S (A Child), Re

LORD JUSTICE THORPE: We are assembled this morning to decide what should be the upper limit of the housing fund to provide a suitable home for the child in question between her present age and her attaining majority.

We have been helped considerably by a beautifully prepared bundle of properties, submitted by Mr Posnansky on behalf of the father. Each of them is identified in a location map and it is very easy to see the range of what money buys you in the areas covered by his search. Mr Thrower has put in a bundle of many properties, less focused than Mr Posnansky’s contribution, but he has taken us through a number of properties in the bundle, as well as throwing all his weight behind a submission that we should endorse the mother’s desire to stay where she is presently living.

Inevitably this is a broad brush, discretionary conclusion, and I express the judgment of the court. We have, inevitably, individually different views as to what is the appropriate figure, but we have collectively arrived at a shared conclusion. Our first conclusion is that the existing property is no longer affordable. The owner has indicated a willingness to negotiate a sale at about £1.375 million net, and that would take the gross fund to something slightly exceeding £1.4 million. So coming down to earth, as I would express it, we have seen a range of properties. Inevitably the further you move from, as it were, the epicentre of the luxury market, the cheaper properties become. So in the end there will be a choice for the mother and the trustees between a good size flat relatively close to the school, or a more extensive property, and even a house, further out towards the periphery of the search area.

Our collective conclusion is that the gross fund to be made available for the purchase of the property should be £1.1 million. That will enable the purchasing trustees to bid for a property at or slightly over the million mark, and we are perfectly satisfied that there are properties that will meet the needs of this child within that price bracket. It seems to me unnecessary to say any more. This is not a conclusion that can be supported by principle or, even further, rationalization. It is a broad-brush judgment.

LORD JUSTICE LAWS: I agree.

LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: I agree.

LORD JUSTICE THORPE: I will add a brief word, with which my Lord and my Lady can agree or disagree as they wish.

At Mr Posnansky’s urging, I add a brief clarification to paragraph 17 of the judgment of 15 March 2006. I did not intend that paragraph to lay down some general rule of separate representation; far from it. I simply suggested that this case was an illustration of circumstances in which separate representation of the child might be considered by the court. Obviously separate representation is only achieved by application to the court; such an application is closely scrutinised by the judge and will only be granted in exceptional circumstances. This is such an exceptional case and that factor, and that factor alone, drew the comment to be found in paragraph 17.

LORD JUSTICE LAWS: I agree entirely with those observations of my Lord, Lord Justice Thorpe.

LADY JUSTICE HALLETT: I agree.