Forrester Ketley & Co v Brent

This is a judgment of the court. Following our dismissal of Mr. Brent’s appeals and our making a civil restraint order against him on 1st March 2005, he has made representations to us. Those representations, which run to 135 pages (which were then supplemented by yet further submissions), deal not merely with the point upon which he was given a specific opportunity to deal, namely the making of the civil restraint order, but with a large number of other matters as well.

We do not consider that Mr. Brent’s submissions contain anything which would justify discharging the civil restraint order. Further, insofar as his submissions seek additional relief, we do not consider that it would be appropriate to grant it. We propose to give our reasons very shortly.

It is inappropriate to accede to Mr. Brent’s suggestion that his appeals be dealt with by the Lord Chief Justice. It is not, and should not be, open to litigants to pick and choose their judges. In any event, his appeals had been disposed of on their merits. The notion that there is “a cabal of Lord Justices that are intent on ensuring that the defendant does not achieve justice” (Para S37), the sort of contention which is found in a number of places in Mr. Brent’s submissions, is quite unjustified and is unhelpful. That sort of allegation indicates the frame of mind on the part of Mr. Brent which helps justify the making of the civil restraint order: contrary to Mr. Brent’s suggestion on the same page, he has mounted a large number of appeals and applications which are “totally without merit”.

We should deal with the contention that Mr. Brent did not have sufficient notice of the fact that a civil restraint order might be made (see e.g. Para S11.13.2). Insofar as there is anything in that contention, it has been fully catered for by giving Mr. Brent the opportunity, of which he has now taken full advantage, to put forward any argument he wishes as to why a civil restraint order should not be made.

It is also right that we should deal with what is said in Para A11.15.1 on page 15 in light of the fact that the order has been amended in writing and Mr. Brent was not in court. Neuberger LJ initially suggested that the effect of the order should be suspended until Mr. Brent had an opportunity to make submissions as to why it should not be made, but Auld LJ expressed the view that it would be better if the order were made with a view to Mr. Brent being entitled to apply to discharge it, a view with which Neuberger LJ then agreed. All of this happened in open court, and it was only when the order as drawn up was seen by Neuberger LJ that he appreciated that paragraph (3) did not clearly reflect that expressed intention, and it was then corrected.

So far as the merits of the civil restraint order are concerned, there is really not much we can add to brief reasoning in our judgment. This is a case where the history of applications and appeals by Mr. Brent speak for themselves. It may seem unkind, but we are bound to add that both the length and the contents of the 135 page document he has now submitted appear to us strongly to reinforce our conclusion that a civil restraint order should be made. Although he has expressed himself very clearly and intelligently, Mr. Brent has become wholly obsessed with these proceedings. The course he has adopted, a course which he is still adopting and is likely to continue to adopt unless restrained from doing so, has been, is and would be wholly inappropriate and disproportionate on any view. Whatever the merits of the claim and the counter-claim may have been, this is a plain case for the making of a civil restraint order to protect the claimants.

An extraordinarily large number of points were made about the civil restraint order by Mr. Brent. They are either self-evidently bad or involve requests for advice, which, absent exceptional circumstances, we should not give. However, it is right to mention, in answer to what is said in Para A022.2 on page 38, that a civil restraint order made by this court cannot prevent Mr. Brent from applying to the European Court of Human Rights (although, in fairness to Mr. Brent, we should emphasise that we are not encouraging him to make any such application).

Mr. Brent makes frequent reference in his submissions to the fact that he suffers from a “stress related heart condition”. It is clear from his medical reports that his health is not good, and obviously we are sorry about that. However, as has been said on more than one occasion, there is nothing in the medical report to suggest that Mr. Brent is incapable of dealing with these proceedings; indeed, the length and contents of his recent submissions reinforce that point.

In paragraphs A1 and following (pages 43 and following) Mr. Brent submits our judgments of 1st March to detailed consideration. We do not think it is appropriate to indulge in arguments with Mr. Brent about our judgments. We have read what he says in this connection, and see no reason to change our views.

On pages 89 and onwards, Mr. Brent makes a large number of requests about whether we have seen certain documents. We cannot pretend to remember every document that we saw in advance of, and during, the hearing on 1st March. However, having considered the various points made by Mr. Brent in this connection, we see no reason to change our conclusions. In particular, we have noted Mr. Brent’s reliance of various aspects of the Human Rights Act 1998, but we feel that there is nothing in any of them either.

In these circumstances, we confirm our order of 1st March 2005.