Lonestar Properties Limited v Laurence Lecacheur & Anor

Was the First-tier Tribunal, Property Chamber (the FTT) in error when it appointed a manager under Part II of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1987 to manage two adjoining buildings in a terrace? That is the issue in this appeal from a decision of the FTT made on 22 December 2025 by which it appointed Ralitsa Tsvetkova as manager over Nos.12 and 14 Abercorn Place, London NW8 at the request of Mr and Mrs Lecacheur, the respondents, who own a long lease of a flat in No.14.

The two adjoining buildings are part of a longer terrace and had been described in an earlier decision of the FTT as separate buildings. The first issue for which the FTT gave permission to appeal is whether it had jurisdiction to appoint a manager over two separate buildings.

Each of the buildings contains two self-contained maisonettes. Above those maisonettes, occupying the whole of the top floor of both buildings, is a single self-contained penthouse flat which is accessible only from No.12 Abercorn Place and is referred to as No.12-3. Each of the maisonettes is let on a long lease granted in 2005. The penthouse flat is let on a long lease granted in 1985.

Both of the maisonettes at No.12 and the self-contained flat spanning the top floor of Nos. 12 and 14 belong to the same leaseholders, Mr Silkin and Mrs Burianova, who occupy the whole space as their home. They also own 60% of the share in the appellant, which I will refer to as Lonestar,

The second issue for which the FTT gave permission to appeal is, broadly, whether when it made its decision, it gave proper consideration to the interests and wishes of Mr Silkin and Mrs Burianova, who oppose the application for appointment of a manager.

The current proceedings are not the first between the parties. A previous dispute over the payability of service charges was resolved by a decision of the FTT published on 5 March 2024 which forms part of the background to this appeal.

At the hearing of the appeal the appellant, which I will refer to as Lonestar, was represented by Mr Cakebread while the respondents, Mr and Mrs Lecacheur, represented themselves.

The power to appoint a manager is contained in Part II of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1987. Section 21(1) provides that:

“The tenant of a flat contained in any premises to which this Part applies may, subject to the following provisions of this Part, apply to the appropriate tribunal for an order under section 24 appointing a manager to act in relation to those premises.”

Under section 21(2), Part II of the Act applies to “premises consisting of the whole or part of a building if the building or part contains two or more flats.”

Section 60(1) of the 1987 Act provides that “flat” means a separate set of premises, whether or not on the same floor, which (a) forms part of a building, and (b) is divided horizontally from some other part of that building, and (c) is constructed or adapted for use for the purpose of a dwelling. The two maisonettes at No.14 are flats within this definition. There is no evidence about the arrangement of space within No.12 and it has not been considered whether either of the original maisonettes or the penthouse comprises a separate set of premises and so remains a flat for the purpose of the 1987 Act, or whether the whole is now a single unit.

Section 21(4) provides that:

“An application for an order under section 24 may be made –

(a)

[…], and

(b)

in respect of two or more premises to which this Part applies;

[…]”

It is also convenient to mention section 24(3) at this point; it provides that

“The premises in respect of which an order is made under this section may, if the tribunal thinks fit, be either more or less extensive than the premises specified in the application on which the order is made.”

The grounds on which the FTT (which is the appropriate tribunal for this purpose in England) may appoint a manager, are specified in section 24, which provides as follows:

It can be seen that section 24(2) identifies five separate grounds on which a manager can be appointed. The first four involve some degree of mismanagement. The fifth is much broader, referring only to “other circumstances”. In each case before it may appoint a manager the tribunal must be satisfied that it is “just and convenient” for an order to be made.

In FirstPort Property Services Ltd v Settlers Court RTM Company Ltd [2022] UKSC 1, at [11], Lord Briggs described Part II of the 1987 Act as “a broad discretionary jurisdiction”. At [12], he distinguished it from the statutory right to manage created by the Part 2 of the Commonhold and Leasehold Reform Act 2002 which was “conferred in relation to a more narrowly defined type of ‘premises’”.

The purpose of the jurisdiction conferred by Part II of the 1987 Act was explained and its flexibility emphasised by the Court of Appeal (Mummery LJ) in Cawsand Fort Management Company Ltd v Stafford [2007] EWCA Civ 1187, at [34]:

“The practical purpose of Part II is to protect the interests of lessees of premises, which form part of a building, by enabling them to secure, through the flexible discretionary machinery of the appointment of a manager, the carrying out of the management functions which they are entitled to enjoy “in relation to” the premises of which their flats are part.”

Identifying the particular functions in connection with the management of the premises which a manager is to perform is a task for the FTT, as section 24(1) makes clear. This Tribunal has frequently said that the scope of an order under section 24 should be reasonably proportionate to the tasks which the tenants are entitled to have performed in accordance with the terms of their leases and the relevant law (Sennadine Properties Ltd v Heelis [2015] UKUT 55 (LC), at [51]; Queensbridge Investments Ltd v Lodge [2015] UKUT 635 (LC), at [44], [48]).

In Invergarry Court Ltd v Connolly [2022] UKUT 209 (LC), at [55], I described the making of a management order as “a draconian remedy, which takes away contractual rights and obligations and imposes expense on the parties”. I identified some of the factors which it would be relevant for the FTT to consider when deciding whether it was just and convenient to make an order (and which had been overlooked in that case). These included what the intended purpose of the management order would be and whether that purpose could be achieved by some different route.  It included also whether the application was made by the owners of a minority of the flats, and whether the owners of the majority were opposed to it.  As will be seen, these are relevant considerations in this appeal.

The leases of all five units at Nos. 12 and 14 are in identical form. The only example in evidence before the FTT was the lease of No.14A, as the basement and ground floor maisonette belonging to Mr and Mrs Lecacheur is known. Information about the other leases is contained in an earlier decision of the FTT published on 5 March 2024, which concerned an application by Mr and Mrs Lecacheur under section 27A, Landlord and Tenant Act 1985, to determine questions regarding their liability to contribute through the service charge to costs incurred by Lonestar in carrying out work to No.12.

The lease of No.14A is for a term 150 years from 1 July 2005 and recites the surrender of an earlier lease granted in 1988. It grants and reserves reciprocal rights in common with the owners or occupiers of the adjacent, adjoining or contiguous flats at Nos. 12 and 14 for the passage of utilities and other easements. It makes various references to the adjacent, adjoining or contiguous flats at Nos. 12 and 14 in relation, for example, to access or the avoidance or amelioration of nuisance, but not in relation to financial obligations. Clause 2(6) obliges Mr and Mrs Lecacheur, as lessees, to pay 45% of the costs incurred by Lonestar, as Lessor, in performing its obligations under clauses 4(2) and 4(4). Clause 4(2) requires Lonestar to insure No.14 alone, while clause 2(4) obliges it to keep No.14 alone in tenantable repair.

Under their lease Mr and Mrs Lecacheur are not liable to make any contribution to expenditure incurred by Lonestar in complying with its obligations under the leases of any of the premises at No.12. The only shared liability between the lessees of No.14 and the lessees of No.12 is imposed by the additional words in clause 2(6) (after the requirement to pay 45% of Lonestar’s expenditure under clause 4(2) and 4(4)), as follows:

“[…] plus such share of the Lessor’s costs for the operation of the Lessor which are general costs and not specific to either building … as the Lessor may determine”

The FTT interpreted these words as referring only to administrative and professional expenses and not to the cost of works.

Although the leases themselves are not in evidence, it was apparent from the parties’ submissions to the FTT that under the single lease of the penthouse flat, the lessees are required to contribute 20% of the costs incurred by Lonestar in performing its obligations in relation to No.14 and 26% of the costs it incurs relating to No.12.

In its 2024 decision the FTT made extensive findings of fact about works undertaken in 2022 which had been intended to cover both No.14 and No.12 but which, in the event, was delayed and proceeded in relation to No.12 only. Lonestar levied service charges in advance, in anticipation of the whole programme of work. When no works were carried out to No.14, Mr and Mrs Lecacheur sought a determination from the FTT regarding their liability to contribute to the cost of works to No.12.

In its 2024 decision the FTT determined that the lessees of the maisonettes in No.14, including Mr and Mrs Lecacheur, were under no obligation to contribute to the cost of works to No.12. As a result, service charges totalling almost £12,000 which had been demanded by Lonestar in 2022 were not payable.

In reaching that decision the FTT rejected an argument advanced on behalf of Lonestar by Mr Silkin that the roof covering the two buildings was a single structure all of which Lonestar was obliged to repair under both leases and which all lessees were therefore required to contribute. The FTT found that the work done in 2022 had been to the roof of No.12 alone and it rejected Mr Silkin’s “dogmatic evidence” that the roof was a single structure. On the contrary, the roof of No.12 was distinct from the roof of No.14 and was separated from it by a brick structure which appeared to be a continuation of the party wall separating the two buildings.

In describing the structure of the two buildings the FTT made the following statement at paragraph [61.1], which is relied on by Mr Cakebread in this appeal: “Nos. 12 and 14 Abercorn Place, while terraced, are 2 separate buildings, separately registered at HM Land Registry”.

In their application to the FTT Mr and Mrs Lecacheur identified the building concerned as Nos. 12 and 14, which they described as two Grade II listed buildings in the St John’s Wood conservation area. They explained that the two buildings are distinct structure forming parts of a longer terrace.

The application reflected the preliminary notice served in 2022 and was based on Lonestar’s alleged failure to carry out any significant repairs or maintenance since 2009, leading to the deterioration of No.14, damage to the stucco frontage, the porch and the front steps and water leaking into the basement area of their flat. Reliance was also placed on the service charges demanded for work on No.12, which were said to be unreasonable, and on what were said to be further demands for service charges for work on No.12 and for advice which it was said Mr Silkin proposed to take about reducing his own service charge percentage. A variety of suggested breaches of the RICS Service Charge Residential Management Code were also relied on. In summary, it was suggested that Mr Silkin and Mrs Burianova were not competent to manage the building and consistently failed to appoint qualified professionals to deal with management functions. This had led to a breakdown in relations between Mr and Mrs Lecacheur and Lonestar which further exacerbated the problem of management.

The application was supported by a lengthy witness statement by Mr and Mrs Lecacheur. In his response on behalf of Lonestar, Mr Silkin explained the benefits of what he called “self-management” and insisted Lonestar was well run. He blamed Mr and Mrs Lecacheur for delaying works by failing to pay service charges demanded of them and attributed the break down in relations to their personal hostility. He suggested that the appointment of a manager would be intrusive and disproportionate. In a second witness statement, Mr Silkin challenged the suitability and qualifications of the proposed manager, Ms Tsvetkova.

The evidence filed by the parties disclosed many disagreements on issues of fact and on the best way to manage the two buildings. Personal animosity and lack of trust between the parties was very apparent.

Both parties are dissatisfied with the FTT’s decision and complain that its treatment of the issues was superficial and inadequate. The decision is relatively concise, given the extent of the matters in dispute, and deals only briefly or not at all with issues of fact and the exercise of discretion. Perhaps surprisingly in view of the dispute over the existence and extent of breaches of covenant, the FTT did not inspect the building, nor did it refer to photographic evidence provided. It made no relevant findings of fact and dismissed Mr and Mrs Lecacheur’s complaints of breaches of repairing covenants in two sentences, focussing exclusively on the absence of expert evidence regarding the condition of the building and concluding that the suggested breaches had not been proved. The FTT’s decision not to assess the available evidence or to consider the history of delayed works documented in the 2024 decision is a significant omission.

In contrast, the FTT based its treatment of the allegedly unreasonable service charges on the conclusions of the panel which had determined the service charge dispute in 2024. That tribunal had found no fault with the work done to No.12 or with the way it had been organised. The FTT determined that notwithstanding that the sum of £11,696 demanded of Mr and Mrs Lecacheur had not been payable by them, it did not qualify as an unreasonable service charge.

The FTT made no separate findings about the unreasonable administration charges which were said to have been levied, and it dismissed the complaints about Lonestar’s alleged failure to comply with the RICS Service Charge Residential Management Code on the basis that management of the building had been carried out informally, rather than by a managing agent, so that the Code did not apply. The FTT reached that conclusion without referring to the Code itself or apparently appreciating that it includes a clear statement that “where the manager is the landlord, they are responsible for complying with the Code” (3^rd edition, page 1).

Having dismissed most of the ground of the application, the FTT finally addressed the ground under section 24(2)(b), as to which it said this:

“Whether other circumstances exist which make it just and convenient for an

order to be made.

76.

The Tribunal next considered whether other circumstances exist which make it just and convenient for an order to be made. The Tribunal noted that although there was an agreement that work should be undertaken, the relationship between the parties had broken down in such a manner as to make it unlikely that the parties would be able to move forward and take proactive steps to repair and manage the building in the interest of all parties.

77.

The Tribunal also noted that the Directors of the freehold company, did not have a thorough understanding of the terms of the lease, and in this regard they had treated No 12 as if it was a freehold house, without taking steps to consult with the other owners of the freehold who have an interest in the premises.

78.

The Tribunal accepted Mr Lecacheur’s submissions that the premises are contiguous and that part of the leased properties from No. 12 extends over No. 14, accordingly the Tribunal accepted that both buildings must be managed together.

79.

The Tribunal made this decision in the full knowledge that this represents an interference with the rights of Ms Burianova and Mr Silkin who occupy the premises at No. 12 as a family home, however notwithstanding their rights, the property they occupy is a series of leased properties and they are not the sole owners of the freehold. Given this the Tribunal consider that it is just and convenient for the buildings to be managed in accordance with the lease for the appointment of a manager.”

Lonestar’s objections to Ms Tsvetkova’s suitability for appointment were dismissed by the FTT which had had the opportunity to hear her give evidence about her experience and her proposals for the management of the building

As presented by Mr Cakebread, the appeal raised four issues:

Issues 1 and 2 are issues of law. Issues 3 and 4 are in part a challenge to the FTT’s exercise of its discretion and in part a challenge to the adequacy of its reasoning.

In their respondents’ notice Mr and Mrs Lecacheur also challenged the FTT’s dismissal of their application on the grounds other than the section 24(2)(b), “other circumstances” ground. They invited me to re-examine the evidence and find that the appointment of a manager was just and convenient because of breaches of Lonestar’s repairing covenants, unreasonable service and administration charges, and breaches of the code of management practice. These challenges are to the FTT’s appreciation of the evidence, its judgment, and the adequacy of its reasoning.

Where an appeal is brought against a tribunal’s assessment or evaluation of the facts the circumstances in which an appellate tribunal may interfere are strictly limited. Statements of principle to that effect are well known, and it is sufficient to refer to the decision of the Court of Appeal (McCombe, Leggatt and Rose LJJ) inPrescott v Potamianos [2019] EWCA Civ 932 where, at [76], the Court summarised the correct approach as follows:

“So, on a challenge to an evaluative decision of a first instance judge, the appeal court does not carry out a balancing task afresh but must ask whether the decision of the judge was wrong by reason of some identifiable flaw in the judge’s treatment of the question to be decided, “such as a gap in logic, a lack of consistency, or a failure to take account of some material factor, which undermines the cogency of the conclusion”.”

Mr Cakebread submitted that the FTT does not have jurisdiction to appoint a manage to premises which comprise two buildings. That proposition is plainly wrong.

Mr Cakebread argued that the purpose of Part II of the 1987 Act is to provide for the proper management of leasehold property, including the structure and other parts of the building of which it forms a part. He suggested that it was impossible to understand how the maintenance of the structure and common parts, provision of services and any other management of No.12 could have either any positive or negative effect on the interests of a leasehold owner in No.14. It followed, he submitted, that it cannot have been the intention of Parliament that a separate building, in whose maintenance and management a lessee of an adjoining building has no interest, could come within the jurisdiction of the FTT for the purposes of deciding whether a manager should be appointed.

None of Mr Cakebread’s submissions on this ground went to the issue of jurisdiction. The answer to the question he posed is found in section 21, and specifically in subsections (2) and (4).

Under section 21(2), Part II of the Act applies to “premises consisting of the whole or part of a building if the building or part contains two or more flats.” The word “building” is not defined in the Act and bears its normal meaning of a built structure. No.12 is a building, as is No.14. But so too is the whole of the terrace which comprises Nos. 8 to 22 Abercorn Place. Nos. 12 and 14 are each parts of the building comprising Nos. 8 to 22. But viewed together, Nos. 12 and 14 are also, jointly, part of the building comprising Nos. 8 to 22.

Section 21(2) imposes no additional requirement concerning the form of the building or part of a building which may be premises to which Part II applies, except that the building or part of a building must contain two or more flats. There is nothing to suggest that a manager may only be appointed to manage the smallest possible unit. Two buildings standing side by side as part of a terrace are therefore part of a building to which Part II applies and in respect of which an application may be made, provided they contain at least two flats.

Nor is it necessary that two or more buildings which form part of a larger building must be contiguous before a single manager may be appointed to manage them. An application could be made for the appointment of a manager to manage No.10 and No.14 together, but not No.12, provided each of them included at least two flats. Two buildings entirely detached from each other could also be the subject of a single order, again provided they both contained at least two flats. That is made clear by section 21(4)(b), which provides that an application for an order under section 24 may be made in respect of two or more premises to which Part II applies. It is also implicit in section 24(3), which permits that the premises in respect of which an order is made may be less extensive than the premises in respect of which the application was made and so appears to contemplate an application being made in respect of more than one set of premises to which Part II of the Act applies.

An example of such an application is provided by Cawsand Fort Management Company Ltd v Stafford; it is apparent from the description of the Fort provided by Mummery LJ at paragraphs [8] and [27] that it comprised a number of separate buildings, each of which was a building to which Part II of the Act applied.

When I drew Mr Cakebread’s attention to the direction in section 21(4)(b) of the 1987 Act that an application for an order under section 24 may be made in respect of two or more premises to which Part II of the Act applies, he suggested that such an application could only be made if at least one applicant was a leaseholder of a flat in each of those premises. There is nothing in the language of section 21 to support that suggestion, and it is a striking feature of the jurisdiction under Part II that there is no requirement for any particular number of leaseholders to join in an application. A single leaseholder may apply for the appointment of a manager over any number of buildings.

As the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal have both observed, Part II of the 1987 Act confers a broad discretion, which applies to a very broadly drawn category of property. It is left to the discretion of the FTT to determine whether it is just and convenient for a manager to be appointed to manage any particular agglomeration.

For these reasons I dismiss the first ground of appeal.

In view of my conclusion on issue 1, this ground of appeal falls away. Mr Cakebread had suggested that the FTT’s description of Nos. 12 and 14 in its 2023 decision as two separate buildings, was fatal to the FTT’s jurisdiction because it prevented Mr and Mrs Lecacheur from arguing that the buildings were a single building. It is enough to say that no issue estoppel arose from the 2024 decision because it decided no issue which is common to the service charge proceedings and the application to appoint a manager. It was not any part of Mr and Mrs Lecacheur’s case that Nos. 12 and 14 were a single building

The substance of Mr Cakebread’s appeal on ground 3 was that the FTT appears to have given no proper consideration to a number of factors which were relevant to the decision to appoint the manager to manage both buildings and gave weight to matters which were either unexplained or not obviously relevant.

The grounds on which the FTT considered it was just and convenient to appoint a manager for both buildings amounted to this. The relationship between the parties had broken down to such an extent that the future management of the building was at risk. The directors of Lonestar, Mr Silkin and Mrs Burianova did not understand the leases and treated No.12 as if it was of concern only to them and did not require consultation with the leaseholders in No.14. And it accepted the submission that both buildings must be managed together.

Mr Cakebread’s criticised this reasoning, and in particular the FTT’s failure to distinguish between the two buildings. There was no evidence to suggest that the poor relationship between the parties had had any effect on the execution of repairs to No.12. The reference to treating No.12 as if it was a freehold house and to failures to consult the other lessees was not readily understood, but the FTT appeared wrongly to believe that there was some issue about the manner in which No.12 was occupied (Mr and Mrs Lecacheur confirmed that as far as they were concerned, there was no such issue). If the reference was intended to relate to work carried out to No.12, that was not a justification for appointing a manager to No.12.

As far as the condition of No.14 was concerned, Mr Cakebread asserted that there was no obligation on the directors of Lonestar to secure the consent of all of the members. If necessary a majority of the members (i.e. Mr Silkin and Mrs Burianova who own 60% of the shares in the company) could make such decisions as seemed to them to be appropriate provided they did not act oppressively to the minority. Remedies were available to Mr and Mrs Lecacheur under the Companies Act if they considered that they were unfairly prejudiced by the decisions made by the company.

Mr Cakebread challenged the FTT’s assertion that “both buildings must be managed together”. Neither Mr and Mrs Lecacheur nor the lessee of the upper maisonette in No.14 had any interest in No.12.

The only reasons given by the FTT for thinking that the buildings must be managed together were that the premises are contiguous and that “part of the leased properties from No. 12 extends over No. 14”. Neither of these propositions seem to support the conclusion which the FTT drew. The fact that the buildings are contiguous does not distinguish them from any other buildings in a terrace, whether freehold or leasehold. While it might be convenient for certain works to both buildings to be coordinated (for example, stucco repairs if these are required) there is nothing to suggest that they cannot be maintained independently. The leases of flats in the buildings treat them as entirely separate. Lonestar assumes no obligations to the lessees of No.14 in relation to the repair or insurance of No.12 and vice versa. It is true that the lessees in both buildings are obliged to contribute to the administrative costs of Lonestar itself, but that is a relatively modest joint commitment; it is also flexible, in that no fixed proportion is specified, and if it was thought appropriate the contribution of each lessee could be adjusted to take account of a reduction in Lones star’s involvement with the management of one of the buildings.

As for the other matter referred to by the FTT, the physical arrangement of the penthouse sitting above both buildings, the FTT’s 2024 decision considered the construction of the buildings at that level and found that a brick wall separates the roofs and that it had been perfectly possible for the roof over No.12 to be repaired without any work being done to the roof of No.14. I was told that the space above both buildings comprises a single flat, but it is difficult to see why that should have a significant impact on management tasks which mainly concern insurance and the repair of the structure of the buildings. In short, nothing in the FTT’s decision explains why it was thought to be necessary for the two buildings to be managed together.

I have considered the statement of case and evidence filed by Mr and Mrs Lecacheur before the FTT and I can find nothing in it which explains why the buildings should be managed together. It is true that the buildings have in fact been managed together but the inference from the FTT’s 2024 decision is that this occurred under a mistaken understanding of the contribution obligations under the leases. I asked Mr and Mrs Lecacheur why they considered that single management of both buildings was necessary. Mrs Lecacheur pointed to the existence of mutual rights and to the shared gas and water supply to both buildings and the fact that there was a single electricity meter for the common parts of both buildings. These seem to me to be either irrelevant or insubstantial considerations. The existence of mutual rights of support and access, and covenants prohibiting activity causing nuisance to adjoining occupiers are commonplace between buildings in a terrace and do not require that neighbouring buildings be managed jointly. The route by which gas and water reach the various parts of the two buildings is not relevant to the tasks required of a manager, and if there is a single electricity bill for the common parts it should not be a difficult matter for it to be divided.

Mrs Lecacheur suggested that if a manager had been appointed to manage No.14 alone it would not have been clear what their responsibilities were in relation to the penthouse flat. That is not a valid objection and it is inconsistent with the structure of the leases in the two buildings. Lonestar has covenanted with the lessees of each of the flats in No.14, including the penthouse, that it will repair, maintain and insure No.14. The two buildings are physically distinct, including at roof level, as the 2024 decision establishes. A manager appointed in relation to No.14 alone would be in no different position from the freeholder; their obligations would extend to the whole of the structure of No.14, including the penthouse flat to the extent that it was within No.14.

The FTT acknowledged that Mr Silkin and Mrs Burianova occupy the whole of No.12 and that the imposition of a management order would interfere with their rights. That acknowledgement does not seem to me to engage with the substance of the objection, which is that the grounds put forward in support of the appointment of a manager related to No.14 and not to No.12, and that the object of the management order could be achieved by limiting its scope to No.14 alone.

The FTT failed to consider the proportionality of the order to the objectives which were sought to be achieved. Those objectives were primarily the implementation of a long delayed programme of repairs to No.14, to mirror the repairs which had already been carried out to the roof and structure of No.12 and to deal with other issues affecting No.14 alone. The FTT reached a conclusion about the need for joint management which was not justified by any evidence provided to it and which was wrong. It should have considered whether the appointment of a manager to premises limited to No.14 alone would achieve the same objectives. Its failure to do so was a substantial defect in its reasoning which undermines the cogency of its decision.

There certainly were grounds on which the FTT could properly appoint a manager. The poor relationship between the parties has become acute and there is very little respect and no trust between them. For Mr Silkin and Mrs Burianova, in their capacity as directors of Lonestar, to have control over work to No.14 involves a conflict of interest and is a recipe for further dispute. The availability of remedies under the Companies Act is an inadequate answer to the impasse which the parties have reached. Leaseholders should not be expected to have to pursue each other through the courts when Parliament has provided a flexible remedy under Part II of the 1987 Act.

I agree with both parties that the FTT’s decision was inadequate. I am satisfied that the appointment of a manager to both buildings was unnecessary and unjustified. It was neither just nor convenient and I allow the appeal on this ground.

Although the FTT gave permission to appeal on the issue of the manager’s suitability, Mr Cakebread very sensibly recognised that he faced a difficult task in persuading me that it had not been open to the FTT to conclude that she was an appropriate person to be appointed. The FTT heard the manager in person and was satisfied that she was well able to perform the required tasks. In the event, Mr Cakebread did not pursue this ground of appeal.

The effect of my decision is that the FTT was justified in appointing a manager to perform functions in relation to No.14, but not in relation to No.12. The manager should therefore remain in post, tasked with commissioning the repairs to No.14 which motivated the application for her appointment, but her responsibilities should be confined to No.14 (including that part of the penthouse flat, otherwise known as 12-3, which is located above No.14, but not including any part of it which is solely above No.12).

The order which I will make in consequence of this decision is an order in the terms of the current order, with such modifications as are necessary to limit the manager’s functions to No.14 alone from a specified date or dates. I invite the parties, in consultation with the manager, to agree the required modifications. If they are unable to do so they may submit draft orders to me within one month of the date of this decision and I will either settle the order myself or remit the matter to the FTT for further consideration having regard to the extent of any disagreement. The date of commencement of the modified order is a matter which will need to be considered, and it may be convenient for the manager’s current responsibilities in relation to No.12 (for example in relation to insurance) to cease to apply when particular contracts or policies come to an end, or on the anniversary of her appointment or on a convenient quarter day. Until the modified order is made the manager remains responsible for the management of both buildings.

Finally, the FTT made an order in Mr and Mrs Lecacheur’s favour under section 20C, Landlord and Tenant Act 1985 preventing Lonestar from adding any costs of the proceedings before it to the service charge payable by them. Mr and Mrs Lecacheur have asked for a similar order to be made in respect of the costs of the appeal. Any submissions which Lonestar wishes to make in response to that request should be made in writing by 21 September 2026.