Williams & Ors v Glyn Owen & Co.

This is an appeal by Mr Douglas Williams and three other members of his family, who are partners in a farming partnership, against an order made on 20 August 2001 by Mr Recorder Howells, sitting in Llangefni County Court, in a solicitor’s negligence action. By his order, the judge awarded the appellants damages against their former solicitor Mr Glyn Owen, practising as Glyn Owen & Co, in the sum of £591.75 plus interest. The damages were for the negligence of Mr Owen in acting for the appellants in the matter of their purchase of a farm known as Pen y Coed Farm, Llansannan, Clwyd. I shall refer to it hereafter as "the Farm". The appeal is against the amount of the damages, and against the judge’s consequential orders for costs. The judge refused permission to appeal, but permission was granted by Ward LJ on 11 July 2002 at an oral hearing.

There is no cross-appeal by Mr Owen on the issue of liability.

The interests of Mr Williams and his co-appellants are identical and Mr Williams has acted on their behalf throughout, both in the purchase of the Farm and in the action. In the circumstances, I will for convenience proceed as if Mr Williams were the sole appellant.

Until the hearing of this appeal, Mr Williams has appeared in person. On this appeal, however, he appears by Mr Graham Walters of counsel, acting pro bono . Mr Walters has only had a very short time in which to familiarise himself with the case, and we are extremely grateful to him for the assistance he has given us.

Mr Owen, the effective respondent to the appeal, appears by Miss Katherine McQuail of counsel. She also appeared for Mr Owen before the judge.

Also before the court was an application by Mr Williams for permission to appeal against an interlocutory costs order made in the action on 14 March 2001 by HHJ Elystan Morgan. By his order dated 11 July 2002 Ward LJ adjourned this application to be heard on notice, with the substantive appeal to follow should permission be granted. The application was, however, withdrawn by Mr Walters on instructions.

The factual and procedural background to the appeal is briefly as follows.

The Farm is a stock and arable farm comprising some 82 hectares (about 203 acres), together with a farmhouse and buildings. It was put up for sale at auction on 30 September 1993, and in the event was knocked down to Mr Williams for £235,000. The underbidder had bid £230,000.

The evidence at the trial was that the vendor, a Mr Bibby (who has since died), was disposing of all his agricultural interests, laying off his employees and retiring from farming.

The particulars of sale provided that any "Hill Cow Quota" which became vested in the vendor would be transferred to the purchaser without further payment. At the trial, the judge found that the expression "Hill Cow Quota" was understood by all parties to refer to a suckler cow premium. He also accepted Mr Williams’ evidence that the vendor had orally assured Mr Williams that he was entitled to such a premium; that such an entitlement was a valuable asset; and that Mr Williams relied on the vendor’s assurance in bidding £235,000 for the Farm.

The contract of sale provided, so far as material;

that the Law Society’s Conditions of Sale (1984 Revision) (I will refer to them hereafter as "the general conditions") should be incorporated in the contract, so far as they were not varied by or inconsistent with it (clause 17);

that the completion date should be 11 November 1993 (clause 1.5);

that a deposit of 10 per cent of the purchase price should be paid on or before the date of the contract to the vendor’s solicitors as stakeholders (clause 4);

that the interest rate applicable under the contract was 4 per cent above Barclays Bank base rate from time to time (clause 1.6);

that, as provided in the particulars, on completion the vendor would, so far as he was able to do so, transfer to the purchaser such "Hill Cow Quota" (i.e. suckler cow premium quota) as might be vested in him, without further payment (clause 5.2);

that on completion the vendor would sell and the purchaser would purchase the breeding flock of 250 ewes and shearlings which grazed the high ground which formed part of the Farm at a valuation, plus an additional £8 per head as "an acclimatisation or hefting payment" (clause 5.3); and

that the Farm was sold with vacant possession on completion (clause 8).

Condition 18(4)(a) of the general conditions provided that should the purchaser, with the authority of the vendor, enter into possession of the whole or any part of the Farm before actual completion, the purchaser should pay to the vendor in respect of such occupation a sum calculated at the contract rate (that is to say the rate specified in clause 1.6 of the contract) on the balance of the purchase money.

Condition 23 of the general conditions (which is headed "Completion Notice" and which was not varied by or inconsistent with the contract) provided as follows (so far as material):

The 10 per cent deposit (£23,500) was duly paid. On or about 8 October 1993 a valuation of the sheep was agreed, and payment (including the additional "hefting payment" of £8 per head) was made to the vendor by Mr Williams.

On or about 12 October 1993 Mr Williams instructed Mr Owen to act for him in the purchase of the Farm. This was the first time he had instructed Mr Owen to act for him.

Mr Williams had arranged a mortgage with the TSB (as it then was), and by letter dated 26 October 1993 the TSB instructed Mr Owen to act for it in the purchase.

By 9 November 1993 (two days before the contractual completion date, 11 November 1993), it had become apparent that the vendor would not be in a position to give vacant possession of the farmhouse on the completion date, by reason of a dispute with the occupier (a service occupier) over the amount of a redundancy payment.

On that date (as the judge found) a meeting took place between Mr Williams and Mr Owen, at which Mr Owen advised Mr Williams as to how he should proceed. At that stage, Mr Williams wished to proceed to completion with a retention of £70,000 in respect of the farmhouse and a further retention of £7,000 in respect of the cow premium. Mr Owen accordingly wrote to the vendor’s solicitors proposing this. The vendor was willing to agree to a retention of £70,000 in respect of the farmhouse (although not in respect of the cow premium) but in the event the proposal came to nought because the TSB was not willing to make an advance otherwise than on the basis that vacant possession would be given of the whole of the Farm (including the farmhouse).

The meeting between Mr Williams and Mr Owen on 9 November 1993 is central to the action since it is Mr Williams’ case (which the judge accepted) that at that meeting Mr Owen negligently failed to advise Mr Williams to serve a completion notice under condition 23 of the general conditions, quoted in paragraph 13 above.

It is common ground that service of a completion notice by Mr Williams on the vendor at any time after 11 November 1993 would have given rise to a situation in which, should the vendor not have completed within the prescribed period of 15 working days (i.e. should he not have been able to give vacant possession of the whole of the Farm, including the farmhouse, within that period), Mr Williams would on the expiry of the notice have had the opportunity to treat the contract as discharged (in effect, to terminate it), and recover his deposit with interest at the rate prescribed by the contract (4 per cent over Barclays base rate from time to time). It is also common ground that had a completion notice been served at the earliest available opportunity (i.e. on 12 November 1993) the prescribed period would have expired on 3 December 1993.

The judge found that had Mr Williams been advised by Mr Owen as to the effect of general condition 23, he would have instructed Mr Owen to serve a completion notice forthwith; and that had the vendor failed to comply with it Mr Williams would have terminated the contract and bought land elsewhere.

In the event, the vendor was not in a position to give vacant possession of the farmhouse until 21 January 1994. At that point, the vendor claimed interest on the balance of the purchase price under condition 18(4)(a) of the general conditions, asserting that Mr Williams had been in occupation of the grazing land on the Farm through subtenants. Mr Williams denied this, and Mr Owen negotiated a reduction in the amount of interest claimed from some £2,000 to £1,351. That sum was paid to the vendor by a Mr Parry, who had agreed to buy the farmhouse from Mr Williams, but Mr Parry was subsequently reimbursed by Mr Williams. Mr Williams sought to recover this sum from Mr Owen by way of damages in the action, but on 11 January 2000 Deputy District Judge Culleton struck out that claim.

On 27 January 1994 the vendor served a completion notice on Mr Williams, and on 21 February 1994 completion took place.

The action was commenced on 29 September 1999 (one day short of six years after the date of the contract). Initially, Mr Williams was the only claimant. In the course of lengthy particulars of claim annexed to the claim form, Mr Williams said this:

In fact, as I recorded earlier, the particulars of sale contained no such statement. It is also to be noted that the particulars of claim contain no allegation of an oral misrepresentation by the vendor, such as the judge found to have been made.

Later in the course of his particulars of claim, Mr Williams said this:

At the conclusion of the particulars of claim, Mr Williams said this:

As already noted, the claim in relation to interest has since been struck out.

On 8 November 1999, a Defence was served (which was subsequently amended). The Defence denied liability, alleging (in paragraph 24) that at the meeting on 9 November 1993 Mr Owen had explained "the difficulties with service of a notice to complete to the claimant in November 1993".

As to damages, paragraph 20 of the Defence denied that the ADAS report set out any loss for which Mr Owen was liable to Mr Williams, asserting that in any event the report had been prepared on the basis of projections rather than actual figures. Paragraph 28 contained a general denial of liability for any loss, should negligence be found. Paragraph 31 of the Defence was in the following terms:

Mr Owen applied for summary judgment on the footing that the ADAS report disclosed no recoverable loss. That was the application which resulted in District Judge Culleton’s order striking out the claim in relation to interest paid to the vendor. The district judge declined to strike out the entire claim (or to enter summary judgment on it in favour of Mr Owen), but in the course of his judgment he expressed doubts as to whether the ADAS report disclosed any recoverable loss. In the event, however, the district judge concluded that he could not rule out the possibility that a claim based on the ADAS report might succeed.

By a Request for Further Information made on 26 April 2000 Mr Owen sought clarification as to the precise basis on which Mr Williams claimed damages.

In his first answer to the Request, the answer being dated 8 May 2000, Mr Williams said this:

In a second answer, dated 18 May 2000, Mr Williams in effect repeated the contents of his earlier letter.

By an order dated 16 June 2000 District Judge Hughes granted Mr Williams permission to add the other three members of his family as claimants, and to amend his particulars of claim. The order also appointed an accountant, Mr Aubrey Davies of Messrs Aston Hughes & Co, a specialist in agricultural accountancy, as the single joint accounting expert on the issue of the loss of profits claim (that is to say the claim for loss of profits by reason of delayed completion).

On 3 July 2000 Mr Williams filed amended particulars of claim in which he alleged that in a letter dated 16 May 1994 Mr Owen had negligently advised him that he had no claim for compensation against the vendor. In that letter, Mr Owen acknowledged that Mr Williams had throughout the transaction emphasised the need to complete at the earliest possible time. He went on to say that the file clearly showed a number of points, including the following:

On 17 July 2000 Mr Owen served an amended Defence objecting to the inclusion of the additional claim of negligence, on the footing that the claim was not within the terms of the permission to amend and that it was in any event statute-barred.

On 22 September 2000 a case management conference took place before District Judge Hughes. By his order, the district judge struck out the additional claim based on Mr Owen’s letter dated 16 May 1994. Among other procedural directions, he directed that each party be permitted to put written questions to Mr Davies, and that Mr Davies give oral evidence at the trial unless the parties agreed otherwise. Mr Williams sought permission to appeal against the district judge’s order (principally, it would appear, against the striking out of the claim based on the letter dated 16 May 1994), but on 18 October 2000 His Honour Judge Edwards QC refused permission.

By an order dated 23 October 2000, District Judge Williams refused Mr Williams’ application to call a second expert witness at the trial, and gave directions about bundles.

In September 2000 Mr Davies submitted his first report, dated 5 September 2000, in which he calculated the loss suffered by Mr Williams by reason of delayed completion. He concluded that the true measure of Mr Williams’ loss was the profit which he would have made from a lamb crop during the 1993/4 season, on the basis that by January 1994 it was too late to buy breeding ewes. In paragraphs 1.19 to 1.21 of his first report, Mr Davies said this:

In paragraph 2.5 of his first report, Mr Davies concluded that the net loss suffered by Mr Williams as a result of his being unable to stock the Farm in good time (i.e. to buy in breeding ewes before the market was lost) was £7,748. In paragraph 3(2)(a) of his first report, Mr Davies concluded that it would have been possible for Mr Williams to carry into effect his original plan – that is to say to buy in breeding ewes for the 1994 lambing season – had completion taken place on 26 November 1993. (The date 26 November 1993 is relevant only in so far as it was a date which had featured in the questions which both parties had asked Mr Davies. At that stage the parties appear to have thought that 26 November 1993 was the earliest available date for the expiry of a completion notice, but if so they were in error in failing to take into account that the period prescribed by general condition 23 is fifteen working days.)

In paragraph 3.2(b) of his first report, Mr Davies concluded that by 7 December 1993 (again, a date which, so far as I can see, has no significance beyond the fact that it was expressly mentioned in the questions which the parties asked Mr Davies) "it was too late to buy good breeding ewes for the 1994 lambing season".

By letter dated 2 October 2000 Mr Williams queried certain aspects of Mr Davies’ report. Mr Davies responded to those queries by letter dated 2 November 2000.

On 29 March 2001 Mr Davies produced a revised report, taking account of the representations made by Mr Williams in his letter dated 2 October 2000. In the light of those representations, Mr Davies increased his figure for the profit which Mr Williams would have made from a lamb crop in 1994, but which he was unable to make due to delayed completion, from £7,748 to £10,594.

The trial of the action took place before Mr Recorder Howells on 14 to 18 May 2001. At the trial, Mr Davies gave oral evidence. In the course of his evidence, in response to a question from Miss McQuail, Mr Davies expressly confirmed the statement in paragraph 1.20 of his first report that "[b]y the end of November the main breeding season [had] passed".

On 20 August 2001 the judge delivered a reserved judgment on liability. After hearing further argument, he went on to deliver an extempore judgment on damages.

I have already sufficiently summarised the judge’s judgment on liability (against which there is, as I noted earlier, no cross-appeal).

On the issue of damages, the judge began by saying that he had listened carefully to Mr Davies’ evidence, and that "there were plainly losses suffered by the claimants". However, in the course of his judgment the judge made no further express reference to Mr Davies’ evidence, either by way of acceptance or by way of rejection of it.

The judge then posed the question to be decided in the following terms:

The judge went on to hold that the correct measure of damages was the difference (in financial terms) between what would have happened had a completion notice been served by Mr Williams and what actually happened. As to that, he accepted Miss McQuail’s submission that the losses identified by Mr Davies would only have been suffered had Mr Williams elected to proceed with the contract rather than to terminate it. He further accepted her submission that in any event Mr Williams ought to have mitigated his damage by suing the vendor for damages (including damages for misrepresentation in relation to the cow premium). As to mitigation, the judge said:

The judge went on to accept Miss McQuail’s further submission that the only damage which Mr Williams could recover was a sum representing interest at the contract rate on the deposit from the contractual completion date until actual completion, together with interest on that sum. That worked out at £591.75 plus £354.72 interest, making a total of £946.47. The judge accordingly awarded that sum as damages.

As to costs, since there had been a payment into court which exceeded the amount of the judgment (the last date for acceptance of which had been 27 April 2000), the judge awarded Mr Owen his costs since that date, and ordered that in respect of the period prior to that date there should be no order for costs save that Mr Williams should be entitled to be paid £300 by Mr Owen, representing the fee for the issue of the claim form. He also ordered payment out to Mr Owen of the sum in court (without, apparently, any deduction in respect of the damages awarded), and he directed that the £300 to be paid by Mr Owen be offset against an earlier order for costs in Mr Owen’s favour.

Mr Williams’ ground of appeal against the amount of damages awarded is, in effect, that as a result of Mr Owen’s failure to advise that a completion notice be served he was forced to pay over the odds for the Farm, particularly in respect of a non-existent cow premium; and that he had done all he reasonably could to mitigate his loss. Mr Williams also appeals against the judge’s costs orders on the ground (as I understand it) that following the dismissal of Mr Owen’s application for summary judgment the only live issue remaining was as to the amount of the damages and that consequently the costs incurred by Mr Owen after 27 April 2000 were unreasonably incurred. Mr Williams also asserts that since Mr Owen’s application for summary judgment was unsuccessful, Mr Owen should have been ordered to pay the costs prior to 27 April 2000. He also complains that a fourth bundle of documents which was prepared for the trial by Messrs Pinsent Curtis Biddle was unnecessary as Mr Williams had prepared the bundle himself. Mr Williams also seeks to adduce new evidence as to advice he received from other solicitors and from counsel in relation to a possible claim for damages against the vendor. This evidence, he asserts, is relevant to the question of mitigation.

Granting permission to appeal, Ward LJ considered that it was arguable that Mr Williams could not reasonably be expected to engage in litigation against the vendor, and accordingly that he had not failed to mitigate the damage which he had suffered.

Before us, Mr Walters (for Mr Williams) effectively conceded that on the available evidence he was not in a position to contend for awards of damages on the footing that Mr Williams paid too much for the Farm, or that the "hefting payment" was in the event wasted expenditure. At all events, whether Mr Walters formally made that concession or not, it is plain, in my judgment, that on the available evidence the only claim to damages which Mr Williams can maintain is a claim to damages for delayed completion.

Mr Walters submits that the judge ought to have assessed the damages for delayed completion at £10,594, in accordance with Mr Davies’ revised report, on the footing that Mr Owen’s negligent failure to advise as to the availability of the completion notice procedure resulted in completion being delayed beyond 3 December 1993, which in turn meant that it was too late for Mr Williams to buy in breeding ewes for the 1994 lambing season. Hence, he submits, Mr Owen’s negligence led directly to the loss of the 1994 lamb crop. As to mitigation, he submits that it was not unreasonable for Mr Williams to claim damages against Mr Owen without having first claimed them against the vendor. He relies on Mr Owen’s letter dated 16 May 1994 as, if not direct advice to Mr Williams that he had no claim against the vendor, at least as discouraging such a claim.

Miss McQuail submits that, on the face of Mr Davies’ first report, by 3 December 1993 it was already too late for Mr Williams to go into the market to buy breeding ewes. She points out that in questioning Mr Davies in the course of his oral evidence at trial she specifically asked him to confirm the contents of paragraph 1.20 of his first report, which he duly did. It follows, she submits, that on the basis of Mr Davies’ own evidence the loss of the 1994 lamb crop cannot be laid at the door of Mr Owen since service of a completion notice at the earliest available opportunity (12 November 1993) would not have prevented that loss occurring.

As to mitigation, Miss McQuail points out that, quite apart from Mr Owen’s negligence, Mr Williams had a claim for damages for breach of contract against the vendor (or his estate) in respect of losses resulting from the delay which occurred after the contractual date for completion (11 November 1993). She submits that that claim (albeit now long-since statute-barred) was in all respects a more straightforward claim than the claim in negligence against Mr Owen, and that in the circumstances it would have been reasonable for Mr Williams to pursue his remedies against the vendor (or his estate) before seeking recovery from Mr Owen. In support of that submission, Miss McQuail relies on the decision of this court in Walker v. Medlicott [1999] 1 WLR 727, a case of negligent drafting of a Will. In that case the claimant failed to recover damages against the negligent draftsman, it being held that he ought to have taken proceedings for the rectification of the Will.

When faced with the possibility we might conclude that the issue of damages might have to be remitted for a further hearing, both Mr Walters and Miss McQuail, having taken instructions, very sensibly took the view that such a course would be disproportionate in terms of time and costs, and they accordingly invited us to deal with the issue of damages finally on this appeal.

Whilst I have considerable sympathy with the judge, confronted as he was with difficult questions in relation to the assessment of damages, I nevertheless take the view that his treatment of Mr Davies’ evidence (or, perhaps more accurately, his non-treatment of it) was so unsatisfactory that in normal circumstances a remission of the issue for a further hearing might well have been unavoidable. However, I recognise the good sense of the parties in inviting us to deal with the matter finally on this appeal, and accordingly I shall do the best I can on the available evidence (such as it is).

In the first place, I accept Miss McQuail’s submission that on the face of Mr Davies’ first report (and in particular paragraph 1.20, which he confirmed in the course of his oral evidence) the market for breeding ewes for the 1994 lambing season was lost by the end of November 1993, and that in consequence by 3 December 1993 (the earliest available date for the expiry of a completion notice served by Mr Williams) it was already too late for Mr Williams to buy in breeding ewes. That in turn means that had Mr Williams terminated the contract on the expiry of a completion notice, he would not have been able to earn his lost profit elsewhere (because it would have been too late for him to buy in breeding ewes) and hence the loss of profit in respect of the 1994 lambing season could not in that event be laid at Mr Owen’s door.

However, that is not the end of the matter (as it seems to me) since it is still necessary to consider what chance there would have been, had Mr Williams served a completion notice on 12 November 1993, of his being thereby placed in a position to buy in breeding ewes before the end of November 1993. In my judgment, the value of that chance represents the true measure of Mr Williams’ loss resulting from Mr Owen’s negligence.

Given that there can, so far as I can see, have been no significant possibility of actual completion taking place on a date prior to the expiry of the notice (3 December 1993), Mr Williams would only have been in a position to buy in breeding ewes before the end of November 1993 if (a) under pressure of a completion notice, the vendor reached a binding agreement with the occupier of the farmhouse whereby vacant possession of it would be given on the expiry of the notice, and (b) Mr Williams had been informed of that agreement, so that he could be sufficiently confident of completion on the expiry of the notice to justify his going into the market to buy breeding ewes. What, then, were the chances of Mr Williams being placed in that position?

This question was not addressed by the judge, and there is no direct evidence about it. However, doing the best I can, and taking a conservative approach, I conclude that, had a completion notice been served on 12 November 1993, the chance of Mr Williams thereby being placed in a position to buy in breeding ewes before the end of November 1993, and hence of being able to earn a profit from the 1994 lambing season, would have been in the region of 40 per cent. In reaching this conclusion I bear in mind that the vendor was selling up and retiring, and hence would be unlikely to risk losing the sale of the Farm for the sake of a dispute about a redundancy payment (the amount of which was not in evidence, but which must, in all likelihood, have been relatively insignificant by comparison with the purchase price of the Farm). It also seems to me to be more likely than not that if the vendor had reached agreement with the occupier of the farm house for completion to be given on 3 December 1993 he would have done so some days before that date, in sufficient time to enable Mr Williams, on being informed of the agreement, to go into the market to buy breeding ewes. It is also reasonable to assume that the vendor would have been aware of Mr Williams’ intention to terminate the contract if completion did not take place in accordance with the completion notice: at the very least, he would have appreciated there was a serious risk that he might do so.

I readily accept that these conclusions involve a significant degree of speculation, but, for reasons already explained, to remit the assessment of damages for a further hearing would in the circumstances be wholly disproportionate.

In my judgment, therefore, but for Mr Owen’s negligence Mr Williams would have had a 40 per cent chance of earning a profit from the 1994 lambing season. As to the amount of that profit, the only available figure is Mr Davies’ revised figure of £10,594. 40 per cent of £10,594 is £4,238. That, in my judgment, is the amount of the damage suffered by Mr Williams as a result of Mr Owen’s negligence, and (subject to the question of mitigation) that is the amount he is entitled to recover against Mr Owen. (I should make it clear at this point that both sides agree that if damages are awarded on this basis, the award must be substituted for judge’s award of damages representing interest on the deposit, in order to avoid double counting.)

I turn, therefore, to the question of mitigation.

In my judgment, Mr Williams’ duty to mitigate his damage did not require him to take proceedings for damages against the vendor. As Lord Macmillan said in a much-cited passage in his speech in Banco de Portugal v. Waterlow [1932] AC 452 at 506:

In the instant case, it cannot in my judgment be assumed that a claim for damages against the vendor would have been a straightforward affair. Moreover, in his letter dated 16 May 1994 Mr Owen himself, to put it at its lowest, fell a long way short of recommending that Mr Williams commence such proceedings. I conclude, therefore, that Mr Williams acted reasonably in the course which he eventually took in suing Mr Owen.

Nor, in my judgment, is the decision in Walker v. Medlicott of assistance in the instant case. In Walker v. Medlicott , as Slade LJ (who gave the leading judgment) pointed out (at p.739), the recovery of damages against the negligent solicitor had the effect of enabling the beneficiaries under the Will to retain "adventitious benefits", and accordingly fairness required that the beneficiaries share the cost of putting things right by means of rectification proceedings. That feature is not present in the instant case.

I would accordingly allow the appeal, set aside the judge’s order, and award Mr Williams damages in the sum of £4,238.

It follows that the costs orders made by the judge may have to be revisited. In that event, unless the parties can reach agreement there will have to be further argument as to costs, and as to any other consequential matters.

I agree with Jonathan Parker LJ that this appeal should be allowed to the extent which he proposes. I add a few words of my own on only one point which arose in the course of the argument in what seems to me to be a difficult case in which to assess damages.

Jonathan Parker LJ has concluded that if Mr Owen had not negligently failed to advise Mr Williams to serve a completion notice there was about a 40 per cent chance that the vendor would have completed the sale in time to enable him to buy in ewes so as not to miss the 1994 lambing season. It follows that there was also a chance that he would not have done so. The Recorder held that if the vendor did not complete within the notice period Mr Williams would have terminated the contract.

In the course of argument there was some discussion as to what, if any, loss Mr Williams sustained as a result of being deprived of the opportunity of terminating the contract. No attempt was made to show that the whole bargain was disadvantageous to Mr Williams and that he suffered a loss as a result of being committed to it which he would have avoided but for Mr Owen’s negligence. Such an exercise would have involved a complicated analysis of the comparison between the position as it was and the position as it would have been if the contract had been terminated.

It occurred to me during the course of the argument that Mr Williams might have been able to recover damages for loss of an opportunity to terminate the contract, but only if he could establish these two steps. The first is that, if he had terminated the contract, he would have sued the vendor for damages for failure to complete on 11 November 1993 (his rights of suit being preserved by clause 23(6) of the general conditions quoted by Jonathan Parker LJ) and the second is that, if he had done so, he would have recovered the whole amount of the loss of profit attributable to the loss of the 1994 lambing season, namely £10,594, from the vendor.

In that event it could be said that Mr Williams was entitled to 40 per cent of the £10,594 to reflect the loss of the chance of the vendor completing in time and a further figure to reflect the value of the loss of opportunity to terminate the contract. He would not, however, be entitled to the whole of the remaining 60 per cent because some allowance would have to be made for the chance of the vendor completing within the period of the notice (or perhaps before Mr Williams exercised his right to terminate) but too late for Mr Williams to buy in suitable ewes.

I have, however, reached the conclusion that Mr Williams has not established the necessary steps identified above. As Jonathan Parker LJ has explained, he did not in fact sue the vendor, although he could have done. I agree with Jonathan Parker LJ that, in the events that happened, it was not unreasonable for him not to do so, but I can see no sensible basis on the evidence for holding that he would have done so if he had terminated the contract. Indeed, so far as I can see, it was not his case at the trial that he would have done. I also note in passing that it was not Mr Williams’ case that Mr Owen should have advised him to sue the vendor or, indeed, that he would have done so if Mr Williams had terminated the contract.

In these circumstances, I have reached the conclusion that Mr Williams has not established any loss as a result of a loss of opportunity to terminate the contract. His loss depends upon the quantification of the chance of the vendor completing in time to enable him to buy in suitable ewes. I agree that, for the reasons given by Jonathan Parker LJ, a fair assessment of that chance leads to the conclusion that Mr Williams is entitled to damages of £4,238.

For the reasons given by my Lords, I agree that the appeal should be allowed and that the Court should substitute for the Judge’s award of damages the award of £4,238 indicated in paragraph 71 of Parker LJ’s judgment.