Bridle v Bridle

Wilson LJ on 2 September identified in Mr Bridle's submissions for permission to appeal one good ground only, namely that the circuit judge in Exeter, HHJ Tyzack, conceived that Mr Bridle required permission to pursue an appeal from the order of District Judge Dancey. That is a misconception which I in this court encounter frequently. There seems to be a general belief at the county court level that in ancillary relief proceedings there is no appeal as of right from the adjudication of the District Judge but only with his permission or with the permission of the circuit judge. That I am quite sure is an erroneous reading of the relevant provisions of the Family Proceedings Rules 1991 which by Rule 8.1(1) and (2) give the right of appeal against the District Judge's order.

The Rules further provide (Rule 8.2A(3)) that the notice of appeal from the decision of the District Judge must be filed within 14 days. It may be that the misconception arises from the fact that if the notice of appeal is not filed within 14 days then the circuit judge will exercise a discretion as to whether or not to extend time and in exercising that discretion will take a general view of the merits of the appeal. But providing a notice is filed within time then the right of appeal is absolute, and as Wilson LJ pointed out, Mr Bridle's notice of appeal was almost premature in that he seems to have sought to issue in advance of judgment and certainly on the day after judgment.

Both parties appear today in person and I have some sympathy with Mrs Bridle's stance. She tells us that she has been to court on innumerable occasions and is fed up with these court trips. What we are doing today of course is not only bringing her to London to respond to this appeal, but in allowing the appeal and directing the hearing of Mr Bridle's appeal, we are setting up another hearing. That I am afraid is inevitable. Justice demands it.

I would invite, on the circuit, the papers to be transferred from Exeter to Bournemouth for the convenience of the parties, and I would express the hope that the appeal would be heard by either HHJ Bond or HHJ Meston QC. Had the matter remained in the Exeter County Court it could not have been heard by HHJ Tyzack QC because in refusing the permission, which he believed to be necessary, he expressed forthright views about the merits of the appeal. The appeal is certainly not without merit in that it has been accepted by the District Judge that the form of order as ultimately approved by him does not reflect the terms of judgment in relation to chattels, and on 6 October in his very helpful letter to the court he made it plain that this point had never been taken in front of him but that once taken he would of course address the mismatch between judgment and order.

So it seems that the order as sealed in the Weymouth County Court needs at least that adjustment even if there be no force in Mr Bridle's other criticisms.

All that said, I would allow the appeal, set aside the order of HHJ Tyzack, request that the liaison judge makes arrangements, if his intervention be necessary, for transfer to Bournemouth, with the further request that it be tried by HHJ Bond, HHJ Meston or such other judge as the designated judge may select.

I agree.