Tom Simpson v Unite the Union

Rule(s) breached by Unite the Union:

Principles of natural justice as incorporated in Unite rules.

Unite Rule 27 including Unite Rule 27.2.

Date(s) of rule breaches:

From 4-9-2018 to 8-5-2019

Description of rule breach:

It is a principle of natural justice that no person may judge their own case. Unite breached this principle and undermined procedural fairness by arranging for John Gillespie, the Chair of the F&GP Committee and chair of the Scottish Unite Executive Committee, to act as chair of the disciplinary panel set up to consider disciplinary charges brought by the F&GP Committee and the Scottish Unite Executive Committee against me, Mr Gillespie chaired the F&GP committee of 4th September 2018 that decided to instruct an investigation into possible malicious and vexatious Intent and decided on my suspension from elected positions.

Mr Gillespie chaired the F&GP committee of 9th October 2018 that decided to instruct Stephen Deans to "further investigate". Mr Gillespie chaired the F&GP committee of 12th March 2019 that decided to "put together" a Rule 27 panel.

It is a breach of unite Rules and Natural justice for Mr Gillespie to have been a member of the committee which raised the initial concerns, initiated the investigation into those concerns, confirmed that the investigation found the concerns to have foundation and to then have gone on to participate in hearing the case concerning those concerns.

The facts

Acting in any way contrary to the rules or any duty or obligation imposed on that member by or pursuant to these rules whether in his/her capacity as a member, a holder of a lay office or a representative of the Union. …

Knowingly, recklessly or in bad faith providing the Union with false or misleading information relating to a member or any other aspect of the Union’s activities.

Inciting, espousing or practising discrimination or intolerance amongst members on grounds of race, ethnic origin, religion, age, gender, disability or sexual orientation.

Bringing about injury to or discredit upon the Union or any member of the Union including the undermining of the Union, branch or workplace organisation and individual workplace representatives or branch officers. …

Breach of the Union’s policies on diversity, bullying and harassment in the workplace, which will include cyber bullying and harassment.[emphasis added]

Disciplinary Hearings shall be organised and conducted under directions issued by the Executive Council. These directions ensure that the process is fair andconducted in accordance with the principles of natural justice. [emphasis added]

A charge under this rule may be heard by a Branch, Branch Committee (where so determined by the Branch), Regional Committee or the Executive Council. The Executive Council may delegate to a subcommittee of the Executive Council. It would be usual practice that disciplinary charges would be heard at branch level in the first instance. Disciplinary charges deemed to be of a serious nature may be initiated by the Regional committee or Executive Council.

Serious allegations of breach of Clauses 27.1.1. to 27.1.7 may be referred directly to the General Secretary. The General Secretary will appoint a senior employee of the Union to conduct an investigation which may lead to disciplinary charges being laid on behalf of the Executive Council.

Investigation and Charge

A member may be charged with one OR more of the offences detailed in Rules 27.1.1 to 27.1.7. A member may not be charged with any matter falling outside of these rules, and at the end of these directions a general statement is provided concerning the law in this area. If there is any doubt as to the matter under consideration, then the body proposing to deal with the matter should seek legal advice from the union’s Director of Legal Services.

Rule 27.3 provides that charges are to be heard by a Branch (or Branch Committee), a Regional Committee or the Executive Council (or a sub-committee of the Executive Council). Where the charge is to be heard by a Branch (or Branch Committee) the charge shall be brought by the Branch. When the charge is to be heard by the Regional Committee, the charge shall be brought by the Regional Committee. Where the charge is to be heard by the Executive Council (or a sub-committee of the Executive Council) the charge shall be brought by the Executive Council (or a sub-committee of the Executive Council) or the General Secretary.

If the union receives notice of a matter which may lead to a disciplinary charge against one more members, then the situation should be investigated to determine if there should be a charge. The means of investigation shall be determined by a body referred to in Rule 27.3 or by the General Secretary. Notice of the fact of an investigation being undertaken shall be sent to the office of the General Secretary.

The investigation shall be completed as soon as is practicable in the circumstances and the outcome of the investigation shall be recorded in writing. The investigation shall report to the body (or the General Secretary) which commissioned the investigation with a recommendation as to whether there is a charge to answer.

After receipt of the investigation report, there shall be no unreasonable delay before a member is charged.

If a charge is to be brought, a letter shall be sent to the member setting out the circumstances (in outline form) giving rise to the charge and specifying the rule which it is alleged has been breached. The member shall also receive a copy of the investigation report and any associated documents. A copy of the letter of charge shall be sent to the office of the General Secretary. [emphasis added]

Elaine Dougall was asked to go through her investigation with the committee who then asked the RCO a number of questions which were answered to their satisfaction.

The committee then went into a private session to go over the paperwork provided to them with regard to the case and to determine how they wished to proceed.

Having considered the evidence provided to them the committee did not uphold the Rule 27 complaint submitted by Mr. Simpson. In reaching their conclusions the committeealso took into consideration whether the complaint by Mr. Simpson had any malicious or vexatious intent. In doing so the committee believed there was that possibility and instructed an investigation to take place and for Mr. Simpson to be suspended during the period of the investigation and any subsequent hearings that may take place. This was not to be seen as an implication of guilt merely a measure to conclude the investigation. [emphasis added]

Following receipt of Ms Dougall's report the Committee had its second task to perform - to reach a conclusion and decision on whether to hold a disciplinary process having considered the investigation report. This report was presented to us as a Committee in September 2018. I was present on the F&GP that day along with six other Committee members. As Chair of the F & GP I tend to let the members debate the matter and try and take the temperature of the meeting and the room. I did so that day and found our members unanimous , having looked through Ms Dougall's report, in the view that there was something amiss in the complaint having been put forward by Mr Simpson. Ms Dougall was questioned about her conclusions. We took a unanimous decision that the conduct of Messrs Morrison and Stoddart did not warrant a disciplinary case being opened. However we reached a further conclusion that there was, on the face of it, evidence to suggest that Mr Simpson had been malicious or vexatious in his complaint.

However concerns were expressed by the Committee that we could not proceed to a disciplinary matter without giving Mr Simpson the opportunity to explain why he believed the actions of others, many of which seemed relatively harmless in themselves or at the least explainable, amounted to the behaviour he had described.

We concluded that we needed more information and for this reason we initiated a second investigation. Mr Simpson would and rightly should be given the opportunity to explain himself.[emphasis added]

The panel deliberated on his report. We agreed with the view of the investigating Officer that the matter should proceed to a disciplinary matter. It was agreed that a panel consisting of myself, Ms Tolmie and Mr Mann would hear the case and consider all of the evidence in the matter.

12 . It is entirely normal for such panels to be made up of lay persons from within the Region and our Executive Committee. It is in fact required by our Rules. I do not see any difficulty or impropriety. The elected members of the Region are required to sit on these bodies and our involvement to date was to decide if that there was sufficient evidence to proceed to the next stage and commence a disciplinary process.

Following an investigation and consideration by the Scottish Executive' s F&GP committee, you are charged with having breached Rules 27.1.1, 27 .1.3 and 27 .1.5 of the Unite rule book.

The conduct which the disciplinary panel will consider is the lodging and pursuing of complaints (lodged initially on 2nd and 16th March 2018) … which were subsequently found, following investigation, to be without merit. The panel will consider whether they were potentially malicious, vexatious and/or defamatory. [emphasis added]

It is my belief that the above compromises your position and ability to act impartially on the disciplinary panel through a conflict of interest. Please let me know if you also believe that the above factors compromises your position on the disciplinary panel due to a perceived or real conflict of interest and impartiality. If so I would ask that you recuse yourself from membership of the disciplinary panel due to a potential, perceived or real conflict of interest or lack of impartiality.

The Hearing before the Certification Officer

A hearing took place by Video Conference. Three sessions, each lasting three hours, were timetabled over three days on 26, 27 and 28 January 2021. Mr Simpson represented himself. He submitted a skeleton argument and made oral submissions. He chose not to give written or oral evidence. The Union was represented by Mr Michael Potter of counsel, instructed by Mr Neil Gillam, of the Union’s Legal Department. The Union submitted a skeleton argument and written statements from Mr Rafferty (Scottish Regional Secretary), Ms Dougall (Regional Coordinating Officer, Scotland Region), Mr Gillespie (Regional Chair of Unite the Union, Scotland), Mr Woodhouse (Chair, Unite the Union) and Mr Deans (Regional Coordinating Officer, Scotland Region). Mr Rafferty, Ms Dougall, Mr Gillespie and Mr Woodhouse gave oral evidence. There was also in evidence a bundle of documents consisting of over 512 pages containing correspondence and a bundle consisting of the rules of the Union, policies and procedures for consideration at the hearing. Mr Simpson and Mr Potter both submitted legal authorities to support the arguments set out in their skeleton arguments.

The jurisdiction of the Certification Officer

A person who claims that there has been a breach or threatened breach of the rules of a trade union relating to any of the matters mentioned in subsection (2) may apply to the Certification Officer for a declaration to that effect, subject to subsections (3) to (7).

The matters are— …

The Certification Officer may refuse to accept an application under section 108A unless he is satisfied that the applicant has taken all reasonable steps to resolve the claim by the use of any internal complaints procedure of the union.

If he accepts an application under section 108A the Certification Officer—

The Decision and Reasons

I refuse to grant Mr Simpson’s application for a declaration that between 4 September 2018 and 8 May 2019 the Union breached rule 27.2 and the principles of Natural Justice and procedural unfairness by arranging for John Gillespie, the Chair of the Finance and General Purposes Committee to also act as chair of the disciplinary panel set up to consider disciplinary charges brought by the F&GP Committee against Mr Simpson.

The core of this second complaint is whether, having chaired the Committee which commissioned the investigation into Mr Simpson’s conduct, received Mr Deans’ report and referred the charges against Mr Simpson to the disciplinary panel, Mr Gillespie should have chaired the disciplinary panel.

Mr Simpson’s view is that Mr Gillespie raised the initial concern about Mr Simpson’s conduct, prosecuted it through the disciplinary process and then acted as the final decision maker by finding against Mr Simpson and expelling him from the Union. He argued that this is a breach of natural justice and, consequently, a breach of Rule 27.2 and the EC Guidance. Mr Simpson also argued that this introduced bias, whether real or perceived, into the Union’s handling of the case.

Mr Potter’s view is that Mr Simpson’s conduct was first raised with the Committee by Elaine Dougall. The Committee, as the relevant Regional Committee, has responsibility for the conduct of the disciplinary procedures. In Mr Simpson’s case the Committee decided to investigate the concerns raised by Ms Dougall and then, once it had received that second investigation report, to charge Mr Simpson under Rule 27.1 and to hold a disciplinary panel. That disciplinary panel was chaired by Mr Gillespie and included a further two members of the Committee. In effect the Committee delegated its disciplinary powers, as provided for by Rule 8.8, to a sub-committee. Mr Potter explained that neither Mr Gillespie nor the Committee had raised the initial concerns; they had acted on issues which arose from Ms Dougall’s investigation. Whilst they commissioned the report, the Committee could not be seen as a prosecutor as they had asked Mr Deans to investigate the concerns and then taken a decision to charge Mr Simpson once his report had been received.

Having read the Rules, I agree with Mr Potter. The Rules clearly give the Committee oversight of the process. The Committee has the power to commission an investigation, consider whether a charge should be made and be the decision maker. Rule 8.8 is clear that the Committee may delegate that power. On that basis I do not agree with Mr Simpson that Mr Gillespie, or indeed the other panel members, raised the initial concern about Mr Simpson’s conduct or undertook the investigation. Their role, ahead of the Hearing, was to oversee that process as part of the Committee and take decisions, under Rule 27 about whether the concerns should be investigated and whether Mr Simpson should be charged following that investigation.

Mr Simpson did not appear to make the argument that the rules themselves are unfair. His argument was that, in his case, the process was unfair. In making his case he was clear that the argument that the process adopted in his case was consistent across the Union did not mean that it was bound to be consistent with natural justice. He is, of course, right on that point. Consequently, I need to consider whether the application of the rules in his case was consistent with natural justice and whether the roles played by Mr Gillespie introduced an element of bias, whether real or perceived, and unfairness.

Mr Simpson’s principal concern appears to be that Mr Gillespie, Mr Rafferty and Ms Dougall were members of the same organisations or movements within, or linked to, the Union. He also argued that, as a result of that Mr Gillespie had links to the members about whom Mr Simpson had originally complained. In Mr Simpson’s view this should have been sufficient for Mr Gillespie to have recused himself from the panel. He did not appear to argue, however, that the other two panel members should have recused themselves.

Mr Simpson has offered no evidence to show that there was real bias in the decision making process, either before or during the disciplinary panel. He has, however, made several allegations of bias to the Union, and to myself during the course of his complaint, but these have not been supported by any evidence. The evidence provided by the Union, in written statements and when giving evidence at the Hearing, supports their case that there was no real bias. Ms Dougall, Mr Raffety and Mr Gillespie all told me that they approached the case without bias. Mr Woodhouse told me that the appeal panel took the view that Mr Gillespie had acted appropriately in his handling of the case. The documents also show that the Union undertook a second investigation to ensure that Mr Simpson had a chance to respond to the views expressed in Ms Rafferty’s report. Mr Deans, who conducted the second investigation, made several attempts to meet with Mr Simpson to hear his views. On that basis I am satisfied that there was no real bias and the only question for me is whether the perceived bias which Mr Simpson raised was sufficient to render the disciplinary process unfair and in breach of natural justice.

Mr Potter referred me to the test of actual or perceived bias which is set out in Porter v Magill [2002] 2 AC 357. That test requires me to consider whether a fair minded observer, having considered the facts, would conclude that there is a real possibility that the judge was biased. That fair minded observer is neither complacent not unduly sensitive or suspicious. If that fair minded observer would conclude that there was a real possibility that Mr Gillespie was biased then he should have recused himself.

It is accepted by both parties that Mr Gillespie was a member of some of the organisations identified by Mr Simpson, as were Mr Rafferty, Ms Dougall and Mr Deans. Mr Gillespie told me that the two additional members of the Panel were also a member of some of those organisations. The question for me, however, is whether that in itself is sufficient for a fair-minded observer to question Mr Gillespie’s fairness. Mr Simpson clearly believes that it was.

When giving evidence Mr Gillespie drew my attention to the letter written to him by Mr Simpson on 30 April 2019 which asked Mr Gillespie to consider whether he should recuse himself from the Hearing. The text of that request is set out at paragraph 43 above. The reason for the request was set out by Mr Simpson as being common membership of some Unite Committees, and Unite Progressive Left Scotland, with a Unite colleague who Mr Simpson describes as a supporter of one of the members about whom he had originally complained. Mr Simpson also noted that the other Member was on the management committee of an organisation who had hosted an event at which Mr Gillespie spoke; however, Mr Gillespie told me in evidence that he did not recall attending such an event.

In my experience it is not uncommon for Union Members and staff to also be a part of movements or organisations which are affiliated to, or linked with, the Union. I do not think, however, that this can be sufficient for the fair minded observer described at paragraph 81 above to believe that real or perceived bias could exist. Nor am I persuaded that the fact that Mr Gillespie sat on a Union Committee with a supporter of the person about whom Mr Simpson had originally complained, is sufficient to demonstrate real bias. On that basis I refuse to make the declaration requested by Mr Simpson.

I would add, however, that it would have been best practice for Mr Gillespie to have shared the letter written by Mr Simpson with the other members of the panel or with Mr Rafferty as Scottish Secretary. This would have ensured that they were comfortable with his decision as to whether he could be perceived as being biased and demonstrated a greater degree of transparency. I am conscious, however, that Mr Gillespie himself drew my attention to this letter and explained the actions he took and I make no criticism of him.

The Appeal

The Jurisdiction of the EAT

An appeal lies to the Employment Appeal Tribunal on any question of law arising in proceedings before or arising from any decision of the Certification Officer under this Chapter. [emphasis added]

Mr Simpson raises the Union’s compliance with natural justice as a central thread through his complaint. Both he and the Union agree that the Union is required to comply with natural justice. In previous decisions my predecessors and I have taken the view that the principles of natural justice are to be regarded as incorporated as implied terms into union rule books. Unite the Union have, however, gone further than some unions as they have incorporated the principles into their rule book at Rule 27.2

“Disciplinary Hearings shall be organised and conducted under directions issued by the Executive Council. These directions ensure that the process is fair and conducted in accordance with the principles of natural justice.”

In addition the EC Guidance itself states that:

“The disciplinary process is intended to be fair and conducted in accordance with the principles of natural justice. These directions are designed to ensure that this is the case.”

There is, therefore, no doubt that the Union should adhere to the principles of natural justice when proceeding with disciplinary action against a member. In previous cases my predecessors and I have established that, within this context, natural justice means that a union member facing disciplinary charges has a right to be given notice of those charges, the right to answer those charges and the right to be heard by an unbiased tribunal.

Mr Simpson, in written submissions and at the Hearing, argued that I should also take into account whether the proceedings were conducted in a way which was fair to him. The principles I have just outlined are intended to ensure that a process is, in a broad sense, fair and it is evident, from Rule 27.2 and from the EC Guidance, that the Union’s intention is that the process should be fair. I, therefore, have no difficulty in agreeing with Mr Simpson that the Union’s disciplinary process should be managed in a way which is fair.

Mr Potter referred me to the test of actual or perceived bias which is set out in Porter v Magill [2002] 2 AC 357. That test requires me to consider whether a fair minded observer, having considered the facts, would conclude that there is a real possibility that the judge was biased. That fair minded observer is neither complacent not unduly sensitive or suspicious. If that fair minded observer would conclude that there was a real possibility that Mr Gillespie was biased then he should have recused himself.

[1] My Lords, the fair-minded and informed observer is a relative newcomer among the select group of personalities who inhabit our legal village and are available to be called upon when a problem arises that needs to be solved objectively. Like the reasonable man whose attributes have been explored so often in the context of the law of negligence, the fair-minded observer is a creature of fiction. Gender-neutral (as this is a case where the complainer and the person complained about are both women, I shall avoid using the word ‘he’), she has attributes which many of us might struggle to attain to.

[2] The observer who is fair-minded is the sort of person who always reserves judgment on every point until she has seen and fully understood both sides of the argument. She is not unduly sensitive or suspicious, as Kirby J observed in Johnson v Johnson (2000) 174 ALR 655, (2000) 201 CLR 488 (para 53). Her approach must not be confused with that of the person who has brought the complaint. The ‘real possibility’ test ensures that there is this measure of detachment. The assumptions that the complainer makes are not to be attributed to the observer unless they can be justified objectively. But she is not complacent either. She knows that fairness requires that a judge must be, and must be seen to be, unbiased. She knows that judges, like anybody else, have their weaknesses. She will not shrink from the conclusion, if it can be justified objectively, that things that they have said or done or associations that they have formed may make it difficult for them to judge the case before them impartially.

[3] Then there is the attribute that the observer is ‘informed’. It makes the point that, before she takes a balanced approach to any information she is given, she will take the trouble to inform herself on all matters that are relevant. She is the sort of person who takes the trouble to read the text of an article as well as the headlines. She is able to put whatever she has read or seen into its overall social, political or geographical context. She is fair-minded, so she will appreciate that the context forms an important part of the material which she must consider before passing judgment.

making a complaint

deciding that the complaint should be investigated

considering whether the member should be suspended

conducting the investigation

considering the outcome of the investigation, and deciding whether a charge should be brought

prosecuting the charge

deciding whether the charge is proven

if the charge is proven, determining any penalty

A complaint was made by a patient to the General Dental Council, the body responsible for the formulation and enforcement of disciplinary rules for dentists, about the standard of care given to her by a dentist when attempting to carry out major restorative dental treatment. In accordance with the council’s usual practice the complaint was considered by a preliminary screener whose task was to decide if there was prima facie evidence of serious professional misconduct so as to require the council’s Preliminary Proceedings Committee to consider whether the complaint should be referred to the council’s Professional Conduct Committee for hearing. The complaint against the dentist was so referred. Unknown to him, the preliminary screener in his case was the president of the council, who thereafter chaired the Professional Conduct Committee hearing. Seven of the other ten members of that committee were members of the council.

The contention for the appellant that the role of the preliminary screener is prosecutorial cannot be accepted. It is more akin to the role of examining justices or a judge ruling on a submission of no case to answer. But that by no means disposes of the appellant’s points under article 6(1). In the opinion of the Board, when the participation of the President both as preliminary screener and as chairman of the PCC is seen in conjunction with the predominance of council members in both the PPC and the PCC, and in conjunction moreover with the fact that the disciplinary charge is brought on behalf of the council, the cumulative result is an appearance and a real danger that the PCC lacked the necessary independence and impartiality. Only the ultimate right of appeal to Her Majesty in Council saves the day.

I accept, that one has to be very careful to draw a distinction between courts of justice, statutory bodies and voluntary bodies in this sense, that a voluntary body is a creation of its members by a contract between them. The contract, of course, in the case of a union is to be found in its rules. It is not for me in this court to suggest, even after the present legislation, that a union is not a voluntary body of its members. One has to look at the rules to find the contract between the members because the voluntary body can, by its contract prescribe in what way its disciplinary proceedings shall be conducted. The members of a voluntary body, if they are so minded, can by their contract exclude from their own domestic tribunal some one or more of what would normally be regarded as rules of natural justice. In my judgment, in construing the rules, a court, if it observes that there has been a clear exclusion of a rule of natural justice, will give effect to the rules of the society, and for the purposes of the particular piece of litigation will treat that rule of natural justice as excluded. However, what the court will not do is to infer from a set of rules that a rule of natural justice has been excluded. One has got to have clear words to exclude a rule of natural justice.

Turning now to apply those principles to the facts of the present case, one has here certain evidence which is undisputed. One has the original memorandum prepared by Mr. Scargill as a report on the libel proceedings in which he makes a complaint against these plaintiffs. It seems to me that in the special circumstances of this case he was setting himself up as a person complaining. It matters not what words he used, whether he is prosecutor or complainant. However one reads his own report, he was complaining about the conduct of these two men. He was setting the machinery in motion. What is more, in the very document in which he was making the complaint, he was not only making the complaint but was also expressing a view on their guilt or culpability. A man who not only makes a complaint but at the same time expresses his views about the guilt and culpability of the persons to be brought before the tribunal seems to me to fall well and truly under both heads, as a prosecutor and as a person who is biased. Be that as it may, anybody who then observes the tribunal, and sees that that man retires willingly as the chairman — whether he has got a vote or not seems to matter not one iota — must feel that justice is not seen to be done. One reaches that conclusion, in my judgment, without ever having reference to one word of what Mr. Walsh said did happen when the tribunal retired. If one adds that fact into the scale, the answer seems to me to be that any bystander, observing that fact would say not only that justice was not seen to be done, but knowing what Mr. Walsh has said, and knowing it is not disputed, would in those circumstances say: “I am certain justice was not done.”

The key arguments

C complains that the CO erred in law by not recognising that JG acted as ‘prosecutor’ in being part of the Committee which commissioned Mr Deans to do the second investigation and which decided the charges to be answered by C. As set out above, the CO considered this argument and rightly rejected it for the reasons she gave.

C complains that the CO erred in not finding that JG (and presumably any member of the Committee) could not properly be part of the disciplinary panel because the Committee had decided, in accepting the recommendation in Mr Deans’ report, that there was “sufficient evidence to proceed”; and thus ended up acting as ‘judge in his own cause’. R disagrees. There is certainly nothing more objectionable in the extremely limited role JG played as part of a large committee accepting a recommendation that another person had already made, following investigation, than – in environments which are much a fotiori in terms of judicial formality – an employment judge refusing to strike out a claim and then hearing that claim, or indeed a member of the Court of Appeal granting permission to appeal and then being part of the court hearing the full appeal.

The approach of the Certification Officer

The involvement of Mr Gillespie in the disciplinary process

Mr Simpson made the initial complaints

Ms Dougall conducted the investigation

Ms Dougall wrote the investigation report. She considered there was no evidence to substantiate both complaints but recommended that a F&GP panel be convened to determine if Mr Simpson had himself breached the Rules

Mr Gillespie chaired the F&GP Committee on 4 September 2018: (a) to whom Ms Dougall presented her complaint, (b) that questioned her about the report, (c) was satisfied by her answers, (d) went into private session to consider the paperwork, (e) rejected Mr Simpson’s complaints, (f) decided it was possible that Mr Simpson had malicious or vexatious intent being of the view that “there was something amiss in the complaint having been put forward by Mr Simpson” (g) instructed that an investigation take place (considering Mr Simpson should have a chance to answer the allegation), and (h) instructed that Mr Simpson should be suspended (noting that was not to be seen as an implication of guilt)

Mr Deans investigated the issue raised by the F&GP Committee

Mr Gillespie chaired the F&GP Committee on 9 October 2018 when Mr Deans was instructed to continue the investigation and to seek a meeting with Mr Simpson

Mr Deans wrote the investigation report and recommended that a Rule 27 panel be put together

Mr Gillespie chaired the F&GP Committee on 12 March 2019 and (a) agreed with the view of the investigating Officer that the matter should proceed to a disciplinary hearing (which meant that Mr Simpson would be charged with a breach of the Rules by the Union) (b) decided that the disciplinary hearing would be before a panel of 3 members of the F&GP Committee, of which he would be the chair.

Mr Simpson wrote to Mr Gillespie on 30 April 2019 and asked that he should not be on the disciplinary panel. Mr Gillespie did not reply to the letter or share it with the other members of the committee.

Mr Gillespie chaired the disciplinary panel and with the other two members decided that Mr Simpson should be expelled from the Union.

Mr Gillespie gave evidence at the appeal hearing before a sub-committee of the Executive Council

The sub-committee of the Executive Council dismissed the appeal.