ON APPEAL FROM THE ASYLUM & IMMIGRATION TRIBUNAL
[AIT No: AA/00479/2006]
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
Before:
LORD JUSTICE LAWS
Between:
SS (IRAN) | Appellant |
- and - | |
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT. | Respondent |
(DAR Transcript of
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Mr D Lemer (instructed by Messrs Alster Kelly) appeared on behalf of the Appellant.
THE RESPONDENT DID NOT APPEAR AND WAS NOT REPRESENTED.
Judgment
Lord Justice Laws:
This is a renewed application for permission to appeal against the decision of Senior Immigration Judge Khan given on 9 July 2007 when, following a hearing on 15 June 2007, he dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the decision of the Secretary of State in December 2005 to refuse the applicant’s asylum claim and to issue directions for his removal from the United Kingdom. Permission to appeal to this court was refused by the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal on 23 August 2007 and refused again on consideration of the papers by Longmore LJ on 14 November 2007.
The applicant is an Iranian national born on 10 October 1970. He arrived in the United Kingdom on 26 October 2005 and applied for asylum two days later. As I have said, that application was refused in December 2005 by a decision letter dated 22 December. His case was crisply described by the senior immigration judge in the determination of 9 July 2007 now sought to be appealed. The senior immigration judge said:
“4. In essence, the Appellant’s case is that he had become politically involved in Iran in August 2005. The Appellant, being of Kurdish ethnicity, attended a demonstration after a Kurdish activist had been tortured by the authorities. The Appellant attended the demonstration with a friend who was involved with the Komala Party. The Appellant attended the demonstrations on five consecutive days and on the fifth day the group were followed by armed security personnel. The Appellant managed to run off after a number of his colleagues were arrested by managing to escape into a house where the Appellant hid for a number of hours with the assistance of the owner of the house. The Appellant then went home but then went to hide at a relative’s house for about twelve days. He claimed that the authorities who had arrested his friend tortured him and the friend had given the Appellant’s name to the authorities who were looking for the Appellant. As a result the Appellant left Iran.”
The applicant’s appeal against the Secretary of State’s decision was heard and dismissed by an immigration judge, in respect of whose determination, however, the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal ordered a reconsideration at which all matters should be considered. In arriving at his adverse decision the Secretary of State had taken a poor view of the applicant’s limited and in some respects inaccurate knowledge and information about the Komala party. In his evidence before the senior immigration judge on 15 June 2007 the applicant had said (see paragraph 9 of the determination) that he had continued to work for the Komala party in the United Kingdom, and had attended its anniversary meeting in London on 24 February 2007. He produced photographs purporting to show as much and he claimed to know a Mr Allahvaisi, the Komala party representative in the United Kingdom. Mr Allahvaisi gave evidence on his behalf before the senior immigration judge.
The senior immigration judge summarised the evidence and the opposing submissions. His essential finding is at paragraph 17 but, as Senior Immigration Judge Batiste indicated when refusing permission to appeal, paragraph 17 must be read in the context of paragraph 16. Here are both paragraphs:
“16. Stripped down to the bare essentials of the case, the Appellant, as he claimed in his written and oral testimony, said that prior to the summer of 2005, he was not politically active but as a result of a Kurdish activist having been tortured and killed by the authorities, he attended the demonstrations near his home area. Even accepting that the Appellant attended the demonstrations on five consecutive days, nothing happened to the Appellant for the first four days. He said he would join the party but there is no evidence that he was actually a member of the Komala Party in Iran itself. On the fifth day, the Appellant claimed that he was chased by the authorities and managed to escape. He claimed that after each day of the demonstration, people would meet at his father’s old property which is where leaflets were stored. In the Appellant’s latest witness statement of 7th June 2007, he said at paragraph 12 that on the fifth day of the demonstration, he managed to escape after the authorities were chasing a group of people, including the Appellant. He said at paragraph 13 that he returned to the demonstration the next day but kept his distance from the main demonstration and was told that his friend, Karim, had been arrested the day before. I find it incredible that if the Appellant had run away on the fifth day of the demonstration, he would have returned the next day and placed himself in danger. I also do not accept that his uncle’s house had been raided by the authorities who had been looking for the Appellant. I reject the Appellant’s explanation that the authorities had taken Karim to the Appellant’s father’s old property and leaflets were discovered there. I also reject the Appellant’s explanation that it was Karim who had been forced to confess and had given the authorities the Appellant’s name. This is pure speculation and there is no evidence before me, other than the Appellant’s word, that this is how the authorities came to be apparently looking for the Appellant. There is also no satisfactory evidence as to why the Appellant claimed that his uncle was involved. In contra-distinction, the Appellant said in oral evidence that his uncle was a successful farmer and continued to be farming his land. There is no evidence before me that he has been arrested and detained by the authorities.
17. Putting the Appellant’s evidence at its highest, I find that he may have attended demonstrations in August 2005 but I do not accept that he faces a real risk of persecution because his friend Karim was arrested and gave the authorities the Appellant’s name. Furthermore, I do not accept that the Appellant’s uncle told the Appellant that the authorities were looking for him and that they had visited his property. Once again, all we have is the Appellant’s word for this..There is no evidence that the uncle has experienced any problems with the authorities and I reject the Appellant’s explanation that the authorities are always watching his uncle. If someone is a political activist and agitating for Kurdish rights and leaflets were found incriminating him, anyone connected with such a person is very likely to be arrested, detained and questioned by the authorities but there is no evidence that this has actually happened to the Appellant’s uncle.”
I should also read paragraphs 20 to 21 which deal with Mr Allahvaisi’s evidence:
“20. Regarding the evidence of Mr Allahvaisi, he may well be the Komala Party representative in the UK but I find his evidence to be totally unbelievable that when he went to Iraqi Kurdistan in July 2006, he met a Mr Kabi who happened to know the Appellant and his family and mentioned this to Mr Allahvaisi. The witness statement of Mr Allahvaisi says that he was told that the Appellant had been involved as a Komala Party member but there is no evidence to show that the Appellant was actually a member of the party.
21. I reject the evidence of this witness that by sheer coincidence, he happened to meet somebody in Iraqi Kurdistan who knew the Appellant and his family. Mr Allahvaisi confirms in his statement that the Appellant would be at real risk of ill-treatment if returned to Iran solely on the basis of his political activities within the UK and that his presence and his activities have been published on the internet and have been broadcast on Komala Television, based in Sweden. I reject this evidence as fanciful. There is no evidence before me, independently of what Mr Allahvaisi said, that the Appellant’s presence and activities would be known to the authorities. There is no evidence to support such a claim. There is also no evidence to support Mr Allahvaisi’s claim that there was a spy at their meetings and the party informed the authorities but this person was unfortunately able to escape from the UK. Such vague assertions as this, unsupported by any independent evidence, simply fail to persuade that the Appellant himself would be at real risk of ill-treatment if returned to Iran now.”
The applicant complains by ground 1 that paragraph 17 betrays an error of law, namely a decision to reject the applicant’s account for want of corroboration. Corroboration is not, he submits, a requirement. Reference is made to the observations in both paragraph 16 and 17 that there is no evidence for this or that proposition “other than the applicant’s word”.
Put this way I consider that the claim is bad. The senior immigration judge is not purporting to go by an assumed rule that corroboration is required, which of course it is not. He is stating, on the face of it at least, as a matter of fact that in this or that respect the applicant’s word is all there is.
It is also said (ground 2) that the senior immigration judge’s findings are not properly reasoned and that his conclusions concerning Mr Allahvaisi were irrationally arrived at.
I am troubled by the quality of the senior immigration judge’s reasoning supporting his dismissal of the appeal. Much of what he says condemns the applicant’s case as speculation or sheer coincidence or fanciful. These references in the determination are usually or at least frequently accompanied by the observation that there is no evidence on the point save that of the applicant and in one instance (paragraph 21) no evidence save that of Mr Allahvaisi.
While, as I have said, I do not consider that the senior immigration judge was applying a rule of evidence that does not exist, his approach does suggest a possible view on his part that he will not accept the applicant’s account save where it is corroborated yet no reason is given for such a view. It may be that the applicant will have a large hill to climb and I have considerable misgivings as to whether the case is fit for appeal but given the anxious scrutiny which tribunals and courts are enjoined to apply to these cases I have concluded that the applicant should have permission.
I will not limit the permission so as to exclude the assertion at paragraph 5b and paragraphs 8 to 9 of the counsel’s skeleton -- namely that the senior immigration judge failed to consider certain matters -- though to my mind the points made there are if anything illustrative of the overall ground that the senior immigration judge’s conclusions are not supported by sufficient reasons rather than amounting to freestanding complaints.
For the reasons I have given I grant permission to appeal.
Order: Application granted