This is an appeal from a Decision of His Honour Judge Langan QC sitting at Leeds County Court on 23 October 2002. It arises out of an action for damages for personal injury sustained by Mr. Justin Binks at work on 15 October 1999. Mr. Binks was employed by Securicor Omega Express Limited whose business includes the carriage of parcels by van. Mr. Binks’ job involved the loading and unloading of vans. That is the task upon which he was engaged on the day in question. The system was described as follows by the learned judge:

None of the witnesses who gave evidence described the accident in accordance with Securicor’s case. Indeed, none of the witnesses called by Securicor saw Mr. Binks fall from the van. The material upon which Securicor’s case was built came from the evidence of Mr. Tovey, the section manager. His evidence was that he spoke to Mr. Binks very soon after the accident, obtained from him an account of the accident and proceeded to write it up in the accident book and in an accident report form. The accident book quotes Mr. Binks as having said:

The learned judge said that he had “absolutely no hesitation in deciding that the person who is telling the truth in this case is Mr. Tovey”. He gave a number of reasons for this finding, including the respective demeanour of the two crucial witnesses, some video evidence which, whilst not conclusive, tended to favour the account of riding on the conveyor belt and “the mechanics of the accident”. As to the latter, the judge considered that Mr. Binks’ account of having fallen onto his back with his feet remaining in the van was far more consistent with his having been mounted on the conveyor belt immediately before the accident with his feet on or just above the floor of the van.

The finding that Mr. Binks had not given a truthful account to the court about the accident proved fatal to his pleaded case. It was no doubt an apprehension on the part of Mr. Hirst, who appeared for Mr. Binks at trial and before us, that the learned judge might well disbelieve Mr. Binks that led him to make a submission at the conclusion of all the evidence to the effect that the court ought to consider the case on an alternative basis, namely that Mr. Binks had indeed been seated on the conveyor belt when Mr. Watson gave Mr. Lister the order to move off without properly adverting to the position of Mr. Binks. Thus, it was suggested, there was negligence on the part of Mr. Watson which could sustain a cause of action even if Mr. Binks’ account were to be disbelieved. The evidential basis for such an alternative case came in part from Mr. Tovey (including what he attributed to Mr. Binks in the accident book and the accident report form), some inferences from the video recording and some answers elicited by Mr. Hirst from Securicor’s witnesses in cross examination. As is apparent from the uncontroversial findings of fact which I described at the beginning of this judgment, the judge was satisfied that Mr. Watson had signalled to Mr. Lister to move off and that he had done so whereupon, as the van was moving forward, Mr. Binks had fallen to the ground. Mr. Hirst points to a number of passages in the transcript of evidence which provide an evidential basis for the alternative case that he was inviting the court to consider.

In the event, the judge refused to allow Mr. Hirst to advance his case on that alternative basis. He dealt with that refusal in the judgment in the following paragraphs:

Having rejected Mr. Binks’ evidence the judge nevertheless went on to dealt with quantum and, on the basis of preferring Securicor’s medical expert to the expert called on behalf of Mr. Binks, concluded that the total award for damages would have been £27,000. Mr. Hirst now submits to this court that we should allow the appeal in relation to the alternative case. He accepts the judge’s decision on quantum and submits that, on the basis of the alternative case, this court ought to make a finding of 50% contributory negligence and substitute for the order of the learned judge below an order to that effect. It seems to me that the appropriate way of approaching this appeal is by reference to what I shall call “the statement of truth point” and “the discretion point”.

When Mr. Hirst addressed the judge at the conclusion of the evidence he did so expressly on the basis that he was not seeking permission to amend the particulars of claim because Mr. Binks was not in a position to sign a statement of truth in relation to the alternative case. The requirement that a statement of case be verified by a statement of truth was an innovation introduced by the Civil Procedure Rules. The material provisions are in part 22. Rule 22.1 provides as follows:

In my judgment it was erroneous for the judge to express himself in that way. For one thing, rule 22.1 (2) enables the court to dispense with verification by a statement of truth when a statement of case is amended. It does not specify circumstances in which the power of dispensation might arise but I take the view that amendment to plead in the alternative a case derived from an opponent’s documents, pleadings or evidence is capable of being such a case. To the extent that the practice direction to part 17 suggests otherwise, I give precedence to the rule over the practice direction. Moreover, I do not accept that the purpose or effect of part 22 is to exclude the possibility of pleading inconsistent factual alternatives. In this, I take comfort from the judgment of Patten J in Clarke v. Marlborough Fine Art Limited2002 1 WLR 1731 at paragraph 30. It is true that Patten J was not concerned with a dishonest claimant who was clinging to a false account and a defendant whose witnesses, at least on one view, were providing evidence for an alternative factual basis of liability. Nor was he concerned with other possible scenarios that readily spring to mind – for example, a claimant in a personal injury case who simply does not know what happened but relies on a independent witness who proves unreliable in circumstances where the defendant’s evidence nevertheless provides him with a positive case; or the claimant who honestly believes in, because he has wrongly convinced himself of, the truth of his case, but who can nevertheless advance a case on the basis of the defendant’s pleadings or evidence. Such scenarios and the history of the present case dispose me to the view that it is necessary to adopt a broader approach to Part 22. In my judgment, it does not in all cases prevent a party from submitting or amending a pleading which includes an allegation which he is not putting forward as the truth, provided that there is an evidential basis for it. If it is in the form of an amendment, then, as I have said, it may be appropriate for the court to permit it without requiring a statement of truth. Moreover, I do not consider it objectionable in principle for a claimant to advance an alternative case based on material put forward by his opponent. In such circumstances, it may be possible for him append a statement of truth, suitably drafted, making it clear that whilst his primary case is not an assertion of the truth of his opponent’s account, if the court find that to be the truth, he will seek to rely upon it as an alternative basis for liability. There is some support for this approach in Kelly v. Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police[2001] EWCA Civ 1632. There, at the conclusion of the evidence, counsel for the claimant sought permission to amend particulars of claim so as to include an alternative factual basis of liability based not on her own evidence but on that of one of the police officers with whom she had been struggling in a car. Neither at first instance nor in the Court of Appeal does there appear to have been a discussion of Part 22. Nevertheless, May LJ concluded (paragraph 18) that the grounds for refusing permission were not sufficient to outweigh the justice of permitting the claimant to advance an alternative case based upon, or close to, the defendant’s evidence. Agreeing, Sedley LJ said (paragraph 21):

Although I accept that the purpose of Part 22 is to deter or discourage claimants from advancing a case which is inherently untrue or wholly speculative (a purpose which will never be wholly achieved), I do not accept that its purpose extends to the possibility of relieving of liability a defendant whose own evidence may establish a cause of action against him. That would not be consistent with the overriding objective of dealing with a case justly (CPR 1.1(1)).

All this leads me to the conclusion that the judge in the present case misdirected himself on the statement of truth point. He deserves our sympathy because, as Mr. Hirst candidly but haplessly concedes, it was he who set the misdirection ball rolling.

It seems from paragraphs 25 and 26 of the judgment below that the judge, having adopted the proposition that amendment was out of the question, proceeded to consider Mr. Hirst’s submission that the overriding interest of doing justice in a manner fair to all parties requires that the court should permit the alternative case to be put in any event. Paragraph 26 is then a consideration of the matters which disposed the judge to the conclusion that it would be wrong to allow the case to be put in such a manner. To a substantial extent, the considerations in paragraph 26 overlap with the considerations which would have had to have been considered in relation to an application for permission to amend. I accept Mr. Baldoock’s submission that there may have been other considerations including ones of proportionality in relation to costs relative to quantum. However, at that stage, and until his medical expert had been rejected by the judge, the claimant’s case was that his claim was worth about £80,000.

Essentially, paragraph 26 of the judgment is to the effect that Securicor would have been prejudiced by allowing the alternative case to be put because they would or might have approached the evidence differently if they had known that liability on the alternative basis had been on the agenda. However, in my judgment the reasoning in paragraph 26 is flawed. It is obvious that any further cross examination of Mr. Binks would only have elicited replies consistent with his untrue case. To use him as a sounding board in relation to contributory negligence on the alternative basis of liability would not have been particularly meaningful. More importantly, the judge’s view that “serious consideration would have had to be given to the calling” of Mr Watson or Mr. Tokarcyk is, in my judgment, untenable. As I understand it, Mr. Tokarcyk was no longer available. He was a temporary employee and it is thought that he had since died. Of course, Mr. Watson had been in a position to give important evidence. However, it is inconceivable that he would have been called on behalf of Securicor. He had made a statement about a week after the accident which is significant more for what it omits that for what it includes. It makes no mention of the fact that (as the judge found) he had signalled the driver to move off whilst Mr. Binks was still in the van. It stated “I did not see Mr. Binks riding on he belt” although Mr. Tovey was able to give evidence that Mr. Watson had informed him that Mr. Binks had been riding on the conveyor belt. In addition, Mr. Tovey gave evidence that there had been a discussion between himself and Mr. Watson as to whether an inaccurate and false account of the accident should be given. Mr. Watson had suggested to Mr. Tovey that they should present a version of the accident that Mr. Binks had been standing on the loading dock and had fallen from there to the ground. It seems that Mr. Watson gave Mr. Tovey the impression that his motive for such falsification was to protect Mr. Binks who was on a final warning, resulting from absences from work, and was therefore vulnerable for dismissal for riding on the conveyor belt, a practice that was forbidden by conspicuous notices. On the other hand, an alternative reason for Mr. Watson’s interest in falsification would have been to conceal his own negligence. For all these reasons, I accept Mr. Hirst’s submission that, as a witness for Securicor, Mr. Watson would have been a liability and would not have been called.

I am persuaded to the extent that the judge addressed matters which impacted on his discretion, his approach was flawed. On the one hand, he found potential prejudice to Securicor on an unsustainable basis. On the other hand, he did not have regard to the wider interests of justice and the extent to which their pursuit might be accompanied by consequential provision as to costs. I reach this conclusion with a degree of reluctance because this court is always slow to interfere with the decisions of a trial judge taken in the broad context of case management. However, as I consider the approach in this case to have been plainly erroneous, such interference is unavoidable.

In Kelly, this court allowed the appeal, granted permission to amend and remitted the case to Sheffield County Court. In the present case, Mr. Hirst now seeks permission to amend. In my judgment we should allow the appeal and grant that permission. However, in this case I do not consider we should countenance a remission to Leeds County Court. The remaining dispute falls within a narrow compass, the unchallenged quantum of damages on a full liability basis is modest and, wisely, Mr. Hirst accepts contributory negligence to the extent of 50% on the alternative basis of liability. He invites us to find liability on the part of Securicor and to reduce the unchallenged damages by 50% to £13,500. At one stage Mr. Baldock submitted that, even with the amendment, the establishment of liability is not inevitable. I do not accept that submission. On the judges undisturbed findings of fact and with the benefit of the amendment I am in no doubt that negligence on the alternative basis is established. Mr. Baldock’s fallback submission is that the contributory negligence should be assessed at a level higher than 50%. I initially found that submission to be attractive but have come to the conclusion that, in all the circumstances of this case, the just assessment of contributory negligence is, as Mr.Hirst submits, 50%. I would substitute an order reflecting this.

I agree. I would only add that, if CPR 22.1 had the effect for which Mr Baldock contends, it would have represented an even more radical change in the pleadings rules than appears to have been contemplated by Lord Woolf’s report.

The tradition of pleading in the alternative is a long one. Of course it can be taken too far, as Sir Robert Megarry memorably illustrated in Miscellany-At-Law, p46.

The relevant part of Lord Woolf’s Interim Report on Access to Justice was Chapter 20 (“Pleadings/Statements of Case”), where he noted that although pleadings are

I agree that one purpose of CPR Part 22 is to deter or discourage claimants from advancing a case which is inherently untrue or wholly speculative. However, I see nothing in that Part, or in Lord Woolf’s report, to indicate an intention to exclude altogether the possibility of pleading factual alternatives, particularly where as here the alternative is raised by the defendant’s own case. So long as the pleading makes clear that the alternative is disputed on the facts, there is nothing untruthful or dishonest in the claimant advancing the contention, that, if it is upheld, the defendant is nonetheless liable.

For the employers, Mr Baldock submits that the effect of Part 22 of the CPR is that a claimant in a personal injury action whose pleaded account of how the accident happened is held to be untruthful cannot succeed unless he has repented of his untruthfulness. For the reasons given by Maurice Kay J, I do not accept that submission. The courts should of course put a premium on the giving of truthful evidence but there will be cases in which to fail to find for an untruthful claimant would be to do an injustice. Lies may sometimes be told to bolster what is already a good case or to conceal unworkmanlike conduct. In this case, the claimant was liable to be dismissed from his employment if he admitted riding the conveyer belt. Where, as in the present case, the account accepted by the judge reveals a clear case of negligence by the employers it may sometimes be permissible to permit a claimant to succeed on the basis of a version of events which he has denied. The effect of Part 22 is not to provide otherwise.

I also agree with Maurice Kay J that discretion to argue the alternative case should have been exercised in the claimant’s favour in the circumstances of this case. The issue of fact was whether the accident happened in the way described by the claimant in evidence or the way he was alleged to have described it to Mr Tovey. The latter account, which the judge accepted, was pleaded by the employers (though not as contributory negligence) and properly put to the claimant in cross-examination. It was open to the employers to call further evidence, if they saw fit, to support their pleaded account. Maurice Kay J has set out the circumstances in detail. I do not consider that the employers have been unfairly prejudiced in this case either by their inability now to call further evidence or by this Court coming to conclusions upon the findings of fact made by the judge. Nor do I not consider that questions of proportionality arise in this case upon the question whether to allow a decision on the alternative account. This Court should proceed accordingly. Since the claimant is permitted to argue the alternative account, the employers should be permitted to argue contributory negligence based on it.

There is not doubt that, on the evidence, there was a plain breach of duty by the employers in allowing, by their employees, the vehicle to be driven off while the claimant was still inside. The driving off was causative of the claimant’s fall. He too was negligent. Riding on the conveyor was prohibited and was foolhardy as he must have known. On the other hand, it was a serious default by the employers to permit the vehicle to be moved in the circumstances. The parties should bear equal responsibility for the consequences of the fall.

Faced with conflicting accounts as to how the accident happened, especially when both come, or are alleged to come, from the claimant himself, those advising a claimant are in a difficult position. In this case, the judge too was put in a difficult position at the close of the evidence. It will often be appropriate to raise the procedural problem at a case management conference or, failing that, at the beginning of the hearing so that consideration can be given to what are the appropriate procedural steps in the circumstances.

I agree that the appeal should be allowed to the extent indicated by Maurice Kay J.