Ali v London Borough of Haringey

This is an application by Mrs Ali for permission to appeal an order of HHJ Riddell in the Edmonton County Court of 17 July 2007. Technically, Mrs Ali needs an extension of time for filing her notice, but I do not think that is of any real consequence. Mrs Ali is here herself in person, without legal representation and without an interpreter. She has a gentleman from the PSU here to whom I am very grateful, but he has not been able to do more than sit beside her. She applies for an adjournment of the application so that she can have an interpreter. I have to decide whether it is, in all the circumstances, fair that she should have that adjournment in these circumstances. She comes from Somalia and she has lived in this country since at least 1995, that is to say, at least twelve years. She did not ask the court for any interpreter before this morning and accordingly the court is left without the practical ability to provide an interpreter today and with the waste of court time which would happen if an adjournment had to take place for that purpose. In addition she understands, I am satisfied, English quite well, and she and I have been conversing effectively for the best part of the last half hour. She understands most of what I am saying and I understand what she has been saying. It is not ideal, but at least she is able to make the case that she wants to make.

Next, as will appear in a moment, the question arose in the proceedings before the judge whether Mrs Ali had sufficiently understood what she had been told about an offer of accommodation that was made to her at an address called 72 Morley Avenue. She was, I may say, represented before the judge, and the judge decided that she had sufficiently understood what was said to her on that occasion. That was a decision about the facts of the case, not about the conduct of the case in the Edmonton County Court. But it is a relevant judicial decision in these proceedings. Next, with the help of an interpreter and a transcriber, Mrs Ali has put before the court a document called “Grounds of Appeal”. It is not dated, but nevertheless it is the basis of her application for permission to appeal. It is a well-prepared document which, in typing, she has, as it were, signed; and it is more than four pages long, and it contains her case that she should be given permission to appeal. I am satisfied that, by that means, her case is before the court in as coherent and well-presented a way as it ever will be. Next, as I shall indicate in a moment, the scope for a successful application for permission to this court is very limited. I have attempted to explain that to Mrs Ali in the course of our conversation and I am quite satisfied that, with the help in particular of her written grounds of appeal, that, in fact, this is not an application which has any prospect of succeeding. Accordingly, I have reached a decision that it would not, in the round, be either fair or necessary for an adjournment to be granted so that she can have an interpreter. I propose, therefore, to deal with the application and, as I have indicated, I shall, at the end of this, dismiss it.

HHJ Riddell had before him Mrs Ali’s appeal under section 204 of the Housing Act 1996, against a review decision of the local housing authority -- the London Borough of Haringey -- which had been made under section 202 of the 1996 Act. The issue was whether the council’s finding that Mrs Ali had made herself intentionally homeless was amenable to appeal. As I have explained, this would be a second appeal within the provisions of rule 52.13 of the Civil Procedure Rules, and that means that the court will not give permission to appeal, cannot give permission to appeal, unless it considers that the appeal would raise an important point of principle or practice or that there is some other compelling reason for the court to hear it.

In summary, the facts before the judge were as follows: Mrs Ali was temporarily accommodated as a homeless person by Haringey. She was made an offer of accommodation. She refused this offer of accommodation, believing that a prior offer of accommodation was still open to her. On the basis of her refusal, Haringey considered its duty to house her had been discharged, and they accordingly evicted her from temporary accommodation. When she then made a further homelessness application, her previous refusal and the consequent eviction was treated as establishing that she was intentionally homeless. Her case was that she was not intentionally homeless.

As I say, she was born in Somalia and has indefinite leave to remain in this country. She has lived in this country since at least 1995. In 1995 she applied to Haringey as a homeless person. Haringey accepted a full housing duty to her and she was placed in temporary accommodation. This accommodation was 83 Arcadian Gardens, London N22, of which she was granted a non-secure tenancy. Over the years Haringey made her a number of offers of accommodation which she refused. In each case, her refusal did not prevent a further offer being made, although Haringey did have a one offer policy which came into effect at some stage. There were some problems of leaks from the flat above and a strong smell of damp at 83 Arcadian Gardens, which were considered by the judge but which are not central to his decision. She was accordingly offered permanent accommodation by a letter dated 5 January 2005 at 182 Morley Avenue, N22. As a matter of fact, the letter stated that the property was ready for her to move into and that was wrong; but the letter did make it clear that Haringey would only make one suitable offer of accommodation and that if Mrs Ali refused it, Haringey would not be responsible for housing her and she would be asked to leave any temporary accommodation provided for her. She did not, as a matter of fact, view this property. Haringey’s case before the judge was that this offer was withdrawn on 20 January 2005 because repairs were needed to that property. Around 25 January 2005 Haringey then offered Mrs Ali a further property close to the previous one, this time at 72 Morley Avenue. She did go and look at this property, and it was Haringey’s case that she refused it on grounds that the bathroom was too close to the kitchen and that she did not think she could manage the stairs. Haringey sent her a letter warning her about the one offer policy and asking for her final decision by 28 January 2005. On about that date -- 28 January 2005 -- she was interviewed twice by Haringey, and Haringey’s record of these interviews states that she had indicated that she preferred 182 Morley Avenue though she had never seen it, and that she refused the offer of 72 Morley Avenue. The record also notes that Haringey explained that that would mean her temporary accommodation would be cancelled and that she fully understood this. There were, it seems, some language difficulties during these interviews although she certainly has a command of reasonable English, as was then decided and as I have satisfied myself today. On the same day, 28 January 2005, Mrs Ali made a request for a review of the decision that 72 Morley Avenue was suitable; her case being that it was not.

She then instructed a different firm of solicitors who wrote to Haringey on 6 July 2005 and said that she had been told that if she did not like 72 Morley Avenue she could wait for the repairs to 182 Morley Avenue to be completed and take an offer of that property instead. Haringey replied on 15 July but did not address this point. They did agree to conduct a non-statutory review of the decision that 72 Morley Avenue was unsuitable and, on 2 August 2005, her solicitors wrote to Haringey again, setting out her version of what had occurred in order to substantiate her claim that she was told she could take up the offer of 182 Morley Avenue. The judge considered that in some paragraphs of his judgment. Haringey looked into this, but rejected it. Accordingly, possession proceedings were brought against Mrs Ali in respect of 83 Arcadian Gardens and the possession order was made with a money judgment for rent arrears, on 13 December 2005, by District Judge Silverman.

She was evicted from 83 Arcadian Gardens on 30 March 2006. She made a fresh homelessness application before the eviction and then made a further one afterwards. She was therefore, on account of this application, placed in temporary accommodation under section 188 and section 190 of the 1996 Act. This accommodation was at 5A Greenwood Avenue, N3. She was interviewed on 24 August 2006 in relation to this more recent homelessness application. On 24 November 2006 Haringey wrote a decision letter to her, stating that she had been found to be intentionally homeless within the meaning of section 191 of the 1996 Act. This was on the basis that she had refused a suitable offer of accommodation at 72 Morley Avenue, which, it was said, constituted a deliberate act which led her to cease to occupy 83 Arcadian Gardens, which it would have been reasonable for her to continue to occupy. On 8 December 2006, through her solicitors, she sought a review of this decision under section 202 of the 1996 Act. In a review letter of 18 December 2006, Haringey upheld its earlier decision.

So the sum of all that is that the judge was concerned with an appeal under section 204 of the 1996 Act against the review decision of the second homelessness application; and that review decision had held that she was intentionally homeless because she had refused a suitable offer of accommodation at 72 Morley Avenue. The judge’s judgment is quite long and deals with a number of points. These included whether it would have been reasonable for Mrs Ali to continue to occupy 83 Arcadian Gardens. The judge held that this was a sustainable decision on review that it was reasonable. The essential question, however, was whether the decision that Mrs Ali was intentionally homeless was amenable to appeal on a point of law, because appeals under section 204 of the 1996 Act have to be on points of law. That turned, under section 191 of the Housing Act 1996, on whether she had done or failed to do anything in consequence of which she ceased to occupy accommodation available for her occupation, and which it would have been reasonable for her to continue to occupy. The critical fact found was that Mrs Ali had refused the one stop offer of accommodation at 72 Morley Avenue which was suitable for her and which was reasonable for her to occupy. Essentially the same issue of fact would arise under section 193(5) of the 1996 Act. The grounds in opposition to this were, in summary: firstly, that Mrs Ali believed that she could go back to 182 Morley Avenue. But this had not been raised for the purpose of the review. The judge held that the review letter had sustainably concluded that Mrs Ali understood that she either accepted 72 Morley Avenue or lost her right to accommodation.

Secondly, it turned on whether, if that were wrong, the decision would have been different. The judge held that it would not have been different; and thirdly, it turned on whether Haringey failed properly to take account of Mrs Ali’s language difficulties. The judge said that it was open to the reviewing officer to find that her knowledge and understanding of English was sufficient. The judge further held that the review decision was not vitiated because Mrs Ali may have been misled, because on an earlier occasion her rejecting offers of accommodation had led to further offers. The essential point was that the offer for 72 Morley Avenue was accompanied by a clear statement to the effect that the consequences would be that she would lose her right to accommodation if she refused the offer.

Lloyd LJ refused permission to appeal on the papers upon an urgency that Mrs Ali was then about to be evicted -- a possession order of 5A Greenwood Avenue having been made on the 12 September 2007. Mrs Ali has formulated grounds of appeal and I have already referred to the letter which has been composed for her but on, she says, her dictation, which extends to more than four pages.

A handwritten letter from the appellant makes the following points: first, the judge found that the decision to evict her from 83 Arcadian Gardens was to enable repairs to be done to the property, yet she is now told that she refused properties offered by the respondent. That is what she says, but it is contrary to facts which were found on review and which the judge upheld. Secondly, it is said that the judge and a previous judge did not hold that she made herself intentionally homeless or that she needed to pay rent arrears. The fact is that the judge upheld a review decision to this effect. Next it is said that the discontinuance of Haringey’s housing file on the appellant -- after her eviction from 83 Arcadian Gardens, and the opening of a new file for her temporary accommodation, presumably at 5A Greenwood Avenue -- was contrary to the respondent’s one offer policy. That, in my view, is of no consequence. Of course Haringey had their files, but those properties were temporary accommodation; and fourthly, it is said that Mrs Ali was never told that she would have to accept an offer or would be considered to have become intentionally homeless. That is contrary to the facts found upon the review which were upheld by the judge. Her typed grounds of appeal set out at some length, and understandably, her version of events. They differ in a number of respects from the facts found by the judge and the housing review manager and, importantly, are all points of fact.

In my judgment, Mrs Ali does not show nor, I believe, could she show any arguable case that the judge’s decision was wrong in law. At all points she is addressing questions of fact and not questions of law. In addition, an appeal to this court is limited to a point of law and, in my view, Mrs Ali does not raise any point of law. It is not open to her to seek to reopen, in this court, findings of fact. Furthermore, although it is clear that she disagrees with some of the factual findings of the review decision, and disagrees with the judge’s findings and conclusions, her proposed appeal raises no important point of principle or practice sufficient to justify permission for a second appeal, nor is there any other compelling reason why the Court of Appeal should hear the appeal. Those are two quite basic points which, in my judgment, make it impossible for Mrs Ali to get permission to appeal to this court. There is no point of law raised, and secondly, there is no important point of principle or practice. I am quite sure that from her point of view this is tremendously important; but it does not, in my judgment, come anywhere near achieving the criteria for a second appeal.