Ahad v London Borough of Tower Hamlets

The applicant for permission to bring a second appeal against the decision of Recorder Proudman QC of 17 October 2007, Mr Ahad, applied to the London Borough of Tower Hamlets as a homeless person in December 2002. He and his wife are from Bangladesh and their first language is Bengali. They cannot read English and their spoken English is imperfect, and they rely on Mr Ahad’s brother to translate documents. They have three children.

In May 2003, Tower Hamlets (to which I shall refer as the “Authority”) accepted that Mr Ahad was a person to whom a duty was owed under part 7 of the Housing Act 1996 because he was (i) homeless; (ii) eligible for assistance; (iii) had a priority need; and (iv) was not intentionally homeless. From that date the family were housed in, first, temporary accommodation and then under a non-secure tenancy.

Under section 193(1) of the 1996 Act, the Authority was under a duty to secure accommodation for Mr Ahad. He was registered under part 6 of the Act and could make bids for accommodation advertised under the choice based letting scheme. Under section 193(3) the Authority’s duty to secure accommodation continued until first of certain specified dates occurred. One of them is set out in s193(7):

“The local housing authority shall also cease to be subject to the duty under this section if --

(a)

the applicant, having been informed of the possible consequence of refusal, refuses an offer of accommodation under Part 6”.

Under Section 173(7F) the authority “shall not make a final offer of accommodation under part 6…unless they are satisfied that the accommodation is suitable for the applicant and that it is reasonable for him to accept the offer”.

Mr Ahad made a bid for accommodation advertised in early 2007 and his bid was successful. On 15 February 2007 he was sent two letters; one was headed “Re final offer of accommodation single housing register” and it included five pages setting out the consequences of refusal, and a final page which contained a warning in several languages, including Bengali, to the effect that the letter contained important information, and if the recipient had not understood what it said the recipient was to take it to someone who could read it.

The letter explained that the applicant had twenty-four hours from viewing the accommodation to accept the offer, after which time the duty of the Authority to him would be discharged, and if he did not take up the offer he would lose his home.

Mr Ahad and his wife viewed the property on 20 February and he did not accept, and a few days later the Authority sent him a letter stating that its duty to rehouse him had ceased. A review was sought and among the points made in a letter from the Tower Hamlets Law Centre on his behalf was the following paragraph which I will quote from page 85 of the bundle:

“We submit that in the event it would not be reasonable for our client to accept the offer. He himself has not had any objection to the property and was inclined to accept it. However, his wife is adamantly opposed to the property. She feels that it is too small for her family’s needs. She does not like the area where it is located as she has no family there and would not feel safe there. Mrs Begum [Mr Ahad’s wife] indicated to our client that he could accept the property if he wished, but that she would not move to the property and neither would their three children. Mr Ahad thus believed that if he were to accept the property he and his wife would separate. Our client was therefore faced with the choice of either refusing the offer or his marriage breaking down.”

The reviewing officer considered the arguments of Mr Ahad, including the point which I have just made by way of quotation from the letter of 20 March, and concluded that the offer was suitable for Mr Ahad and his family and that it would be reasonable to expect him to accept it. In particular, she said as follows in her review decision of 24 May 2007:

“…that Mr Ahad had not advised the council prior to or following the offer that he and his wife had differing opinions on what constituted suitable accommodation for him and, in any event, his having bid for a property, the council could only have accepted in good faith that he and his household wished to reside in the property. As he had applied to the council, it was appropriate for them to draw the inference that he acted on behalf of the whole family on bidding for the property, and the differences of opinion between him and his wife as to the type and location of the property was a domestic matter for them to discuss and reach a conclusion before making any bid.”

On appeal to the County Court, it was said that the Authority had misdirected itself in law and failed to take into account the relevant consideration which it should have considered afresh at the review stage, namely whether it was reasonable for Mr Ahad to accept the offer, taking into account the new information raised by him that he believed that, if he were to accept the offer, he and his wife would separate. The Authority, if it had taken those matters into account, had failed to give adequate reasons as to why it found that it had been reasonable for Mr Ahad to accept the offer.

It has at all material times been accepted by Mr Ahad that his wife’s objections were misplaced and unreasonable, and it was also conceded that if she had been the applicant and refused the offer that would not have been reasonable.

The judge accepted that the characteristics of the household had to be considered, but considered that it was reasonable for the Authority to expect that internal disputes as to suitability should have been resolved within the family. The objections fell to be considered as primary objections to suitability and the reviewing officer was entitled to reject them as a reasonable basis for refusing the offer in the light of: (a) the lack of foundation for the wife’s objections; (b) the fact that the reviewing officer found that Mr Ahad was given particulars of the property and its location before bidding for it; (c) it was a choice-based bidding system; (d) the Authority was not concerned with matrimonial problems arising between the persons to be housed in a single household and the result of a dispute as to subjective matters of suitability; and (e) the Authority was not in a position to make findings of fact as to the legitimacy of Mr Ahad’s fears about the future of his marriage.

Lloyd LJ refused permission on the paper application and, since this would be a second appeal, the applicant must show that the appeal would raise an important point of principle or practice. It is said that that point is this: can the situation of a person who refuses an offer on the grounds of disagreement within the household, and a genuine belief that this will lead to the break up of the household, be resolved within the framework set down by the authorities of this court in Slater v London Borough of Lewisham [2006] EWCA Civ 394 and Ahmed v Leicester City Council [2007] EWCA Civ 843.

At this point I should mention that Slater v London Borough of Lewisham established that section 193(7F) comprised two distinct requirements: suitability, which was primarily an objective test, and reasonableness of accepting the offer, which involved consideration of the applicant’s subjective views. As regards the second element, Ward LJ said that the local authority properly directing itself would have to ask whether a right-thinking housing authority would conclude that it was reasonable for this applicant to have accepted this offer of accommodation.

This decision was applied in Ahmed v Leicester City Council [2007] EWA Civ 843, [2008] HLR 6. On this application it is said that the judge was wrong in law to conclude that the authority was not bound to enquire into the issue of his fears as to the future of his marriage and that local authorities are not bound or entitled to treat a married couple as a united front. An important point of principle or practice is raised, it is said, because many homeless households contain more than one adult and the relevant authorities of the court, in relation to reasonableness, are concerned with a decision made by a sole applicant. In particular, it is said that the judge had misdirected herself by concluding that it was open to the Authority to find that the husband and wife were bound to present a united front, and the judge erred in law in concluding that the Authority had considered the reasonableness test (in that it made no findings or enquiries) and the judge erred in law in finding it was reasonable for the Authority to decide that disputes should be resolved within the family. Consequently, no reasonable judge would have found that the Authority had considered the characteristics of Mr Ahad and had made all necessary enquiries.

I am satisfied that the circumstances of this case do not raise an important point of principle or practice. The case, it seems to me, was decided on the facts and not on any point of general principle. Although I accept that the Authority may have to take into account facts in existence at the time of the decision although unknown to it, provided they are brought to the attention of the council at the review stage, it seems to me that the reviewing officer did take all relevant facts into account and that therefore, even if, contrary to my view, the case had raised an important point of principle or practice, I would have come to the view that this was a case in which there was no flaw in the process or reasoning and would have dismissed the application on that ground also.