Bulled, R (on the application of) v Parking and Traffic Appeals Service

LORD JUSTICE MAY: The applicant, Mr Bulled, who comes from Devon, seeks permission to appeal from the order made in the Administrative Court by Bean J on 31 March 2006. Bean J refused the applicant’s application to bring proceedings for judicial review. Permission for judicial review had previously been refused on the papers by Sullivan J on 14 September 2005. I rather think that Mr Bulled needs an extension of time to bring his application today but I do not think that that is the main point that I have to decide.

The facts of the matter are briefly as follows. On 26 April 2004 Mr Bulled parked his car in Cheyne Walk in Chelsea, which is in the London Borough of Kensington and Chelsea. He got a parking ticket. He is a blue badge holder. Blue badges are part of an EU-wide parking scheme. He qualifies for the dispensation given by the blue badge scheme on the basis of a disability which I understand takes the form of rheumatoid arthritis.

He is able to display his blue badge on the dashboard of his motor car and is then eligible for free parking in some areas of the United Kingdom. He actually lives in the London Borough of Hammersmith and Fulham where parking exemptions under the blue badge scheme apply. However, the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea operates a rather different scheme of its own under which a blue badge holder is not exempt from parking fees, but is entitled to extra time free after buying a pay-and-display ticket. On 26 April 2004, as I say, Mr Bulled parked in the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea. A penalty charge notice was fixed by a traffic warden to the windscreen of his car because, according to that person, a valid pay-and-display ticket was not displayed. Mr Bulled sent a letter dated 27 April 2004 to the Royal Borough challenging the penalty charge notice and saying that his disabled blue badge was displayed on the dashboard clearly. He also claimed that traffic wardens had deliberately targeted his vehicle. The Borough responded by letter dated 14 May 2004 refusing the challenge to the parking charge notice but offering to accept a payment of a reduced penalty charge if payment was made by 28 May 2004. The letter also explained the limits of the blue badge scheme as it operated in the Royal Borough.

Mr Bulled continued to refuse to pay and sent a Notice of Appeal to the respondent in the present proceedings, the Parking and Traffic Appeals Service. In this notice he said that he always pays for parking, and he complained that there were inadequate signs indicating where to park and a lack of bays for those who are disabled. Attached to this notice were photographs of a defaced ticket machine which the applicant claimed, and claims, was not readable for motorists.

On 5 November 2004 the respondent considered the appeal and at the hearing the applicant stated that he had always purchased a pay-and-display ticket but had forgotten to bring it with him, so the hearing was adjourned to allow him time to produce it. On 24 November 2004 Mr Bulled sent a letter to the respondent stating that he intended to apply for judicial review but he did not send a copy of the outstanding ticket. So on 7 January 2005 the case was again adjourned to allow him further time to produce the ticket. On 20 January 2005 he sent another letter to the respondent repeating his intention to apply for judicial review and complaining that his evidence was not being adequately considered.

On 8 February 2005 the Appeal Service refused the appeal. The adjudicator described Mr Bulled’s evidence as confusing, and it was recorded that he produced photographic evidence and several pay-and-display tickets and that he referred to police reports. However, the adjudicator found that none of this evidence related to the location for the alleged contravention in question. The adjudicator said that she had asked Mr Bulled if he had purchased a ticket, to which he said that he must have left it at home. This led to the two adjournments but no ticket was supplied. The adjudicator said that she was satisfied that the parking charge notice had been properly issued.

On 4 March 2005 Mr Bulled sent a letter to the respondent attempting to appeal the decision of 8 February. The respondent replied on 21 March saying that a second adjudicator had considered the evidence in the case. There was no right of appeal of an adjudicator’s decision but a review of the decision could be given in limited circumstances. The second adjudicator found that there were no grounds for review of the original decision. As a result, a charge certificate was issued to the applicant dated 1 July 2005. On 14 July he brought these proceedings applying for permission to bring judicial review proceedings.

Now what this all boils down to is that the applicant’s case, contrary to that of the traffic warden, was that he had bought a ticket and displayed it. He was given ample opportunity to produce the ticket but did not do so. Two adjudicators considered his case. The first found against him on the facts. The second decided against a review of the first decision. There is no remotely arguable basis for judicial review of any of this. Two judges, including Bean J, have so held.

The applicant’s grounds of appeal, which are to be found in section 7 of the appellant’s notice in this case, contain the following contentions. He starts off by saying that he had a valid blue badge at the time the parking charge notice was issued. That I have no doubt is correct. The second contention is that the adjudicator’s reasons of 8 February 2005 are misleading and confusing. In my view they are not. The third contention is the points that Mr Bulled only had medical problems, whereas the decision refers to mental problems. That of course is correct and Bean J put that type of typographical error right. The next contention, which Mr Bulled renews orally this morning, is that police reports were made at Chelsea Police Station. That may well be the case but does not seem to me to go to the heart of the matter at all. The next contention is that following decided authority, including the case of the R v The Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Doody [1994] App Cases 531, the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea has a duty to act fairly towards motorists, and so parking attendants and ticket machines or signs posted must provide reasonable information to the motorist. Of course the Royal Borough have a duty to act fairly; otherwise the case of Doody is a case about prison services and has no particular relevance to the present matter.

The next contention is that Mr Bulled always paid for and displayed tickets before obtaining the blue badge. I have no doubt that that may well be the case but the adjudicator found that he did not prove that he had bought a ticket on this occasion. That is the heart of the matter because that is a decision of fact not amenable to judicial review. The next contentions are that on the day the parking charge notice was issued the parking attendant had instructed Mr Bulled to park as he did. However, the attendant did not tell him to purchase a ticket and it is further suggested that the adjudicator’s decision did not take into account photographic evidence of the defaced ticket machine. That is not, as I read it, correct. The adjudicator did take into account the point that Mr Bulled was making about relying on his photograph.

The next point is that Mr Bulled is willing if necessary to take this case to the European Court of Human Rights. That is entirely a matter for him. The next point is that he can demonstrate that he supports, as I have no doubt he does, strict parking regulations and that he has worked with the London Borough of Hammersmith and Fulham to provide for the painting of double yellow lines. This of course is a very good thing but it does not affect the matter before the court. He also refers to the case of Davis v Kensington & Chelsea which again is a case about duty to act fairly but it is mainly about the obligation to enforce a penalty for parking matters within a reasonable time. In my judgment none of this gets anywhere near a proper case for giving permission for judicial review.

The fact is that the decision of the adjudicator and of the second adjudicator who reviewed the matter were decisions of pure fact. The proposed grounds for judicial review do not raise any point of law, nor any proper basis for bringing judicial review proceedings. In my judgment there is nothing wrong at all with Bean J’s decision and certainly there is no real prospect of success in this court of appealing against it.

Accordingly for these reasons the application for permission to do so is refused.