Customs & Excise v Elm Milk Ltd

This is an appeal from the order dated 3 February 2005 of Park J. By his order, the judge dismissed the appeal of the Commissioners of Customs & Excise (“Customs & Excise”) from the decision of the Value Added Tax and Duties Tribunal (Mr Stephen Oliver QC and Ms Rachel Adams FCA). The tribunal had in turn allowed the appeal of Elm Milk Limited (“the company”) from the refusal of Customs & Excise to allow the company’s claim to recover input tax incurred on the purchase of a Mercedes motor car.

As one would expect, input tax of this kind is not deductible unless the car is intended to be used exclusively for business use. But the relevant statutory provisions go on to provide that a person is not deemed to intend to use a car exclusively for business use if he intends to make it available for private use. The question is how such intention is shown where the owner of the car is a small company with a sole director. To decide that question I shall have to consider an important authority of this court, referred to below as the Upton case, on these provisions where the taxable person was a sole proprietor of his business who was to use the car for business use. I shall have to consider the ratio of that decision and whether it applies to a company with a sole director for whose use the car is bought. There is a further issue as to the meaning of “available” in this context, and as to what is meant by an intention to make available. Finally, there is a subsidiary ground of appeal as to the effect of a finding of fact of the tribunal that was clearly in error.

The relevant statutory provisions are contained in art 7 of the Value Added Tax (Input Tax) Order 1992 (“the 1992 Order”). I set out the relevant provisions in para 4 of this judgment. Art.7 applies to motor cars as defined by the 1992 Order, but nothing turns on that definition for the purposes of this appeal, and so I need not set out that definition. The 1992 Order was made pursuant to section 14(10) of the Value Added Tax Act 1983 but following the consolidation of that enacting provision the Order now has effect as if made under the Value Added Tax 1994 (“the 1994 Act”). Section 25 of the 1994 Act, referred to in art 7, provides for the general right of a taxable person to deduct input tax in respect of the supplies of goods and services to him for the purposes of his business.

The relevant provisions of art 7 of the 1992 Order, as amended, are as follows:-

“7(1) - Subject to paragraph (2) to (2H) below tax charged on –

(a)

the supply . . . to a taxable person. . .

of a motor car shall be excluded from any credit under section 25 of the [1994] Act.

(2)

Paragraph (1 ) above does not apply where

(a)

the motor car is -

(i)

a qualifying motor car;

(ii)

supplied ... to ... a taxable person; and

(iii)

the relevant condition is satisfied...

…

(2E) For the purposes of paragraph (2)(a) above the relevant condition is that the ... supply... is to a taxable person who intends to use the motor car either –

(a)

exclusively for the purposes of a business carried on by him, but this is subject to paragraph (2G) below; or ...

(2G) A taxable person shall not be taken to intend to use a motor car exclusively for the purposes of a business carried on by him if he intends to ...

(a)…

(b)

make it available (otherwise than by letting it on hire) to any person (including where the taxable person is an individual, himself, or where the taxable person is a partnership, a partner) for private use, whether or not for a consideration...”

I will have to consider the interpretation of these provisions in some detail below but at this stage I will confine myself to three preliminary observations. First, the provisions of art 7 set out above are drafted in a convoluted way. Parliament’s starting point is an exclusion from the general rule as to deductibility (art. 7(1)). Art. 7(2) then sets out an exception from this exclusion. Art. 7(2G) then provides for an exception to that exception in certain circumstances. I shall consider the implications of this convoluted scheme below.

Secondly, the exceptions in art 7 (2E) are based around the intention to use the car rather than use itself. No doubt that is because the deductibility of the input tax has to be determined when the car is purchased. The time for assessing the relevant intentions is at the time of the supply. Nonetheless the need to find intention to use rather than actual use adds an additional layer of difficulty. In the Upton case, the conclusion as to intention as to use departed from the evidence as to actual use after acquisition although it was not suggested that there had been any change of intention. This highlights the point that the Upton case turns on its very special facts since in the usual way consciously or unconsciously a tribunal or court would seek to test any provisional finding as to the taxpayer’s intention as to use by reference to what use had actually taken place after the alleged intention was formed.

Thirdly, the exception to the exception in art 7(2G) is also based on intention rather than an actual act, but this time the intention is not an intention to use but an intention to make available for use.

At the relevant time, the company was a private company with one director, Mr Phillips, and members of his family owned it. The company carried on business in three areas, as a landlord of farm premises, as a consultant to the dairy trade and as a consultant to the leisure industry. Mr Phillips was an executive director but he had no written terms of employment. Mr Phillips drove considerable distances in the course of the company’s business. In the year following the purchase of the car (which took place in February 2003) the car has been driven some 50,000 miles on company business. On 1 February 2003, the company acting by Mr Phillips passed a board resolution noting that the company was to purchase the car. The board minutes stated that the car was to be bought with the intention that it should be used for business purposes only by Mr Phillips, that the company did not intend to make the car available for private use, and that any private use would be a breach of an employee’s terms of employment.

The tribunal heard evidence from Mr Phillips, whom it accepted as a witness of truth. It found that the car was purchased for business use and also that the company and Mr Phillips intended to be bound by the board resolution (decision paras 10 and 11).

There is an issue as to the terms of the insurance for the car. The board minute referred to above noted that the insurance policy for the car would not permit anyone other than the company to use it for social, domestic or pleasure purposes. On this basis the company’s intention was that no third party should be insured to use the car for private use. The tribunal found that the persons insured to drive the car “included Mrs Phillips (as policyholder) and anyone driving with her permission” (decision para 14). Mrs Phillips is the wife of Mr Phillips. In fact the insurance policy for the car when issued named a number of drivers, and permitted all the drivers to drive the car for any purpose. The company had been informed by its insurers that it was not possible to insure the car solely for business purposes. I shall have to come to the implications of the terms of the insurance below.

In due course the car was purchased. When not in use, it was kept locked in a car park near the company’s office and within fifty yards of Mr Phillip’s home. The keys to the car, however, were kept in the company’s office. As sole director Mr Phillips would clearly have had access to the keys at all times. Mrs Phillips had a Rover 75 car and the tribunal was satisfied that all private motoring was done by Mr Phillips in Mrs Phillips’ car.

The tribunal considered the decision in the Upton case (referred to below). It recognised that in this situation it would have to be satisfied on strong evidence that there was no intention to use the car for private use. Nonetheless, the tribunal found as a fact that there was no intention that the car should be made available for Mr Phillips’ private use. It held that the terms of the insurance were “beside the point”. If Mr Phillips were to use the car for private purposes this would be a breach of the terms of the board resolution which the tribunal was satisfied was “intended to be acted upon”(decision para 21). Accordingly the company was entitled to deduct the VAT which it paid on the purchase of the car from the VAT for which it had to account to Customs & Excise.

Customs & Excise appealed to the High Court. Their principal submission was that the decision of the tribunal was perverse. They also contended that the Upton case mandated the result that the company was not entitled to deduct the VAT paid on the purchase of the car. They submitted that the decision of the tribunal was against the weight of the evidence and that the car was suitable for private use and the terms of the insurance for the car permitted it to be driven by others. In those circumstances there was no physical barrier to prevent the employee or the other named drivers using the car for private purposes and the board resolution was not an effective restraint on private use of the car.

The judge held that the tribunal had not erred. The physical circumstances of where the car was kept did not mean that as a matter of law the company intended to make it available for private use ([22]). The tribunal found that the board resolution was genuine and was properly to be taken into account in determining the VAT effects of the company’s acquisition of the car ([23]). Accordingly, the decision of this court in the Upton case was distinguishable ([24] to [25]). There was a clear difference between the sole trader situation and the employer and employee situation ([26]). Where an employer provides a car genuinely on terms that the employee may use it for business purposes only, the “relevant condition” in art 7(2A) (iii) of the 1992 Order was satisfied and thus if all the other requirements for input tax recovery were fulfilled the employer could recover the input tax included in the price of the car ([27)]. The condition could be satisfied even if the car was not for example placed in a locked compound when not required for business use ([28]). Deductibility was not lost if the employer recognised that the car might be used for non-business use in an emergency ([29]). Such use would be a breach of the contractual restriction on use for private purposes but “realistically…few reasonable employers would do anything about it” ([29)]. The important point was not whether it was possible to imagine any exceptional circumstances in which the car might be used for private purposes. The question was whether when the employer purchased the car he intended to make it available for private use. The maxim that a person is presumed to intend the natural consequences of his acts was only a presumption ([30)]. “In my judgment the presumption is pushed too far if it used to argue that a person intends something to happen when he has specifically imposed a contractual condition designed (and genuinely designed, rather than merely colourably designed) to prevent it happening.” ([30]). There was no difference of principle where the director was the sole director of a small family company though where the employer and employee are connected the facts may require closer scrutiny ([32]) but the tribunal had examined the claim of the taxpayer with care ([33] to [36]).

In his judgment, the judge considered also a judgment of the Inner House of the Court of Session in Customs & Excise Commissioners v Skellett [2004] STC 201. That case followed the Upton case but does not further deal with the issues in this case so I need not make further reference to it, save to note that the Inner House expressed a provisional view that a strong case for saying that a sole trader had complied with art 7(2G) might be made if (for example) the insurance for the car had been restricted to business use. Likewise the Upton case has been followed in two decisions of the High Court, Crown & Cushion Hotels Ltd v Commissioners of Customs & Excise [2003] EWHC 1693 (Ch) (Lawrence Collins J) and Commissioners of Customs & Excise v Robbins [2004] EWHC 3373 (Ch), Lloyd J, 28 April 2004 unreported. In the first case, the point only arose obiter as the claim failed for other reasons but it was held that contractual restrictions could be relied on for the purposes of art 7(2G). In the latter case, the claim failed because there were neither legal nor physical restrictions against private use. The number of cases on this point, however, illustrates the importance of the principal point of law in issue on this appeal.

I now turn at last to examine the important decision of this court in the Upton case. I take the facts from the headnote. Mr Upton carried on business as a cigarette vending machine operator. His vending machines were installed in nightclubs in London. In 1998 for the purpose of impressing his customers and staying ahead of his competitors, he bought a Lamborghini motor car. When the car was insured, Mr Upton made enquiries as to whether it could be insured for business use only but was told by his agent that all insurance policies covered private use without charge. He conducted his business seven days a week from 8am until midnight or later. When the car was not in use it was parked in a car park. Mr Upton owed no other car for private use but did not need one. He did not use the car for shopping or for social occasions. He claimed to recover the VAT paid on the purchase of the car. Customs & Excise disallowed the claim. Mr Upton appealed to the tribunal which held allowing the appeal that “made available” in the 1992 Order had to mean more than “be available” and that there was no evidence in the specialised circumstances of Mr Upton’s business and personal life that he intended to make the car available for his own private use. Customs & Excise appealed to the High Court. Sir Andrew Morritt VC allowed the appeal on the ground that the car might be made available if it was available in fact and the owner did nothing to prevent its use by himself. Mr Upton then appealed to this court. His appeal was dismissed.

It is convenient to set out the material passages from each judgment.

Peter Gibson LJ gave the first judgment and held as follows:-

“21.

It is plain that the test for the disqualifying condition of para (2G)(b) is of intention at the time of acquisition. The fact that a car is available or is made available to a person for private use subsequent to the acquisition is not determinative. However, that fact may be highly relevant to an inference that the taxable person has the intention to make the car available to himself for private use. I do not think that the Vice-Chancellor can fairly be criticised as having addressed the fact of the car’s availability to Mr Upton for private use rather than his intention to make it so available. On the contrary he makes it clear that the issue is as to the nature of what is intended and that he had to consider whether, given that the car was available for private use, the taxable person intended to make it so.

22.

I own to having been troubled at one time that the Vice-Chancellor was construing the language of para (2G)(b) by rewriting the words ‘if he intends to ... make it available... to any person... for private use’ so as, to mean ‘unless he intends to ... take positive steps to make it unavailable... to any person... for private use’, and that either such a construction was limited to the case of the individual taxable person intending to make the car available to himself for persona1 use, in which case the same words had a different meaning in their application to other taxable persons and other circumstances, or the rewriting applied to all taxable persons, in which case it was hard to justify the rewriting in circumstances other than where the individual taxable person was intending to make the car available to himself for personal use. However, I am persuaded by Mr Paines that the Vice-Chancellor was not attempting any such rewriting nor was he giving a different meaning to the words of para (2G) in differing circumstances. Rather the Vice-Chancellor was recognising that in the case of an individual taxable person who acquires a car there is a particular difficulty in the way of that person if he is to escape from the disqualifying condition that ‘he intends to ... make it available... to ... himself... for private use’. The very fact of his deliberate acquisition of the car whereby he makes himself the owner of the car and controller of it means that at least ordinarily he must intend to make it available to himself for private use, even if he never intends to use it privately. The Vice-Chancellor appeared to contemplate that there might be ways in which that result could be avoided by action taken by the individual taxable person such as would lead to the inference that the relevant intention was absent. But whether or not that possibility is a real one, the Vice-Chancellor thought it plain that in the present case there was no material to enable the tribunal to conclude that Mr Upton did not intend to make the car available to himself for private use. The Vice-Chancellor was therefore giving the same meaning to the language of para (2G)(b) in relation to Mr Upton as he would give to that language in relation to, say, a corporate taxable person, but he was recognising the peculiar problem poised for an individual taxable person acquiring a car.

[23] The tribunal appear not to have recognised the difficulty but to have treated the test of para (2G)(b) as being in effect the same as that of para (2E), so that if the taxable person intends to use the car exclusively for the purposes of a business carried on by him, he could not intend to make it available to himself for private use: hence their emphatic finding in para 13 that Mr Upton did not intend to use the car privately and in para 15 their seeing force in the submission that para (2G) was mere surplusage. It is also reflected in the fact that nowhere do the tribunal say that Mr Upton did not intend to make the car available to himself for personal use. The closest they get to it is in the final sentence of para 16 when they say that there is no evidence whatever to suggest that he intended to make the car available. The tribunal’s concluding remarks are, with respect, not easy to follow. But what is plain is that the tribunal did not recognise that Mr Upton’s deliberate action in acquiring the car and obtaining insurance permitting private use was to make the car available to himself for private use and that he must be taken to have intended that result in the absence of evidence to the contrary even if he did not intend to use the car privately. In my judgment, the tribunal erred in law in their approach to, and application of, the disqualifying condition of para (2G)(b).”

In these passages, Peter Gibson LJ is considering only the case of a sole trader. He applies the presumption that a person must be presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of his act from the fact that the insurance for the car permitted private use and there was no evidence to rebut that conclusion.

Buxton LJ in his judgment held as follows:-

“28.

The first issue is, therefore what the draftsman meant by ‘make available for use’. That is an ordinary English expression, deliberately different from ‘use’ itself. An object can be available for use without there being any present intention of actually using it just as, for instance, a person can be available for, say, military service without there being any intention that he should serve or be asked to serve.

29.

The question has to be decided as at the moment of acquisition of the car. On the facts of the present case, I see no escape from the conclusion that the car was at that moment, as a matter of fact, available for Mr Upton’s private use, however little he then had an intention of actually so using it. He had sole control over the car. It was not to be disabled or in any other way put beyond use: quite the reverse, since the whole purpose of buying it was so that it could be use, albeit in the business and not privately. A further way of testing this point, if it needs further exposition would be to ask whether the car was available for Mr Upton’s use, generally stated. That question answers itself. And Mr Upton did not restrict the general nature of that that availability by deciding that he would only use the car for one of the two purposes for which at the time of purchase, it became available.

30.

Further, I see no escape from the conclusion that Mr Upton had made the car available to himself. He did that, tautologically enough, by providing himself, with ownership and control of the car. And, as we have seen, the availability that was created was availability for private as well as for business use.

31.

Did Mr Upton at the moment of purchase intend to make the car available to himself for private use? The question is not whether he intended to use it, but whether he intended to make it available for use. That again seems to me to lead to a short answer. The first question, of whether what was done constituted a making available for private use, is answered, in the terms urged above, by analysis of what Mr Upton did in the context of the true construction of the statutory concept of making available for private use. Mr Upton unquestionably intended to do the acts that, on that true construction, constituted the making available of the car for private use. He therefore necessarily intended to make the car so available, by intending to do the acts that constituted making the car available for use. He cannot escape from that conclusion by saying, as he does, that he did not intend actual use; or that, for that reason, he did not regard the car as available for use. If he intends to do the acts that are in law the state of affairs referred to in the statute, the he intends that state of affairs as statutorily defined.”

Buxton LJ then drew a distinction between intention to use and intention to make available. He considered that Mr Upton could not show that he did not intend to make the car available for private use simply by showing that he intended to use it for business purposes only or indeed by showing that he did not intend to use the car for private use. The statutory question was whether he intended to make it available for private use and if he did acts which made the car so available he was to be taken to intend to make the car so available. Like Peter Gibson LJ he decided the case on its particular facts. He did not consider what availability for the purpose of art 7 meant and in particular whether it could be satisfied by contractual provisions.

The third judgment was given by Neuberger J (as he then was). He adopted Peter Gibson’s LJ analysis of the facts, the procedural history and legislative provisions. He agreed with his reasons and those of Buxton LJ. He then went on to add some additional reasons of his own. In the course of those reasons he held as follows:-

“40.

Ignoring, for the moment, the unusual concept of a person making his own property available to himself, what does the provision mean when it refers to an intention to make motor car available to a person other than the taxpayer for private use? In this connection, it is important to bear in mind, as Mr Paines QC, for the commissioners, says, that art 7 (2G)(b) does not refer to an intention that the motor car be put to the use in question: the intention must be to make it available for that use. The difference between the two concepts appears to me to be emphasised by the contrast with art 7(2E) which requires the taxpayer to show that he ‘intends to use’ the motor car exclusively for business purposes.

41.

If an article is supplied by one person to another with no physical or legal restraint as to a particular use, then it appears to me that, as a matter of ordinary language, the article has been ‘made available’ for that use. The fact that neither the supplier nor the recipient expects, or even intends, the article to be put to the particular use does not prevent the article being ‘available’ for that use, if there is no physical or legal restraint on such use by the recipient. Further, it cannot be said, at any rate as a matter of ordinary language that the supplier does not ‘make’ the article available for that use, simply because he does not expect or intend it to be put to that use. If he supplies the article so that it is, as a matter of fact, available for a particular use, then he has, in normal practice, made it available for that use. On the other hand, if the supplier provides the article under a contract which bona fide precludes the recipient from putting it to a particular use, or if it is supplied only at such times that it cannot be put to a particular use, then there is clearly a powerful argument for saying that it has not been ‘made available’ for such use.

42.

The fact that the article is also made available for other purposes, even primarily for other purposes, does not alter this conclusion. If a motor car or other article is supplied to a recipient in circumstances where he can put it to, among other uses, private use, then, as I see it, as a matter of ordinary language the supplier ‘make[s] it available … for private use’. That appears to me to be reinforced in this case by the absence in art 7(2G)(b) of the word ‘exclusively’, found in art 7(2E)(a). Article 7(2G)(b) requires one to consider the intention of the taxpayer with regard to making the motor car available for a particular use. Accordingly, to my mind, the proper inquiry is, as the commissioners contend, whether the taxpayer intends to supply the motor car to a third party in circumstances where it could be available for private use. The intention in question, is concerned with the basis on which the motor car is to be made available to the recipient, not with the use to which the motor car is to be put by the recipient.”

. . .

48.

Accordingly, I have reached the same conclusion as the Vice-Chancellor, for the same reasons. A point that gives pause for further thought is that the consequence of this conclusion may be to render it very difficult for a sole trader, who acquires a motor car exclusively for his business, thereby satisfying art 7 (2E) (b), to avoid falling foul of art 7(2G) (b). It was suggested on behalf of the commissioners during argument that, if a sole trader acquired a motor car for the sole use of employees in his business, and arranged for the motor car to be housed some distance away from his home, and for the keys to be kept by an employee, with a view to its only being used for business purposes, the motor car would not thereby be made available for private use. I find that difficult to accept. The person in control of the motor car and of the keys would be an employee of the trader, and could be compelled to provide him with the motor car and the keys for whatever purpose the trader chose. Accordingly, while it is unnecessary to express a concluded view on the point, I think that the logical consequence of the Vice-Chancellor’s decision is that a sole trader who purchases a motor car with that sort of arrangement in mind would not avoid the consequences of art 7 (2G) (b).

49.

The commissioners contended, as the Vice-Chancellor recorded ([2001]) STC 912 at 917), that a motor car would not be available for private use if it were-

‘... physically unavailable, that is to say a car let to another, or is realistically incapable of private use, for example marked police cars or ambulances, or alternatively is insulated from the possibility of private use, that is to say pool cars issued to employees for business use only.’

As already indicated, I have some difficulty with the last example, at least where the taxpayer who has acquired the motor car is a sole trader. However, as mentioned, I think it is also possible that a legal impediment to private use, so that such use would be unlawful, might also amount to unavailability for private use. An obvious example would be where a motor car was only insured for business use. However, it is unnecessary to decide whether that would be sufficient to enable a sole trader taxpayer to avoid the effect of art 7 (2G) (b). Even if only physical unavailability will do, I do not think the fact that the Vice-Chancellor’s decision would lead to it being difficult for a sole trader to be able to take advantage of art 7 (2E) justifies a different conclusion from that which he reached.”

Accordingly, to show lack of intention to make available for private use required restraint on such use. Neuberger J considered, leaving aside the particular case of a sole trader, that such restraint could be legal or physical. As to the sole trader, Neuberger J left open the question whether it would be possible for a sole trader to satisfy art 7(2G) if there was a legal restraint on private use.

Mr Nicholas Paines QC, for Customs & Excise, submits that under the 1992 Order the fact that a taxpayer, whether a company or an individual, who purchases a car, intends to use the car for business use does not of itself mean that he can set off the input tax paid on purchase against its or his output tax. This is a policy decision because cars lend themselves to private use. It is self-evident that it would be difficult to police the use of cars. Customs & Excise have drawn up a list of non-deductible expenses. This was done so as to block recovery. The list was relaxed over the years. The aim was to block repayment claims save where the car was not used for private use. The legislative scheme in the United Kingdom is less extensive than Community law permits. So, there will be cases where cars are put to business use but no input VAT is recoverable.

On Community law, Mr Paines relies on Royscot Leasing Ltd v Customs & Excise [2000] 1 WLR 1151. In that case the taxpayer contended that there was no private use. It was held by the Court of Justice that member states could exclude expenditure even though business-related. The Advocate General explained the rationale at page 1158. It follows that member states can block the deduction of input tax even where business use is involved. The reason for this is the difficulty of enforcement. So no question arises in the present case of the compatibility of domestic legislation with Community law.

In the present case the question arises whether the contractual prohibition in the employee’s terms of employment was capable of making the car not available if available factually for private use. The employee could have revoked the contractual prohibition at any time in his capacity as sole director. There is further, on Mr Paines’s submission, an issue as to whether, where a controller forbids himself in a private company to use a car for private use, there is an effective prohibition on private use. Mr Paines accepts that a controller can cause a company to contract with himself as an individual. He further accepts that an unconnected employee can be effectively prohibited and that any board can change its mind even in relation to an unconnected employee. However, in this case the contractual fetter was revocable at the will of the sole director. It was not a contractual fetter for the purposes of input recovery. The relevant time for testing this is at time of acquisition. At that time the car was factually available. The Upton case establishes that intention not to make a car available for private use is not enough.

Mr Paines submits that it follows from the Upton case that where there is availability for private use and acts are intentionally done to bring about availability, intention within art 7(2G) is presumed. It is therefore, difficult for a private trader to get within the 1992 Order. “Available” for the purposes of art 7(2G) means physically available although Mr Paines does not submit that the Upton case establishes this.

Mr Paines submits that the legislature made a deliberate choice. Contractual restrictions can be very difficult to monitor. As to use of the car in emergencies, this possibility is very vague. If a company would not impose a hire charge, it would be unreal to say there was a breach of contract.

In summary on this point, Mr Paines submits that the judge erred in treating a legal impediment as a practical impediment, and treating the company resolution as amounting to a practical impediment in this case where the use was by the person who controlled the company so that no distinction could be drawn between this case and that of a sole trader.

Mr Paines submits that there were four drivers, not just Mr and Mrs Phillips. There was no finding by the tribunal that the other drivers would drive Mr Phillips, and thus private use was not in fact excluded. Accordingly, Mr Paines submits that the tribunal’s finding regarding the insurance was perverse. The judge was wrong to find that the decision could not be different. He accepts that it was a question of discretion but that discretion had to be judicially exercised. It was wrong in principle. It was not inevitable that the tribunal would have reached the same result. It might have accepted the explanation. There were no relevant findings from the tribunal. It is no answer that this court cannot interfere with the tribunal’s finding as to the effectiveness of the contractual restriction because it goes to whether the contractual restriction was varied or revoked or was ever genuine.

Mr Oliver Conolly, for the company, submits that the ratio of the Upton case applies where a sole trader acquires the car without more and by that active acquisition he has put it to use without restriction. The case turns on the impossibility of contracting with oneself. For the purpose of this case, he relies particularly on para 49 of the judgment of Neuberger J and seeks to uphold the judgment of the judge for the reasons that he gave.

As to the insurance point, Mr Conolly submits that the tribunal held that a business only insurance would be a sufficient impediment to private use. Thus the terms of the insurance for the car may have evidential value, but no more. Mr Conolly submits that the ease with which a company resolution could be revoked does not mean that there must have been an intention to make the car available for private use. Mr Conolly also contends that it is not necessary for this case to be remitted to the tribunal to deal with the tribunal’s error regarding the existence of other named drivers.

I agree.

I also agree.