against the general civil restraint order and on paper Richards LJ granted her permission. He said that it was arguable that the judge should not have included the High Court in an order made when ostensibly sitting in the county court. He added that it was unclear whether Mrs Mortimer's previous forays into the High Court (as he described them) justified the inclusion of the High Court in the order. He also queried whether it was appropriate, for example, for applications to the Administrative Court to be subject to the prior grant of permission by Judge Griggs or his deputy in Devon and Cornwall.

Thus matters rested for a considerable time and, of course, the restraint order expired, as I have said, on 14 January 2010.

In those circumstances, by letter dated 16 March, an officer of the Civil Appeals Office upstairs wrote to Mrs Mortimer, inviting her to withdraw her appeal on the basis that it had become academic and that, if the appeal proceeded to a hearing, the court was likely to dismiss it summarily because the appeal could no longer achieve any useful purpose. Mrs Mortimer’s response to that, by letter, was that it was necessary to obtain a declaration of law as to the invalidity of the court order albeit that it was now out of date.

Later, when asked by letter dated 20 May 2010, from the same officer of this court to file certain documents in readiness for today's hearing, Mrs Mortimer responded, by letter dated 26 May, saying that it would not be possible for her to send the court the requested documents; that it was well-known that the Crown Prosecution Service was infiltrated by criminal activity; and that it would not be possible for her to attend court because of criminal harassment and physical injuries suffered in consequence. It is by reason of that letter that I observed at the outset that it is no surprise that Mrs Mortimer has elected not to be present in court this morning.

Without in any way doubting the appropriateness of the permission to appeal granted by Richards LJ on paper, one might observe that at least some of the points that he raised when granting permission were really matters of convenient judicial deployment rather than matters which went to the legality of the general civil restraint order made by the judge in Newton Abbot, including sitting under section 9. That said, others of his points might well, in the event of a full enquiry during the relevant time, namely prior to the expiry of the order, have indeed merited this court's attention.

But in circumstances in which the general civil restraint order has expired and in which Mrs Mortimer is not here to press any points that could be pressed in support of her appeal, my suggestion to my Lords is that we should on a summary basis dismiss it.