Daie, R (on the application of) v London Borough of Camden Homeless Persons' Unit

LORD JUSTICE LONGMORE: We do not think it right to adjourn the application for permission to appeal. We think that one way or another it ought to be decided today whether Dr Daie should have permission to appeal. However, now that we have seen the letter of 6th October in which Camden have rejected the application of 10th September, this letter not having been before Keene LJ, we do consider that it is right to grant permission to appeal for reasons which I will shortly elaborate.

The history of this matter is set out in the full judgment of Hodge J, given on 7th March 2004. The transcript of the judgment that we have is an unapproved judgment, since the judge has not had an opportunity as yet to correct it. The only correction that we need to make to the chronology of events which he sets out is that on the third page of the transcript, the judge refers to a letter of 1st October 2004. He says this:

Now that we read this letter (which, as I say, was not before Keene LJ when he adjourned this matter), the relevant paragraph says this:

The way that that paragraph is phrased is arguably not consistent with the way in which the matter was put by this court in a decision which was given after Hodge J gave his judgment, namely London Borough of TowerHamlets v Rikha Begum [2005] EWCA Civ 340, dated 23rd March 2005. It is for that reason we think it right that permission should be granted in order to consider whether a letter expressed in the terms of the letter of 6th October to which I have referred is a satisfactory way of putting the matter in the light of that most recent authority.

Dr Daie has asked that the application for permission to appeal should itself by adjourned, so that he can provide a skeleton argument which he wishes to provide to the court. We are conscious that he will not have seen until today the unapproved transcript of the judgment of Hodge J. He maintains he has not seen the letter of 6th October 2004, but although we think that cannot be right, since he had the trial bundle before Hodge J, nevertheless if we grant permission to appeal (as we will), he will have the opportunity of putting in a skeleton argument. Since the reason that we do give permission to appeal is on a question of law, we do hope that he will be able to have some legal input into that point of law.

So, for those reasons, we refuse the application to adjourn but we do grant permission to appeal. The question of interim relief will therefore arise. We are conscious that this matter has been pending for a while. We are not quite sure what the current arrangement is, but we assume that Keene LJ continued the existing order. If he did, then we would be minded to do the same, but we will hear what Dr Daie and Miss Godfrey say about that.

LORD JUSTICE LONGMORE: We do think it appropriate to exercise our powers under CPR 52.15(3) and, rather than give permission to appeal, we will give permission to apply for judicial review. We will extend the order made by Keene LJ, that the London Borough of Camden continue to provide the claimant with temporary accommodation until the hearing of the judicial review application. We will order the expedition of the judicial review application and that a transcript of my short judgment be circulated to the parties and to the Administrative Court. We will also order that Dr Daie serve a skeleton argument on Camden by 11th April and that the London Borough of Camden should serve a skeleton argument within seven days thereafter. I hope that the judicial review application itself can be dealt with early in the new term.