Stephen Grant Forster t/a Premier Research and Marketing v The Financial Conduct Authority

Mr Forster relies on a wide range of personal, medical, and domestic circumstances to explain his failure to submit regulatory returns. The FCA accepted Mr Forster’s account of the facts underlying these circumstances but disputes that they provide a reasonable explanation for Mr Forster’s failure to file any of the required returns over such a prolonged period of time.

As to his own health, the evidence describes a series of significant and ongoing medical conditions that, by his account, required repeated clinical intervention, affected his ability to work consistently, and caused periods of incapacity. He explains that these conditions demanded substantial time for treatment and recovery. During 2024–2025, he reported further medical difficulties requiring investigations and planned procedures. He states that these matters, taken cumulatively, materially restricted his ability to attend to administrative obligations including regulatory reporting.

In relation to his immediate family, Mr Forster stated that several close family members had, over an extended period, experienced serious and complex health difficulties. He described one adult family member as living with long-term serious disability arising from major medical events, requiring ongoing support, regular appointments, and daily assistance.
He explained that another adult family member suffered from chronic conditions necessitating frequent care and monitoring. He further stated that dependent children within the household have experienced prolonged and significant medical issues requiring hospital treatment and specialist supervision. He mentioned that he bears the primary responsibility for transporting these family members to medical appointments and for providing day-to-day care.

Mr Forster also described extensive caring responsibilities for elderly relatives. He states that he had long-term responsibility for supporting an elderly relative with multiple serious conditions requiring intensive practical assistance until that relative’s death in 2024.
He reported ongoing responsibilities for another elderly relative with chronic age-related health needs requiring regular medical attendance. He submitted that these duties placed significant demands on his time and limited his ability to perform regulatory tasks.

Mr Forster additionally relies on the impact of a security-related incident involving a stalker in 2020, which he states caused severe disruption to his personal life and necessitated an unplanned change of residence. He explains that the relocation created substantial administrative and logistical burdens. He asserts that the consequences of this incident continued to affect his household stability and the time available to manage his business obligations.

As to his business circumstances, Mr Forster is a sole trader and stated that he had no administrative support to assist with regulatory or bookkeeping functions. He explained that changes in his accounting support left him without the external assistance on which he had previously relied, and that he lacked resources to outsource administrative work. He stated that he experienced difficulties with electronic systems, document submission, and broadband reliability, which he says compounded the challenges arising from his personal circumstances.

The record of correspondence before us showed that across a sustained period the FCA repeatedly granted extensions of time to enable Mr Forster to bring his returns up to date. The first extension was granted on 22 May 2023, when, following a telephone conversation initiated by Mr Forster, the FCA agreed to extend the deadline for submission of overdue returns to 5 June 2023. When that deadline passed without any return being submitted, the FCA issued a further reminder on 23 June 2023, giving him until 30 June 2023 to comply. In early July 2023, the FCA offered that it would discontinue its enforcement action altogether if Mr Forster submitted only the most recent set of outstanding returns by 18 July 2023 (with the other outstanding returns to follow); he did not do so. In the following months, additional opportunities were afforded before the FCA issued a Warning Notice in September 2024, one of which was a further extension confirmed on 10 September 2024, again intended to give Mr Forster additional time to file at least the latest return. No returns were received at any stage

The pattern of non-submission of returns continued after the Decision Notice. On 27 January 2025, following Mr Forster’s reference to the Tribunal in December 2024, the FCA agreed to a formal stay of enforcement proceedings until 28 February 2025, to enable him to submit the most recent returns so that cancellation might be avoided. Within the Tribunal proceedings, the FCA supported the granting of further time in response to Mr Forster’s requests, including the extension to allow him to file his Reply by 18 July 2025, which he submitted on the final day. The Tribunal thereafter granted multiple elongated deadlines for service of evidence, including an extension to 2 January 2026 ordered on 19 November 2025. Mr Forster did not file any outstanding returns, whether during the FCA’s supervisory and enforcement process or during the Tribunal proceedings themselves.

On behalf of the FCA Mr Oh gave unchallenged evidence explaining that regulatory returns are central to the FCA’s supervision of some 5,000 firms within the relevant supervisory cohort and are often the only routine source of information for small financial advice practices such as Mr Forster’s. He described how the RMAR, complaints and consumer-credit returns provide essential data on a firm’s financial resources, client-money position, PII cover, adviser competence, product sales and complaint levels, and explained that many of the relevant items require only simple numerical entries or nil returns. He said that the information fed into “supervisory dashboards” which allowed supervisors to identify red flags and assess whether firms continue to satisfy the Threshold Conditions. Because Mr Forster had not submitted any returns since 2019, the FCA has had no visibility of his business for more than six years, leaving it unable to assess his financial resilience, operational soundness or potential consumer detriment, and preventing both proactive and reactive supervision. In Mr Oh’s view, persistent non-submission of returns leaves the FCA unable to determine whether a firm remains fit and proper and is therefore a significant regulatory concern.

We accept the FCA’s evidence that the absence of these returns deprives the FCA of the core information necessary to assess whether Mr Forster satisfies the Suitability Threshold Condition in para 2E of Schedule 6 FSMA, including the requirement that a firm comply with requests for information and maintain its affairs in a sound and prudent manner. The absence also prevents the FCA from understanding the firm’s financial position, the protection of client money, its PII coverage, the scale and nature of its activity, or whether risks to consumers have arisen.

We cover the evidence and findings regarding Mr Forster’s future prospects for compliance in the discussion section below.

Mr Forster submits that the FCA’s decision to cancel his Part 4A permission is wholly unjust and disproportionate. He accepts that he did not submit the regulatory returns required of him but contends that this was the result of an exceptional and prolonged period of personal and family crisis. He describes a sustained burden of caring responsibilities, serious illnesses within his household, financial strain, and professional commitments which, he says, left him unable to devote the time required to complete the returns. He maintains that his non-compliance was never wilful but the product of circumstances beyond his control.

He emphasises that he has been a financial adviser for over fifty years, has never acted dishonestly, has harmed no client, and has provided advice valued by “hundreds if not almost a thousand” clients. He submits that the FCA’s case reduces to the proposition that “some paperwork is late,” and that such a failing does not justify terminating a professional career and extinguishing the ability to earn a livelihood at the age of 71. He says the consequences for his family would be “catastrophic,” arguing that cancellation would deprive him of all income, including future trail commission. He further submits that the FCA has “lost its way,” levelling criticisms of the institution, including reliance on political commentary. He argues that the regulatory regime was designed to address wrongdoing, not to “squeeze” small firms such as his, and that the FCA should have helped him complete the returns rather than pursue cancellation. In response to questions from the Tribunal, he stated repeatedly that he had “just run out of time,” that he had done his best, and that if he had more stability and time he could file the returns with the assistance of an accountant.

He also advanced a series of submissions founded on the European Convention on Human Rights. He contends that the cumulative pressure arising from the FCA’s correspondence and the prospect of losing his livelihood amounted to inhuman or degrading treatment contrary to Article 3. Under Article 6, he maintains that the process culminating in the Decision Notice afforded him no meaningful opportunity to be heard (describing it as “no trial, no meeting, no nothing”) and that the deadlines set in these proceedings, together with what he characterises as a marked inequality of arms, deprived him of a fair hearing. He further submits that cancellation infringes Article 8 because it interferes with his private and family life and damages longstanding professional relationships. He argues throughout that the FCA failed to recognise or engage with the personal circumstances he placed before it, and that his position was, as he put it, “dismissed” rather than considered.

The FCA submits that its decision was plainly within the range of reasonable decisions available under s.55J FSMA. There is no dispute that Mr Forster has not submitted any of the returns required since 2019, resulting in an information vacuum lasting more than six years. The FCA emphasises that regulatory returns are essential tools for supervision; without them it cannot assess financial soundness, PII coverage, client money handling, competence, or suitability. It says this case involves not an isolated delay but a persistent and complete failure to submit any returns despite numerous reminders, extensions, opportunities, and stays offered for the sole purpose of enabling compliance.

On proportionality, the FCA relies on North London Van Centre, arguing that this case is far more serious: over 100 missing returns, no evidence of future compliance, and no concrete plan to address non-compliance to date. It submits that the information required for a sole-adviser firm is not onerous, much of it being information one would hold for tax purposes or capable of nil return. It notes that as part of his submissions Mr Forster stated he had spent “two hours per day for 18 months” on the proceedings, which the FCA says demonstrates capacity to have filed at least one return.

The FCA denies that it ignored Mr Forster’s circumstances. It points to repeated extensions, including postponements and stays expressly offered to enable him to file even the most recent returns (with the other outstanding returns to follow), none of which were submitted. It says it has not attempted to pressure the Tribunal, and that any correspondence was directed towards progressing stalled proceedings. The FCA also emphasises that challenges to FCA policy or to the regulatory regime itself are not matters for this Tribunal.

The FCA therefore submits that the persistent non-submission of returns, the absence of evidence of future compliance, and Mr Forster’s minimisation of his regulatory obligations fully justify cancellation. In relation to Mr Forster’s ECHR arguments, the FCA submits that Mr Forster’s ECHR arguments are wholly misconceived.

The starting point is that the periodic returns required under SUP 16 are not an ancillary or optional administrative exercise, but a central component of the regulatory system. The FCA’s evidence explains that the information contained in the RMAR, consumer-credit returns and complaints returns feeds directly into the FCA’s supervisory dashboards, which are used both for proactive, risk-based supervision and for responsive intervention where potential issues arise. These returns allow the FCA to understand a firm’s financial resources, client-money position, PII coverage, business model, adviser competence and consumer-complaints profile. For firms in Mr Forster’s cohort (smaller firms with limited direct supervisory engagement) the returns represent one of the FCA’s primary and routine sources of supervisory visibility. Without them, the FCA cannot carry out its statutory function of monitoring compliance with the Threshold Conditions or protecting consumers. A sustained absence of returns will clearly obstruct meaningful supervision.

These reporting obligations apply to all authorised firms, including sole advisers. The evidence shows that while the RMAR contains multiple sections, the degree of difficulty varies considerably between firms depending on size and structure. In the case of a single-person business such as Mr Forster’s, many items require only simple confirmations or figures that any competent business proprietor would ordinarily hold. Several items permit nil returns where not applicable, and the FCA demonstrated that the forms Mr Forster last completed in 2019 had been completed without difficulty. The regulatory regime therefore anticipates and accommodates smaller firms; it does not exempt them. The duty to submit periodic returns applies uniformly, and compliance has been shown across the market to be clearly possible for firms of the Applicant’s size.

Mr Forster repeatedly submitted that the returns were unnecessary, disproportionate or irrelevant to a firm of his size. He described himself as “just a minnow… one millionth of a degree of the economy” and maintained that the FCA should focus on larger institutions. We reject this submission. The statutory regime applies to all authorised firms. As already mentioned, for small firms such as Mr Forster’s, periodic returns are often the FCA’s only source of supervisory information. The absence of any reporting over six years denies the FCA essential visibility of consumer detriment, client money, capital resources and the scale of regulated activity. Size does not exempt a firm from its obligations.

He also submitted that the returns were too complex for a sole trader, describing them as lengthy, intricate and requiring accountant-level expertise. We do not accept this. Ms Hassell-Hart carefully took us through the forms from which it was clear that many only required simple numerical entries or nil returns. The forms became complex only in proportion to the complexity of the firm; for a one-person advisory firm the burden was modest. Thousands of sole practitioners complete these returns without external support.

Mr Forster’s submission that no consumer had complained and that therefore no harm had resulted also did not assist. Harm might arise despite no complaint being made and in any case consumer harm is not a precondition of cancellation where a firm fails to meet the Threshold Conditions. Without the complaints returns, the FCA would not necessarily know whether complaints existed. Mr Forster argued also that the FCA should have actively assisted him in completing or inputting his returns. We reject this. The duty to file periodic returns rests with the firm. The regulator cannot and should not prepare a firm’s regulatory information for it.

As can be seen from the findings of fact above, Mr Forster has not submitted any regulatory returns since November 2019. The last annual returns were submitted in May 2018. All required returns since those dates remain outstanding. The FCA sent repeated reminders to Mr Forster over several years. It granted multiple extensions beginning in 2020. In 2023 and 2024, it offered to close enforcement if he submitted even one set of the most recent returns. He did not do so. In late 2024 and early 2025, the FCA agreed to a stay of enforcement so that Mr Forster could bring the returns up to date, again requiring only the most recent set. He did not file them. Throughout this period, Mr Forster continued to conduct regulated activities. He continued to advise clients, work part-time, and to contact the FCA about password and access issues. Those issues were genuine, but they were capable of being resolved with the FCA’s assistance and did not prevent submission of returns at any consistent or sustained level.

Mr Forster relies heavily on the combination of these personal circumstances. Taken together, Mr Forster contends that the combined effect of: his own medical difficulties; the serious and continuing health needs of several close family members; extensive caring duties for both dependants and elderly relatives; the domestic disruption and aftermath of a prior security-related incident; and the pressures inherent in operating as a sole practitioner without administrative support, left him overwhelmed and unable to meet regulatory reporting deadlines over a prolonged period.

The FCA does not dispute the difficulties Mr Forster faced. We accept that Mr Forster’s personal circumstances were extremely challenging and express our sympathy for all the issues he has to face. However, we must consider whether those circumstances were such that it was not reasonable for Mr Forster to have complied over such a long period of time. On Mr Forster’s own account he prioritised client work over regulatory tasks. He continued to operate his regulated business, meeting clients and generating at least some income. While his dedication to his clients is, when viewed in isolation, a positive, it cannot excuse the wholesale non-compliance with key regulatory reporting obligations. These obligations are part of the price for the right to conduct regulated activity. The obligations cannot simply be deprioritised and effectively ignored, while at the same time the right to conduct regulated activity is pursued.

We were also not persuaded by Mr Forster’s point that it did not make sense for him to seek professional help for returns until the outcome of this case was known. As long as Mr Forster remained a regulated person, compliance with the relevant regulatory requirements was required irrespective of the eventual outcome of these proceedings.

We thus reject Mr Forster’s case that the combination of personal circumstances he faced provided a reasonable explanation for the failure to submit the required returns.

Mr Forster advanced several submissions suggesting that his future regulatory compliance would be markedly different. He told us that his family circumstances were beginning to ease and that, with further time, he would be able to allocate more time to completing the outstanding returns. He also said that he had started to populate a number of the returns on the FCA’s “RegData” system, that information had been gathered and assembled, and that some items were ready to submit but could not yet be finalised because certain figures required reconciliation, or cross-validation or professional input that he had been unable to afford. He characterised his position as a “Catch-22,” saying that he could not justify paying an accountant while the outcome of these proceedings was unresolved, but insisted that once permissions were restored he would “get things back under control” and bring the reporting fully up to date. In essence he sought to persuade us that he was on the verge of recovering compliance and that one final opportunity would produce meaningful change.

The FCA disputed that there was any basis for relying on these assurances. It pointed to numerous occasions since 2023 when Mr Forster provided similar commitments (that returns were nearly ready, that accountants were engaged, or that the most recent return would be filed by a particular date) none of which resulted in any submission. The FCA emphasised that throughout this period Mr Forster continued to conduct regulated business and, by his own account, devoted “two hours per day for 18 months” to this matter, yet did not submit even the simplest returns requiring only basic confirmations or nil entries. After the hearing, the FCA produced a screenshot from its RegData system. While this confirms that Mr Forster had begun entering data into certain returns (some recorded as “Ready to Submit” or in “Draft”) a substantial proportion remained unstarted or only partially completed, with many marked “No Data” or “Waiting for Cross Validation.” Crucially, the screenshot does not show that any return due since 2019 has been submitted, nor that any item is complete and capable of submission without further work. It reinforces, rather than undermines, the picture of prolonged and wholesale non-submission.

We accept the FCA’s analysis. The absence of regulatory returns spans more than six years and persists despite reminders, extensions, formal stays, bespoke offers to accept a single set of the most recent returns by a specified deadline (with others to follow later), and repeated promises of imminent completion. Nothing before us (whether in oral evidence, in Mr Forster’s late emails, or in the RegData screenshot) provides a concrete or credible basis to suppose that future compliance would now be forthcoming. Mr Forster identified no specific changes in circumstance, resourcing or approach that would break the established pattern, and his references to circumstances “easing” were general and unsupported. Given the length and completeness of the non-compliance, and the absence of any filed return even when given multiple opportunities, we are not persuaded that further time or forbearance would produce a different outcome. Even taking the new information advanced at the hearing, with regard to future compliance, at its highest, it would plainly remain open to the FCA to conclude that there is no realistic prospect of future compliance and that continued authorisation was incompatible with the Suitability Threshold Condition.

Mr Forster emphasised that he has never acted without integrity. We accept that there is no allegation of dishonesty. Suitability under paragraph 2E, however, encompasses more than honesty. It requires readiness, willingness and organisation to comply with regulatory requirements. Integrity alone cannot overcome persistent and total non-compliance with core obligations.

Proportionality is central to Mr Forster’s challenge. He submitted that cancellation was an excessive response to what he described as an “administrative failing” and “some paperwork being late.” He relied on his long and unblemished career, the absence of consumer harm, and the trust placed in him by “hundreds if not almost a thousand” clients. He said cancellation would be “catastrophic,” leaving him and his family without income and extinguishing future streams of remuneration. He also described the FCA’s conduct as “vindictive” and “crushing,” placing him under intense psychological pressure, and maintained that cancellation was therefore wholly disproportionate. He reinforced this by emphasising the very small scale of his business arguing it was irrational for the FCA to target a sole trader rather than larger firms. He contended the returns were unduly complex for a single-person practice and said the FCA ought to have assisted him rather than penalised him. He submitted that the FCA had failed to appreciate the real-world impact cancellation would have on him.

We do not accept those submissions. Proportionality must be assessed in light of the FCA’s statutory objectives. Six years of complete non-submission deprived the FCA of all supervisory visibility over matters at the core of the regulatory framework: financial resources, client-money handling, PII cover, adviser competence and complaints. The FCA granted extensive forbearance: multiple extensions, offers to limit the immediate requirement to the most recent set of returns, and agreed stays but without any progress. In North London Van Centre, delays of 155 and 270 days justified cancellation; here the period exceeds six years with more than 120 returns outstanding and no credible plan for future compliance. In those circumstances the FCA was entitled to conclude cancellation was necessary and proportionate. Neither integrity, experience nor firm size substitutes for compliance with statutory reporting obligations and consumer harm cannot be assessed where no information is provided.

Mr Forster further argued that cancellation would cut off all future earnings, including adviser charges, commissions and any residual trail-type payments, rendering the decision disproportionate. The FCA explained that its rules do not preclude continued earning of pre-2013 trail commissions after cancellation, and that only “ongoing” commission would cease because he could no longer lawfully provide regulated services. Even on Mr Forster’s account of how firms might react in practice, the financial consequences of losing authorisation are an inherent and foreseeable feature of the statutory scheme and do not undermine the proportionality of the FCA’s decision. The prospect of losing authorisation should have been a powerful incentive for Mr Forster to comply with the Threshold Conditions that all firms are subject to and which included the applicable reporting obligations. The fact that he did not file the required returns over so many years means any resulting loss of income is a consequence of his own work prioritisation decisions rather than any disproportionality in the FCA’s response.

We therefore conclude that nothing in Mr Forster’s proportionality arguments places the FCA’s decision outside the range of reasonable responses available to it.

Mr Forster also criticised the FCA for their handling of the Upper Tribunal hearing arguing they had sought to rush matters or prevent the hearing. We reject that. The correspondence shows that the FCA raised case-management matters following periods of non-engagement, and on at least one occasion suggested granting further time to Mr Forster. Where, as in this case there had been several instances of non-compliance and non-responsiveness there was nothing untoward in the FCA’s position inviting the Tribunal to make an order which, if not complied with, would have led to the reference being struck out.

We also do not accept Mr Forster’s broader criticisms of the reporting framework. Such matters concern the design of the regulatory regime and fall outside the jurisdiction of this Tribunal. Our task is confined to determining whether the FCA acted reasonably within that statutory framework that has been imposed.

Nor do Mr Forster’s allegations of institutional hypocrisy or inconsistency assist in determining whether the statutory conditions for cancellation were met. They do not address Mr Forster’s own obligations or the FCA’s statutory duties.

Likewise the contention that the FCA should focus its resources on larger firms misunderstands the statutory scheme. The FCA’s duties are owed equally in respect of all authorised persons, and persistent non-compliance by a small firm is not rendered acceptable by reference to the size of others.

We also do not accept that the pending outcome of these proceedings prevented Mr Forster from engaging accounting support. The obligation to submit returns existed irrespective of enforcement. He should have gone ahead and filed to put himself in the best position in this reference. However even if that had been done, it cannot be assumed this would change the outcome in that it would still be difficult to say the FCA’s removal of authorisation would be unreasonable given the length of the period of non-compliance.

As regards Mr Forster’s ECHR arguments we were not persuaded, for the reasons set out below, that any aspect of the FCA’s conduct, either at the regulatory stage or within these proceedings, amounted to a breach of Mr Forster’s Convention rights. In essence, and for the reasons advanced by the FCA in its detailed post-hearing submissions, none of the requirements of Articles 3, 6 or 8 were engaged on the facts of this case, and even where engagement was arguable in principle, no unlawful interference was established.

Mr Forster submits that the psychological strain imposed by the FCA’s correspondence, reminders and regulatory action amounts to “constant prodding” and created such mental suffering for himself and his family that it breached Article 3. He characterises the cumulative pressure of losing his authorisation as “inhumane”.

Article 3 sets an exceptionally high threshold. Ill-treatment must meet a “minimum level of severity” (R (AB) v Secretary of State for Justice [2021] UKSC 28 at [40]) and go beyond the “inevitable element connected with a given form of legitimate treatment or punishment” (R (HA (Nigeria)) v SSHD [2012] EWHC 979 (Admin) at [173(5)]). A “high level of suffering” is usually required (R (ASK) v SSHD [2019] EWCA Civ 1239 at [69]–[70]). These authorities emphasise that Article 3 is not engaged by stress or anxiety arising from lawful regulatory or judicial processes.

In agreement with the FCA, we are satisfied that nothing in the FCA’s conduct approaches this demanding threshold. The FCA’s post-hearing submissions demonstrate that its communications were limited, often facilitative, and frequently copied to the Tribunal; they were not “constant” nor oppressive in character. We accept the FCA’s submission that the stress arising from regulatory enforcement cannot, without more, constitute treatment of the type contemplated by Article 3. Nor has Mr Forster provided evidence of suffering of the severity required by the Convention jurisprudence. We therefore conclude that Article 3 is not engaged.

Mr Forster argues that Article 6 was breached because there was “no trial, no meeting, no nothing” before the FCA issued the Decision Notice, and that during these proceedings the FCA sought “draconian deadlines,” creating an “inequality of arms” and depriving him of adequate time and facilities to prepare.

Article 6 requires that civil rights be determined by an independent and impartial tribunal. In this regulatory context, any procedural defect at the administrative stage is cured by a de novo appeal: see Promethean Finance Ltd v FCA [2024] UKUT 229 (TCC) at [118]. The Article 6(3) “criminal trial” guarantees do not apply. Case management decisions and deadlines are imposed by the Tribunal under the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, not by the regulator.

We accept the FCA’s analysis that there was no breach of Article 6. The evidence shows that Mr Forster made written representations at the Warning Notice stage and that those were considered. More importantly, he is now receiving the procedural fairness Article 6 requires: a full merits hearing before an independent tribunal. We also agree with the FCA that the procedural timetable in these proceedings was set by the Tribunal and repeatedly adjusted to accommodate Mr Forster, including by granting extensions, the exercise of discretion not to strike out, but proceed to a hearing, even though an unless-order had been breached, and a stay of the proceedings. There is no basis for the submission that the FCA sought, in setting deadlines, to prejudice Mr Forster’s ability to prepare. Nor is there any evidential foundation for the claim of unfair inequality of arms. The disparity in resources between a regulator and a litigant in person does not of itself infringe Article 6. What matters is whether the applicant had a fair opportunity to present their case, which Mr Forster clearly did. The procedural timetable was set by the Tribunal and repeatedly relaxed for Mr Forster’s benefit. He had more than a year to prepare evidence but filed none. His right to a fair hearing has been fully vindicated.

Mr Forster contends that cancellation of his permission interferes with his private and family life because it destroys his ability to earn a living, deprives him of income including future trail commission, and harms the longstanding client relationships that form part of his professional identity. He says it would leave him and his family in abject poverty.

Article 8 protects private and family life but is a qualifiedright. Interference may be justified if it is (i) in accordance with the law, and (ii) necessary in a democratic society for a legitimate aim, such as protecting the rights of others or promoting economic well-being. Proportionality is assessed using the structured approach in Bank Mellat v HM Treasury [2013] UKSC 39 at [20].

We agree with the FCA that, even assuming Article 8 is engaged, the statutory framework and the FCA’s decision-making satisfy the requirements of legality, legitimacy and proportionality. The cancellation decision is taken under s55J FSMA and Schedule 6 and pursues the core regulatory objective of consumer protection. We accept the FCA’s submission that persistent non-submission of returns over more than six years leaves it without any supervisory visibility and is fundamentally incompatible with the Suitability Threshold Condition. The FCA attempted less intrusive means: multiple extensions, offers to close enforcement upon submission of a single set of the most recent returns, and two stays, none of which resulted in compliance. We also cannot accept Mr Forster’s arguments as to the financial consequences being catastrophic. Mr Forster did not provide any evidence of his financial circumstances such as his income, expenditure, assets and liabilities. Even taking his account at its highest some loss of income, with the impact that follows, is an inherent and foreseeable consequence of losing authorisation following a prolonged period of non-compliance. We are satisfied that, if Article 8 is engaged, the interference is justified and proportionate.

Mr Forster submits that the FCA’s decision was disproportionate, unfair, and failed to take proper account of his personal difficulties. He contends that consumer harm is absent, that he is a longstanding adviser of good character, and that his failings are administrative in nature. He asks effectively for “one last chance” to file his returns.

We recognise the high level of personal hardship he endured and the sincerity with which he advanced his submissions. Nevertheless, the question before us is not whether we would have made the same decision as the FCA, but whether the FCA’s decision was reasonably open to it.

In our judgment, the FCA faced a case not of isolated delay but of complete and persistent non-compliance spanning more than six years. It had no information concerning Mr Forster’s financial resources, client money position, professional indemnity cover, adviser competence, or client complaints. This information vacuum undermines the regulatory system of supervision. In North London Van Centre, the Upper Tribunal dismissed a reference where a firm had filed returns but had filed them late (by periods under a year: 155 days and 270 days). Here, the non-compliance is several magnitudes greater. No returns were submitted at all for over six years. That remained the case as at the date of the hearing. This was a patent breach of the suitability condition in paragraph 2E Schedule 6 FSMA.

We accept the FCA’s submissions that personal difficulties, even serious ones, cannot explain the complete failure to file even a single return over such an extended period, particularly where the FCA repeatedly sought to facilitate compliance and limited its requests to the most recent set of returns. We also accept that the FCA cannot supervise a firm that provides no information for years on end. The regulatory duty to protect consumers requires a minimum level of engagement by authorised persons, which includes submission of periodic returns. As mentioned Mr Forster did not provide us with any clear plan for prospective compliance that would give us confidence that he would be able to bring his returns up to date.

For these reasons, and as elaborated above, we conclude that the FCA’s decision was plainly well within the range of decisions reasonably available to it.

Mr Forster’s reference is accordingly dismissed.