Midill (97PL) Ltd. v Park Lane Estates Ltd & Anor

Midill conceded that it was not ready, able and willing to complete on 8th or 11th April or on a date within the period of the notice to complete. The issue therefore was Gomba's readiness to complete on 11 April and in the period up to 27 April.

It was common ground that it was necessary for the seller to remain ready, able and willing throughout the notice period. The judge accepted, following Blackburne J in Aero Properties Ltd –v– Citycrest Properties [2002] 2 P&CR 21, that it was sufficient that the vendor should "be able within the time reasonably required to do so to set up the necessary administrative arrangements to enable completion to take place…” (para 24) He also regarded it as clear “from Aero and from principle” that the burden of proof lay on Midill, as the party seeking to establish that the other was not ready, able and willing to complete.

The judge heard evidence from a Mr Keith Gregory for Midill, but noted that he had had little involvement with efforts to complete the transaction. For Gomba he heard four witnesses, including Mr Anthony Simmons and Mr Neil Aspess, both partners in David Wineman, Gomba's solicitors responsible for the conveyancing.

He dealt briefly with the position on 11 April:

“Mr Simmons' evidence was that Gomba was ready, willing and able to complete on 8 April, the contract had been complied with. The directors nominated by the Buyer had been appointed, Mr Simmons had the signed stock transfer form and share certificates ready to hand over. He also around that time saw the seal, statutory books, Memorandum and Articles, share register and share certificate. Mr Aspess said that all the formalities necessary for completion were or could have been dealt with on or before 11 April. Mr Aspess also confirmed what Mr Simmons said and emphasised, as he did with regard to the later period, that completions involving the sale of a company as opposed to the property itself tend to involve attendance by the parties or their representatives, as well as by the solicitors, with the meetings containing more negotiation, activity and interaction. Mr Gregory claims, in the most general terms, that Gomba was unable to complete on 8 April but unsurprisingly had no detailed material to back this up.

The burden is upon Midill to prove that Gomba was not ready, able and willing to complete on 11 April. Midill has failed to discharge that burden.” (paras 16-17)

The position as at 27 April, the notice completion date, required a fuller review of the evidence. For present purposes it is important to note the judge’s preliminary comment:

“When looking at the period leading up to 27 April it needs to be borne in mind that as Midill were in no position to go ahead the preparations for completion were made by one side only without the conventional cooperation between solicitors. The picture of readiness or lack of it is not necessarily an accurate snapshot of what would have happened if there had been a sign of Gomba being called on to complete.” (para 18)

For example, he drew attention to the problem of securing the resignation of the current directors as required by clause 5, since they felt unable to resign until they knew the names of new directors nominated by Midill, which Midill had failed to supply.

The judge was unimpressed by concessions extracted from Mr Aspess in cross-examination, directed to his lack of direct recollection of the documentation, including the stock transfer form. He attached more importance to a memo dated 27^th April, but left by Mr Aspess before he went on holiday on 25^th April, briefing his colleague Mr Vivian Wineman to deal with a possible completion in his absence. That memo addressed specifically the completion requirements under Clause 5 of the Agreement. It confirmed that the solicitors held the statutory books and that he had a signed stock transfer form and share certificate. The judge thought it “most unlikely” that Mr Aspess did not have the relevant documents, correctly executed, at the time he dictated the memo.

He concluded:

“The issues are more complex as at 27 April. Nevertheless in my view the Claimant has failed to show that the Defendant was not ready, able and willing. As I see it Gomba would have been able, within the time reasonably required to do so, to set up the necessary administrative arrangements to enable completion to take place. It seems to me likely that all relevant documents were available other than those required from the directors. These would also have been available had the Claimant discharged its obligations to co-operate in agreeing arrangements for completion under Condition 6.2, most obviously by giving details of who the new directors were to be. It is improbable that having carefully considered preparations for completion Mr Aspess omitted to attend to important matters. I place little weight on his absence of recollection now of such routine matters compared with what he wrote at the time and with what one would assume in the ordinary way would be likely to happen in a solicitor's practice. In a situation where it seemed very likely that Midill would fail to complete and there were no signs whatever of activity on its part it is unsurprising that steps were not taken by Gomba to ensure that the documents were actually in order on the right day. I have no doubt that, in the real world, should Midill have shown signs of going ahead the minds of Gomba and its advisers would have become more closely focussed and commercial adrenalin would have taken effect. The fact that in this rather unreal atmosphere all documents were not in fact prepared to the right standard does not mean that they would not have been had Gomba been required to complete. As I see it Midill has failed to show that Gomba were not ready, willing and able to complete on either relevant date. It is not enough for Midill to point to what actually happened at the end of April where they had failed to co-operate to bring about completion and showed no signs of proceeding. That is not a true picture of what would probably have happened had Midill shown that it would or might complete on time.” (para 25, emphasis added)

The judgment was given in January 2008. Midill gave notice of appeal on three grounds. In summary:-

The application was considered on the papers by Lord Justice Thomas who on 28^th April 2008 gave permission, with the following comment:

“I consider that the issue on s.49 of the Law of Property Act 1925 is arguable. I am not persuaded that the issue on the burden of proof has a real prospect of success, but the convenient course is to adjourn that application to the court hearing the appeal, with the hearing to follow if permission is granted.”

No steps were taken by Midill at the time to clarify the scope of that permission. However, on 17^th September 2008, some two weeks before the date fixed for the appeal hearing, Midill gave notice of an application to amend the grounds of appeal by adding as ground 2A further challenges to the judge’s findings of fact in relation to whether Gomba was “ready, able and willing” on 27^th April. This application was supported by a detailed skeleton argument running to some eighty-seven paragraphs dealing with all the issues including the amended grounds.

Since these documents were filed with the court during the vacation, it is perhaps not surprising that they did not come to the attention of the members of court until the day before the hearing. Subject to one minor point on the burden of proof ground, the proposed amendment was opposed by Gomba. Mr Crampin for Midill renewed the application to amend at the beginning of the hearing. We refused it, indicating that we would give our reasons in the judgment.

The application to amend raises implicitly a preliminary issue, as to the scope of the grant of permission. With respect to Thomas LJ, it would have been clearer if he had dealt specifically with each of the three numbered grounds in the Notice of Appeal. However, from his comment, it is to my mind reasonably clear that he intended only to grant permission on ground 3, relating to section 49, and to adjourn ground 1, described as “the issue on the burden of proof”.

The inference I would draw is that he intended to refuse ground 2, rather than adjourn it. In no sense can it be described as “an issue on the burden of proof”. At best, from the applicants’ point of view, it was unclear what his intention was in relation to ground 2. On either view, it was incumbent upon them, if they wished to maintain that ground, to take immediate steps to renew the application, or to clarify the position. The purpose of the permission to appeal stage is to ensure that all parties, including the court, are aware of the issues in play, well before the preparation for the appeal. Here no good reason has been given for not observing that discipline.

The same applies to the application to amend the grounds. The normal course is for the proposed grounds to be put fully before the Lord Justice who considers the application for permission to appeal. The court will be very reluctant to allow amendments at a late stage for no good reason, particularly if they risk widening the scope of the appeal and increasing the time required for the hearing. In this case the proposed amendment would widen a relatively narrow attack on one issue of the factual findings, to a general attack on the judge’s factual conclusions. Such a challenge always involves an uphill task, where the judge’s conclusions depend to a significant extent on his view of the witnesses and the effect of cross examination. It would in my view have added substantially to the time for the appeal.

In my view both the application to reinstate ground 2, and the application for permission to extend it by ground 2A, are far too late, and should be refused for that reason alone.

I turn to the adjourned application for permission to appeal on the burden of proof issue. Having heard Mr Crampin, we indicated that permission would be refused for reasons to be given in the judgment.

He had submitted that, in the absence of binding authority in this court, the issue of burden of proof should be decided by reference to “fairness, justice and common sense”. He relied on the general principle that “he who asserts must prove”. A completion notice under condition 6.8.1 contains an implied assertion by the giver that he is ready to complete, and accordingly, where that assertion is put in issue, it is for him to prove it. There is no presumption that the notice is correct. Requiring the recipient to prove the giver’s non-readiness is unfair, since it requires him to prove a negative; and unrealistic since the relevant facts will normally be within the peculiar knowledge of the giver. He referred by way of analogy to a 19^th C case, relating to a notice to renew a lease (Finch v Underwood (1876) 2 ChD 310). (I say at once that I do not find the analogy helpful in this very different context.)

I see some theoretical force in these submissions. Under the applicable condition the right to serve a completion notice is given to a party “who is ready, able and willing to complete”. The service of such a notice can be said therefore to carry with it an implicit assertion to that effect. If the truth of that assertion is put in issue, it is not unreasonable to expect the giver to be able to justify it. To that extent, I am prepared to assume that he carries at least some obligation in subsequent proceedings to call evidence to support his position, and that he cannot simply rest on the notice. Although the judgment of Blackburne J in Aero Properties contains statements suggesting that the burden of proof lies on the recipient of the notice, there does not appear to have been any argument on that point, as a distinct issue of law.

In any event, I am not persuaded that this point gives Midill any realistic basis for challenging the judge’s decision in this case. As so often, it is unhelpful to separate the issue of burden of proof from the context. The test laid down by the condition is not black and white. In this case, it was further complicated by the special requirements of clause 5 for the sale of shares in a company, and the practical need for co-operation between the parties on certain aspects.

As I read it, the judge was satisfied that Gomba was ready to complete on the 11^th April. That is clear from paragraph 16, in which he compares the specific evidence of Mr Simmons and Mr Aspess to that effect, with the generalised assertions to the contrary of Mr Gregory. His reference in the following paragraph to the burden of proof reads as a makeweight, rather than an essential part of the reasoning. The position on 27^th April was understandably less clear-cut, for the reasons the judge gave. But he was satisfied that Gomba had gone as far as was reasonable to prepare themselves to complete, had there been any likelihood of this happening.

Mr Crampin points to the italicised words in the passage quoted above, as a finding that the required documents had not all been “prepared to the right standard” by 27^th April. However, the judge was right to see this against the background of the mutual duties of cooperation imposed by the agreement. He had already found that Gomba would have been able to set up the necessary administrative arrangements to enable completion to take place “within the time reasonably required to do so”, and that all the relevant documents were available other than those for which Midill’s co-operation was necessary. This is enough for Gomba’s purposes. In context, again, the references to the burden of proof seem to me no more than makeweights.

It follows that the only live issue in the appeal is that relating to section 49(2) for which permission was granted by Thomas LJ.

The claim for return of the deposit ultimately rested on section 49(2) of the Law of Property Act 1925. Section 49(2) provides:-

“Where the court refuses to grant specific performance of a contract, or in any action for the return of the deposit, the court may, if it thinks fit, order the repayment of any deposit.”

Although the power applies only to “a contract for the sale or exchange of any interest in land” (s 49(3)), it was conceded by Gomba that the present contract should be treated as such for the purposes of the proceedings. (The judge expressed no view on the correctness of that concession, and it is equally unnecessary for us to do so.)

The judge noted the differences of emphasis expressed in the various authorities and textbooks on the width of the discretion, but regarded the judgment of this court in Omar v El Wakil [2001] EWCA Civ 1090, as providing the most authoritative guidance, in particular as requiring something “exceptional” to justify ordering return. He concluded:

“The guidance of the Court of Appeal is clear that in the ordinary way the court will not order the payment of the purchase price and that applies even if the Seller makes a profit on the subsequent sale. If the position were otherwise and the liability to repay the deposit depended upon some future sale price there would be considerable uncertainty possibly for a lengthy period. That would create precisely the uncertainty which a fixed deposit is intended to avoid. There is no special factor here which would justify departing from the normal approach. Midill is a sophisticated investor well aware of the risks involved in failing to complete a deal. Of course there is nothing to prevent the parties providing, if they so agree but did not in this case, that liability to repay the deposit, should there be a default, will depend upon the outcome of a further sale. The court will therefore not exercise its jurisdiction under Section 49.” (para 32)

Mr Crampin submits that the judge took too narrow a view of his discretion. He urged us to follow the view of Buckley LJ (Universal Corp v Five Ways Properties Ltd [1979] 1 All ER 552, 555e that the discretion is a wide one, to be exercised “in any circumstances which make this the fairest course between the two parties”. The judgment of Arden LJ in Omar v El-Wakil does not purport to redefine the scope of the discretion; it merely gives some non-binding guidelines for its exercise. The judge was wrong to treat them as constraining his discretion, or as indicating that it was irrelevant that the vendor had made a profit on resale. That was inconsistent with the approach adopted in Dimsdale Developments (South East) Ltd v De Haan (1983) 47 P&CR 1, which was approved by Neuberger J in Tennaro Ltd v Majorarch [2003] EWHC 2601.

Mr Steinfeld, for Gomba, submits that the judge exercised his discretion in accordance with the most recent authoritative guidance of this court in Omar, and that the judgment discloses no error of law or principle.

For a section which has been on the statute book for over 80 years, the learning in respect of section 49(2) remains surprisingly incoherent.

A contractual provision for a deposit on the sale of land was a long-established (albeit anomalous) exception to the ordinary principles governing penalties in contract:

“Ancient law has established that the forfeiture of such a deposit (customarily 10 per cent. of the contract price) does not fall within the general rule and can be validly forfeited even though the amount of the deposit bears no reference to the anticipated loss to the vendor flowing from the breach of contract.

… Even in the absence of express contractual provision, it is an earnest for the performance of the contract: in the event of completion of the contract the deposit is applicable towards payment of the purchase price; in the event of the purchaser's failure to complete in accordance with the terms of the contract, the deposit is forfeit, equity having no power to relieve against such forfeiture” (Workers Trust Bank Ltd v Dojap Ltd [1993] AC 573, 578-9, per Lord Browne-Wilkinson)

In line with this principle it was held in a series of 19^th Century cases that, even where specific performance was refused to the vendor because the title was wholly defective, the purchaser might be left unable to rescind by the terms of the contract, and therefore unable in law to claim return of the deposit (see Megarry & Wade Law of Real Property para 15-80). As was said in the leading case:

“There is no question of discretion in such a case as that… The legal answer is this: ‘There is no breach of contract at all; you have taken your chance with respect to your deposit; and unless you shew a breach by the vendor of his bargain, you are not entitled to have that deposit back.’…” (Re Scott and Alvarez's Contract No 2 [1895] 2 Ch 603, 612, per Lindley LJ)

The immediate purpose of section 49(2) was to correct this apparent injustice. That appears from Sir Benjamin Cherry’s own commentary (in Wostenholme & Cherry Conveyancing Statutes 12^th Ed (1932), cited in Megarry & Wade para 15-111). However, that does not explain the apparent width of the discretion, as expressed in the statute.

Since then the jurisprudence has followed an uncertain course. In the first 50 years of its life, the section remained “remarkably quiescent”, as Megarry J observed in Schindler v Pigault (1975) 30 P&CR 328. In the only reported case in the Court of Appeal, James Macara v Barclay [1944] 2 All ER 31, the court found it unnecessary to express a concluded view as to the scope of the section. The decade from 1975 to 1985 saw a sequence of cases which yielded a range of views but no binding authority. A significant Privy Council decision in 1995 went unreported and was ignored in later authorities. In Omar in 2001 a majority of this court laid down certain principles for the purpose of dealing with the very unusual facts of that case, but apparently without having had any assistance from counsel or citation of authority on the point. Since then there have been some cases at first instance, including notably Tennaro, a decision of Neuberger J. The textbooks generally favour a broad approach, but without any consistent underpinning of principle. Although detailed analysis may be unnecessary for the purpose of deciding this case, a review of the authorities (including some not cited to us) may be helpful in order to reduce uncertainty in the future.

The first substantive discussion of the section came in Schindler in 1975. The facts were that the purchaser had failed to comply with a vendor's notice to complete, for reasons which were partly attributable to the vendor’s failure to provide access to the property for an intended sub-purchaser. Megarry J held that the purchaser was entitled to rescind, but, even if that were wrong, it would be “just and equitable” for the deposit to be returned. He made some general comments about the effect of the “few” authorities:

“… it appears, as one might expect, that the jurisdiction is discretionary, and that it is to be exercised where justice requires it… The sub-section is essentially one that is available for use in mitigation of the vendor's right at law to forfeit the deposit…

Mr. Lightman … contended that the jurisdiction under section 49 (2) should only be exercised in favour of one party if there was unconscionable conduct by the other, but I do not think that what is appropriate, in relation to any alleged equity of restitution, provides any reliable touchstone for the exercise of the statutory jurisdiction conferred by section 49 (2). That jurisdiction is, I think, exercisable on wider grounds than that, including a general consideration of the conduct of the parties (and especially the applicant), the gravity of the matters in question, and the amounts at stake… The jurisdiction is, of course, statutory and is not the product of equity, but its discretionary character in relation to deposits on the sale of land makes it at least akin to equitable relief against forfeiture. A purchaser who does not claim rescission or is unable to establish a sufficient case for it may nevertheless recover his deposit by suing for its return and making out a proper case under the subsection.”(p 336-7)

Later in 1975, but without reference to Schindler, Goff J decided Michael Richards Properties Ltd v St Saviour's Parish, Southwark [1975] 3 All ER 416. The purchaser had refused to complete after discovering that the local authority intended to acquire the property compulsorily. The judge refused to order return of the deposit, saying:

“Section 49, however, was passed to remove the former hardship which existed where a defendant had a good defence in equity to a claim for specific performance but no defence in law, and, therefore, the deposit was forfeited. I am not prepared to say that the jurisdiction can only be exercised in such a case, but outside that ambit, it should only be exercised, if at all, sparingly and with caution.

Here the plaintiffs have advanced only two reasons why I should exercise my discretion in their favour. First, that if I do not, the defendants will have made a profit, and secondly, that the warning concerning the views of the local authority could have been communicated before the deposit was paid. The first element, however, is inherent in cases where a deposit is forfeited, and the second is not really significant because the contract was concluded before then by the letter of acceptance….” (p 424-5)

In Cole v Rose [1978] 3 All ER 1121, where the vendor had purported to rescind the contract and retain the deposit, while selling to another purchaser at a higher price, it was held that the purchaser was entitled to return of the deposit, because the notice to complete had been ineffective. It was unnecessary, therefore, for him to rely on section 49(2). However, the judge (Mervyn Davies QC) indicated that he would not otherwise have ordered return of the deposit. Having cited the above passage from Schindler he said:

“With those observations in mind, it seems that one can contemplate an order under s 49(2) only if there are some special circumstances in the particular matter, being circumstances that suggest that it is perhaps unfair or inequitable that the purchaser should lose his deposit. I cannot see any special circumstances in the present case. It is a straightforward case of a contract for sale that was not completed because the purchaser could not find the purchase price in time.” (p 1130)

In Universal Corporation v Five Ways Properties Ltd [1979] 1 All ER 552, the purchaser, a Liberian company, required money from their Nigerian bank to complete the contract, but due to a change in the exchange control regulations they were unable to arrange the transfer of the moneys in time. The vendor rescinded the contract and forfeited the deposit. The purchasers obtained the money twelve days later, and issued a writ claiming repayment of the deposit with interest under section 49(2). Walton J struck out the claim, but this Court allowed the appeal on the basis that the claim was not unarguable. It had become clear by the time of the Court of Appeal hearing (but not before Walton J) that the vendors had been aware that the purchasers needed to bring funds from Nigeria (p 555h). Walton J had held that, having regard to the structure of the section and its history, it should be treated as applying only to the type of case to which it had originally been directed, where the vendor was unable to obtain specific performance; or alternatively it must be severely limited so as to apply only where the vendor had been party to some conduct which was “not straightforward” or “tricky”, or had “some other mark of equitable disfavour attached to it” ([1978] 3 AllER 1131, 1137f-j).

In the Court of Appeal, Buckley LJ thought this approach was too narrow. The section conferred a discretion unqualified by any language, albeit –

“a discretion which must, of course, be exercised judicially, and with regard to all relevant considerations, including the very important consideration of the terms of the contract into which the parties have chosen to enter...”

Since the language was plain, and showed that Parliament had conferred “a wide and general discretion”, there was no justification for limiting it by reference to its mischief or history. He contrasted Walton J’s approach with what he understood to be Megarry J’s broader approach in Schindler that the jurisdiction was one to be exercised “where the justice of the case requires”, adding:

“I take the word ‘justice’ to be used in a wide sense, indicating that repayment must be ordered in any circumstances which make this the fairest course between the two parties.” (p 690-1)

The other member of the court, Eveleigh LJ, did not express a concluded view, observing simply that the limitation applied by the judge was not “plain and obvious”. This was sufficient for the strike-out claim to fail.

The last case in the sequence is Dimsdale Developments (South East) Ltd. v De Haan (1984) 47 P. & C.R. 1. The contract provided for sale of a freehold for £122,250, and a 10% deposit was paid. Completion, originally fixed for 28 October 1981, was delayed because the purchasers had difficulties over planning and finance. Eventually in January 1982, after a notice to complete was not complied with, the vendors informed the purchasers that they regarded the contract as repudiated, and in February they sold the property to a third party for £140,000. They incurred a total of £6,500 in fees and interest. The purchasers applied for return of their deposit. The judge (Gerald Godfrey QC), applying a wide view of section 49(2), held that the deposit should be returned, but only after allowing a deduction to cover the defendants' losses of £6,500. He made clear, however, that he was adopting this wide approach with reluctance. He did so “loyally” following the line taken by Buckley LJ, even though he thought that Buckley LJ had misinterpreted the judgment of Megarry J. He read Megarry J’s reference to the need to make out “a proper case” under section 49(2) as being in accord with Walton J’s approach, and also with that expressed by Mervyn Davies QC in Cole v Rose, an approach which he personally preferred (pp 11-12).

Against this somewhat confusing background, it is surprising that more attention has not been paid to the Privy Council decision on the identical provision in a Trinidad and Tobago statute: Bidaisee v Dorinsa Yusidai Sampath & Ors Privy Council Appeal No. 33 of 1993 (Lords Goff, Mustill, Slynn, Nicholls and Steyn). Although the case is unreported, it is noted in the textbooks, and the judgment is obtainable from the Privy Council.

The contract was for the sale of a half share of land to the co-owner for TT$2 million, and a deposit of 10% was paid. After notice of completion was not complied with, the vendor sold his half share to third parties for TT$2.5 million. There were arguments as to the validity of the notice, which were not upheld. The third ground of appeal related to the court’s refusal to order return of the deposit under the equivalent of section 49(2). The refusal was upheld by the Privy Council whose Opinion was delivered by Lord Nicholls. He noted that the gain represented by the retention of the deposit was offset by the amount of interest (“some $250,000”) which he would have received if the sale had been completed on time. He continued:

“Even so, and having regard to the price of the resale to (the third party) he did not suffer a loss. This, of itself and without more, is not a sufficient reason for the court to exercise its discretion in favour of a defaulting buyer. The traditional deposit paid by a buyer when he enters into a contract is an earnest for the performance of the contract, and can be retained by the seller if the buyer defaults. Equity does not regard this as a penalty against which it granted relief: see Workers Trust & Merchant back Ltd v Dojap Investment Ltd [1993] A.C. 573 578-9. Section 49(2) has never been understood as intended to overrule this principle, and it should not be so interpreted or applied.

So the search is for something more. In the present case the money spent by the plaintiff on work done in connection with the land does not qualify under this head, for the lack of evidence of the effect of such expenditure on the value of the land. Nor does the first defendant's profit on re-selling at a higher price to the (third parties). In the first place, against the uplift of $500,000 in the price must be set the loss of interest already mentioned. Secondly, and more generally, their Lordships simply do not know the reason for the higher price. This may be due to movements in land prices generally. Once again their Lordships are being asked to speculate. This is not a proper basis on which the court should exercise its discretion…” (p 7, emphasis added)

I come next to Omar v El-Wakil on which the judge principally relied. The case was not concerned with a typical deposit under a contract for sale of land. The facts were complicated, and the evidence confused. In simple terms, two agreements were signed on 22 January 1992. By one, Omar sold a car-hire business to a company controlled by El-Wakil for £110,000. By the other (“the Corringham contract”), El-Wakil sold to Omar a property for £350,000, of which £110,000 was to be paid on signing the contract, and the balance on completion. The transactions failed for various reasons, for which both parties were in part responsible. One issue was whether Omar should be treated, by virtue of the first agreement, as having paid a deposit of £110,000 under the second, and if so whether the court should order it to be repaid by El-Wakil under section 49(2).

Arden LJ gave the leading judgment, the reasoning of which on this point was adopted by Lord Phillips MR. She noted that the court had not been taken to any authorities on the scope of section 49(2), that none appeared in the judgment below, and that there had been no argument on the point. She had herself noted the comments of Buckley LJ in the Universal Corporation case on the width of the discretion, but observed that, since the other member of the court had not expressed a view and the case was an interlocutory appeal heard by two lords justices, the decision was not binding on the court. She also referred to criticisms in the textbooks of the absence of criteria guiding the exercise of the court's jurisdiction, and the support in some for the “generous interpretation” adopted by Buckley LJ (citing Jones and Goodhart, Specific Performance, 2nd ed. (1996) page 305; and Charles Harpum, Relief against Forfeiture and The Purchase of Land (1984) CLJ 134, 172). She continued (paras 35-37):

“The starting point must be that although section 49(2) is expressed in open-textured terms leaving it to the courts to determine the organising principles, the court must bear in mind that the payment in question was a ‘deposit’, that is an earnest for performance and that accordingly there should not be relief simply because the Corringham contract never took place….

The context here is of a conveyancing transaction. It is common knowledge that if a purchaser pays a deposit he is likely to forfeit it if he does not fulfil the contract. Moreover deposits are very usual features of conveyancing transactions and conveyancing transactions are common. It is important that there should be certainty attaching to the consequences of paying a deposit.

As the judge did not exercise his discretion under section 49(2), or alternatively declined to exercise it on the basis no deposit had been paid, it is open to this court to do so. For the reasons given, I would start from the position that the deposit should not normally be ordered to be repaid. Are there any mitigating circumstances in the present case?...”

She then considered the facts of the case in detail, and concluded:

“Furthermore in my judgment, in a situation where a purchaser could not himself perform, the circumstances which make it appropriate for the court to exercise its discretion under section 49(2) in his favour must be exceptional. Inability to complete is exactly the risk the deposit was intended to guard against. Accordingly I would not exercise the discretion conferred by section 49(2) in Mr Omar's favour and would dismiss the appeal on that point.” (para 38)

Finally, of the more recent first-instance cases, I need refer only to Tennaro, on which Mr Crampin relies. Three related contracts to grant long leases of three flats in the same block (Nos 37, 32 and 31) were entered into between the vendor (Majorarch) and the purchaser (Tennaro Ltd). Deposits were paid in each case. The vendor served notices to complete in respect of the three contracts and, on the purchaser’s failure to comply, purported to rescind each of the agreements and to forfeit the deposits. Among other arguments, the purchaser sought repayment of the deposits under section 49(2). By way of authority, Neuberger J referred to the comments of Buckley LJ in Universal Corporation, and those of Arden LJ in Omar, which he described as representing “a slightly stricter or, at any rate, a more analytical view” (para 83).

He rejected the claim for return of the deposit in respect of Flat 37 (whose value had dropped by some £400,000), but allowed it for the other two flats. In respect of Flat 32, the benefit of the agreement had been assigned to a third party, who had himself (at “about the time that the contract with the Buyer would have been completed”) made an offer to purchase it for a price substantially higher than the contract price, which had been rejected by the vendor without explanation (para 87-8). Neuberger J added that on this case he “drew assistance” from the judgment in Dimsdale Developments (South East) Limited v De Haan:

“As I understand it, (the judge) considered that the fact that the Seller had sold the property at a substantially higher price than it would have received under the contract with the defaulting Buyer, was the crucial factor which justified the return of the deposit. However, it is right to add that he made deductions from the deposit, in favour of the Seller, in relation to expenditure wasted by the Seller under the abortive contract.” (para 89) ”

In respect of Flat 31, the Buyer had been willing to purchase that flat alone at the purchase price, but the Seller required it to be bought along with Flat 37. Neuberger J concluded “on balance” that in this case also the deposit should be repaid. He noted, in particular, that the Seller had had the opportunity to complete at the contract price, and had not come forward with any explanation of this refusal; and that, on the basis of its then market-value, the flat could have been resold at 15% above the contract price (para 98).

The balance of academic comment appears to favour a wide view of the section (see e.g. Jones & Goodhart Specific Performance 2^nd Ed p 304-5; Treitel, Law of Contract 12^th Ed p 1084-6). The most recent edition of Goff & Jones (7th Ed para 20-035), contrasts the “generous” approach of Buckley LJ with the “stricter view” of Arden LJ in Omar, commenting:

“It is to be hoped that Buckley LJ's view will prevail. There seems little justification for restricting so sharply, as Arden LJ proposed, the exercise of the Court's discretion.”

Bidaisee is not mentioned in this context. It is suggested that for the future guidance should be sought in -

“… the principles which determine whether penalty payments are recoverable…, namely the court should order restitution of the whole or part of the deposit if the sum forfeited is out of all proportion to the vendor's loss arising from the purchaser's repudiation.”

Since Arden LJ’s judgment contains the most recent, considered guidance of a majority of this court, I doubt if it would be appropriate for us to depart from it even if we wished to do so. In fact, as the review shows, her approach is in line with the balance of judicial view, including that of the Privy Council. Buckley LJ’s comments, though of course entitled to great respect, are not binding on us, for the reasons given by Arden LJ. Furthermore, they need to be read in the context of the case before him. He was concerned principally to rebut the very narrow line taken by Walton J, which required some “trickiness” or the like by the vendor. Similarly, Megarry J’s observations on the width of the discretion, whatever their precise intention, must be read as a response to the vendor’s argument that the section only applied where there had been “unconscionable” conduct.

The critical point, on which Arden LJ echoed Lord Nicholls, is that the deposit is “an earnest for the performance of the contract”, which can be retained by the seller if the buyer defaults, without any necessary regard to the question of actual loss or its amount. That principle, as the Privy Council made clear, is not “overruled” by section 49(2). There needs to be “something more”; or, as other judges have said, something special or exceptional to justify overriding the ordinary contractual expectations of the parties.

The cases at first instance should not be seen as altering the principle, but as illustrations of how it has been applied in particular circumstances. The only one which I would respectfully question is Dimsdale, which was decided against the instincts of the judge himself, and without the benefit of the guidance provided in Omar. That view is not altered by the fact that it was relied on by Neuberger J to reinforce his conclusion on the second transaction in Tennaro. The decision on that transaction is readily understandable, given that the relative attractiveness of the alternative offer available to the vendor at the time of intended completion, arranged by the purchaser, and the lack of any stated reason for rejecting it. I find it unnecessary to express a view on Neuberger J’s decision on the third transaction. It is less easy to analyse, since it is not entirely clear whether the vendor had any valid contractual basis for linking Flats 31 and 37.

Against that background, I return to the present case. In my view, the judge’s reasoning was impeccable. He was entitled to find that it was not enough that the vendor sold at a higher price some months after the date for completion. That delay distinguishes the case from Tennaro. There is nothing to suggest that the price rise was exceptional, in relation to movements in the market generally. There is no obvious reason why the purchaser should have the benefit of any such price rise. It was the vendor who had borne the risk and cost of holding the property during the intervening period. I also agree with the judge that to decide otherwise would add undesirable uncertainty to the well-established contractual understanding.

For these reasons I would dismiss the appeal on the issue for which permission, has been given, and refuse the other applications.