3M United Kingdom Plc & Anor v Linklaters & Paines (A Firm)

This is an appeal from an order made on 5 July 2005 by Mr Justice Hart on the hearing of a preliminary issue in proceedings brought by 3M United Kingdom Plc and 3M UK Holdings Plc against Linklaters & Paines, the well known firm of solicitors. The claim in the proceedings is for damages for breach of duty under a retainer. The work in respect of which complaint is made was carried out in 1989. These proceedings were not issued until August 1999. In those circumstances the defendants rely upon the Limitation Act 1980 as a defence to the claim. The preliminary issue which the judge had to determine was whether the claimants had commenced the proceedings within any applicable period of limitation.

It was common ground before the judge that the only relevant period of limitation was that prescribed by section 14A(4)(b) of the 1980 Act; that is to say, the period of three years from the starting date as defined by section 14A(5). And further, given that the parties entered into a standstill agreement on 3 September 1998 (under which they agreed that questions of limitation should be determined on the basis that proceedings (if any) be treated as having been issued on 1 September 1998), it was common ground that the question whether or not a limitation defence is available turns on whether the starting date, for the purposes of section 14A(5) of the Act, was before 1 September 1995; or was on or after that date.

Section 14A(5) of the Limitation Act 1980 is in these terms:

“14A(5) For the purposes of this section, the starting date for reckoning the period of limitation under subsection (4)(b) above is the earliest date on which the plaintiff or any person in whom the cause of action was vested before him first had both the knowledge required for bringing an action for damages in respect of the relevant damage and a right to bring such an action.”

It is common ground that the relevant damage was suffered in 1989. It is not in doubt that the claimants had a right to bring an action for damages in respect of that damage before 1 September 1995. The question is whether the claimants had the knowledge required for bringing such an action before that date.

The judge held that they did. He held that the claimants had the necessary knowledge for the purposes of section 14A(5) of the Act on 30 August 1995. It followed that the starting date for the purposes of section 14A was two days before 1 September 1995. So, when the proceedings were commenced, the claimants were out of time. It is the judge’s conclusion as to knowledge that the claimants seek to challenge on this appeal.

With that introduction, I now turn to the underlying facts. They are fully – and, if I may say so, most helpfully – set out by the judge at paragraphs 3 to 15 of his judgment [2005] EWHC 1382 (Ch). For the purposes of this judgment I can summarise those facts as follows:

It was in those circumstances that the judge had to decide whether the 3M companies (through Mr Herd) had the knowledge required, in the context of section 14A(5) of the Limitation Act 1980, before 1 September 1995. For the purposes of this appeal it is accepted that the 3M companies are to be treated as having, on 30 August 1995, the knowledge which Mr Herd acquired on that day in the course of his revision of the draft deed of variation.

The judge found, at paragraph 45 of his judgment, that Mr Herd knew, on 30 August 1995 “that the damage in respect of which the claimants now sue (namely damage attributable to the loss of the break clause) had occurred and that it had occurred as a result of the acts and omissions of the defendants”. He thought that conclusion “inescapable”.

It is pertinent to have in mind the damage in respect of which the claimants sue in these proceedings. Particulars of damage are set out under paragraph 15 of the amended particulars of claim served pursuant to an order dated 10 September 2004. The damage pleaded includes, at sub-paragraphs (i) and (v):

“(i)

The Claimants lost the opportunity of negotiating an extension of the right to break (contained in clause 9 of each of the three leases) so as to be capable of being operated, in the first instance, in March 2001 and, subsequently, in March 2003. If the defendants had discharged their duty the Claimants would have ensured that they retained the right to break the three leases in September 1997. The retention of the right to break would have provided the Claimants with the opportunity, as they in fact thought it did in 1995, of reorganising the date at which the break was to take effect so as to coincide with their evolving accommodation policy for the 3M Group

. . .

(v)

By not having the opportunity to break the three leases with effect from 29 September 1997:

(a)

the First Claimant is under a contractual obligation to pay the rent and other outgoings for the duration of the term of the three leases;

(b)

the Second Claimant is under a continuing liability for rent and other outgoings under the three leases notwithstanding any assignment thereof . . . by reason of the fact that the three leases were granted prior to the coming into force of the Landlord and Tenant (Covenants) Act 1995.”

That damage is said to have been suffered “by reason of the matters aforesaid”.

Those matters include the allegation (at paragraph 10 of the amended particulars of claim) that:

“In breach of the express and/or implied terms of their retainer and/or their duty of care in tort the Defendants

. . .

(3)

failed to advise the Claimants as to the effects the assignment of the 3 leases would or might have on the rights of the Claimants and each of them. In particular, the Defendants failed to advise the Claimants

(a)

that the Second Claimant’s right to break contained in clause 9 of the 3 leases would or might be lost by reason of the assignment of the leases; and/or

(b)

that the right to break contained in clause 9 of the 3 leases would or might be extinguished altogether by reason of the assignment of the leases; and/or

(c)

that the right to break contained in clause 9 of the 3 leases could not be revived, or might not be capable of being revived, by the re-assignment of the leases to the Second Claimant; and/or

(d)

that, if the First Claimant were to seek the landlord’s licence to re-assign the 3 leases to the Second Claimant, with a view to the Second Claimant exercising the right to break contained in clause 9 of the leases, it would be reasonable for the landlord to withhold its consent; . . .”

Paragraph 14 of the amended particulars of claim contains the allegation that:

“Had the Defendants brought to the Claimants’ attention the facts and matters set out in paragraphs 10(3)(a) – (d) above, the Claimants would not have assigned the 3 leases, alternatively would have taken measures to preserve the right to break contained in clause 9 before assigning the 3 leases.”

As I have said, it is clear from the terms of the draft document which Herbert Smith sent to Mr Herd on 18 August 1995 that the draftsman had not appreciated that there had been a change of tenant since the grant of the lease in 1987. That appears from the description of the proposed deed of variation as being: “Supplemental to a lease (hereinafter called ‘the Lease’) dated 4th December 1987 and made between the same parties as are parties hereto and in the same order.” The draftsman knew that the option to break in clause 9(1) of the lease was exercisable only by the original tenant, as he made clear in recital (3) to his draft, which is in these terms:

“(3)

The Lease contains an option to determine in favour of the Tenant (defined in the Lease to mean only 3M United Kingdom Plc)”

But he had not appreciated that the tenant who was to execute the deed of variation (although having the name 3M United Kingdom Plc in 1995) was not the company of that name to whom the lease had been granted in 1987. And, not knowing that, the draftsman had not appreciated that the option to break had ceased to be exercisable by reason of the change of tenant.

Mr Herd was aware of each of those matters on 30 August 1995. That appears from the amendments to the draft deed which he made on that day. Those included (i) the substitution for the words “the same parties as are parties hereto and in the same order”, in the description of the lease to which the deed of variation was to be supplemental, of the words at Rider A - “3M UK Holdings Plc (company number 241 888) formerly known as 3M United Kingdom Plc” - (ii) the introduction of a new recital in the terms of Rider B - “By a Transfer dated 3 May 1989 the interest of 3M UK Holdings Plc under the Lease was assigned to the Tenant.” - and (iii) Rider C - the new clause 3 which I have already set out. It is the third of those amendments – read in conjunction with what had been recital (3) in the Herbert Smith draft (in the terms to which I have already referred) which Mr Herd left unamended – which, to my mind, shows beyond argument that Mr Herd appreciated the effect that the change in tenant had had on the option to break conferred by clause 9(1) of the lease. The effect of that amendment – as Mr Herd must have intended – was to enable the tenant by assignment (then known as 3M United Kingdom Plc) to exercise the option to break confirmed by clause 9(1) of the lease. As the judge put it, in paragraph 45 of his judgment: “His drafting of Rider C is really only explicable on the basis of his having correctly identified the existence of the problem and of his wish to cure it at that point”.

Knowing the matters to which I have just referred, the inference that Mr Herd knew that, as at 30 August 1995, the options to break were no longer capable of being exercised – unless the problem could be overcome – and that he knew that the reason why those options were no longer capable of being exercised was that the leases had been assigned in 1989 without steps being taken to preserve the options, is, indeed, inescapable. As the judge put it in the passage which I have set out, Mr Herd knew, on 30 August 1995, that the damage in respect of which the claimants now sue had occurred and that the defendants had failed (in the manner of which complaint is now made) to give the advice which would have led the claimants to take steps to prevent that damage.

The question for the judge, given those findings of fact, was whether, on 30 August 1995, the claimants had the knowledge required “for bringing an action for damages in respect of the relevant damage” – section 14A(5) of the Limitation Act 1980.

Section 14A(5) of the Limitation Act 1980 must be read with the subsequent provisions of that section. Sub-section (6) is in these terms:

“14A(6) In subsection (5) above ‘the knowledge required for bringing an action for damages in respect of the relevant damage’ means knowledge both –

(a)

of the material facts about the damage in respect of which damages are claimed; and

(b)

of the other facts relevant to the current action mentioned in subsection (8) below.”

Subsection (7) provides that

“14A(7) For the purposes of subsection (6)(a) above, the material facts about the damage are such facts about the damage as would lead a reasonable person who had suffered such damage to consider it sufficiently serious to justify his instituting proceedings for damages against a defendant who did not dispute liability and was able to satisfy a judgment.”

Subsections (8), (9) and (10) are in these terms:

“14A(8) The other facts referred to in subsection (6)(b) are—

(a)

that the damage was attributable in whole or in part to the act or omission which is alleged to constitute negligence; and

(b)

the identity of the defendant; and

(c)

if it is alleged that the act or omission was that of a person other than the defendant, the identity of that person and the additional facts supporting the bringing of an action against the defendant.

(9)

Knowledge that any facts or omissions did or did not, as a matter of law, involve negligence is irrelevant for the purposes of subsection (5) above.

(10)

For the purposes of this section a person’s knowledge includes knowledge which he might reasonably have been expected to acquire –

(a)

from facts observable or ascertainable by him; or

(b)

from facts ascertainable by him with the help of appropriate expert advice which it is reasonable for him to seek;

but a person shall not be taken by virtue of this subsection to have knowledge of a fact ascertainable only with the help of expert advice so long as he has taken all reasonable steps to obtain (and, where appropriate, to act on) that advice.”

In the context of this appeal, the key provision is that in section 14A(7): knowledge of “such facts about the damage as would lead a reasonable person who had suffered such damage to consider it sufficiently serious to justify instituting proceedings against a defendant who did not dispute liability and was able to satisfy a judgment.”

The statutory provisions were considered recently by the House of Lords in Haward and others v Fawcetts (a firm) [2006] UKHL 9; [2006] 1 WLR 682. The claim, in those proceedings, was in respect of loss suffered as a result of investment advice given in December 1994. The action was not commenced until December 2001. The claimants relied on section 14A(4)(b) of the Limitation Act 1980, contending that the earliest date upon which they had had the requisite knowledge for the purposes of section 14A(5) of that Act was after December 1998. The House of Lords (reversing the Court of Appeal, [2004] EWCA Civ 240) rejected that contention. The central question on the appeal to the House of Lords was whether Mr Haward knew, before December 1998, that the damage was attributable in whole or in part to the advice given by the defendants in 1994 – section 14A(8)(a) of the Act. It is, perhaps, for that reason that section 14A(7) receives consideration only in the speech of Lord Mance. He said this (ibid, [106], [107]; 717B-H):

“106

Under s.14A the onus is on a claimant to plead and prove that he first had the knowledge required for bringing his action within a period of three years prior to its bringing. Subsection (6) of s.14A distinguishes two aspects of the knowledge required. The first aspect relates to the seriousness of the damage, the second to ‘the other facts relevant to the current action’ including in particular that such damage was attributable in whole or part to the act or omission alleged to constitute negligence and the identity of the defendant. The seriousness of the damage is relevant because there may be cases where, although it is known that loss has been suffered due to the negligence of another person, the loss may appear for a time so minor that no-one would contemplate instituting proceedings. That is I think more likely in the area of personal injuries and fatal accidents, covered by s.14 on which s.14A(7) to (10) were modelled, than in the area covered by s.14A itself. In both areas, the statutory language assumes that it is known that there has been some injury (under s.14) or damage (under s.14A). But this too can give rise to difficulty. If a doctor advises that it is necessary to operate, or to remove a breast, in order to remove a malignant tumour, one would not usually speak of the patient sustaining an injury until one knew that the diagnosis was misconceived and there was no such tumour. Similarly, if a financial adviser advises in favour of an investment, one would not describe the making of the investment itself as ‘damage’ until one discovered that it had been a bad or unsound investment from the outset.

107

In such cases, there is an inter-play between knowledge of what would ordinarily be regarded as injury or damage and knowledge regarding the factual circumstances in which the operation or investment occurred. Yet, the first aspect of the knowledge required relates to damage of sufficient seriousness ‘to justify [the claimant] instituting proceedings’ (section 14A(7)), whereas the knowledge required regarding the attributability of such damage to some act or omission of the defendants is, as will appear, not necessarily such knowledge as to justify proceedings. To maintain a coherent scheme, the better view therefore appears to be to treat the first aspect of knowledge as relating solely to matters of quantum and all questions regarding the evaluation or classification of damage as such as falling within the second aspect of the knowledge required. This is also the view taken in authority: see Dobbie v. Medway Health Authority [1994] 1 WLR 1234, 1241G-1242A, per Sir Thomas Bingham MR. In the present case, the judge said that Mr Haward knew by 6th December 1998 that at any rate part of the large investments which had been made in HAL would not be recovered and had become lost, whatever happened to HAL. But that is not the same as saying that he knew that the investments were bad from the outset.” [emphasis added]

The claim in Dobbie v Medway Health Authority [1994] 1WLR 1234 – to which Lord Mance referred in the passage which I have just set out – was in respect of personal injuries. The decision turned on the provisions of sections 11(4)(b) and 14(1)(a) and (2) of the Limitation Act 1980. Those provisions are in terms which (although not the same) are very similar to those in section 14A(4)(b), 6(a) and (7) of the Act. The three year limitation period made applicable to personal injury claims by section 11(4) runs from “(b) the date of knowledge . . . of the person injured”. The date of knowledge, in that context, is the date on which the person injured first had knowledge of certain facts including “(a) that the injury in question was significant” – section 14(1). Section 14(2) is in these terms:

“14(2) For the purposes of this section an injury is significant if the person whose date of knowledge is in question would reasonably have considered it sufficiently serious to justify his instituting proceedings for damages against a defendant who did not dispute liability and was able to satisfy a judgment.”

After referring to two (then recent) decisions of this Court – Nash v Eli Lilly & Co [1993] 1 WLR 782 and Broadley v Guy Clapham & Co [1993] 4 Med LR 328, Sir Thomas Bingham, Master of the Rolls, said this ([1994] 1 WLR 1234, 1241H):

“Those decisions are, I think, consistent with and supportive of the construction of the statutory language set out above, subject to one possible qualification. The requirement that the injury of which a plaintiff has knowledge should be ‘significant’ is in my view directed solely to the quantum of the injury and not to the plaintiff’s evaluation of its cause, nature or usualness. Time does not run against a plaintiff, even if he is aware of the injury, if he would reasonably have considered it insufficiently serious to justify proceedings against an acquiescent and credit-worthy defendant, if (in other words) he would reasonably have accepted it as a fact of life and not worth bothering about. . . .”

As I have said, there can be no dispute that the claimant companies knew on 30 August 1995, as a result of the work done by Mr Herd on the draft deed of variation, that the options to break conferred by clauses 9(1) in the leases of the three CTC units were no longer capable of being exercised unless the problem which arose from the assignments made in 1989 could be overcome. In those circumstances the only remaining question was whether a reasonable person, faced with that problem, would have considered it sufficiently serious to justify instituting proceedings against an acquiescent and credit-worthy defendant (to adopt the words of Sir Thomas Bingham, Master of the Rolls, in the Dobbie case).

It is said that the judge did not address that question adequately in his judgment. In particular it is said, in the appellants’ notice, (a) that the judge was wrong to treat the loss of the options to break the leases as relevant damage for the purpose of the knowledge required by section 14A(7) of the Act if the claimant companies were not aware that Provident Mutual could and would rely on the fact that the options had been lost, (b) that he failed to give proper consideration to the fact that Provident Mutual had agreed, in principle, to deferment of the options to break prior to 30 August 1995 and (c) that he failed to appreciate that it was not until the claimant companies knew that Provident Mutual had resiled from that agreement in principle (which occurred after 1 September 1995) that they had knowledge of damage sufficient to satisfy section 14A(7). In granting permission to appeal, on 17 August 2005, Lord Justice Lloyd observed:

“The only basis upon which the judge’s conclusion could be faulted, as it seems to me, is if it were said that the reasonable person would have waited a short time to see whether the landlord would agree to proceed without the Claimants incurring any more than trivial expenditure or other disadvantage. If a reasonable person would have waited for, say, a month before deciding whether the damage was sufficiently serious to justify proceedings, that would be enough for the Claimants to succeed.”

But, as he said, he was far from concluding that the judge was even probably wrong on that point.

The judge may be excused for failing to address the point at any length. It was not raised by the claimants in their pleaded case. It is pertinent to have in mind that, as Lord Mance pointed out in the opening sentence of paragraph 106 of his speech in the Haward case, the onus is on a claimant who seeks to rely on section 14A(4)(b) of the Limitation Act, “to plead and prove that he first had the knowledge required for bringing his action within a period of three years prior to its bringing”. In the present case, the defendants had raised the limitation defence at paragraph 5(d)(iv) of their amended defence, dated 29 December 2004:

“. . . the Defendant avers that on . . . 31 August 1995, the Claimants had knowledge of, or could reasonably have been expected to acquire knowledge of, the material facts about the damage in respect of which damages are claimed, as would have led a reasonable person who had suffered such damage to consider it sufficiently serious to justify his instituting proceedings for damages against a defendant who did not dispute liability and was able to satisfy judgement.”

The claimants’ response is at paragraph 8 of the amended reply to amended defence, dated 2 February 2005. Paragraphs 8.7 and 8.8 are in these terms (so far as material):

“8.7

The amendments [made by Mr Herd to the draft deed of variation on 30 August 1995] were not made with the intention of attempting to cure the loss of the break clause because at the time he made the amendments Mr Herd did not know that the break clause had been lost on the assignment.

8.8

It is the Claimants’ case that Mr Herd did not know, nor was it reasonable to have expected him to acquire knowledge, that the break clause was personal to the Second Claimant and had been lost on the assignment . . .”

Given that that was the claimants’ pleaded case – that Mr Herd did not know, on 30 or 31 August 1995, that the options to break had been lost by the assignment – there were obvious difficulties in advancing before the judge a case that Mr Herd did know that the options had been lost but did not think that loss sufficiently serious to justify proceedings.

Nevertheless, the case which the 3M companies now wish to advance was raised by the judge during the closing submissions of counsel then instructed on their behalf. The judge said this (transcript, 11 May 2005, page 20, lines 15-25):

“. . . Assume for a moment that the finding of fact is that the problem was perceived before 1^st September, but was assumed to be retrievable because you could re-assign, or retrievable because there was an overwhelming probability or there appeared to be an overwhelming probability that Herbert Smith would accept the amendments in the Deed of Variation, there is still actionable damage, arguably. But there might be an argument on those perceptions it was not damage sufficiently serious to justify actually embarking on the preliminaries to the issue of a writ.”

It took some time before the argument suggested by the judge was embraced by counsel; but the following passage does appear later in his closing submissions (transcript 11 May 2005, page 78 lines, 13-21):

“We submit that the recent negotiations in the agreements which were drafted by Herbert Smith suggested that there was no issue as to whether rights to break [were] subsisting, and [a] reasonable person would, therefore, not consider it sufficiently serious to justify the institution of proceedings. The position only changed in late September when the landlord’s position was made [known] . . .”

It was that response, perhaps, which led the judge to say, at paragraph 45 of his judgment:

“. . . It may be that [Mr Herd] hoped that the point would not be seen by Herbert Smith or, if seen, not taken by Provident Mutual, but that in my judgment would have been a matter of hope rather than rational expectation. Once Provident Mutual was alive to the point it would have no commercial incentive to agree to the deed of variation. It may also be that he hoped that, if the point were taken, the solution of a re-assignment could be activated but, as he accepted in cross-examination, he would have expected the defendants to pick up the costs occasioned by that.”

It is, I think, clear that – having raised the argument in the course of closing submissions – the judge rejected it, for the reasons which he gave, when he came to write his judgment.

I turn, therefore, to the points raised in the appellants’ notice. In my view they cannot be sustained. First, it is impossible to contend that the loss of the options to break the leases was not relevant damage for the purpose of the knowledge required by section 14A(7) of the Act until the claimant companies were aware that Provident Mutual could and would rely on the fact that options were not exercisable by the current tenant. The “relevant damage” in the context of sections 14A(5) and (7) of the 1980 Act is the “damage in respect of which damages are claimed” – section 14A(6)(a). The relevant damage, in the present case, is the damage alleged in paragraph 15 of the particulars of claim. As I have said, earlier in this judgment, the damage in respect of which damages are claimed (as pleaded) is the loss of the right to break the three leases in September 1997. It was the loss of the right to break in September 1997 which gave rise to the loss of the opportunity to negotiate an extension of that right to March 2001 or to March 2003. That loss was sustained when the leases were assigned in 1989; not when Provident Mutual broke off negotiations in September 1995. That point was accepted by Mr Herd in his oral evidence before the judge (transcript, 9 May 2005, page 71, lines 5-10):

“A. At that time [August 1995] it is quite clear that both of us assumed the break clause was effective.

Q. Was available to the assignee?

A.

Absolutely, because the whole negotiations that had taken place between Mr Bird and Mr Wilkes proceeded on that assumption. They would have been wasting their time otherwise.”

The second point fails for much the same reason. It is impossible to contend that the fact that Provident Mutual had agreed, in principle, to deferment of the options to break prior to 30 August 1995 – at a time when it thought that the options were exercisable in September 1997 – could be taken as any indication that it would be willing to affirm that agreement in principle once it knew that the options were not exercisable at that date or at all. That is the thrust of Mr Herd’s answer, to which I have just referred. If both parties had not entered negotiations in the (mistaken) belief that the options remained exercisable “they would have been wasting their time”. The point was made clearly by Mr Bird, in paragraphs 20 and 21 of the witness statement which he signed on 22 March 2000:

“20.

In late September [1995] . . . the landlord informed me verbally that it had received legal advice that the break clause was personal to the 3M company which had signed the Technical Centre Leases. . . . Accordingly, it appeared that the right to break had been lost as the Technical Centre Leases had been assigned in 1989 to another 3M company and the landlord would, in consequence, not be deferring an existing option but creating a new one. This would be of no benefit to the landlord. . . .

21

. . . The 3M proposal had been attractive enough to the landlord for it to drop the penalty of six months’ rent which was payable on exercising the break in 1997. In addition, there was to be no increase in the current rent until September 2002. Under the variation 3M would have stayed in the property for four years longer than if the existing break had been exercise in 1997. Retaining a tenant of 3M’s calibre for an extra four years was obviously very attractive to the landlord. Retaining such a tenant until the lease expiry in 2012 was even more attractive.”

Nor can the third point raised in the appellants’ notice be sustained. The claimant companies knew, on 30 August 1995, what damage had been sustained: they no longer had a right to break in September 1997 and, without that right, they had lost the opportunity to negotiate an extension. There was nothing to extend. As Mr Bird recognised, deferring an existing option is one thing: granting a new option is quite another. Provident Mutual had no incentive to negotiate. It was inevitable that it would resile from the agreement in principle once it became aware that that agreement had been negotiated on a false basis. As the judge put it, if Mr Herd hoped that the point would not be seen by Herbert Smith or, if seen, not taken by Provident Mutual, that would be “a matter of hope rather than rational expectation”.

The true position on 30 August 1995, as the judge appreciated, was that the claimant companies (through Mr Herd) well knew what they had lost by the assignments in 1989. And they knew that that loss was serious, unless the problem could be solved. The hope that Provident Mutual would not receive informed advice as to the strength of its position has not been advanced: there could be no basis for a suggestion that the landlord would not be properly advised by its solicitors. The hope that there could be a solution to the problem by negotiation was founded on sand: there was no basis for negotiation. The suggestion (canvassed by the judge, but not advanced on this appeal) that the problem could be solved by a reassignment of the leases to the original tenant was based on a misunderstanding of the law – as Mr Justice Lightman had pointed out in Max Factor Limited v Wesleyan Assurance Society (1996) 74 P & CR 8, decided some three and a half months earlier. And, in any event, the landlord could not have been required to consent to a reassignment for that purpose – as this Court had held in Olympia & York Canary Wharf Ltd and another v Oil Property Investments Ltd [1994] 2 EGLR 48.

In those circumstances, as it seems to me, it is impossible to contend that the claimant companies did not have the knowledge required by section 14A(7) of the Act on 30 August 1995: that is to say, knowledge of such facts about the damage which they had suffered as would lead a reasonable person who had suffered such damage to consider it sufficiently serious to justify his instituting proceedings for damages against a defendant who did not dispute liability and was able to satisfy a judgment. That does not mean, of course, that the claimant companies knew enough to commence proceedings by issuing a writ on 30 August 1995 – it means that they knew enough and with sufficient confidence “to justify embarking on the preliminaries to the issue of a writ, such as submitting a claim to the proposed defendant, taking advice, and collecting evidence: . . . In other words, the claimant must know enough for it to be reasonable to begin to investigate further.” - per Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead in the Haward case at [9], ([2006] 1 WLR 682, 685F).

I would dismiss this appeal.

I have had the advantage of reading in draft the judgments of Chadwick and Moore-Bick LJJs. I agree with both and have nothing I can usefully add.

I agree that the appeal should be dismissed for the reasons given by Chadwick L.J. and venture to add a few words of my own only in deference to the argument of Mr. Pooles Q.C. for the appellants.

When Mr. Herd examined the leases and the documents which accompanied them, which of course included the assignments, he realised that the break clauses were personal to the original tenant and did not survive for the benefit of the assignee. He immediately became aware, therefore, that the 3M Group had lost a valuable right as a result of the assignments, but it was apparent from the draft deed prepared by Provident Mutual’s solicitors that they had not appreciated that the company entitled “3M United Kingdom Plc” was not the original tenant and so were probably not aware of their consequences. However, Mr. Herd realised that there was a problem because he drafted a new recital referring to the assignment and a new clause which was intended to cure it by providing that all references to 3M United Kingdom Plc in the lease should be treated as references to the assignee.

Mr. Pooles Q.C. did not seek to challenge any of that, but he submitted that at that stage Mr. Herd did not know whether the loss of the break clauses would give rise to any practical consequences and therefore did not know whether the situation was one in which it would be reasonable to issue proceedings. He was aware that the parties had reached agreement in principle and thought that the deeds of variation might still be executed as planned. If they were, the 3M Group would be no worse off. It was only on 25^th September when Provident Mutual made it clear that it intended to resile from the agreement because the break clauses had ceased to have effect that it became obvious to him that the loss was sufficiently serious to justify proceedings. Accordingly, it was only then that Mr. Herd knew such facts about the damage as, in the words of section 14A(7) of the Limitation Act 1980,

“would lead a reasonable person who had suffered such damage to consider it sufficiently serious to justify his instituting proceedings for damages against a defendant who did not dispute liability and was able to satisfy a judgment.”

In my view the flaw in this argument is that subsection (7) is directed to a narrow question. It is not concerned with whether the claimant has such knowledge of the facts generally as would cause a reasonable person to commence proceedings there and then, or even such knowledge as would cause him to embark on the preliminaries to the issue of proceedings, but simply with whether he has such knowledge of the material facts about the damage as would cause a reasonable person to consider it sufficiently serious to justify proceedings against a solvent defendant who did not dispute liability. In other words, by its own terms subsection (7) is concerned only with the claimant’s knowledge of the seriousness of the damage. Support for that conclusion is to be found in the speech of Lord Mance in Haward v Fawcetts [2006] UKHL 9, [2006] 1 W.L.R. 682, 717E-H, in the judgment of Sir Thomas Bingham M.R. in Dobbie v Medway Health Authority [1994] 1 W.L.R. 1234, 1241H-1242A and in the judgment of this court in Nash v Eli Lilly & Co [1993] 1 W.L.R. 782, 799C-D (these last two being decisions on the corresponding provision of section 14).

It was accepted in this case that the claimants had suffered damage as a result of their solicitors’ negligence at the time of the assignment in May 1989 because at that point they had lost valuable rights in the form of the break clauses and it was the loss of those rights which came to Mr. Herd’s attention on 30^th August 1995. I am prepared to assume for present purposes that he thought there was a chance that the situation could be retrieved, either because Provident Mutual and those advising it would not spot the problem or because, if it did, it would decide not to rely on the point, although I find it difficult to believe that in the circumstances either could be reasonably be regarded as at all likely. Even so, I am unable to accept that Mr. Herd did not already have sufficient knowledge to satisfy the requirements of subsection (7). The fact is that valuable rights had been lost and damage had been suffered. There was a possibility, albeit a remote one, that it might be made good, but that does not detract from the fact that the damage already existed. The only question, so far as subsection (7) is concerned, is whether it was known to be sufficiently serious to justify instituting proceedings against a defendant who did not dispute liability and was able to satisfy a judgment. In a commercial context damage does not have to be very substantial to satisfy those requirements in view of the limited cost of issuing proceedings and whatever figure was to be put on the damage suffered by the 3M Group in this case, it clearly exceeded that amount. Mr. Pooles did not seek to argue the contrary. This is not a case, therefore, in which it was uncertain whether significant damage had occurred; the only uncertainty, if indeed there was any, was whether that damage would be made good.