AM (Cameroon), R (on the application of) v Asylum and Immigration Tribunal

I understand however that the telephone conference facility was available at the County Court. The County Court is located in the same building as the AIT and it is. on the same floor. I therefore made enquires with the AIT regarding the use of the County Court facility but my request was hindered. I wrote to the county court but I did not receive a reply. I telephoned Field house. I was told that installing telephone conference facility was an accommodation issue and was asked to write to the ECO for advice but I did not get a reply.

Because I did not get satisfactory replies from the AIT and the County Court I made an application to the Legal Service Commission (LSC) to fund the installation and connection of the telephone conference facility. Funding was granted in full"

Attendance at CMRH:

Immigration Judge: Sacks

Clerk: Colin Walsh

HOPO: McSween

KFX confirming address, acting and no interpreter present.

Both parties agreed not suitable to float.

Do we have chronology - confirmed no, but will submit.

Do we have skeleton argument - confirmed no, but will submit.

KFX handing over letter that had been sent to court [presumably letter of 27 July] and was provided to me by the clerk before the hearing. Immigration Judge read out request and asked HOPO for comments- none made.

KFX raising issue of telephone conference with Immigration Judge - initial query as to what further information could be obtained that was not in the CIPU report! Explaining that the individual had personal knowledge of our client's circumstances in the Cameroon and that he had in fact applied for bail for our client whilst in prison. Immigration Judge explained he had not dealt with this issue before and adjourned to check whether the court had the facilities. Asked if I knew the time distance - confirmed I did not.

Clerk returned and said likely could be carried out using facilities from the .county court - but they can not make international outgoing calls and therefore would have to receive a telephone call in.

In absence confirmed to HOPO the details of the barrister and law firm.

Immigration Judge returned to state that the answer was no - that there were no facilities set up with Cameroon like there was re Nigeria. That there were standard directions in existence on this point and that there was no means by which we can verify the identity/ credibility and authenticity. Can not be done and if it was done we would have to pay. If give evidence must be here before us.

KFX putting to Immigration Judge that the identity of the individual could be checked by the British Embassy and we could telephone link from there. He could provide his passport to the embassy and evidence of qualifications. If this court does not have the facilities we could transfer the matter to Bradford.

Immigration Judge confirming that the telephones in court can not link from GPO and GPO verify this is usually between two solicitor firms in the UK. KFX advising that the individual in question worked for a solicitor firm - could the contact be carried out through that means.

No - he should file a sworn affidavit if he wants to at the embassy.

Any witnesses - potentially individual from Cameroon if we can get funding.

Immigration Judge confirmed that he would need advance notification if a witness was to attend so that he could make suitable arrangements to accommodate a witness who had travelled so far. That it would also increase the estimated length of the hearing.

HOPO confirmed that they wished only to rely on the reasons for refusal. Then raised s8 in relation to travel with agent on forged passport. False documents (A8 of bundle) Immigration Judge noted standard directions. Drew his attention to request for reduced time agreed to submit 2 days before the hearing.

Convention - political and gender

HR- 3,8,5,6,7-

Immigration Judge noted 5,6,7 would not succeed without article 3. KFX confirming still wish to rely on them.

Medical Reports - confirmed that the medical report had been submitted and was a part of the HO bundle (E2-5) and that we may obtain an updated report depending on whether there is any further information. All reports should be served within the time scale in the directions.

Language - English.

Change ground of appeal - no

Anything agreed upon = Nationality

Family members - no

HOPO relying on updated CIPU and authorities -handed a copy.

Any other matters:

KFX pointing out to immigration Judge that BofP [burden of proof] was on the Appellant, the issue of the witness was particularly important. Immigration Judge noting that they can not entertain such an action, I was unlikely to get funding and in any event authenticity was an issue.

KFX explaining again about link with embassy. Time difference raised and KFX confirming unlikely to be significant given the placement of Cameroon compared to the UK. Conference could be arranged at the embassy as it was unlikely we would get funding for witness important to consider telephone conference.

Immigration Judge stated that the answer was no. If calling a witness let them know in advance."

At paragraph 3 of IJ Sacks statement, he states that he did not consider it appropriate to allow such evidence to be admitted in this form. He said that it was not practical to hear evidence from a telephone link. He failed to give reasons and in my view did not consider the possibility with an open mind.

I believed that it was not appropriate to challenge J Sacks decision by Judicial Review following the CMRH until I had ascertained whether the telephone link could in any event be made possible. So I embarked on making enquiries with both the AIT and seeking co-operation from the British High Commissioner (BHC) in Cameroon. (Ex 3).

Unfortunately I was confronted with negative responses from the AIT and the British High Commissioner. They were unhelpful (Exs 3 & 7). I did not obtain a response from AIT in Field House from my enquiries (Ex 13).

I approached the Legal Service Commission (Ex 4) and I was granted funding to make the telephone link possible.

With the LSC funding and my firm the connection and the equipment was purchased to enable the evidence to be heard in court. With this I sincerely believed that the Immigration Judge would not have objected to our request if the funding, equipment and technology was made available."

With regard to my refusal to consider hearing evidence from a witness in the Cameroon, I am aware that under the Procedure Rules I have discretion as to how and in what form evidence can be admitted. The Appellant was seeking leave for telephone evidence to be admitted, and for her witness in Cameroon to attend at the British Embassy, and to have his credentials verified at the Embassy, and for him then to give evidence over a telephone link at the hearing. I did not consider it appropriate to allow such evidence to be admitted in this form. ...

The Appellant's representative, following my decision on 28^l July 2005 to refuse to admit evidence by telephone, sought to overturn my decision by approaching the management staff at the North Shields centre. I understand that quite rightly they refused to consider the approaches that were being made by the Appellant's representatives, bearing in mind that I had already made a judicial decision. I understand that the representatives were very persistent in their approaches to the Office Manager at North Shields on this particular point."

The Case Management Review took place on 28^th July 2005. At that hearing the Appellant made an application that the court grant permission for a telephone link to enable a witness in Cameroon to give evidence. This witness was a Barrister who had represented the Appellant's husband in the past. Paragraph 45 of the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal (Procedure) Rules 2005 gives me power should I so wish to exercise it, to make provision for a hearing to be conducted or evidence given or representations made by video link or by other electronic means. Having considered the Appellant's request I did not consider it appropriate to make such an order. I consider that there was more than adequate time for affidavit evidence from that witness to be lodged and considered by the court. I directed that the matter proceed to a full hearing on 11^th August 2005.

The Appellant's solicitors sought to challenge my refusal to receive evidence via the telephone conference, and by their letter of 9 August 2005 indicated that they would want the matter re-considered at the hearing on 11 August 2005, and in their letter confirmed that the LSC had agreed to fund any telephone conference. They identified the basis of their arguments for seeking such a facility, and identified the witness that they would be calling, and the evidence that he would be giving."

"We respectfully give notice of our request for permission to adduce evidence via telephone conference at the above name appeal hearing as preliminary issue at the appellant's hearing tomorrow.

We initially made the request before Mr Sacks at the CMR hearing recently and it was refused on the basis that the facility is not available at North Shields hearing centre. We confirm that we can now have the facility made available.

We made extensive enquiries with the AIT with a view of obtaining the telephone conference facility on loan from the County Court but our efforts were hindered.

We have consulted with LSC and applied for funding. They have today agreed to fund the installation and telephone connection between the court and the witnesses in Cameroon.

In view of the available funding, we ask the court to give directions for the evidence to be given by telephone conference. We ask the court to consider the following:-

With regard to the evidence, the appellant stated that she was arrested, tortured and imprisoned in October 2001. The Home Office rejected her evidence. The witness we intend to call is a Supreme Court Barrister at law who states that AM was amongst those detained in October 2001 and that he was asked by a Human Rights group to get her and others bail. There are other issues which the witness can give evidence in relation to prison condition, arrest, fair trial, detention, escape prisoners, prosecution, law and procedure and what will happen to the appellant on returning to Cameroon. We are of the opinion that the witness evidence is vital and support the appellant's claim entirely.

We also intend to call a Human Rights Activist in Cameroon.

We confirm that we will provide the Home Office the details of our witnesses and we would invite the Home Office to allow the witnesses to attend the Commissioner's office where identity of the witnesses and their qualification can be checked by the Commissioner's legal team and where they can give their evidence by telephone.

According to BT (BT legal line) the installation of the device and connection of the facility can be completed within 30 minutes. A device is plugged into an ordinary telephone socket. There should not be any grave concern of disruption to the court during installation, if any, it would be very small. The installation of the connection can be done on very short notice.

We respectfully ask for our request to be considered as a preliminary issue at the start of the hearing oh the 11^th August. We are guided by the court.

If the court is minded to hear evidence via telephone conference we would be grateful if the court would adjourn the matter to accommodate the installation of the device and connection and at a time and date when suitable to all.

Please do not hesitate to contact this office if we can be of further assistance."

"I first became aware of the case on 10 August 2005, when a letter was received from Browell Smith & Co asking that telephone conference- facilities be made available for the substantive hearing on 11^th August 2005 to enable a witness from Cameroon to give evidence. The request was referred to me and, since it was a matter of court procedure, I referred it to the Resident Senior Immigration Judge, Mr Conway. I understand that the letter was taken to Mr Conway by Patsy Porter, a Court Clerk at the centre, and that he rejected the request. I understand that Mrs Porter telephoned Mr Bell and informed him of the decision of Mr Conway, that he was transferred to Mrs Judith Davies, the Court Clerk Manager and that because of the manner in which he was speaking to her, Mrs Davis requested that I speak to Mr Bell.

Mr Bell was transferred through to me and he explained that he wanted telephone conferencing equipment available at the hearing and that he did not understand why Mrs Porter had spoken to Mr Conway about this as it did not involve him. I explained that Mr Conway is our Resident Senior Immigration Judge and a request like this would have to be looked at by a member of the Judiciary not the administrative staff. I explained to Mr Bell that I would look at the file and would call him back, although I did explain that we did not have such facilities available at the AIT. I spoke to both Mrs Davis and Mrs Porter to ascertain what they had both said to Mr Bell and what exactly Mr Conway had said. On looking through the file I noticed that at the Case Management Review (CMR) hearing which was held on 28^th July 2005 this had been requested by the representatives and had been refused by Mr Sacks. I then went to see Mr Conway myself and he showed me the memorandum that was sent by Mr Justice Hodge. I then telephoned Mr Bell to inform him that I had spoken to Mr Conway again and that the information he had been given by Mrs Porter was indeed correct. I also explained that as he had already requested this at CMR and it had been refused by the Immigration Judge, we could do no more. Mr Bell became very irate again and insisted that this be looked at again. I was keen to do everything possible to assist and I informed Mr Bell that Mr Sacks was in the centre tomorrow so I would ask him to look at it and inform Mr Bell of his comments.

The next day I took the file to Mr Sacks and asked him to look at it. Mr Sacks informed me that his decision remained the same and that was to refuse the application, and that if Mr Bell was not happy with this decision he would have to appeal it. I telephoned Mr Bell again and informed him of this decision. He again became very irate with me and we had a very long conversation . which did not progress matters. I informed Mr Bell that I could not help him any further and that I would have to terminate the conversation because of his manner and lack of progress.

Mr Bell then wrote to the County Court office and asked if he would be able to use their equipment. This request was shown to me by a member of County Court staff who was unsure what to do with it as County Court staff have no jurisdiction within AIT. I again telephoned Mr Bell and informed him of the procedures to follow if he was not happy with the Judge's decision at the CMR and that the County Court could not overrule an Immigration Judge's decision.

Over the next few weeks phone calls came almost daily, with Mr Bell requesting that telephone conferencing facilities be available and with me informing Mr Bell of the previous conversations and the action he would need to take. I had put this in writing to Mr Bell to clarify the situation but the telephone calls still persisted. I found Mr Bell's behaviour and tone completely unacceptable and, due to the length of time that he persisted with telephone calls and letters, it became intolerable. The telephone calls ceased at the time of the first substantive hearing which was held on. 11 August 2005."

"Mr Sacks informed me that his decision remained the same and that was to refuse the application, and that if Mr Bell was not happy with this decision he would Have to appeal it."

"The request was made because I believed that evidence by telephone link from a barrister in Cameroon could corroborate our client's claim which had been rejected by the Home Office as untrue some three and a half years after it was made. I am aware that such delay can hamper a witness's recollection and given that a doctor had reported that our client has brain lesions which may impair her memory I was anxious to provide the best evidence available. A draft affidavit, a fax copy affidavit or a scan copy affidavit by e mail would only carry very limited weight, if any as evidence, especially when it could be subject to change and correction, given the susceptibility to such evidence to accusations from the Home Office of being 'self-serving' and the problems of obtaining a finding from the court that such evidence is 'reliable'. It would be wrong and irresponsible to submit evidence of which is not certain of its content. Also, the postal service from Cameroon is not reliable. The sense of urgency in Cameroon is not similar to our sense of urgency in the United Kingdom and despite diligence from my end documents sometimes do not arrive in time for the hearing (as in this case). To hear live evidence would have been more beneficial and efficient and would have given the Home Office an opportunity to put to the Cameroonian barrister and human rights activist any matters which caused concern."

I was instructed to represent the Appellant (AM) in a hearing today at North Shields and to apply for an adjournment on the basis that a telephone link was required to be put in place for the final hearing in order for evidence to be adduced by telephone conference from two witnesses in Cameroon. The witnesses (a Cameroonian lawyer and an officer of recognized human rights NGO) were able to give evidence corroborative of AM's evidence that she had been unlawfully detained in Cameroon.

I had received and considered recent medical evidence dated 9^th August 2005 regarding the Appellant's life-threatening condition and I was accordingly concerned that the Appellant should not be put at risk at the hearing.

The Immigration judge, Mr. Sacks, opened proceedings by stating that he did not wish to hear any submissions from me with regard to any adjournment application in order to enable telephone evidence to be adduced as he had seen the letter dated the 9^th August 2005 from my I. S. He said that the reason for refusal was clear. The IJ asked if the HOPO, Brian Craven, wished to say anything and he did not, save to say that an application had already been made in this matter and was refused.

The Immigration Judge made it clear that the decision . that he had made at the case management review hearing (CMRH) was based not only on the economics and practicality of the situation but also "on the case as a whole". He said that the Procedure Rules guided him and in the circumstances of this case he did not consider it appropriate to adjourn. He said that it was his judicial decision.

I submitted that all the factors in the case should be considered and that the recently filed medical evidence setting out the real risk of death if her blood pressure was to rise sharply was a significant factor in considering the way in which the Appellant's case should be approached. In the event that it may not be possible to call the Appellant herself to give evidence any other evidence that can be adduced should be adduced in the interests of justice and fairness. I explained that the evidence from the lawyers in Cameroon was crucial as it was central to the issues to be decided that the appellant establishes whether she was detained in prison in Cameroon. This fact has been challenged by the Secretary of State. Solicitors acting for A have arranged and secured funding for the evidence of a lawyer in Cameroon concerned with A's detention to be given by telephone, enabling the Home Office Presenting Officer (HOPO) to test such evidence by way of cross-examination. Efforts are being made for a witness statement to be taken and checked in such a way that it will be acceptable to the court.

I was surprised by the Court's unwillingness to hear any submissions from me as it seemed that the reasons for refusing the request for facilities to be made available for the telephone link were purely practical. The practical difficulties were seemingly overcome by the purchase by my Instructing Solicitors of the telephone and the confirmation from BT that it would only take about 30 minutes to set up the connection. Moreover, the Legal Services Commission had agreed to fund it. Katy (a clerk) from my Instructing Solicitors did write an attendance note which suggests that her understanding of the reasons for the refusal were essentially practical.

The HOPO took the view that the written evidence could be obtained from the barrister in Cameroon and he said that enquiries had been made with the High Commission and that their view had been sought.

The Immigration Judge said that if my Instructing Solicitors were unhappy with the earlier decision to refuse an adjournment in order that the telephone link evidence could be adduced, that decision made at the case management review hearing (CMRH) should have been judicially reviewed. He said that in the absence of such a challenge the decision must stand, it was a "judicial decision".

I explained that there had been further developments since that application as at that point the facilities could only theoretically be provided whereas now there were concrete arrangements in place and the Legal Services Commission had agreed to fund the arrangements. I explained that it was imperative that the evidence from the lawyers should be adduced - be it in the form of statements or telephone link. But by this stage it was apparent that the IJ wanted to hear the case immediately and would not allow any more time for anything.

The Immigration Judge showed his anger that I kept trying to put forward my client's case in the absence of any reason for his objection to my application to adjourn in the circumstances of this particular case. It seemed that his mind had been clearly made up before he came into court. He kept repeating that it was a judicial decision and could only be challenged by judicial review.

I explained that it seemed appropriate to renew my application to adjourn today before proceeding to hear the case as full funding from the Legal Services Commission had only just been obtained, the appellant was seriously ill and statements had not been received by the lawyers in Cameroon despite having been requested by my Instructing Solicitor. As soon as my Instructing Solicitor became aware of the relevance of their evidence he had asked for their assistance in both statement and telephone evidence form. It was in the interests of justice that such evidence be adduced as we were aware of its availability and the fact that it would be forthcoming within a few days.

The Immigration Judge kept repeating that his had been a judicial decision and that he was entitled to exercise his discretion as he saw fit. Again he showed his irritation and at one point banged his fist on the table.

I asked the Immigration Judge if I could have a few minutes to speak to the Appellant before calling evidence as I needed to be sure that she would be well enough to give evidence, that she wanted to do so and that her blood pressure was stable. As I took her out of the court room I could hear that she was breathing irregularly, and when we got to a seat she began to slump and could not sit up straight. She complained of a pain in the back of her head which she had had at the beginning but was getting worse.

I returned to the court room to say that the Appellant was in a very distressed state and that I was concerned that it had all been too much for her. I was concerned for her wellbeing in view of the Doctor's report about rising blood pressure caused by stress. The Immigration Judge said that all Appellants get stressed and that there should be no reason why she should not be able to give evidence shortly. I said that I felt that the proceedings had been unduly stressful for her and reminded him of the fact that he had commented on the medical report by saying .that it was "mere supposition" and he had also banged his fist on the table saying that he would hear this case today whatever I tried to say to convince him otherwise.

The Immigration Judge asked her to come back into court so that he could assess the situation himself. It was clear that he was sceptical about the Appellant's condition and so I went out to see if she could come back into Court. When I went out again she was lying on the floor with a first-aid officer and a doctor who happened to be in the building, and they were waiting for an ambulance to arrive. She had started to lose consciousness on the floor. Her eyes were shutting and the whites of her eyes looked red. I was profoundly concerned.

When I returned to the court room the Immigration Judge clarified what he had meant when he referred to the medical report as 'pure supposition'. He said that what he had meant was that to say that whether the Appellant might only live for two days after deportation was pure supposition. He said that when he came to hear the case he would consider the evidence in the light of the guidance given by the case of "M" and would proceed by taking the evidence slowly.

As it became clear that the Appellant was in a very serious medical condition the Immigration Judge said that he would adjourn the case to 18^th August 2005, "only because of her medical condition as manifested today". This was not a date upon which I was available to appear. After some persuasion on my part he agreed to try to adjourn it to Tuesday 23^rd August 2005 but when the Court said that that date was not available he reverted to the 18^th August notwithstanding the lack of availability of myself or any Counsel at such short notice. He stated that the case would be first on the list and if the Affidavit evidence (from Cameroon) could be available for that day it could be admitted (and short service accepted.) He stated that if the Appellant's condition is such that she cannot attend then a request for a further adjournment confirming her medical condition and unfitness to attend should be provided. The Immigration Judge reserved the case to himself."

I was present in court on the 11^th August 2005 with the appellant and counsel, Ms. McVay.

I have had the opportunity of perusing Ms. McVay's attendance note and the appellant's statement regarding Mr. Sacks conduct on the 11* August 2005. I wish to echo what has been said by Ms. McVay and by the appellant as I witnessed the same incident.

I cannot explain why Mr. Sacks acted irrationally in the way that he did.

When I saw AM at the Accident & Emergency department she informed me that she was afraid of Mr. Sacks. AM said that she would be afraid of returning to court to face Mr. Sacks. She did not believe that she would get a fair hearing from Mr. Sacks.

When Ms. McVay made the adjournment application Mr. Sacks reacted very angrily and refused to entertain the idea of a renewed application and said that he had made his decision and that it was final. He said that he had received my letter and noted the content and he was not prepared to change his mind. In court he said that we should Judicially Review his decision, When counsel tried to explain why we were making the application Mr. Sacks appears to be behaving even more irrationally.

I saw Mr. Sacks pound his desk with his fist. He was not willing to listen to counsel.

When counsel realised that Mr. Sacks would not listen to further representations, in light of Dr. Wohlrab's letter counsel requested a short break to check with client regarding her fitness to give evidence. Initially Mr. Sacks was reluctant to agree to this. Mr. Sacks said that the medical report was mere supposition.

We were eventually given a short break but Mr. Sacks said that he will remain in court and that we should return in five minutes.

I noticed that AM did not appear to look well as she could not stand without being assisted. I held her arm and walked with her to the waiting area. I took her to the toilet. She later returned to the waiting area. She sat down but could not sit herself up straight. She was slanting to one side. AM complained that she was not well.

Counsel and I returned to the court to inform Mr. Sacks of AM's condition. Mr. Sacks did not accept our account and asked that AM to appear before him. He went on to say "I would have all day to wait, she will recover."

Counsel and I went out to see AM. We. found her collapsed on the floor. She was attended by I believe a doctor who happened to be in court and by the court first aider. I gave the first aider Dr. Wohlrab's letter and after reading the content of the letter she immediately called the ambulance.

As we waited for the paramedics and ambulance to arrive I called Dr. Wohlrab and informed him of the situation.

Counsel and I returned to court to see Mr. Sacks. At this stage, Mr. Sacks had been informed by the court staff of AM's condition and he adjourned the matter to the 18 August 2005 reserving the matter for himself. Ms. McVay informed Mr. Sacks that she was not available on that day and asked if it could be listed on a later date. The 23 August was suggested but the court administrative said that it was not possible. Mr. Sacks said that he was not available for two weeks in September and therefore the matter will be back before him on the 18 August 2005. Mr. Sacks were well aware that Ms. McVay will not be available on that day.

Immediately after the adjournment counsel and I went to the hospital to visit AM. She was awake and alert. She was distressed and tearful. AM said that she was frightened of the judge and she does not think that she will receive a fair hearing if the matter was to be heard before Mr. Sacks."

On the 11 August 2005, as we had funding from the LSC I instructed Bridget McVay to renew our application for telephone link evidence with the benefit of the further information now available. IJ Sacks refused to listen to her further representations and was somewhat intemperate in his response. At paragraph 5 of IJ Sacks' statement he said he saw no reason to alter this decision despite the fact that we had funding and equipment. No explanation was given for his refusal either in the statement or in court. He appeared to view our wish to put the additional matters before him as an attack on his authority. Unfortunately his attitude and manner was witnessed by the appellant and had a severe effect on her. She was escorted from the room and was obviously very unwell and beginning to lose consciousness.

During a short adjournment the appellant became really ill and she collapsed in the Tribunal building and was taken to Accident and Emergency by ambulance. The Immigration Judge was aware that the Appellant had a rare and serious blood pressure problem that could rise to a dangerous level cause by stress. Medical evidence had been produced to show this to which he acted dismissively and described it as 'supposition'. Despite the attempts by Counsel to explain her nonavailability and the practical problems involved in relisting the matter for only seven days' time, the Immigration Judge refused to adjourn for any longer and reserved the matter to himself. On return to the office (having first visited the Appellant at A&E) I resolved to do the best I could to evidence the case and obtain medical evidence as to whether the Appellant was sufficiently well to give evidence."

On 11^th August 2005 I went to North Shields Asylum Immigration Tribunal for the hearing of my case. I suffer from acute hypertension and my doctor, Dr Wohlrab, prepared a report for the court setting out his concerns that the stress of the proceedings might raise my blood pressure to dangerous levels. The first time I heard about the report was when I got to court as it had only just been received by my solicitors.

My barrister asked me how I felt and I told her that I had a pain in the back of my head. I said that it was because I was in court and that the Doctor had recently increased the medication to try to deal with my high blood pressure. I confirmed that I was still alright but that I would tell her if it got worse.

I went into court and as soon as my lawyer tried to speak the judge said that he did not want to hear from her as he already had a letter and kept repeating the fact that he had made a judicial decision. My barrister kept trying to argue my case but he would not listen and seemed to get angry. He said nothing can change him from the decision he has made.

He pounded the table and said that he would hear this case and would not allow the adjournment because it was his judicial decision. He did not give reasons for rejecting what my barrister said. I became at this stage very afraid of the judge. I was frightened that I was not given a fair hearing. I felt my body suddenly became weak and heavy. I was getting dizzy and my vision was blurry. I was becoming confused.

I was shocked when the judge referred to my Doctor's report as "pure supposition" as my Doctor knows about my health problems. I do not understand how the judge can say such a thing. When. I heard this I started to get chest pain. I felt that my heart was beating very fast. At this stage I became paralyzed, unable to speak. I was sjtting on the appellant chair a desk length away from the representative desk. I was unable to inform my lawyers that I was not feeling well. Everyone in court was listening and looking at the judge.

The judge made me very uncomfortable when he pounded the table and said negative things about my case. It was the judge who made me feel even more stressed than I was already just by being in court that day to have my case heard. I was frightened of the judge. When my barrister asked for time to check how I was feeling, I told her that my head ached and I could not tell her more. I wanted to get out of the court. My solicitor had to help me walked back to the waiting area as I could not stand up straight. It was my head and my chest that really hurt. I now know that my blood pressure had shot up to dangerous levels because of the stress and as a result I had to be taken to A and E in an ambulance. Apparently I had collapsed in the waiting area. I cannot remember what happened. I remembered waking up in the hospital.

I am being referred to Professor Wilkinson at the Renal Department Sunderland Royal Hospital and I hope that he will help to find the right medication so that my blood pressure will be back to normal levels again so that I don't collapse again under stress.

I do not feel that the judge took my medical condition seriously at the hearing as he did nothing to reassure me that my case was being considered fairly. I hope to be able to give evidence in my case if the professor can find the right mix of drugs "that will work for me. I would like to be given the opportunity of trying to get my blood pressure problems sorted out. I know that at the moment it would not be safe for me to try to go back to court.

I do not think that I will get a fair hearing if the case is heard by Mr. Sacks. I am afraid of him. I would ask the Court to remove him from hearing my case. I did not think that judges would pound the table as he did and just keep refusing everything for no reason. He certainly did not help my situation.

The application was renewed at the hearing of 11^th August 2005. I had already, for the reasons that I had given to .the Appellant's representatives on 28* July 2005, made a decision on this particular point and saw no reasons to alter this decision. The Appellant's solicitors, at the hearing of 11^th August then sought to have the matter adjourned so the affidavits could be lodged from Ambo Daniel Amombi, who was the witness they wished to call, he being a Barrister at Law. I considered that they had had more than sufficient time to lodge affidavits and refused an adjournment request on this particular point.

Attendance Notes of Bridget McVav, Barrister

10. I confirm that I have read Ms McVay's attendance note. At the case management hearing I did hear from Ms McVay on her application to have evidence adduced via a telephone link. I am aware that there had been a previous application made in this matter which had already been refused. After hearing Ms McVay's arguments I saw no reason to alter the decision, and again, refused this application. I was aware that I had a discretion as to whether such evidence should be introduced, and consider that I properly exercised my discretion in this matter by refusing to have evidence adduced via a telephone link.

11. Ms McVay was reluctant to accept my decision in this matter, and despite my decision on the question of a telephone link, kept trying to re-open her arguments. I maintained my position. I do not accept that I showed anger towards Ms McVay. I would have been firm in my approach to her, bearing in mind her persistence and reluctance to accept the judicial decision that I had made.

As to the suggestion that on 11^th August I refused to hear a repeat submission by Ms McVay to adjourn to enable telephone evidence to be adduced, Ms McVay's attendance note clearly indicates she was heard on the matter. I maintained my decision to refuse the adjournment, and it was her continued challenge to the decision that I sought to bring to a conclusion and proceed with the hearing.

I do not accept Ms McVay's suggestion that I showed anger. If I banged my first on the table, which I do not recall, it would have been merely to emphasise the point and was not a display of anger, as suggested.

Witness Statement of Alexanda Chapman Bell

I have considered Mr Bell's statement and do not accept his contention that I acted in anything other than a professional and judicial way in dealing with this appeal. I am aware that Mr Bell had been in contact with the Court Manager and court staff on a number of occasions prior to the hearing of this matter, and that his attitude towards the court staff had caused some concern. I do not accept that I acted irrationally in any way. I do not accept what he says in paragraph 11 of this statement, namely, that I "reacted very angrily" when Ms McVay made an adjournment application.

As previously stated, neither Ms McVay or Mr Bell would accept any of the judicial decisions that I made, and were constantly trying to re-open applications and challenge what I considered to be final judicial decisions. I do not accept, as Mr Bell states at paragraph 12, that I "pounded [the] desk with [my] fist", I was always willing to listen to Counsel, but as previously stated, felt that I had to take control of the proceedings and refused to entertain repeat applications and repeat arguments over judicial decisions that had already been made. Having made what I considered to be the right and proper judicial decision, I wished to proceed to deal with the issues before me, and had to adopt a firm approach to both the Appellant's Counsel and her solicitor to achieve this end.

I take issue with the picture Mr Bell seeks to paint as to my conduct at all the hearings. At all times I allowed the Appellant's representatives to present their arguments. They, however, refused to accept my decisions and sought to challenge my decision by continued aggressive arguments both in court and to staff in the centre. This was not acceptable, as I pointed out to them. I take issue with the suggestion I displayed anger and acted irrationally, I acted in what I considered to be in a polite, firm judicial manner, and it was indeed those that represented the Appellant who, by their unprofessional attitude and approach to this case, created the situation they now seek to complain of.

Statement of Appellant

I have read the statement of the Appellant and note what she says. I do not accept what the Appellant has said about my refusal to listen to arguments that were put forward. I have already dealt with the allegation that I pounded the table. I repeat that it was the Appellant's representatives that I considered to have acted unreasonably and unprofessionally in their approach to this matter in that whatever decision I made in court, which was not to their liking, they chose to challenge immediately and attempted to re-open and reargue "at the time. I was not prepared, having made the decision, to hear further arguments, and any firmness that I showed was to enable me to process this appeal. and hear it to a conclusion.

At no point did the Appellant give any indication that she was fearful of me, or was fearful that she would not get a fair hearing. There was no indication at the hearing on 11^th August 2005 that the Appellant felt unwell, and she walked into the court and walked out of the court without any difficulty. When I granted the five minute adjournment, after refusing to adjourn the matter in full, I thought that this was merely so that the Appellant's representatives could take further instructions from her, and at no time was there any indication to me that she was feeling ill and likely to collapse. So far as the Appellant's condition is concerned, I did not immediately adjourn the case generally on 11^th August, considering that I should allow time for the Appellant's condition to resolve and then to assess for myself whether I considered that she was fit and able to proceed. It was only when I learned that she had been taken to hospital that I considered it appropriate to adjourn the case generally on 11 August 2005."

At the hearing on 11^th August Mr Craven represented the Respondent. He was not prepared to consent to an adjournment request. Ms McVay, on behalf of the Appellant, relied upon the reasons set out in her letter of 9^th August 2005. The application was considered afresh by me and refused. The Appellant then lodged a second application to adjourn, namely, for time to lodge affidavits by the witness in Cameroon who they intended to call to give evidence by the telephone link. I considered that the Appellant had had more than adequate time to lodge such affidavits, and again, refused an adjourn for this purpose. The witness that they intended to call was a lawyer, and would have been well versed in preparing affidavits which could have been prepared by him and sent by fax. At this point the Appellant's solicitors sought a ten minute adjournment to allow them to take instructions from their client with regard to a medical report that had been received and was dated 9^th August 2005, the report being from Dr C Wohlrab. Before the court could reconvene, I was advised that the Appellant felt unwell, her condition deteriorated to the extent that an ambulance was called to the centre, and the Appellant was taken to hospital for a check up. I considered at this point that having regard to the Appellant's sudden onset of illness, I had no alternative but to adjourn, and for this reason only, adjourned the hearing until 18* August 2005."

During preliminary proceedings at the 11 August 2005 hearing the Appellant's Counsel made repeated adjournment requests in an aggressive manner to IJ Sacks, on the basis that she understood there now was funding available for such a video-link. IJ Sacks did reconsider this request in light of the additional evidence that was presented at the time of the hearing and again refused the application.

IJ Sacks clearly pointed out several times that no judicial challenge had been made by the Appellants' representatives to the decision made at the CMR stage to refuse permission for live evidence to be given. IJ Sacks said that any challenge to his application would have to be by way of judicial review. IJ Sacks said that challenging this decision via administrative staff at the court and the Home Office was not acceptable.

During the proceedings, IJ Sacks was accommodating to counsel's repeated aggressive requests for an adjournment on the same grounds. Counsel seemed determined to avoid the appeal being heard, and was unwilling to accept IJ Sacks' decision. At one point IJ Sacks did strike the table. I should emphasise however, that this was not done in anger but was more an act of frustration. IJ Sacks again outlined to the representative his reasons for the adjournment not to be granted.

Counsel for the Appellant explained that the Appellant's representatives had not had sufficient time to acquire affidavit evidence from the Mr Amombi, who was based in Cameroon.

Counsel for the Appellant also raised the issue of the Appellant's medical condition. The medical report indicated that survival rate, if medication for hypertension was withheld, would be between 3 days and 6 months. Counsel again aggressively requested an adjournment based upon the conclusions contained in the GP's medical report. IJ Sacks was of the view that some of the contents of this report was supposition and referred to the case of N (Kenya) (2004) UKIAT 00053, which he regarded as relevant to the medical issues pertaining to the Appellant's case.

IJ Sacks indicated that the Appellant had had sufficient time to fully prepare her case prior to 11 August 2005 hearing and refused the application for an adjournment.

Counsel for the Appellant indicated during these proceedings that no skeleton argument was available, due to confirmation of funding only being made on the 9 August 2005.

Counsel then requested a short ten-minute adjournment to enable her to consult with the Appellant as to her medical condition and the contents of the GP report which had been served at the hearing on 11 August 2005. IJ Sacks granted this adjournment request.

During the short adjournment the Appellant became unwell in the reception area of the hearing centre. The Appellant collapsed and was attended to by Court staff with medical training. Subsequently, an ambulance was called to the hearing centre and took the Appellant from the hearing centre to hospital.

In light of the circumstances, the Appellant was unable to give evidence at her appeal hearing. IJ Sacks subsequently adjourned the hearing until 18 August 2005. The adjournment would enable the representatives to acquire the affidavit evidence from the Mr Amombi in Cameroon. It would also enable further medical evidence to be obtained regarding the Appellant's present medical condition. IJ Sacks specified that any further adjournment request received before 18 August 2005 must be accompanied by a medical report. Hearing proceedings were then terminated.

"Thank you very much for keeping me updated about AM.

I was sorry to hear she collapsed in court. As you know she was taken to North Tyneside General Hospital. A& E of North Tyneside General Hospital faxed me a report of 10 pages (not including the cover page).

On arrival at A&E her blood pressure was 199/134.

As you know from my previous report, such a high blood pressure is dangerous. It can cause headaches, heart attacks and strokes.

In the A&E notes it read 'hypertension induced headache secondary to the stress of the day's events'. It also read: 'severe headache triggered by hypertension caused by stress of court admission'.

Without further medication (further to her regular medication), apart from analgesia, the blood pressure settled gradually in A&E to a normal reading of 126/84.

Since this event AM has chest' pain, it is worse in exertion. The pain is perceived behind the sternum, right inside the chest. This definitely sounds cardiac.

Because of her insufficient blood pressure control I am sending her to Professor Wilkinson of the Renal Department Sunderland Royal Hospital for further advice before her planned appointment with him in September. This is only done because her blood pressure proves so difficult to control. Usually blood pressure is handled within primary care (i.e. by the GP).

AM is physically unfit to attend any further court hearings for now. I am afraid for her health and life. She had this collapse in court once. We do not want this to be repeated with a possibly fatal outcome next time. I did experience a man in a stressful discussion collapse and after a few days in intensive care he died."

"Late yesterday we received a letter from Dr Wohlrab regarding AM's health following her collapse in court on Thursday 11 August 2005.

The court is aware from earlier medical reports regarding AM's serious hypertension problem.

We respectfully ask for an adjournment of this case on the 18 August 2005 for a short period to enable AM to be seen by Professor Wilkinson with a view to control her blood pressure which is dangerously high at the present time. We have today by fax requested Professor Wilkinson to see AM at his earliest convenience and stressed that it would have to be soon.

Dr Wohlrab stated that AM is physically unfit to attend any further court hearings for now. AM would like to give evidence in her case and she would like to be given the opportunity to attend court to prove her case.

As it is possible to control AM's medical condition it is not unreasonable therefore to ask for her case to be adjourned to a later time in September with a view to reviewing her situation again. We shall keep the court informed of AM's appointment with Professor Wilkinson.

Please do not hesitate to contact this office if we can be of further assistance."

"The application by the Appellant for the adjournment of the hearing of this appeal from 18 August 2005 is refused for the following reason(s):

On the 17 August 2005 I wrote to Home Office Presenting Unit advising them on our progress in obtaining the signed affidavit from Cameroon (Ex 14).

I was concerned that the matter had remained before IJ Sacks on the 18 August 2005 after the earlier incident when the Appellant had collapsed in the Tribunal building. I thought he would have removed himself from the proceedings as he had expressed his doubts over the seriousness of her medical condition prior to the Appellant's illness becoming apparent when she was taken to Accident and Emergency. Please note Brian Craven's statement at paragraph 8, referring to the medical report "IJ Sacks was of the view that some of the contents of this report were supposition..." As a practitioner I felt it was inappropriate for the IJ to retain the .case when he had expressed doubts about the evidence and provoked such a reaction in the Appellant."

"We have taken witness statements from Mr Amombi and Mr Churchill but it is still in the draft form. We have sent the document back for each witness to read and check for mistakes. As soon as the statements are signed we will forward copies to you and the to the court.

We can however, inform you that both of the witnesses will confirm that they are aware of AM's imprisonment and that Mr Amombi was instructed to obtain bail."

I attended AM's hearing on 18 August 2005 as Counsel who originally had conduct of the case, nor any alternative Counsel was available at such short notice. My colleague Alex Chapman Bell a caseworker at this firm who has full conduct and knowledge of this case was unable to represent the Claimant in court due to the fact that he is yet to be accredited.

I have had no involvement or preparation in this case. I had acquired only limited knowledge of this case and was briefed only in respect of the adjournment request.

In light of the refusal to Adjourn by the Immigration Judge I did not feel that it was in the interest of justice or fair disposal of the case that this matter proceed without the Appellant's oral evidence."

I have had the opportunity to read the statements made by Immigration Judge Lawrence David Sacks, Brian Craven, Loma Bavage, Kelly Swan and Patsy Porter.

I would like to point out that I have very limited knowledge of this case, Alex Bell has had full conduct of this case until proceedings commenced in the Higher Courts. We are an extremely busy department and are responsible for our own individual large caseload. Alex Bell requested at very short notice that I represent the Appellant on the 18^th of August 2006 to request adjournment as he was not accredited to do so himself and Counsel Bridget McVay with previous conduct of the case was not available at such short notice. I understand that he was only informed that his written application for an adjournment had been refused late on the afternoon of 17 August. I was due to attend court on 18 August on a CMRH hearing for one of my own cases. Alex Bell attended with me on the day and had indicated to me that he felt that in view of the Appellant's temporary incapacity, that an adjournment should be granted. He provided me with a letter from the appellant's doctor indicating that further specialist treatment was to be arranged.

My request for an adjournment was refused for the reasons stated by Mr Sacks in his statement and that the case was to proceed to a full hearing. Mr Sacks said that if I disagreed with his decision then I should judicially review the issue. Thereafter I asked for an adjournment to lodge my Judicial Review and he refused. At this point I stated that I refused to participate in the hearing as it was not in the interest of Justice and fair disposal of the case that the matter proceeded in the Appellants' absence. I was also profoundly concerned that I knew so little about the case that it would simply be against my rules of professional conduct to hold myself out as being competent to conduct the appeal. Asylum appeals raise matters of the utmost importance and demand careful and thorough preparation. This was a very difficult decision for me to take but in good conscience I simply did not feel that it was appropriate for me to step in and try and improvise. Mr Sacks then asked whether I was withdrawing the appeal at which point I said no but reiterated my very difficult position. I disagree with the last sentence in paragraph 17 of Mr Sack's statement. I sought permission to leave the Court to deal with my other CMRH hearing but this was refused by Mr Sacks despite the fact that Alex Bell would remain to take notes. Please refer to Ms Bavage's hand written notes of the proceedings on the day.

At the end of the hearing following Ms Bavage's closing submissions, Mr Sacks again gave me the opportunity to make submissions on behalf of the Appellant to which I again re-iterated my position and added that the Appellant as a result of her absence has not been given the opportunity to address the credibility issues raised by the Home Office in their submissions. I have to admit to being somewhat flabbergasted by the approach taken by the judge in the face of what I had felt were carefully explained and conscientious reasons for being unable to conduct the appeal. I cannot understand how the learned Immigration Judge felt it was just or desirable for someone who was attending on an emergency basis to deal with an adjournment application only and who therefore had little knowledge of the case, to make submissions on it. I confirm that I have at all times acted mindful of my professional obligations to the court and the firm's client."

In relation to the hearing on the 18 August 2005, my colleague Rehana Haque, an accredited immigration solicitor (who was attending another matter), was instructed to attend the Tribunal to make a further application for an adjournment because the Appellant could not attend because of ill health. I had faxed a letter to the Tribunal on the 17 August 2005 (Ex 5). My request was refused (Ex 11).

Rehana Haque had no knowledge of the matter in detail and she would not have been able to represent the Appellant adequately, especially when the Appellant was not there. I was not in a position to represent the Appellant because I was not accredited at that time. I had just returned to work after a very serious illness. I was exempted from the accreditation examination briefly with the permission of the L.S.C. However, I was able to gain my accreditation from the 13 October 2005(Exs9&10).

On the 18 August IJ Sacks said that if we disagreed with him we should Judicially Review his decision. After making this comment Rehana Haque made a request for an adjournment to lodge a Judicial Review application but again this was refused. Rehana Haque submitted that this was not a fair hearing.

I believe our client should have been allowed to give evidence at her appeal hearing. Our client expressed to us her very strong wish to give evidence as soon as she was fit to do so. In view of what has happened at the tribunal previously I had hoped and believed that the Immigration Judge would be allowing a reasonable period of adjournment to enable the Appellant to recover from her illness and for her medication to take effect and control her blood pressure. Rehana Haque and I were very surprised when our application was refused."

I was the Presenting Officer at the appeal hearing of AM, the Appellant, on the 18 August 2005 before Immigration Judge Sacks. At this hearing, the Appellant's representative, Ms Haque of Counsel, sought an adjournment on the ground of the Appellant's ill health. I opposed this adjournment on the basis that the evidence provided by her GP provided no indication as to when the Appellant would be fit to give evidence and it was therefore unclear what purpose an adjournment would serve.

The Immigration Judge refused the application for an adjournment. At that point, Counsel indicated to the court that she would no longer participate in the proceedings. When asked by the Judge whether this meant that the Appellant was withdrawing her appeal, Counsel answered in the negative but reconfirmed that she would not be participating further. The Judge asked that their position be reconsidered but Counsel for the Appellant remained adamant and declined to participate any further.

The hearing therefore proceeded on the papers and, as Presenting Officer, I made oral submissions. The Judge then gave the Appellant's representative a further opportunity to make oral representations. She again declined to do so, citing the reasons for her refusal, namely that to proceed without the Appellant giving oral evidence was not in the interest of justice. The Judge gave the Appellant one final opportunity to respond before reserving his decision.

On 18 August 2005 I was the designated court clerk for Immigration Judge Sacks who was presiding over the Appeal. I was informed by Miss Haque, counsel for the appellant, that the Appellant would not be attending court on that day due to her illness and that they would be submitting an application for the adjournment at the hearing due to this. I informed Judge Sacks of the situation and then gathered counsel for the Appellant, Mr Bell (the Appellant's solicitor) and Ms Bavage (Home Office Presenting Officer) into court.

The hearing commenced and the representatives submitted an application to adjourn the hearing due to their client not being present. Judge Sacks dismissed this application and informed all parties that the hearing was to proceed. The representatives at this point informed the Judge that they would take no part if the proceedings were to continue. The Judge then asked the representatives if they were withdrawing the appeal and they stated that they were not. Judge Sacks then invited the Home Office Presenting Officer to give her submissions. During this time Miss Haque stood up and informed Judge Sacks that she was going to deal with a CMR in another court. Judge Sacks informed Miss Haque that she was instructed to deal with this case and that she would remain in this court until the case had concluded. During the hearing neither Miss Haque nor Mr Bell made any submissions on behalf of the Appellant. The hearing concluded after the Home Office submissions.

The proceedings were unusual and I remember them because it is the first and indeed only time I have seen the representatives turn up then refuse to take part, although I have seen occasions when a representative has withdrawn. There was nothing overbearing or ill tempered in Mr Sacks' manner when he dealt with the case."

There was an application on 17 August 2005 to adjourn. This was not dealt with by myself. I believe it was dealt with by the Designated Immigration Judge, Mr John Aitken, who refused the application by telephone. The application was renewed on 18^th August 2005 and again refused by me. Having considered all the medical evidence that was on the file and having decided that it was sufficient for me to be fully aware of the Appellant's medical condition, I considered that the evidence within the file, including all statements by the Appellant, all documentary evidence, all the objective evidence and all other relevant documents enabled me to deal with this appeal in the absence of the Appellant without, in my opinion, the Appellant being prejudiced.

In reaching this decision I had regard to the fact that the medical evidence indicated that no definite date could be given as to when, or if, the Appellant would be fit to attend court at any adjourned hearing. I considered that it was in the interests of none of the parties for this matter to remain outstanding indefinitely, and felt that in view of the fact that there was little likelihood of the Appellant being pronounced fit to attend the hearing in the imminent future, the only course open to me was to proceed to deal with the matter which I proceeded to do.

…..

With regard to the disposal of this matter on 18^th August 2005,1 must state that I was extremely surprised by the attitude taken by those representing the Appellant on that occasion, in that they chose to withdraw their representation of the Appellant on my advising them of my intention to proceed notwithstanding the non-attendance of the Appellant. Having withdrawn representation, they then remained in the court to make a note of what then transpired in the hearing of the case."

The appeal appeared before me again on 18¹ August 2005. A medical report from Dr Christian Wohlrab dated 16^fh August 2005 was produced. The matter had earlier appeared before Designated Immigrated Judge Aitken on 17 August 2005 when he refused an application to adjourn because such application did not comply with practice direction 9.1. The application to adjourn was repeated by the Appellant's solicitors based on the medical report from Dr Wohlrab of 16^th August 2005. I was advised that the Appellant was unwell, unable to attend court and wished to give evidence. I read carefully Dr Wohlrab's report. His conclusion was that the Appellant was physically unfit to attend any further court hearings for now. He did not give any indication when he considered that she may be fit to attend a future hearing, which presumably would only be when or if the Appellant's blood pressure became controlled.

I considered the Appellant's request to adjourn and rejected it. The Appellant had been suffering from her blood pressure problems for at least the last two years. There was no indication when or if she would be fit to attend a hearing. In view of the uncertainty, I decided that the case should proceed to be dealt with on the papers and submissions. I was satisfied that the papers contained sufficient evidence and arguments to allow me to decide the issues fairly and without prejudicing the Appellant in any way.

At this stage the Appellant's representative indicated that having regard to my refusal to adjourn, that whilst they were not withdrawing from the court, they did not intend to take any further part in these proceedings, and would not be making any submissions or presenting any arguments on the Appellant's behalf. The Appellant's representative did not consider that it was in the interests of justice or a fair disposal of the case that the hearing go ahead in the absence of the Appellant being given an opportunity to give evidence. At this point, I invited the Appellant's representative to reconsider the stand that they had taken which I did not consider was in the best interest of their client. The Appellant's representative 'maintained a position on behalf of the Appellant, and at that point I decided, having carefully read the file, that the evidence and issues were clearly identified and presented no problem in me hearing and fairly disposing of the matter at the hearing.

"50....

I am satisfied that the medical evidence that has been produced to me from Dr Wohlrab gives an accurate assessment of the Appellant's medical condition. I am further satisfied that the Appellant has been suffering her present problems for the last two years, and that there appears to be no resolution to the problems, and that the future prognosis is uncertain. The medical evidence confirms that until further examination of the client has taken place, and possible further treatment, it would be unwise for her to give evidence in any hearing. This of itself satisfies me that the decision to proceed in the absence of the Appellant was a right and proper decision to make, there being no realistic prospect of a future date being identified when the Appellant would be available to give evidence in this case. To adjourn a case indefinitely for this reason is highly unsatisfactory and is the basis of the reasoning behind my refusal to allow an indefinite adjournment for the purposes of the Appellant to give evidence.

This is an unusual case in that because of my refusal to grant the Appellant an adjournment on 18^th August 2005 to enable her to give evidence, the Appellant's representatives, whilst not withdrawing from representing the Appellant, declined to take any active part in the proceedings before me on 18^th August. They did not raise any challenges or make any submissions on their client's behalf. The issue that they take is that the Appellant has been denied the opportunity to give evidence. I am satisfied however, having considered in great detail the papers that were before me, that there was more than sufficient information contained within those papers to enable me to fairly and justly deal with the Appellant's evidence. The Appellant's representatives did not indicate to me what issues they . considered clarification was required on. I do not consider that I have in any way been prejudiced by the fact that I have not heard directly from the Appellant. There is more than adequate evidence contained within the file to, as I have previously stated, enable me to deal with this case equitably and justly. I do not consider that this Appellant has in any way been prejudiced. In any event, I could not have permitted a situation to exist whereby I would be granting an adjournment without being aware of when or if indeed this case could have hoped to have been heard. The Appellant has been suffering from her existing condition for the past two years without improvement, there is no suggestion of what treatment she is likely to receive, whether that treatment will be successful, and whether that treatment would have enabled her to be fit enough to give evidence. The risks of the Appellant giving evidence have been clearly identified in the medical report. It is having regard to these risks that I have come to the conclusion that the best way forward for this matter would be to deal with the appeal on the evidence that is contained in the file. It is unfortunate that the Appellant's solicitors did not agree with this course of action and assist me by presenting arguments on her behalf and making the appropriate submissions. This was their choice, however, with which I cannot argue."

I was concerned that the matter had remained before IJ Sacks on the 18 August 2005 after the earlier incident when the Appellant had collapsed in the Tribunal building. I thought he would have removed himself from the proceedings as he had expressed his doubts over the seriousness of her medical condition prior to the Appellant's illness becoming apparent when she was taken to Accident and Emergency. Please note Brian Craven's statement at paragraph 8, referring to the medical report "IJ Sacks was of the view that some of the contents of this report were supposition...' As a practitioner I felt it was inappropriate for the IJ to retain the case when he had expressed doubts about the evidence and provoked such a reaction in the Appellant."

The witnesses in Cameroon were asked to prepare their affidavits for the hearing on the 11 August 2005. I cannot be sure when the draft affidavits arrived by e-mail. However, I have a letter of which I wrote to Home Office Presenting Officer 17 August informing them of the contents of the affidavit. I believe the draft only came to this office on the 17 August 2005 for checking. On the 19 August 2005 I believe I received an e-mail with an attached scanned copy of the signed affidavits of which I immediately forwarded to the Tribunal for consideration (Ex 12)."

There was no application made at the hearing for me to receive late evidence. Despite this, a fax was received from Broweil Smith and Co on 22" August 2005 enclosing what they claimed to be affidavits from two people in Cameroon. In the covering fax they invited me to adjourn my consideration of the case, and once again they asked me to receive evidence by telephone link, an application for which had already been refused. A decision on these issues had been made by me following arguments from both sides at the hearing on 18^th August 2005. Accordingly, I do not consider it appropriate to take heed of these documents submitted without permission after the hearing.

….

50 d) There was no application made at the hearing for me to receive late evidence. Despite this, a fax was received from Browell Smith and Co on 22^nd August 2005 enclosing what they claimed to be affidavits from two people in Cameroon. In the covering fax they invited me to adjourn my consideration of the case, and once again they asked me to receive evidence by telephone link, and application for which had already been refused. A decision on these issues had been made by me following arguments from both sides at the hearing on 18 August 2005. Accordingly, I do not consider it appropriate to take heed of these documents submitted without permission after the hearing."

"I, Ambo Daniel Amombi, adult male Cameroonian Barrister, Solicitor and Notary Public of the Supreme Courts of Nigeria and Cameroon, and Partner in the Ngenko Law Firm with headquarters along the Commonwealth Avenue Kumba, PO Box 459 Kumba, do make oath and state as follows:

That I am holder of a Bachelor's Degree (LLB Hons) in Law from the University of Yaonde, Cameroon (1992) and also a Law graduate from the Nigerian Law School Aduja (BL Hons.), and was sworn into the Abuja Branch of the Nigerian Bar Association in September 1999.

That I was sworn into the Cameroon Bar Association on April 14, 2000, and hold membership No. 805 on the roll of Practicing Advocates in Cameroon for the 2004 Judicial year.

That I am also the Board Chairman of the Youths for Peace Initiative Cameroon, YPIC, (a national NGO on Peace building through human rights and democracy) with headquarters in Kumba YPIC is registered number G39/D14/5/1006 of November 1,2004.

That I have worked as Legal Adviser for the Human Rights Defence Group - Southwest Office (HRDG/SWP) in Kumba from 2000 to 2004, and continue to offer my assistance to the group. HRDG is registered as an NGO No. E29/1111 /Vol6/400/APP and has its head quarters in Bamenda in the Northwest Province of Cameroon.

That my responsibilities to the HRDG were to offer free legal counselling to the organization and victims of rights violations. I intervened in many cases to seek the release of some unlawfully detained persons from the prison, police and gendarmerie cells in Kumba.

That I have, at the instance of the HRDG/SWP, intervened on many cases to address the detention of SCNC Militants.

That most detained SCNC militant are hardly ever charged with an offence and are kept in prolonged pretrial detention on administrative orders of District Officers, Senior Divisional Officers and Governors.

That sometime in October 2001, I was contacted by the. HRDG/SWP Coordinator Mr Samba Churchill about the arrest and detention of some SCNC militants. We visited the Kumba Prisons where they were detained and discovered that some of them, including AM were arrested in the place of their relations, who are SCNC activists. I did not meet AM personally and had no particular interest in her individual case.

That I contacted the Senior State Counsel of Meme Judicial Division, Mrs Vera Ngassa, to demand the reason for the arrest of all the 'SCNC militants', and ask for their release on bail. She told me that she was not aware of their arrest and detention and could not order for their release.

That I contacted the Prison Superintendent and they informed me that the militants were brought to the prison on the orders of the SDO for Meme Division, I then contacted the SDO especially about the plight of four persons, including AM, arrested in the place of their relations. The SDO said the militants were being held for 'hostilities against the fatherland', meaning Cameroon, and that AM and the three others could only be released if the targeted relations showed up.

That I reported this to Mr Samba Churchill and he wrote a petition to the SDO to unconditionally release all the detained persons, or charge them with an offence. The SDO insisted that he had the right to arrest and detain persons for 15 days renewable, citing Section two of Law No 90/054 of December 19 1990 on the maintenance of law and order that empowered him to 'take measures to detain persons for a renewable period of 15 days'.

That Mr Samba reminded the SDO of article 45 of the Cameroon Constitution to the effect that all duly ratified international treaties shall following their publication override national laws, and inferred from the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) that all arrested and detained person ought to be charged with a penal offence and that due process of law ought to be respected at all times.

That Mr Samba later informed me that all his pleas fell on deaf ears.

That I am not particularly aware of how AM escaped from the prison and only heard about the escape of some of the detained person from Mr Samba Churchill. I also learnt of the release of the others from him.

That I swear to the aforementioned facts to be true to the best of my knowledge and information."

I, Samba Churchill, certify the following,

I am a Cameroonian citizen who currently resides in Kumba, Cameroon. I am holder of a Diploma from the Cameroon Institute of Journalism in Limbe.

I am the Chief Executive Officer of the Youths for Peace Initiative Cameroon. A not for profit making non governmental organisation registered No G39/14/5/10006 on November 1 2004. See www.vpicm.ora.

I have worked as Coordinator of the Southwest office of Human Rights Defence Group (HRDG) in Kumba from July 1999, and I am still acting Coordinator of the Organisation.

HRDG was created in 1995 for the promotion and protection of human rights. The Danish Immigration Service reported, 'HRDG is a credible and serious human rights organization', (the Danish Immigration Service fact-finding mission to Cameroon (2001) (§ 5.1.1) and (§ 6.1.4)). Its mission is to foster a democratic and human rights culture in Cameroon. HRDG is one of Cameroon's most active human rights organizations, and we have worked closely with Amnesty International to compile reports of human rights abuses in Cameroon. I lead an office of five university-educated human rights activists who investigate government practices and examine their legality in the context of the Cameroon Constitution, the African Human Rights Charter and International Protocols such as the ICCPR (International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights).

As part of my responsibilities for HRDG, I held seminars for rural community members and police officers to educate them on constitutional rights. Because I work to educate police officers, and visit their cells regularly to seek the release of illegally detained persons, I have gathered a wealth of information on police and gendarmes' tactics and human rights abuses.

I am also the Editor-in-Chief of 'The Freedom Forum,' the official newsletter of HRDG, which reports, amongst others, human rights violations such as detention, torture, and 'disappearance' perpetrated by the government. As Editor-in-Chief, I have published numerous articles on detention and even outright killing of SCNC (Southern Cameroons National Council) activists and supporters.

I am also the Secretary of the Cameroon Association of English Speaking Journalists, (CAMASEJ) for its Meme Divisional Chapter.

Before joining the HRDG, I had worked as correspondent for various newspapers and was one of the founding reporters of Cameroon's leading English bi-weekly newspapers, The Post (See www.postline.com)

I am also Editorial Assistant of a national weekly publication, Express newspaper, with Headquarters in Kumba, and I write most of the editorials addressing country political situations such as the SCNC and elections.

In much of Cameroon, you must forget SCNC unless you want to disappear. Government officials can detain SCNC members indefinitely with impunity. In Douala and Yaounde, for example, Anglophones are prisoners of conscience and rarely express their opinion or sympathy to the SCNC even though they are provoked daily. There are many cases of Anglophones being held in Kondengui Maximum Security Prison and Douala New Bell prison on trumped-up charges.

The government also operates under the assumption of guilt by association, if one's family members and friends are SCNC then one is likely to be placed under Surveillance and harassed by government security operatives. In October 2001, Police and Gendarmes arrested the wife of Isaac Mbohbako Sona, SCNC Southern Zonal Chairman, and his son when they visited his house and could not find him. The two were detained in the Kumba police station for two days and only released when the HRDG and some diplomatic sources intervened.

I am aware of the arrest and detention of AM by police in Kumba, after the October 1, 2001 incident. She was arrested in the place of her husband, who was said to have disappeared after arrested SCNC militants, after torture, allegedly gave his name as the driver that transported them to Kumbo for the 40^th anniversary celebrations of the Southern Cameroons Independence.

The HRDG intervened to secure her release amongst others on bail to no avail, as police authorities insisted that her detention was administrative and that she could only be released on the orders of the SDO for Meme.

The SDO told HRDG Field workers that he could only release AM if her husband gave up himself.

A police confidante later informed me that they conducted a search of the family residence and found 'subversive and seditious documents and materials', referring to SCNC literature, flags, banners etc.

I later learnt of the escape of AM and others from the Kumba prison and thought it was a lie, fearing that she could have been jettisoned to the Kondengui Maximum security prison in Yaounde.

Many times arrested notorious SCNC militants are taken from the English parts of Cameroon, where they are arrested, and detained in the French parts to.be tried under civil law procedures that are quite alien to their common law background, and without any guarantee of an impartial trial.

Prison conditions in Cameroon, generally,- are horrible and inmates are often afflicted with diseases such as tuberculosis, dysentery, diarrhoea, limp paralysis, body rashes and scabies etc.

Most prison inmates are poorly fed and most often denied visitation from their relations, while prison medical facilities lack even basic drugs for cold.

I am aware of many cases of deaths of detained persons in prisons due to the horrible conditions, and sometimes due to torture,

I am aware of the deaths of many SCNC activists in prisons in French-speaking parts of Cameroon Mr Titahonjio Mathew, a teacher in Ndop and Social Democratic Front (SDF) party electoral district Chairman died in early 2001 in the Bafoussam Prison where he was awaiting trial after arrested in Ndop, for alleged SCNC involvement. Daniel Ntanen, another SCNC activist died in the Kondengui Maximum security prison in Yaounde on April 30, 2003, at age 31. Much recently, Julius Ngu Ndi, an SCNC activist also died in the Kondengui prison. On January 3, 2005, an Anglophone activist, Sunday Kula Nya, was beaten to death allegedly by special proteges of the administration in the Douala New Bell Prison.

Failed asylum seekers extradited to Cameroon usually go through so much torture and prolonged detention without any charges levelled against them.

Against the foregone, I am of the considered opinion that AM is likely to suffer untold hardship in the place of her husband if sent back to Cameroon at this junction.

I Samba Churchill Chifu, declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United Kingdom that the foregoing is true and correct."

The application was made outside the period specified in section 103A of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. The determination is marked "served in person by Sarah Brown at North Shields Reporting Centre" and bears the date stamp "07 SEP 2005". The last day on which an application could be made was thus 14 September but the application was not filed until 19 September, having been posted on 16 September.

No reasons have been given as to why it was not reasonably practicable to have made the application in time nor is there anything to suggest that this might be the case. The appellant is said to have high blood. pressure but this has not precluded her from instructing representatives to challenge (by judicial review) the Immigration Judge's decision not to adjourn the appeal hearing or to make the section 103 A application itself.

Even if the application had been made in time, I would not have ordered reconsideration. The Immigration Judge did not act perversely or otherwise unlawfully in concluding at paragraphs 13 to 17 of the determination that he would proceed in the appellant's absence or to refuse to admit the evidence referred to at paragraph 19. The Immigration Judge's findings of fact were open to him as a matter of law.

Time is not extended under section 103A(4)(b) and there is accordingly no valid application under that section."

I note from the file that AM was served in person at North Shields Reporting Centre. I have identified this by the handwritten note but this only gives the date the determination was promulgated. There is no evidence as to the specific date AM was served.

None of our clients have ever been served a Notice of Determination in person in the last four years. It is not simply a matter of it being an unusual step to take for it to be served personally by the Home Office, it is simply unique in terms of the determinations received at this office.

I have asked a colleague of mine to call other solicitors firms in the region. To date no other solicitors firm is aware of asylum determinations being hand delivered. We have contacted Brar & Company (based in Newcastle), David Gray Solicitors (based in Newcastle, and Donnelly Adamson Solicitors (based in Middlesbrough), none of these firms have any clients whose determinations were delivered in person.

We normally receive the determinations by post. We received a copy of this determination by post and therefore assumed that it was being served in this normal way. We have not been given any satisfactory reasons to date why this particular client was served by this most unusual method."

"When this application reached me I enquired of the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal if the determination of the Immigration Judge who heard this case on 18^th August 2005 had been promulgated. I was told it had been and that the appeal had been dismissed. I have not seen the determination of the Immigration Judge.

There is therefore nothing to stay as asked for in the application for urgent consideration.

I was also told by the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal that there appeared to be no application for a reconsideration filed.

It may well be arguable that the Immigration Judge was wrong in law in the way he dealt with this case. A decision will have to await the acknowledgment of service. But the case may also raise the issue of whether the appropriate way to challenge decisions such as were made in this case by the Immigration Judge is by judicial review or by following the more obvious route of applying for a reconsideration."

Ms McVay's note of the proceedings on 11 August state that the Immigration Judge states that if there was dissatisfaction with the case management decisions they should have been judicially reviewed (paragraphs 8 and 10). Neither this nor what is said about the Judge's behaviour is contradicted in the defendant's summary grounds of defence. The Judge's statement about how challenges should be made would appear to make this case materially different from the case of M and G. The defendant's summary grounds of resistance do not address the question of why, notwithstanding this distinction, lodging an application for judicial review on 8 September constituted an abuse of process.

There is no application before me of the decision of the Senior Immigration Judge not to reconsider the Tribunal decision. If there is one pending it would be appropriate for it to be considered at the same time as the application to move for judicial review."

I do not consider that the Immigration Judge committed what counsel for the Applicant sees fit to describe a "flagrant breach of natural justice involving judicial conduct prejudicial to the interest of justice". On the contrary:

The Immigration Judge was faced with a very difficult decision as to whether to deal with the case on the papers and submissions. It was within his discretion to do so and I find no error of law in his decision. His treatment of the medical evidence at para. 50(c) is impeccable.

The Applicant's representatives then refused to take any part in the hearing. If this was without the prior instructions of their client it seems to me prima facie unprofessional behaviour. I will assume in their favour that they were acting on instructions. In that event the Appellant must take the consequences.

On the material before him the Immigration Judge was entitled to make the adverse credibility findings which he did in para. 50. There is no arguable error of law in his conclusions."

"... we are naturally concerned to learn that the matter was not linked with our client's outstanding JR application which is now listed for hearing on the 19 December 2005. My office has specifically informed the court the wishes of Honourable Mr Beatson to have the matter before him. I am also attaching our letter dated 11^th October 2005 for your information."

MR JUSTICE STANLEY BURNTON: This is an application for permission to bring judicial review proceedings in respect of interlocutory decisions made by an immigration judge, Mr L D Sacks, in the course of his consideration of the claim for asylum by the present claimant, AM, a citizen of Cameroon. It is unnecessary for the purposes of my decision to consider the substance of the complaints made in respect of Mr Sacks' decisions. Ultimately, he rejected the claim.

The claimant sought reconsideration under section 103A which was rejected by the senior immigration judge and reconsideration was sought again by the High Court. On 10th November 2005 Bean J made an order on the papers, necessarily, rejecting the application for reconsideration of Mr Sacks' decision under the present statutory regime.

It is clear that there were genuine complaints about Mr Sacks' procedure and these proceedings were begun before he had made his final decision, so at that date only his interlocutory decisions and determinations had been made and therefore the judicial review proceedings could apply to them. It follows, however, that if he had made decisions which were unfair and which were unfairly prejudicial to the claim for asylum, his substantive decision would be liable to be set aside by the judicial review proceedings or under section 103 A, because his procedural errors would constitute errors of law.

As appears from what I have already said, there have been two sets of proceedings commenced by AM to challenge, in practice, the decision of Mr Sacks; namely judicial review proceedings and proceedings under section 103 A. The Tribunal has appeared today by Miss Broadfoot to challenge the judicial review proceedings on the basis that they constitute an abuse of the process of the court, or are otherwise inappropriate in a case such as the present. She relies on the decisions of the Court of Appeal in M and G [2004] EWCA Civ 1731, and the more recent decision of Andrew Collins J in Y [2005] EWHC 2845.

The procedure laid down under section 103A of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 clearly is intended to be the normal procedure available to any applicant who is disappointed by a decision of the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal. It restricts the challenge to errors of law and restricts the number of occasions in which an order may be made for reconsideration; that is to say, in relation to any appeal an order can only be made once (see section 103A(2)). The Act imposes very stringent time limits for the making of an application for reconsideration. Manifestly, section 103A was introduced by Parliament with a view to expediting consideration of asylum claims to the appeals system. It is, I think, accepted by Miss Weston on behalf of the claimant that in the normal course it would be inappropriate, and possibly an abuse of the court, to seek to challenge a decision of the Tribunal which is open to the section 103A procedure by means of judicial review. Judicial review is,' in general, but particularly in this context, an exceptional remedy.

The question for me is whether, in the circumstances of this case, that exception has been established so as to justify judicial review proceedings.

As I have already stated, material procedural errors which may have affected a determination of the Tribunal will be now regarded as errors of law which should lead to an order for the reconsideration of the immigration judge's decision. Miss Weston contends that in a case such as the present evidence would be required in order to establish whether or not there were material procedural errors or defects in procedure before the immigration judge: demonstration of bias, unfairness, exclusion of admissible evidence and the like. However, if seems to me that where such allegations are made, it is open to an appellant ~ that is to say someone seeking reconsideration ~ to put before the senior immigration judge and the Court of Appeal the evidence on which he or she relies in order to establish those procedural errors, as indeed occurred in the present case. I do not see that the procedure under section 103 A is inappropriate to deal with complaints such as those made in the present case.

Furthermore, I am considerably troubled by the fact that if I were to give permission in this case the matter would come before a High Court judge who would, in effect, be asked to rule that Bean J, who refused reconsideration and gave substantial reasons for doing so, was in error. It can be only in the most extreme circumstances, if ever, that one High Court judge dealing with the same, case and the same complaints as another could be invited to come to a different conclusion. If I were to give permission in this case, it seems to me that if I were to hear the substantive claim I should be sitting as a Court of Appeal from the decision of Bean J. Bean J had before him the complaints of breach of natural justice and unfairness. He examined them to see whether they were arguable and ruled that they were not. Complaints may be made about the conclusion that he reached, but it is inappropriate for such a complaint to be made to another High Court judge and Parliament has stipulated that his decision is, in any event, final.

It seems to me that this case is not distinguishable from the general rule as stated by the Court of Appeal in G. It is unnecessary for me to find that these proceedings are an abuse of the process. It is sufficient for me to say that in the circumstances of a case such as the present, it is inappropriate for permission to challenge the decision of the immigration judge by way of judicial review to be granted.

I would add that although these judicial review proceedings concerned interlocutory decisions, in due course one would have expected the substantive decision also to be challenged. Generally it is inappropriate to challenge interlocutory decisions. A party complaining of those decisions is normally required to await the substantive decision. I have not considered the merits of the procedural complaints made in this case. I appreciate that those complaints are complaints which are strongly held but, having regard to the statutory regime and the authorities' which it seems to me have considered the position, for material purposes, I refuse permission.

MISS WESTON: My Lord, I simply remind the court that the immigration judge did invite the claimant to seek interlocutory judicial review. When one considers whether it is an abuse of process one has to consider that.

MR JUSTICE STANLEY BURNTON: Perhaps I should add something. I am reminded that the immigration judge himself suggested judicial review of the interlocutory decisions we have made. It seems to me that he erred in that respect, but it does mean, that those representing the claimant are not to be faulted in the same way for having sought to do so. I have no doubt also that they brought proceedings rapidly because they were concerned that there has been an injustice."

The manner in which Mr Sacks dealt with the application to call evidence by telephone as well as the decision to refuse the application;

The decisions to adjourn the hearing to 18 August notwithstanding the absence of counsel and to continue with the hearing on 18 August in the absence of the appellant and in the absence of any proper legal • representation.

"I approach the question... on the basis that... the resolution of any issue of fact and the exercise of discretion in relation to an application for asylum... He exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Secretary of State subject only to the court's powers of review. The limitations on the scope of that power are well known and need not be restated here. Within those limitations the court must, I think, be entitled to subject an administrative decision to the more rigorous examination, to ensure that it is in no way flawed, according to the gravity of the issue which the decision determines. The most fundamental of all human rights is the individual's right to life and when an administrative decision under review is said to be one which may put the applicant's life at risk, the basis of the decision must call for the most anxious scrutiny."

Where an immigration decision is made in respect of a person he may appeal to the Tribunal."

A party to an appeal under section 82 ... may apply to the appropriate court, on the grounds that the Tribunal made an error of law, for an order requiring the Tribunal to reconsider its decision on the appeal.

The appropriate court may make an order under subsection (1)-

...

...

An application under subsection (1) shall be determined by reference only to

A decision of the appropriate court on an application under subsection (1) shall be final.

In this section a reference to the Tribunal's decision on an appeal does not include a reference to-

...

In this section "the appropriate court" means-

..."

Where a party applies for an adjournment of a hearing of an appeal, he must-

The Tribunal must not adjourn a hearing of an appeal on the application of a party unless satisfied that the appeal cannot otherwise be justly determined."

Mr Tarn's main submission was that since the reconsideration was, as he put it, a single exercise, judicial review of what was an interlocutory decision should not be entertained. The court undoubtedly has jurisdiction to consider claims such as this, but will not in general entertain challenges to interlocutory decisions on the ground that the challenge is premature: cf: R (on the application of Nader) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [1998] Imm AR 33 and R (on the application of Buck) v Rochford JJ (1978) 68 Cr App Rep 114, [1978] Crim LR 492. The proceedings should be allowed to take their course and, if the Tribunal was wrong to find errors of law where none existed, the remedy lies in an appeal to the Court of Appeal. While that approach may sometimes be modified in relation to a decision to adjourn proceedings, it will normally apply to a decision such as is in issue in this case which amounts to a preliminary ruling. If, as I believe, the parties must see the reasons and are able in the circumstances which I have set out in this judgment to argue against them, there is all the more reason to refuse to entertain proceedings for judicial review. I am satisfied that the court should not permit claims such as these. They are premature and can only create delays which are manifestly contrary to the intention of Parliament as appears from r 31(1) of the Procedure Rules. There is no prejudice to the aggrieved party since, if the alleged error persists in the final determination, there is a right of appeal to the Court of Appeal. And it is always possible that he will succeed in the appeal.

Accordingly, I am satisfied that it would normally be an abuse of the process of the Court to seek to pursue claims such as this. I have learnt that it is dangerous to say 'never' in this jurisdiction, but I find it difficult to conceive of circumstances in which such a claim would be proper."

In Sivasubramaniam [ [2002] EWCA Civ 1738; [2003] 1 WLR 475 ] this court referred to the pressure on the IAT and the serious consequences of error on their part. The court commented on the need for anxious scrutiny of individual cases and the desirability of a review by a High Court judge as part of that process. Section 101 provides for such a review, but on paper only. Is this adequate?

How likely is it that the judge conducting the statutory review will overlook an arguable point of law that may affect the outcome in circumstances where he would not do so on an oral hearing or where his error would be identified by the Court of Appeal? The possibility cannot be discounted, but it is not great, as experience shows. The judges conducting the statutory review are judges of the Administrative Court with great experience in this area of the law. Their task is not to decide the answer to any arguable point of law, but simply whether an arguable point of law exists. If they so decide, their order will be more advantageous to the applicant than a successful application for judicial review, since it will require the IAT without more to hear the appeal. Judges will be aware of the importance of their decision and can be expected to give the most anxious scrutiny to the documents and written submissions placed before them. The comments made by Laws LJ in Sengupta were general; in the particular situation with which we are concerned we do. not consider that oral submissions are likely to add significantly to what can be set out on paper by a lawyer who remembers that precision is more important than verbosity.

For these reasons, and subject to the question of discrimination to which we are about to turn, we have concluded, in agreement with Collins J, that the statutory regime, including statutory review of a refusal of permission to appeal, provides adequate and proportionate protection of the asylum seeker's rights. It is accordingly a proper exercise of the Court's discretion to decline to entertain an application for judicial review of issues which have been, or could have been, the subject of statutory review.

We would add two observations. First, the applicability of the well-established principle that judicial review is a remedy of last resort is tested objectively by the court. Thus our conclusion has had regard to the legislative purpose and effect of s. 101 but not to any wider policy - if there is one - of excluding recourse to the courts. Secondly, our decision concerns only cases, such as the two before us, in which the application for judicial review is coextensive with the available statutory review. Judicial review remains open in principle in cases of justiciable errors not susceptible of statutory review."

"importantly, the Court framed its decision as a lawful exercise of the Court's discretion in declining to consider an application for judicial review and did not include decisions which did not attract such remedy as, in the instant case, interlocutory decisions. Further, in the decision by Collins J at first instance, the learned judge had identified situations such as '... evidence of fraud or bias or similar matters' as potentially providing an exception to the general rule."

The Claimant...claims:

the AIT acted unreasonably and unfairly and that proceedings consequentially before it are and were procedurally unfair."

"To permit simultaneous applications for statutory review and for permission to seek judicial review would rob section 101 of the finality which it seeks to achieve."

"[The fair-minded and informed observer] would know of the central place accorded to oral argument in our common law adversarial system. This I think is important, because oral argument is perhaps the most powerful force there is, in our legal process, to promote a change of mind by the judge. That judges in fact change their minds under the influence of oral argument is not an arcane feature of the system; it is at the centre of it."

For these reasons, and subject to the question of discrimination to which we are about to turn, we have concluded, in agreement with Collins J, that the statutory regime, including statutory review of a refusal of permission to appeal, provides adequate and proportionate protection of the asylum seeker's rights. It is accordingly a proper exercise of the court's discretion to decline to entertain an application for judicial review of issues which have been, or could have been, the subject of statutory review.

We would add two observations. First, the applicability of the well-established principle that judicial review is a remedy of last resort is tested objectively by the court. Thus our conclusion has had regard to the legislative purpose and effect of section 101 but not to any wider policy - if there is one - of excluding recourse to the courts. Secondly, our decision concerns only cases, such as the two before us, in which the application for judicial review is co-extensive with the available statutory review. Judicial review remains open in principle in cases of justiciable errors not susceptible of statutory review."

Mr Tarn's main submission was that since the reconsideration was, as he put it, a single exercise, judicial review of what was an interlocutory decision should not be entertained. The court undoubtedly has jurisdiction to consider claims such as this, but will not in general entertain challenges to interlocutory decisions on the ground that the challenge is premature: cf: R v Secretary of State for the home Department Ex p Nader [1998] IAR 33 and R v Rochford JJ Exp p Buck (1978) 68 CAR 114. The proceedings should be allowed to take their course and, if the Tribunal was wrong to find errors of law where none existed, the remedy lies in an appeal to the Court of Appeal. While that approach may sometimes be . modified in relation to a decision to adjourn proceedings, it will normally apply to a decision such as in an issue in this case which amounts to a preliminary ruling. If, as I believe, the parties must see the reasons and are able in the circumstances which I have set out in this judgment to argue against them, there is all the more reason to refuse to entertain proceedings for judicial review. I am satisfied that the court should not permit claims such as these. They are premature and can only create delays which are manifestly contrary to the intention of Parliament as appears from Rule 31(1) of the Procedure Rules. There is no prejudice to the aggrieved party since, if the alleged error persists in the final determination, there is a right of . appeal to the Court of Appeal. And it is always possible that he will succeed in the appeal.

Accordingly, I am satisfied that it would normally be an abuse of the process of the Court to seek to pursue claims such as this. I have learnt that it is dangerous to say 'never' in this jurisdiction, but I find it difficult to conceive of circumstances in which such a claim would be proper."

"Manifestly, this Court has jurisdiction to entertain the issue which has been argued. The challenge is, in my view, of a class which ought to be made by way of Judicial Review. The Crown Office List is the natural forum for questions of natural justice, arising from tribunal proceedings. Any allegation that there has been, for want of fair procedure, typically raises questions both of law and of fact, in other words, questions, not only of what the relevant rules were, but of what happened. The latter ordinarily requires evidence, but evidence is ordinarily given on affidavit. While this Court has power to admit fresh evidence, this is normally only in relation to the issues canvassed below.

The present case is not of this kind. It concerns not what was argued but what happened. The preferable course in such a case would have been and should be in future to put the applicant's account of events on affidavit in this case it would be Miss Fieldens affidavit and another counsel would have to conduct the case. If leave is granted, both the Home Office and the Immigration Appeal Tribunal will be served with notice of motion, and each, if so advised, may put in its account of events, this may be important, where, as here, the conduct of the Tribunal itself is in question. If there is a conflict, the Court of Judicial Review has means of resolving it."

"While we do not doubt that Ex parte Dowler [1997] OB 911 was correctly decided, it should not in our view be treated as authority that a party complaining of procedural unfairness or bias in the magistrates' court should be denied leave to move for judicial review and left to whatever rights he may have in the Crown Court. So to hold would be to emasculate the long-established supervisory jurisdiction of this court over magistrates' courts, which has over the years proved an invaluable guarantee of the integrity of proceedings in those courts. The crucial role of the magistrates' courts, mentioned above, makes it the more important that the jurisdiction should be retained with a view to ensuring that high standards of procedural fairness and impartiality are. maintained.

Two notes of caution should however be sounded. First, leave to move should not be granted unless the applicant advances an apparently plausible complaint which, if made good, might arguably be held to vitiate the proceedings in the magistrates' court. Immaterial and minor deviations from best practice would not have that effect, and the court should be respectful of discretionary decisions of magistrates' courts as of all other courts. This court should be generally slow to intervene, and should do so only where good (or arguably good) grounds for doing so are shown. Secondly, the decision whether or not to grant relief by way of judicial review is always, in the end, a discretionary one. Many factors may properly influence the exercise of discretion, and it would be both foolish and impossible to seek to anticipate them all. The need for an applicant to make full disclosure of all matters relevant to the exercise of discretion should require no emphasis. We do not, however, consider that the existence of a right of appeal to the Crown Court, particularly if unexercised, should ordinarily weigh against the grant of leave to move for judicial review, or the grant of substantive relief, in a proper case."

"I do not propose, because it is unnecessary, to go into the question of whether the existence of the pending appeal is a bar to proceeding by judicial review in the sense that it is an inevitable bar, for it appears to me that in some cases it may be possible for a judicial review to proceed notwithstanding such an appeal. But in this case I have no doubt that judicial review should not be granted. The issues which arise appear to me to be much more suitable to be tried on appeal to the Crown Court, and there are a number of points which clearly can be made and no doubt will be made on the hearing of the appeal. I propose to say no more about them because if there is an appeal coming before the Crown Court, it would not be right that this court should make observations about the merits of the case."

The possibility remains that there may be very rare cases where a litigant challenges the jurisdiction of a circuit judge giving or refusing permission to appeal on the ground of jurisdictional error in the narrow, pre-Anisminic sense, or procedural irregularity of such a kind as to constitute a denial of the applicant's right to a fair hearing. If such grounds are made out we consider that a proper case for judicial review will have been established."

The Claimant C claims that the determination of the Immigration Judge (IJ) dated 7.10.2005 discloses the following errors of law: