TA (Sudan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department

This is a renewed application for permission to appeal a determination issued on 25 January 2008 by Immigration Judges Clayton and Davey, relating to Mr TA, a citizen of Sudan, who had come to this county by lorry, arriving clandestinely and claimed asylum. He claimed to be a member of the Beja people, an activist of the Beja Congress and someone who had been the subject of ill-treatment and would if returned, again be the subject of ill-treatment. And the ill-treatment to which he referred included alleged cigarette burns and, indeed, he had two circular scars on his forearm.

The claim for asylum was rejected and the appeal dismissed by the Tribunal primarily on the basis of their rejection of the credibility of the applicant, but also on the basis of the risk of return to someone who was Beja and had been active in the movement. Their rejection of his credibility is criticised on the basis that they either misunderstood or exaggerated some of the evidence against him. The first matter they took against him was his ignorance of the customary law of the Beja. He was asked about that; said he did not understand the question and certainly did not know the name of the customary law of the Beja. It is clear that they do have a customary law, although its importance has been considerably weakened over recent years, and it is equally clear that the applicant is an educated man who lived in a town.

The Tribunal did not put that matter at the centre of their decision. They rejected the possibility that there might have been an interpretive misunderstanding, since they were using a well-qualified Sudanese Arabic interpreter.

This court could only interfere on the basis of an arguable error of law, and it seems to me the manner in which the tribunal dealt with that matter might give rise to a factual appeal but not one of law. It seems to me that they were entitled to deal with the matter in the way that they did, that is to expect someone who was Beja to know something about, and to understand the question about, customary law.

The second item they hold against him was the fact that he was unaware of the differences between the two languages spoken by the Beja, namely Bedawit and Tigri: one Hamitic or Semito-Hamitic and the other, Tigri, Semitic. What is said on his behalf is that the difference between those languages is rather less clear than is addressed and assumed by the tribunal. Again, this seems to me to be very much a factual matter, but what seems to be really told against the applicant before the tribunal was the fact that he contradicted himself and said one thing in cross-examination and another thing at interview. He sought to explain the discrepancy in cross-examination and therefore failed to convince the tribunal, applying the lower standard of proof, that he was a Bejan. The way he dealt with questions about the two languages was inconsistent and inaccurate.

There is then the way the evidence, as to the education of Beja in the Sudan, was dealt with, with some, perhaps not very important contradiction, between only 2% of Beja going onto secondary education and the applicant saying that there were a large number of doctors from the Beja community. What also told against him was his evidence referred to in paragraph 47, which was rejected on the basis of incredibility. It seems to me that the attack on that paragraph is also really a factual attack. One must expect a tribunal to form a view as to what is or is not sensible for people to do if they are involved in an organisation which may be under attack by government.

I do not find what he said in paragraph 47 to be perverse and therefore unsustainable. What he said in paragraph 48 is also important. If he were active in Beja, one would have expected him to know rather more about it and its affairs since he came to this country. And lastly, the applicant faces the difficulty that the tribunal rejected the contention that those active in Beja would be subject to persecution if returned.

Looking at all those matters together, I cannot see that, as a matter of law is concerned, there is any arguable basis for an appeal, and therefore, despite Miss Ward’s attractive submissions, I shall refuse permission.