Reka v Secretary of State for the Home Department

This is an appeal from the decision of the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal, (the AIT) brought with the permission of a senior immigration judge of that tribunal. On 10^th October 2005, the AIT dismissed the appellant’s appeal against the determination of an adjudicator promulgated on 6^th January 2005 in which the adjudicator had dismissed the appellant’s appeal against the Secretary of State’s decision to refuse his application for asylum and permission to remain in the United Kingdom.

The appellant is a citizen of Iran born on 23^rd August 1974. He entered the UK on 6^th August 2004 and claimed asylum. Screening forms level 1 and 2 were completed on that day. The appellant provided a statement of evidence on 15^th August and was interviewed on 10^th September. In outline, his story was that he had been arrested during a demonstration in Tehran on 10^th June 2003. At that time, he was a student at the University. Following his arrest, he had been detained without charge at a prison near Tehran for nearly a year and had been interrogated and tortured regularly by beating and other means. In about May or June 2004 he was transferred to a prison in his home town of Kermanshah. There living conditions were better and his wife was able to visit him. However, his interrogation and physical ill treatment had continued. His father died on 13^th July 2004 and his family made representations for him to be released temporarily for the funeral and wake. The family surrendered the deeds to some land which had been owned by the appellant’s father in return for his temporary release. The appellant was released on 17^th July for 3 days. On 18th July he escaped from Iran. His brother had made the arrangements. He travelled via Dubai and eventually to London. He feared that, if were returned to Iran, he would be rearrested, detained and tortured again on account of his illegal departure and because he was of interest to the authorities on account of his political views.

By letter dated 4^th October 2004, the Secretary of State rejected his application for asylum. The gist of the reasons for the refusal was that the appellant’s account was not accepted as credible. At the heart of the reasoning was the view that, if the appellant had indeed been held in detention and tortured for over a year, he would not have been released on compassionate grounds following his father’s death. Further, it was said that it would not have been feasible for the appellant’s brother to make arrangements for his escape so quickly following the father’s death and the appellant’s release from prison. He would have been under surveillance if he had been temporarily released.

The appellant appealed to an adjudicator. He put in additional evidence in response to the grounds for refusal by the Secretary of State. He also submitted some documentary evidence in support of his case. The hearing took place in December 2004. The appellant was represented by counsel. He gave evidence and was cross-examined. The adjudicator rejected the appellant’s account of his arrest detention and torture as untrue.

The adjudicator’s reasons for this conclusion were expressed quite briefly. He considered seven separate but related issues. First, he accepted that the appellant had been a student at the university and had been a member of a group which discussed political issues. But he was not a leader or significant member of the group and he had not come to the attention of the authorities before the demonstrations of June 2003. The information in the Country Information Policy Unit (CIPU) report on Iran for October 2004, suggested that, although about 4000 people had been arrested nationwide during the demonstrations in June 2003, only a few students had been included. At least 65 people had been charged. Some students were still in prison but these had been arrested in connection with earlier disturbances. The adjudicator inferred from this material that only the leaders of the demonstration, who were of real interest to the authorities, would have been detained. The appellant was not one of those and the adjudicator did not believe that he had been detained for a year as he claimed.

Second, the adjudicator considered that, if the appellant had been beaten regularly as he claimed, he would still have had some signs of this on his body when he arrived in the UK in August 2004. There were no such signs. This apparently caused the adjudicator to reject the claim of torture.

Third, the adjudicator considered that the appellant’s evidence had been embellished since his arrival in the UK in particular in respect of his account of how he came to be released following his father’s death. In his first statement made in September 2004, the appellant had said that his brother had persuaded the authorities to agree to his temporary release. He had also added that the local Imam and his sister’s husband had put in a good word for him. However, in his additional statement and when he gave evidence before the adjudicator, he had said that his local MP and his brother-in-law had also played a part in securing his release.

Fourth, the adjudicator dealt briefly with a point that had been made against the appellant in the decision letter. The Secretary of State had said that the appellant’s credibility had been damaged because, in his screening interview on arrival, he said he had last seen his father on 11^th July 2004. Later he had said that he had not seen his father for over a year before he left Iran; his father had attended the prison shortly before his death but had not been allowed to see the appellant. The appellant’s explanation for this inconsistency was that he had misunderstood the question during the screening interview; he had thought he had been asked when he had last seen his family. The adjudicator accepted that there may have been some confusion during the screening interview, from which it appears that he did not consider that that particular aspect of the evidence damaged the appellant’s credibility.

Fifth, the adjudicator said that he did not accept that if the appellant had been granted 3 days’ temporary release (which began on 17^th July) it would have been possible for his brother to arrange his escape on 18^th. He observed that escape would have put the brother and brother-in-law at risk.

His sixth observation was that the appellant had recently produced a copy of the deeds to his father’s land which he said had been faxed to him. The adjudicator observed that the fact that the deeds had been faxed to him was not consistent with the appellant’s claim that they had been surrendered to the authorities in order to obtain his release.

Seventh, the adjudicator said that he found the Secretary of State’s submission convincing that the appellant’s account had been designed to fit the historical facts, namely the known fact that a lot of people including students had been arrested during the demonstrations in June 2003.

Finally he observed that the CIPU report showed that asylum seekers returning to Iran who had been seen as economic migrants are not at risk from the authorities. He considered that the appellant fell into that group.

For all of those reasons, the adjudicator held that the appellant had not discharged the burden of proving that he had a well-founded fear of persecution for a Refugee Convention reason or that his human rights were likely to be infringed if he were returned to Iran.

The appellant sought and obtained permission to appeal to the Immigration Appeal Tribunal but that tribunal ceased to exist before the appeal had been heard. The appeal was heard by the AIT. The grounds of appeal that were accepted as arguable were, in summary, that the adjudicator’s findings against the appellant’s credibility were perverse, inadequately reasoned and based on an incomplete understanding of the evidence; the adjudicator had erred in his assessment of the objective evidence and in drawing an adverse inference from the absence of observable signs of ill treatment on his arrival in the UK. Also, it was said that the adjudicator had failed to give reasons for rejecting the claimant’s evidence that he was granted release from custody because of the death of his father. Finally, it was said that the adjudicator had failed to notice that the copy deeds produced by the appellant carried an official stamp which indicated that the deeds had been confiscated on 15^th July 2004.

The AIT dismissed the appeal. They stated that the adjudicator’s determination revealed no error of law. Dealing first with the issue of the adjudicator’s finding in respect of the title deeds, the AIT said the adjudicator had held that the fact that the deeds had been faxed to the UK was inconsistent with the appellant’s claim that the deeds had been confiscated. They agreed that it was unclear whether the appellant’s family might have been required physically to surrender the deeds to the authorities but it was up the appellant to prove his case. It had been open to the adjudicator to hold as he did in respect of the deeds.

Second, the AIT dealt with the appellant’s argument that the objective evidence in the CIPU was unreliable and that the adjudicator’s reliance on it had undermined the inference drawn from it. The AIT said that there was no error of law in the adjudicator’s approach. The ground of appeal was really no more than an attempt to persuade the tribunal that the adjudicator should have reached a different conclusion. The AIT could not interfere with such a finding unless it was perverse, irrational or unsupported by evidence. No such error was shown. The adjudicator had been entitled to infer from the CIPU report that only known leaders had been detained. He was also entitled, on the appellant’s own evidence, to conclude that the appellant was not a leader. He was entitled to conclude that the appellant would not have been detained for a long period as claimed.

Third, the AIT considered whether the adjudicator had been entitled to hold that, if the appellant had been subject to ill-treatment as claimed, it was likely that he would still have had some physical signs of this when he arrived in the UK. The AIT referred to the appellant’s evidence on this issue and noted that he had not said that his ill-treatment ceased when he was transferred to the prison at Kermanshah. He had only said that conditions there were better and that interrogation sessions had reduced in frequency. The AIT considered that the adjudicator’s findings were sustainable on the evidence before him.

Finally, the AIT considered the complaint that the adjudicator had not been justified in rejecting the appellant’s account of his escape from Iran. The AIT noted that the appellant had embellished his account of how his release had been obtained. They also noted that the adjudicator had mentioned a discrepancy about the evidence of when the appellant had last seen his father. I note in passing that the AIT did not mention that the adjudicator had accepted the appellant’s explanation for that and had not held it against him. However, the AIT considered that the adjudicator was entitled to conclude that it would not have been feasible for the escape to have been accomplished at short notice.

The AIT concluded that the adjudicator’s findings were sustainable and there was no substance in any of the grounds of appeal. As a rider to their decision, they added an observation. They said that they had noticed that the stamp on the deeds indicated that they had been confiscated on 15^th July 2004. They said that that was the date of the father’s death. In that, they were wrong; the death certificate gives the date of death as 13^th July. They noted that the appellant had claimed that the appellant was granted 3 days release from 17^th July. Quite what the AIT thought was the significance of these observations is not clear to me. In any event, the AIT said that their observation on this issue did not form part of their reasons for upholding the adjudicator’s decision. So far as I am concerned, that is just as well because I do not understand how or why that observation might be regarded as support for the adjudicator’s decision. I for my part would accept the AIT’s assertion that this observation did not play any part in their reasoning of the appeal. Although at the hearing before us, Miss Chapman was critical of the AIT for making this observation, I regard the matter as of no importance and will say no more about it.

The appellant then sought permission to appeal to this court on the basis that the adjudicator’s decision was undermined by errors of law. It was submitted that the AIT had been wrong to hold that there were no such errors. Although the AIT had recorded the main errors complained of, it had merely dismissed them as not amounting to errors of law without making ‘any logical impact’ on the points raised. The same points were referred to: the deeds, the reliability of the information in the CIPU report, the adjudicator’s finding that the appellant’s account had been tailored to fit the historical facts and the adjudicator’s finding in respect of the absence of any signs of injury on the appellant’s body when he arrived in the UK.

A senior immigration judge granted permission, saying that there was merit in the complaint that the AIT had ‘failed to engage with and address the grounds of the appeal’. She further considered it arguable that the AIT had failed to deal with the complaint raised in the written grounds of appeal that the adjudicator’s findings were inadequately reasoned or that the AIT had wrongly inferred reasons where the adjudicator had failed to give reasons or where his reasons were unclear. Further, she considered it to be arguable that the adjudicator had made findings without an evidential basis and/or had misdirected itself as to the content of the appellant’s evidence. I mention the grounds on which permission to appeal to this court was granted because it appears to me that the senior immigration judge has described the arguable shortcomings of the AIT decision in rather more critical terms than was contended for by the appellant either on paper or at the oral hearing before us.

Although the appeal to this court is nominally an appeal against the decision of the AIT and is limited to consideration of whether their decision was undermined by an error of law, in practice our function is to decide whether the adjudicator’s determination was undermined by legal error. If it was not, it would follow that the AIT had made no error of law in dismissing the appeal. Criticisms - even valid ones- of the way in which the AIT analysed the issues or expressed its reasons for dismissing the appeal will not avail the appellant if the overall conclusion about the adjudicator’s determination was right. Thus, the question for this court is whether the adjudicator’s determination was legally flawed.

Although the grounds of appeal were set out at length, there is in reality only one ground. It is that the adjudicator’s findings of fact and inferences were perverse and/or irrational and/or not founded in evidence. The argument that the findings were inadequately reasoned was not pursued before this court, rightly in my view. Although it might be said that the adjudicator’s reasons could have been more fully explained, it certainly cannot be said that the reasoning was such that the decision could not be understood. The reason for the decision was clearly that the adjudicator did not believe the appellant’s account of what had happened to him. As I have already explained, there were several findings and inferences upon which that conclusion was based. As Miss Chapman for the appellant recognised, in order to succeed in the appeal, she had to undermine the adjudicator’s decision by showing that at least some of those findings or inferences were perverse, irrational or unfounded in evidence.

I shall deal with the issues in the order in which the adjudicator himself mentioned them. First, the adjudicator said that he did not believe that the appellant had been detained for over a year. He was prepared to accept that he was a student at the University and that he was involved in a group which discussed political issues. The adjudicator might well have accepted that the appellant took part in the demonstrations in June 2003. It seems that he might have been prepared to believe that the appellant was arrested and even detained for a while, although he made no specific findings on those points. However, the adjudicator firmly drew the line saying that he was not prepared to believe that the appellant had been detained for over a year. It was an essential part of the appellant’s case that he had been arrested in June 2003 and detained until his temporary release in July 2004. The rejection of his evidence about the period of detention could in itself be fatal to his claim.

The adjudicator’s reasoning on this point involved a finding of fact based on the appellant’s own evidence and the drawing of an inference from information in the CIPU report. The appellant had said that he was not a significant member of the student group to which he belonged. He also said that he had not been drawn to the attention of the authorities prior to his arrest on 10^th June. Perhaps more accurately, he should have said that, so far as he knew, he had not been drawn to the attention of the authorities. For, as Sedley LJ pointed out, the CIPU report said that there were informers within the student body and so the appellant could not know for certain what had been reported about him. However, there was clearly an evidential basis for the adjudicator’s finding of fact that the appellant was not a leader or was of interest to the authorities.

Miss Chapman’s ground of attack on this point was that the adjudicator should not have drawn the inference that only leaders who were of interest to the authorities would have been detained. The adjudicator had relied on the information in the CIPU report. He summarised that information as follows:

“The CIPU Report describes the events which occurred on the 10 and 11 June and the following ten nights. Thousands took to the streets and were joined by local residents. The demonstration became increasingly politicised. Militant supporters of the religious leaders attacked the demonstrators and police intervened to end the clashes. The Special Forces were deployed to disperse demonstrators. About four thousand people were reportedly arrested nationwide. Few students were reported amongst those arrested during the clashes. At least sixty five people were charged. Some students are still in prison and they had been arrested in connection with earlier disturbances. It appears, however, that the various students’ organisations still go about their business undisturbed.”

Miss Chapman did not seriously contend that that paragraph was not an accurate summary of the CIPU material. She demonstrated that the source of the information was a BBC news report of 22^nd June 2003 from which it could be seen that the statement about the number of students arrested was attributed to the police commander for Tehran province. She submitted that the police commander might have had reasons (she meant ulterior reasons) for playing down the number of students who had been arrested. She submitted that, for that reason, ‘it would have been wise for (the adjudicator) to have ascertained whether or not this source was consistent with other sources in the objective evidence’. Had he done so, by checking the BBC news report, the adjudicator would have found cause to doubt the accuracy of the CIPU report. He would have seen that the police commander had asserted that only 10 of those arrested were students. On the other hand, elsewhere in the news report, it was said that ‘scores of student activists …are reported to have been arrested in Tehran and around the country’. Miss Chapman submitted that because of that internal conflict, the adjudicator’s reliance on the CIPU report was unsustainable.

I, for my part, cannot accept that submission. First, I observe that Miss Chapman was not able to tell us whether the adjudicator’s attention had been drawn to this potential conflict within the BBC news report. She was only able to say that the documents were in the adjudicator’s bundle. Her submission is based on the premise that the adjudicator is expected to check the accuracy of a CIPU report against the source documents which lie behind it. That imposes a heavy duty on the adjudicator. I would accept that the adjudicator’s decision could be invalidated (without fault on his part) if he had relied on information which was in fact inaccurate. However, here, in my view, there is no reason to think that the CIPU report was inaccurate. True there is, on the face of the report, a possible conflict as to the number of students arrested. But the conflict may not be real. It is quite possible that, although scores (say for example 60) students had been arrested in the whole country, only 10 had been arrested in Tehran province. I do not think that the adjudicator should be expected to speculate about the ulterior motives of the police commander or to think that he might have down played the number of students arrested in Tehran. In my view, the adjudicator was entitled to rely on the information in the CIPU report, which seems to me to be a fair summary of the news report. If the adjudicator was entitled to find that only a small number of students had been arrested, as in my view he was, he was also entitled to infer that those few would be the leaders who were of particular interest to the authorities. He was also entitled to infer that a student who was not a leader would be unlikely to be detained for a substantial period. In my judgment, the adjudicator’s rejection as incredible of the appellant’s claim that he was detained for over a year following his arrest during the demonstration was neither perverse nor irrational. It was founded in evidence. As I have said, it was a very important finding in relation to the appellant’s claim as a whole.

The adjudicator’s second finding was that it was most unlikely that the appellant would not have had some signs of injury on his body on arrival in the UK if he had been regularly beaten as he had claimed. Miss Chapman’s submission in respect of this was that the adjudicator had misunderstood the appellant’s evidence in respect of his beatings. His case was that he had been severely beaten in the early days following his arrest. During that period, he had indeed had marks on his body but these had resolved. In addition to the beatings, he had suffered sleep deprivation, solitary confinement and other forms of psychological torture which do not leave marks. By the time of his transfer to Kermanshah, the interrogation sessions had reduced in frequency. Miss Chapman submitted that it was entirely explicable that the appellant had no marks on his body on arrival in the UK and this could not and should not have been used as a reason to reject his evidence on torture.

In response to this point, Miss Laing for the Secretary of State took us to the appellant’s evidence. First, at paragraph 17 of his statement of evidence dated 15^th August 2004, the appellant described the interrogation sessions he underwent following his arrest. He said:

“These interrogation session continued day after day. I was subjected to various forms of torture including beatings, sleep deprivation, being forced to face a wall standing for hours on end, solitary confinement and other forms of psychological torture. I was not permitted any contact with the outside world.”

Then at paragraph 21 he said that, some time later, (which would have been in either May or June 2004) he was transferred to Kermanshah. He said that he still had not been charged. His wife was able to visit more easily and in general conditions in detention were somewhat better. The interrogation sessions had reduced in frequency by then in any event. He said nothing about beatings.

When interviewed on 10^th September 2004, the appellant described the severe physical and psychological abuse he had suffered after his arrest. He said that these sessions were ‘continuous’ and were conducted by different groups of interrogators. At times he had been near to death. Initially there was no pattern to the torture; ‘they’ would beat him at every opportunity. After a while they would come to his room at a specific time every day to beat him. He said that at first he had had bruises and scars but they had healed. He then said that, at the approach of the anniversary of the initial protests (which had apparently occurred in July 1999) the authorities had decided to send prisoners to local prisons near their places of residence. In that interview, he was not specifically asked about physical abuse after his transfer to Kermanshah. However, following the Secretary of State’s letter of refusal, the appellant submitted a further statement of evidence prior to the hearing before the adjudicator. In that he said:

“With regard to paragraph 16 of the refusal letter, I wish to point out that in Tehran I was subjected to systematic torture and interrogations which was aimed at extracting specific information from me about my political activities and colleagues. Once I was transferred to Kermanshah, the systemic interrogation and torture came to an end. I was subjected to abuse and beatings like other detainees, but I believe that this was more as a punishment rather than a method to obtain information. Therefore, I would maintain that, from my point of view, conditions in Kermanshah were better than in Tehran.

With regard to paragraph 17 of the refusal letter, I confirm that in Kermanshah I was only subjected to beatings which at worst left bruising. There were no visible marks on my body (as far as I am aware) by the time I applied for asylum.”

Thus it was the appellant’s evidence that he had suffered severe beatings regularly while at Tehran although the frequency of these had reduced by the time he left. After his transfer, he had still been given beatings which ‘at worst left bruising’. This had apparently continued until his release on 17^th July, about 3 weeks before he arrived in the UK. In cross-examination before the adjudicator he had said that he was able to withstand the beatings because he was strong. He was a sportsman, a weightlifter. However, I do not think it could sensibly have been suggested on his part that the signs of his injuries would disappear more quickly because of his sporting prowess.

Miss Chapman submitted that the appellant’s account was entirely consistent with the absence of marks of violence on his body on arrival and the adjudicator’s rejection of his claim to have been tortured was perverse or unfounded in evidence. Miss Laing submitted that the adjudicator’s conclusion was open to him on the evidence.

I have found this point quite difficult. The appellant’s evidence could provide an explanation for the absence of any marks on his body which was consistent with his claim that he had been subject to severe beatings until May or June 2004 and less severe beatings causing only bruising from then until his release. The rejection of that explanation would damage the appellant’s credibility. However, it should be noted that that explanation does not provide any positive support for the appellant’s claim that he was tortured. If the adjudicator had said, having heard the evidence of torture he doubted its truth and that, as there was no evidence in support of it, his decision was to reject it, I would have had no difficulty in saying that the decision was rational and open to him on the evidence. However, the adjudicator based his rejection of the appellant’s explanation upon the much narrower ground that he thought it most unlikely that the appellant would not have had marks on his body if he had been beaten as he claimed. The marks would still have been there. The adjudicator was in effect making a finding as to the lasting nature of scars and bruises. He made that finding, not on the basis of any medical evidence but on the basis of his own knowledge and experience. He may have a good deal of experience of such matters. I myself would not feel confident that I could say that if the appellant had been beaten as he claimed he would have had marks on his arrival. Accordingly, I accept Miss Chapman’s submission to the extent that I am doubtful as to the basis of the adjudicator’s conclusion as he has expressed it. It may be that the adjudicator’s knowledge and experience is such as to justify his conclusion. But that is not evident. It may be that the adjudicator expressed himself too briefly and what he wanted to say was that he doubted the appellant’s story of torture and it was not supported by residual marks. But he did not say that and, accordingly, I have some doubt about the soundness of this finding.

The adjudicator’s third reason for rejecting the claim was that he thought that the appellant had embellished his evidence as time passed. He had introduced reference to his MP and his influential brother-in-law. I note that his sister’s husband (who must have been his brother-in-law) had been mentioned at the earlier stage. Notwithstanding that, there was at least some sound evidential basis for the charge of embellishment. Miss Chapman did not submit that this finding was perverse, irrational or unfounded in evidence.

The fourth point mentioned by the adjudicator was resolved in favour of the appellant. He did not think that the appellant’s credibility had been damaged by the apparent inconsistency within his evidence about when he had last seen his father.

Miss Chapman did not challenge as perverse the adjudicator’s finding that it would not have been possible for the appellant to leave Iran in the way that he did. It had been submitted for the Secretary of State that it would not have been possible for the arrangements to have been made in such haste after his release and it appears that the adjudicator accepted that. Miss Chapman pointed out the appellant’s evidence that his brother had been making advance plans for him to escape and that the father’s death had provided the opportunity to seek temporary release and go. But as I understood her submission, she accepted that the adjudicator was entitled to hold that it would not have been possible for the appellant to escape when he did, within the short window of opportunity provided by the temporary release. The adjudicator was also of the view that the appellant would not have left in the circumstances claimed as this would have put his brother and brother in law at risk. There was evidence that they had not suffered any ill consequence as the result of the appellant leaving Iran.

Miss Chapman placed considerable weight on the adjudicator’s observations about the deeds for the land which had been held by the appellant’s father and which had been produced to the adjudicator shortly before the hearing. She said that adjudicator had misunderstood the significance of these deeds. It appeared that he regarded the very fact that they had been produced at all as inconsistent with the appellant’s claim that they had been confiscated. He had completely failed to appreciate the point that the fact that they were stamped as confiscated provided positive support for the appellant’s case that they had been surrendered in return for three days’ temporary release. The fact that the adjudicator had not mentioned the stamp showed that he had not applied his mind to the appellant’s point. However, in the course of argument, Miss Chapman had to accept that any positive support the confiscation stamp might provide was dependent upon an explanation of how the deal had been done with the authorities and how it had come about that the family was still in physical possession of the deeds, albeit they were marked confiscated. There was some discussion about whether the Farsi word which had been translated as ‘confiscated’ really meant that. However, there was no evidence on these points and it seems to me that, in the absence of any explanation as to how it came about that the family were in possession of deeds which were supposed to have been surrendered, it was open to the adjudicator to make the observation that he did.

Finally, Miss Chapman challenged the adjudicator’s statement that he found convincing the suggestion that the appellant’s evidence had been tailored to fit the historical facts. She submitted that this was a finding of fact but was completely unsupported by reasons. In my view, that is not so. This was not a freestanding finding of fact. It was merely the recognition that, because the adjudicator had rejected the appellant’s story as untrue, it must follow that his story had been made up and because it fitted some historical facts, it must have been made up to fit those facts. Once the adjudicator had rejected as untrue the appellant’s claim that he had been detained for a year it was a necessary corollary that he would find that the story had been made up to fit the known facts. I reject Miss Chapman’s submission on this point.

I have examined each of the adjudicator’s findings separately because that is the only way in which one can examine whether each was rational and supported by evidence. However, it must be recognised that, when a decision maker is deciding whether he or she believes an account, the various points impinge on each other and also have a cumulative effect on the decision maker’s mind. The decision maker has to decide whether the whole story ‘hangs together’ or ‘stacks up’. Miss Chapman submitted that, if there were doubts about the soundness of more than one of the adjudicator’s reasons, those doubts would have a cumulative effect on the soundness of the final decision. I agree that that is so. Accordingly, it is necessary to look collectively at the various strands in the decision and to decide whether any uncertainty about the soundness of one or more strand undermines the validity of the whole.

The only strand of reasoning which gives rise to any concern in my mind is that relating to the absence of signs of abuse on the appellant’s body on his arrival in the UK. In all other respects, I consider that the adjudicator’s findings were rational and founded in evidence. However, my concerns about this point do not lead me to the conclusion that the decision as a whole is undermined. The absence of marks on the appellant’s body could never have provided positive support for his case; the complaint was only that their absence was explicable and did not undermine his credibility. If the adjudicator had put that point aside, (as he did with the confusion about when the appellant had last seen his father) saying that he accepted the explanation for the absence of marks and this did not affect credibility, the overall decision would still have been the same and would in my view have been rational and evidentially sound.

I must therefore reject the criticism of the adjudicator’s decision as irrational and unfounded in evidence and it follows that I would dismiss the appeal.

With misgivings, I agree that this appeal has to be dismissed.

My misgivings stem not only from the concern which I share with Lady Justice Smith about the adjudicator’s reasoning on the absence of visible marks of ill-treatment, but from his reasons for disbelieving the appellant’s account of over a year’s detention without charge or trial.

The in-country information about modern Iran demonstrates the arbitrariness and brutality with which the state’s powers are exercised against those perceived as untrustworthy. It is entirely possible for an individual to be informed upon, quite possibly untruthfully, and subjected in consequence to prolonged detention and torture by security authorities over whom there is no independent judicial control. There is therefore nothing incredible in principle about what the appellant says happened to him.

But in this as in every case the adjudicator has to go and decide whether, albeit feasible, what the appellant describes is what actually happened. This adjudicator has given reasons which are neither perverse nor illogical for finding that it is not. The fact – and it is a fact – that I consider his reasons to be strained, and not to be reasons at which many adjudicators would have arrived on this material, is not enough. Nor, for the reasons given by Lady Justice Smith, does it help to add his deficient reasoning on the want of physical marks: the two things are of a different kind and cannot be aggregated.

One is always conscious of the major potential of any fact-finding system for radical error, and never more so than when return may inadvertently be putting a person’s life or safety at risk; but our functions and powers in this field are limited to the correction of errors of law. We cannot intervene simply because we are uneasy – as I certainly am - at the fact-finder’s mode of reasoning or his conclusions, so long as these have stayed within what is legally permissible.