SJ (Iran) & Ors v Secretary of State for the Home Department

This is an application for permission to appeal against a decision of the Immigration Appeal Tribunal promulgated on 13 September 2007. The Tribunal dismissed appeals by the three appellants, SJ, RJ and FR, against decisions of the Secretary of State on 12 October 2005 that they could not stay in the United Kingdom. Proposals were made on that date for their removal to Iran. The applicants are citizens of Iran, a mother and two children; mother born 1963, the second and third applicants 1983 and 1986. The Tribunal found that they were not entitled to stay on asylum grounds or humanitarian protection grounds or on human rights grounds. The determination sets out, in what is accepted by Mr Symes, who appears for the applicants, as a comprehensive manner, the evidence given by the three applicants and the findings on it.

The first applicant ran a hairdressing salon in Iran. Central to their case is that they have become Christians and they are likely, it is submitted, to be persecuted on that ground if they are returned to Iran. They entered the United Kingdom on visitors’ visas for six months, issued on 16 June 2005. They arrived in Heathrow on 13 July 2005. Two months later, on 20 September 2005, they claimed asylum.

It is unnecessary to set in detail the sequence of events. It is set out not only in the determination but in the full skeleton argument of Mr Symes which includes a detailed chronology referring to paragraphs in the determination. The first ground of appeal is that the Tribunal have misapplied guidance in relation to Christian beliefs and the attitude of authorities in Iran towards them and have misconstrued the evidence on that subject. As a part of each of the grounds of appeal there is reliance on the statement of Neuberger LJ in HK v SSHD [2006] EWCA Civ 1037 at paragraphs 28 and 29. Neuberger LJ warned against reliance on the concept of inherent probability when assessing the value of evidence. He stated that the evidence given by applicants has to be considered against the background of the available country evidence. The Tribunal should bear in mind, he stated, that their members do not have first hand or even second hand knowledge of the conditions in the country, and assessment of evidence should be considered against those conditions, so that the Tribunal may be at a disadvantage. I say at this stage that I have no reason to doubt that the Tribunal did have in mind the in-country material that is cited in detail in the skeleton argument; and the leading case FS & Others v SSHD (Iran-Christian converts) CG Iran [2004] UKIAT 00303 is twice mentioned by the Tribunal. Paragraph 175 of the guidance is set out by them in their determination.

Against that background I turn to the first of the grounds which, again, pervades the entire case. It is that the Tribunal misjudged the nature of the applicant’s Christian faith. The Tribunal, it is submitted, had insufficient regard to evidence about out-of-life experiences which the second applicant had and the first applicant’s evidence that as a result of her Christian faith she had given up smoking. I cite those as examples. The third applicant has converted to Christianity only since he was in this country. It appears to me that the Tribunal have carefully considered the evidence which was submitted to them on this subject. I do have reservations, and this point has properly been made by Mr Symes, about some of the detailed questions which the applicants were asked to test whether in fact they were Christians and I would accept that there will be many Christians who do not know the answers to some of the questions which were raised. Of course what was sought to be established was that they were not only Christians but evangelising or proselytising Christians and reliance is placed on two pieces of evidence. First, that the first applicant did convert the second applicant, which shows that she was a proselytiser, and, secondly, that the father, who is not a Christian, has unintentionally disclosed a document which reveals the first applicant as being an evangelist.

However, I have considered the analysis of the Tribunal on this subject. I note that while some of their findings in relation to detail in the scriptures are subject to the reservation I have made, they did find that the first applicant “had absolutely no idea of the very reason for the crucifixion of Christ”. That is at paragraph 96 and it is of course basic to the Christian faith. It was after consideration in detail of the evidence, including that of Mr Malcolm Steer, whose evidence the tribunal did not find impressive, that they concluded at paragraph 97:

“97.

The whole evidence before us showed that these were people who were highly concerned to be perceived to be Christians, the only purpose for which was, we find, in order to be able to succeed in an asylum claim. …looking at the evidence in the round, given the fact that none of them has ever proselytised in Iran in any open way, and indeed given that the first and second appellant have allegedly gone about it in such a secretive manner that they were never spotted in Iran, we do not find that they are likely to change their method of exercising their ‘faith’ now if returned to Iran.

98…Even if they have converted to Christianity, we do not find that the appellants are likely to return to Iran and proselytise in a manner which is likely to bring them to the attention of the authorities and endanger them, if not for their own sake, for that of their followers, as they are too conscious of the result of their being caught.”

Mr Symes has referred us to paragraph 189 of the Country Guidance case, which does make the distinction between “the more active convert, Pastor, church leader, proselytiser or evangelist” and the guidance is that such persons are at real risks. But it goes on to say that, in the absence of that status, the risk which is claimed to exist does not normally do so.

The second ground is that the Tribunal failed to have regard to the cumulative effect of several factors which were present in the lifestyle and history of the applicants. That included the running of the hairdressing salon, which is regarded as a liberal enterprise in Iran, and often viewed with suspicion and the salon had on occasions been targeted for activities which were alleged, wrongly it appears, to have been conducted there. It is submitted that because the applicant is not likely to get on with her husband she should be treated as a single woman, and Country Guidance refers to the difficulties of such women. Paragraph 190 of FS refers to the combination of risk factors which may be present and create a risk. It is submitted that the Tribunal did not grapple with the cumulative nature of the case.

I do not accept that submission. I first say that the entire emphasis of the case has been upon the Christian faiths and the other matters on their own would get the applicants nowhere. The Tribunal did consider the incident at the hairdressing salon and regarded that as a closed case. It appears to me they did have in mind, not only the central Christian aspect of the claim, but the other factors which were present.

The third and fourth grounds are those on which specific reliance is placed on the statements in HK. It appears to me that the Tribunal were aware of the dangers involved. They have a difficult task. They have to find facts. Their duty does not permit them to accept the say-so of witnesses as necessarily being true. They gave close attention to all the evidence which was before them and it does not appear to me that they have fallen into the trap of judging everything by Western standards. Of course, one assumes they are Westerners and accordingly their appreciation of local conditions, as with any other tribunal, may be limited. But tribunals have been entrusted by Parliament with the task of making findings of fact. They have expertise in assessing evidence and in appreciating the detailed guidance provided in other publications and also, in this case, in a detailed guidance decision which the Tribunal plainly had in mind. It appears to me that the Tribunal did grapple with the central question which they had to consider and were entitled to make the finding of fact they did.

The fourth ground relates to a statement by the Tribunal that any lawyer worth his salt would have been able to resolve an issue which had arisen at the hairdressing salon. That it submits shows a lack of appreciation of the different role which lawyers are likely to have in Iran from that in western countries. I understand the force with which the point is put but the Tribunal appears to me were entitled to make that comment and have regard to the comparatively sophisticated people concerned. Clearly the Tribunal regarded them as people who would be sensitive to local needs. I have referred to the finding at paragraph 98 and the point is developed at paragraph 99. The applicants:

“Are not likely to do so [that is, proselytise] in a manner that would lead nowhere except to their arrest or that of their followers”

Mr Symes has, in my judgment, been unable to indicate potential error of law by the Tribunal. I see no real prospect of success in an appeal and accordingly I would refuse permission.

I agree.