Birmingham City Council v Lee

This is the judgment of the Court.

The issue of principle in this second appeal relates to costs in a housing disrepair case. There is a pre-action protocol applicable under the Civil Procedure Rules to such cases. It requires the tenant to give early notification to the landlord that a claim is being made, rather than commence immediate proceedings. The question which we have to consider arises where, on receipt of that notification, the landlord promptly carries out the repairs. If he does, that will remove from the tenant’s claim in the court action subsequently brought any application for specific performance of the repairing covenant, but will, very often, leave outstanding in that action only a claim for consequential damages. It may often be the case that if the landlord had not carried out the repairs, and thus the tenant had sued for specific performance as well as for consequential damages, the effect of the Civil Procedure Rules (“CPR”) would have been that the action was allocated to the fast track. By contrast, if the action is for the consequential damages alone, because the repairs have now been done, the action will very often fall to be allocated to the small claims track. The issue for us is this: what if any order ought to be made in such a case as to pre-allocation costs? In particular, ought some order to be made which reflects the fact that until the repairs were carried out the tenant’s claim (notified under the protocol) was for specific performance as well as for damages, and would potentially have been for allocation to the fast track ?

The problem arises because there is a marked difference between the costs recoverable in a case allocated to the small claims track and those recoverable in a case allocated to the fast track. Where a case is allocated to the small claims track the costs recoverable by the winner are ordinarily limited by CPR 27.14 to:

This difference is undoubtedly deliberate. The small claims track, which was created by the CPR, took the place of the former scheme under the County Court Rules for compulsory reference to arbitration. The policy of the Rules is plainly that small claims cannot justify the recovery of costs of lawyers. It is a deliberate decision that such costs are not proportionate.

The general rule for allocation is that the small claims track is the normal track for any claim which has a financial value of not more than £5000. That is provided by CPR 26.6(3). The general rule is that the fast track is the normal track for claims which are not small claims but where the financial value is not more than £15,000: CPR 26.6(4). However, there are special rules for housing disrepair cases, contained in CPR 26.6(1)(b).

CPR 26.6(1)(b) provides, so far as material, as follows:

“26.6

(1) The small claims track is the normal track for –

…….

(b)

any claim which includes a claim by a tenant of residential premises against his landlord where –

(i)

the tenant is seeking an order requiring the landlord to carry out repairs or other work to the premises (whether or not the tenant is also seeking some other remedy);

(ii)

the cost of the repairs or other work to the premises is estimated to be not more than £1000; and

(iii)

the financial value of any other claim for damages is not more than £1000”

The effect of that is: providing there is a claim for specific performance, a tenant’s claim in a disrepair case will be a fast track case if either the cost of repairs or the consequential damages claim exceeds £1000. If, on the other hand, there is no specific performance claim, the ordinary rule in CPR 26.6 (3) applies and the claim will only be a fast track claim if its overall value exceeds £5000.

Because there is a significant number of these cases in which the cost of repairs or the consequential damages claim falls somewhere in the bracket between £1000 and £5000, the presence or absence of a specific performance claim will often make the critical difference between the case being allocated to the fast track and it being allocated to the small claims track.

Allocation is, ordinarily, the critical stage governing the level of costs recoverable. Rule 44.9, which is to be found in the costs section of the CPR, provides as follows:

“(1)

Part 27 (small claims) and Part 46 (fast track costs) contain special rules about –

(a)

liability for costs;

(b)

the amount of costs which the court may award; and

(c)

the procedure for assessing costs.

(2)

Once a claim is allocated to a particular track, those special rules shall apply to the period before, as well as after, allocation, except where the court or a practice direction provides otherwise.”

There is an exception in 44.11 where the court has already made an order in relation to costs before allocation takes place. Such an order is not affected by the subsequent allocation. Subject to that, by CPR 44.9(2), once a case is allocated, the track governs pre-allocation as well as post-allocation costs, unless the court otherwise directs.

In the absence of the protocol, a tenant who complained of lack of repair could begin his action claiming specific performance and consequential damages. That does not mean that he could or should start the action without any prior notice to the landlord that he had a complaint of lack of repair. On the contrary, it is agreed law that the landlord is only liable for lack of repair if he has been put on notice by the tenant that the premises are in need of repair, or has knowledge of the want of repair, and has failed within a reasonable time, and being given access to the premises for the purpose, to put the lack of repair right. So an action brought before the landlord was put on notice and had reasonable time to repair would fail to establish liability. But providing the tenant could prove that he had asked the landlord to repair, that he had made the premises available, and that the landlord had had a reasonable time to do the work but had not done it, the tenant could start his action forthwith.

The protocol (which came into existence after the rules) alters that position. Its declared aims include:

•

To avoid unnecessary litigation;

•

To promote the speedy and appropriate carrying out of any repairs which are the landlord’s responsibility;

•

…..

•

To keep the costs of resolving disputes down.

The protocol proceeds by stipulating that the tenant should give notice of the claim either by way of an “early notification letter”, or by way of a “letter of claim”. The difference between the two does not need detailed analysis here, but it is material to note that both require some detail. They require the listing of the defects, by way of schedule if appropriate, the setting out of why the tenant says that the landlord knows the defects are there, the identification of a proposed single joint expert, a copy of the proposed letter of instruction to that expert and disclosure of relevant documents in the hands of the tenant. The protocol continues by requiring a response from the landlord within, ordinarily, 20 working days. In its response the landlord is expected to say whether liability is admitted or not, to schedule any work which will be done, and to say when it will be done.

The introduction to the protocol contains a warning:

“Should a claim proceed to litigation, the court will expect all parties to have complied with the Protocol as far as possible. The court has the power to order parties who have unreasonably failed to comply with the Protocol to pay costs or be subject to other sanctions.”

That warning is repeated in the guidance notes attached, at 4.1(a).

It was accepted before us that, although of course the protocol is meant to be open for operation by tenants in person if they wish to act alone, it was reasonably to be expected that many tenants would not be in a position to do so and would need legal help. For a layman, the requirements of the protocol are quite complex. The terms of the protocol make it clear that it anticipates that the tenant may incur legal costs in operating it. That is apparent from, among other provisions:

It is quite clear from those warnings and other provisions that the protocol is structured in such a way as (a) to put a claimant at risk of an adverse costs order if he ignores the protocol and commences his action straight away, and (b) to assume that if he does not ignore it, but, rather, operates it correctly by giving early notification of his impending claim without starting an action, his reasonable costs will be met, providing his claim is justified, according to whether the claim would fall within the fast track or the small claims track if it were to be made in court. However, although that is the clear structure of the protocol, it proceeds upon the assumption (or hope) that the parties will settle if there is an early exchange of claim and response and that that settlement will include the claimant’s reasonable costs if his claim was justified. Whilst that may be the assumption, or hope, the protocol has itself no coercive power as to costs, and if there is no legal action, there is no court to compel payment of the costs which are anticipated by paragraph 3.7.

Mrs Lee (“the tenant”) is a longstanding secure tenant of the defendant Council.

On 16 August 2006 solicitors acting for the tenant sent to the Council a letter of claim, invoking the housing disrepair protocol. It was in form appropriate to the protocol. It scheduled the disrepair relied upon and it set out when and how the tenant contended that the Council had been put on notice of it. It did not specify the amount of any consequential damages claim, but it foreshadowed such by including complaints of increased heating bills, embarrassment and anxiety about the effect on a child’s asthma. The schedule had plainly been professionally drafted; we were told by a solicitor or legal executive rather than by a surveyor. The letter gave notice that the solicitors were acting under a conditional fee agreement.

The Council inspected the property within a week, and within a month had carried out the great majority of the repairs sought. On its case, the cost of doing so (no doubt at an in-house price) was only £265. There was at that stage no court action. When, seven months later in April 2007, an action was begun by the tenant, it did not complain of any outstanding want of repair and thus made no claim for specific performance. It did claim consequential damages, which were put in the bracket £1000 - £5000.

The Council had carried out the repairs without any admission of liability. In particular, it contended that it had had no sufficient prior notice of the want of repair. When proceedings were begun, it pleaded this defence, as well as putting in issue the quantum of damages. Irrespective of any perceived tactical advantage in converting a case into a small claim, it will be obvious that it may be in the interests of a well-run housing authority to remedy any disrepair promptly whether or not it has had previous notice. If it was on notice, it is legally liable to repair, and may be liable in damages; the sooner it gets the work done the better and it may stave off legal action which it would lose. If it was not previously on notice, it still knows now of the disrepair, it is its own stock which needs repair, and it makes sense to do the work when it conveniently can, and then to contest any court action on the ground of want of notice.

It is plain that in those intervening seven months between the repairs being carried out, without admission of liability, and the proceedings being begun, there had been negotiations. We are, correctly, not privy to their details. But the open correspondence shows, and we were told, that the discussions had advanced to the point where some offer had been made by way of a global sum for damages and costs. For the tenant at least, the correspondence suggests that the sticking point was costs. It seems at least likely that the action was begun effectively in an effort to obtain costs, and that it was defended effectively on the same issue.

The parties duly filed allocation questionnaires. Those documents make clear what the real issue by now was. The parties agreed that the action fell to be allocated to the small claims track. That was correct because CPR 26.6(3) applied, and the claim was under £5000. CPR 26.6(1)(b) did not apply because there was no claim for specific performance. However, the tenant sought in her allocation questionnaire an order for costs on the fast track “until at least the date that repairs were completed”.

The Deputy District Judge declined to make that order. On the tenant’s appeal, Judge MacDuff QC (as he then was) did make an order in relation to pre-allocation costs. He invoked CPR 44.9(2), for which see paragraph 9 above. His order was:

“The court orders pursuant to CPR 44.9(2) that the costs incurred prior to allocation by both parties shall be reserved for consideration by the trial judge at the conclusion of the claim.”

It is against that order that the Council now appeals.

If the District Judge’s decision had been confined to the facts of the instant case, it would have been a matter wholly of discretion and the judge ought not to have disturbed it. We are, however, clear that the argument was approached before both courts below as a matter of general principle applicable to cases of this kind. Certainly that is how it was treated by Judge MacDuff QC who was at the time the Designated Civil Judge for Birmingham. Given (a) the juxtaposition of the protocol with the allocation provisions of the CPR and (b) the volume of housing disrepair cases in which this problem is likely to arise, he was entitled so to deal with it. The course which this claim took is very likely to be repeated in many cases. It was on that basis that Moore-Bick LJ gave leave for a second appeal, which would of course be quite inappropriate if a question of principle did not arise.

The Judge’s reasons for his decision are summarised in paragraphs 38 and 39 of his extempore judgment:

“ 38. ….If one were to test this case by reference to what I think of as the bad old days when there was no such protocol and where the claim would be issued a day or two after the letter before action without giving a prospect of settlement…this case would have been allocated to fast track because the disrepair claim would then have been outstanding with the damages claim. Costs would have followed the event in the normal way.

39.

I have reached the firm conclusion that the deputy district judge erred in principle and that where at the time of the letter before action there is a case which would, at that stage, had it been allocated, go on to the fast track, these costs should be reserved, and they should be reserved because at that stage the claimant is entitled to have legal advice and legal assistance which will be paid, albeit at the modest fast track rates, but which, if it be known that the defendant can evade any responsibility for costs, solicitors in the community would not be prepared to take on these cases, saying to the claimant who came in through the front door; “I can’t help you, because we have to follow the protocol - Birmingham City Council may well come in and do the repairs before we are allowed under the protocol to issue, and if they do that we go on to small claims track and we will be unremunerated for this work and will be looking for you to pay it”. That in my judgment cannot be right. ”

Thus he gave two reasons for his order. (1) The claimant ought not to be treated differently because she followed the protocol. (2) Such an order was necessary if the legal advice which tenants such as this claimant need is to be available in the market. Elsewhere he made it clear that the reason why he made his order in the form of a general reservation of costs to the trial judge was because unless the claimant succeeded on the prior notice point, the claim would fail altogether and the defendant council would be liable for neither damages nor costs.

For the tenant, Mr Luba QC reflects those two reasons in his submissions. He contends, in summary:

For the landlord Council Mr Mansfield QC contends that, even if there is a point of principle in issue, the Judge’s order is wrong, because:

We were pressed by the tenant with fresh material not before the Judge which was designed to demonstrate that Birmingham City Council has, or has had, a high level of disrepair in its very large housing stock. Thus, it was said, there is a problem of some scale in providing the representation which tenants need. It is true that in Birmingham CC v Crook [2007] EWHC 1415, Irwin J considered the enforceability of a conditional fee agreement in a test series of housing disrepair cases, recorded that he had been told that this Council almost always lost such claims brought against them, and had evidence about the availability of legal aid. Those cases, however, appear to have dated from some years ago. We have no evidence as to the present position and nor did the Judge. The Council’s contention is that it has radically re-appraised its repair policy. Whether that is so or not, we have no means of knowing. Moreover, the conditional fee agreement in question in Crook dated from 2004 and was not the one presently being used; it contained no provision for a success fee, whereas the letter of claim made clear that the present one does. We have not seen the conditional fee agreement in the present case. We do know that these solicitors routinely undertake claims of this kind, and that they were plainly willing to undertake this one. It was suggested to us in argument that that was in part because an order such as Judge MacDuff made here is commonly made, but that assertion was disputed on behalf of the Council. Moreover, we have not been able properly to consider what limitations there might be on the ability of the Council to recover its costs, should it succeed in a case of this kind.

On that state of the evidence, it does not seem to us that we are in any position to decide whether an order such as made by the Judge is justified under the overriding objective of the CPR in order to ensure access to justice for such tenants as Mrs Lee. We acknowledge the breadth of experience of local cases of this kind which this Judge will necessarily have accumulated, but there still needs to be an evidential base for a finding that solicitors will not take on claims such as these in the absence of an order such as he made. There are, no doubt, complex questions associated with the funding of volume modest claims of various kinds, including this kind. But it seems to us that Mr Mansfield is right to say that a single interlocutory appeal, without any reliable evidence, is simply not the place to debate them.

Accordingly, it seems to us that we should approach this case without any pre-conceptions about the available methods of funding of cases such as these. The question is, as it seems to us, whether in order to make the rules and the protocol operate in the manner which must be intended, some order for pre-allocation costs is necessary, and if so, what.

Mr Mansfield drew our attention to CPR 27.14(2)(g). Rule 27.14(2) is the rule which limits the costs recoverable in a small claims track case. Broadly, as we have explained, the effect is that little if anything is recoverable by way of the cost of legal advice or representation. Subparagraph (g) does make recoverable:

“(g)

such further costs as the court may assess by the summary procedure and order to be paid by a party who has behaved unreasonably.”

Says Mr Mansfield, this would enable the court to make an order for the recovery of costs of legal representation if in an exceptional case it was satisfied that the landlord had unreasonably refused to settle under the protocol on the basis that it should have done. That, he says, represents the limit of the court’s power.

The power to make particular orders as to costs in the event of unreasonable behaviour by a party appears, unsurprisingly, at a number of places in the CPR. Other examples include CPR 44.3(5) and 44.14. But the exercise of the power under 27.14(2)(g) is not the answer to the justice of the cases we are considering. Firstly, to categorise a failure to settle on particular terms as unreasonable conduct would open up wide questions with ramifications for other forms of litigation, and we have heard no argument on the point. Secondly, the investigation of whether an offer of settlement was reasonable or not would require the trial of the case, which would be quite inconsistent with the objectives of the protocol, and indeed of the CPR generally.

In our view, the answer to the question posed at paragraph 30 is clear. Since the promulgation of the protocol it is no longer the case that a claim is only made (for costs purposes at least) when and if litigation is begun. On the contrary, the protocol requires a claim to be advanced initially in accordance with its terms, under a warning that there is likely to be a costs penalty if it is not. The references to costs which are contained in the protocol, and which we have set out at paragraph 15 above, clearly demonstrate that the object of the protocol is to achieve settlement of disrepair claims without recourse to litigation. Its object is very clearly that, provided the claim was justified, it ought to be settled on terms which include the payment of the tenant’s reasonable costs: and costs calculated according to the track which the claim would fall to if made by way of litigation. We are unable to read the combination of paragraph 3.7 and Guidance Note 4.10 in any other way.

Without some order as to the early-incurred costs, it would be open to a landlord who is in fact and in law liable for want of repairs to adopt a deliberate policy of omitting to repair until the protocol letter is received, but then of repairing without admission of liability so as to ensure that any subsequent court claim fell to the small claims track. The result of that would be that fast track costs which would otherwise have been due to the tenant would no longer be payable. We do not say that this is what has happened here; it may well not be. But that very possible scenario illustrates the necessity for some order in relation to the costs of advancing the protocol claim. Moreover, quite independently of the possibility of any such deliberate manipulation of the process by a landlord, such an order is necessary if the protocol is not to operate as a means of preventing recovery of reasonably incurred costs. The tenant who has a justifiable claim for disrepair needs legal assistance in advancing it. He must initiate it in accordance with the protocol. If the effect of the claim is to get the work done, then providing that the landlord was liable for the disrepair the tenant ought to recover the reasonable costs of achieving that result.

That conclusion is also consistent with the policy of the rules as it can be seen in operation in CPR 44.11, explained in the accompanying Practice Direction paragraph 15.1 (to be found in Civil Procedure at 44PD.9). Pre-allocation costs orders are, by CPR 44.11, unaffected by allocation. The Practice Direction adds this:

“Before a claim is allocated to one of those tracks the court is not restricted by any of the special rules that apply to that track.”

The Practice Direction goes on to refer to cases where a partial admission of liability is made, but those are only one example of the general principle. The court’s powers are unrestricted in relation to pre-allocation costs. It is, we are satisfied, perfectly proper to make an order in relation to them under CPR 44.9(2) if to do so is necessary in order to ensure that the protocol does not operate to prevent recovery of costs reasonably incurred in achieving the repair.

The form of order adopted by the Judge has the possible disadvantage of leaving too much for later decision at trial. If every question remains at large there may be a perverse incentive on one or other party to contest the case. Litigation continued on the merits for the sole purpose of recovering costs is to be discouraged, and particularly so in cases where small amounts are at stake. Preferable, we think, is an order which shows now what the costs consequences will be if the claimant succeeds in her claim. If that is done, the parties know where they will be, subject to liability, and that ought to facilitate settlement. What is necessary in a case of this kind is that the claimant should, providing she is right about liability, recover the reasonable fast-track costs of advancing the claim by way of letter under the protocol, and thus getting the work done. In this case the work was completed by 26 September 2006. We would accordingly replace the order made by the judge with the following:

“Pursuant to CPR 44.9(2), the claimant shall have her costs in the cause on the fast track basis up to 26 September 2006.”

That means that if she wins, she will have fast-track costs of making the claim up to that date. If she fails, she will have nothing. Any costs order, in favour of either side, relating to the period after 26 September will remain governed by the allocation to the small claims track. The certain knowledge that that order will stand if she succeeds can inform any efforts to settle. In future cases of a similar kind, the expectation of an order such as this should have a similar effect, and it is to be hoped, without the need for litigation beyond the protocol negotiations.

We have not been concerned in this appeal with any question of the quantum of costs recoverable. However, in view of some of the information which we were given, some things ought to be made clear.

Accordingly we allow this appeal only to the limited extent of varying the Judge’s order to that set out at paragraph 36 above. Otherwise, the Council’s appeal fails.