Case Nos: LC-2025-101
AN APPEAL AGAINST A DECISION OF THE FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL (PROPERTY CHAMBER)
Ref: CAM/33UD/HMR/2023/0001
Royal Courts of Justice, Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
24 November 2025
TRIBUNALS, COURTS AND ENFORCEMENT ACT 2007
HOUSING – HOUSE IN MULTIPLE OCCUPATION – meaning of cooking facilities in s.254(8) Housing Act 2004 – whether a microwave constitutes cooking facilities
BETWEEN:
OXFORD HOTEL INVESTMENTS LTD
Appellant
-and-
GREAT YARMOUTH BOROUGH COUNCIL
Respondent
St George Hotel,
7/10 Albert Square,
Great Yarmouth,
Norfolk, NR30 3JH
His Honour Judge Johns KC
Mr Shabbir Gheewalla, a director, for the appellant
Mr Archie Maddan (instructed by Norfolk County Council legal department) for the respondent
© CROWN COPYRIGHT 2025
The following cases were referred to in this decision:
Barker v Shokar [2014] UKUT 17 (LC)
Uratemp Ventures Ltd v Collins [2001] UKHL 43
R (on the application of PACCAR Inc) v Competition Appeal Tribunal [2023] UKSC 28
Global 100 Ltd v Jimenez [2023] EWCA Civ1243
Camfield v Uyiekpen [2022] UKUT 234 (LC)
Introduction
Does provision of a microwave oven amount to cooking facilities for the purposes of s.254(8) of the Housing Act 2004? (the Act) That is the principal question on this appeal. The answer, in my judgment and for the reasons which follow, is that mere provision of a microwave does not amount to cooking facilities within the meaning of s.254(8). That answer means that the Great Yarmouth Borough Council (GYBC) was right to declare the building known as St George Hotel, 7-10 Albert Square, Great Yarmouth, Norfolk NR30 3JH (the Building) a house in multiple occupation (HMO) and so subject to the important controls of the Act.
Background and the FTT decision
The Building is operated by the appellant company, Oxford Hotel Investments Limited (OHIL). A large part of the use of the Building is to accommodate persons placed there by GYBC under its homelessness housing duties. On an inspection by officers of GYBC on 4 October 2023, it was found that of the 62 rooms in the Building, 32 were occupied as homeless accommodation. Following that inspection, on 10 October 2023, GYBC made a declaration that the Building was an HMO, and on 23 October 2023 made a decision refusing to revoke that declaration. That latter decision was appealed to the First-tier Tribunal (the FTT) under s.256(4) of the Act.
The FTT inspected the Building, and described the selection of rooms which it inspected in this way at [17] of its decision dated 21 January 2025 (the Decision): “ … each contained a fridge, a microwave, a shower and wash hand basin and WC (which were en-suite to the bedroom area), and a microwave oven…None of the rooms seen had any food preparation area, or storage for cutlery/crockery.” The FTT referred at [39] to the evidence of Ms Tilley, an environmental health officer for GYBC, which “emphasised the lack of cooking facilities in the rooms, which she contended would not satisfy Schedule 3 of the Licensing & Management of HMOs Regulations 2006 – there was only a fridge, microwave, sometimes a kettle, a very small bathroom sink, no cutlery or plates, and no work surface or cupboards in which to store foods.”
The FTT determined that the Building satisfied the standard test for an HMO set out in s.254(2) of the Act, at least as modified by s.255. That included a finding that the rooms lacked one or more of the basic amenities, namely cooking facilities. It appears to have been common ground before the FTT that the rooms lacked cooking facilities, notwithstanding the presence of microwave ovens. In that regard, the FTT recorded at [57] an admission by OHIL that there was an absence of cooking facilities. OHIL’s argument on this aspect of the case was instead that the legislation meant that the presence of any one of the basic amenities listed in s.254(8), namely a toilet, washing facilities, or cooking facilities, was enough to avoid the Building being declared an HMO. The FTT rejected that interpretation of the Act.
The Decision also included a finding that the relevant occupation constituted a significant use of the accommodation within s.255 of the Act, so that GYBC was right to make the declaration. The FTT recorded at [61] that this point as to significant use was not one contested by OHIL. Accordingly, it confirmed GYBC’s decision not to revoke the HMO declaration.
The Appeal
While a raft of other complaints were made about the Decision by the grounds of appeal, permission to appeal has been given on just two overlapping grounds, grounds 12(1) and 11. Those grounds criticise the approach of the FTT to the requirement for basic amenities. At least one argument made in those grounds, being the same argument as made before the FTT, is that the legislation requires only one of the three basic amenities to be present in the rooms in order for the Building to avoid being an HMO. But it is a different issue which is highlighted in the order granting permission to appeal.
“Some of the points taken by the applicant are difficult to sustain, but others are more readily arguable; in particular, it is arguable (notwithstanding the applicant’s apparent concession that a microwave oven did not amount to cooking facilities) that as a matter of law the rooms so equipped did have cooking facilities”.
In arguing the appeal, Mr Gheewalla, a director of OHIL, pressed his original point that the presence of one of the basic amenities was enough to mean that GYBC’s declaration could not stand. But he also submitted that the rooms in the Building did have cooking facilities; saying that there was binding authority that microwaves were cooking facilities, namely Barker v Shokar [2014] UKUT 17 (LC).
Given the concession by OHIL before the FTT that the rooms lacked cooking facilities, this submission represented a new point. While permission would not by itself constitute permission to raise a new point on appeal, Mr Maddan, appearing for GYBC, made clear that no objection was being raised to this point being taken on appeal. Rather, his submission was that it was wrong. Provision of a microwave did not amount to cooking facilities within the meaning of s.254(8) of the Act. He referred, in the course of argument, to The Licensing and Management of Houses in Multiple Occupation and Other Houses (Miscellaneous Provisions) (England) Regulations 2006 (the Regulations), in particular paragraph 4 of Schedule 3 specifying the level of kitchen facilities to be provided as part of accommodation which does not share such facilities.
Mr Gheewalla’s submissions on the appeal, both written and oral (and including further submissions sent to the Tribunal after the hearing), ranged over other ground, much of which was clearly outside the scope of the appeal. Ground 12(1), for which permission was obtained, did though include two points, in addition to the basic amenities issues, which need to be considered. They are OHIL’s criticisms of the FTT’s findings as to only or main residence, and as to significant use.
Discussion and conclusions
Basic amenities
For the purposes of this Act a building or a part of a building is a “house in multiple occupation” if–
it meets the conditions in subsection (2) (“the standard test”);
it meets the conditions in subsection (3) (“the self-contained flat test”);
it meets the conditions in subsection (4) (“the converted building test”);
an HMO declaration is in force in respect of it under section 255; or
it is a converted block of flats to which section 257 applies.
A building or a part of a building meets the standard test if–
it consists of one or more units of living accommodation not consisting of a self-contained flat or flats;
the living accommodation is occupied by persons who do not form a single household (see section 258);
the living accommodation is occupied by those persons as their only or main residence or they are to be treated as so occupying it (see section 259);
their occupation of the living accommodation constitutes the only use of that accommodation;
rents are payable or other consideration is to be provided in respect of at least one of those persons' occupation of the living accommodation; and
two or more of the households who occupy the living accommodation share one or more basic amenities or the living accommodation is lacking in one or more basic amenities.
A part of a building meets the self-contained flat test if–
it consists of a self-contained flat; and
paragraphs (b) to (f) of subsection (2) apply (reading references to the living accommodation concerned as references to the flat).
A building or a part of a building meets the converted building test if–
it is a converted building
it contains one or more units of living accommodation that do not consist of a self-contained flat or flats (whether or not it also contains any such flat or flats);
the living accommodation is occupied by persons who do not form a single household (see section 258);
the living accommodation is occupied by those persons as their only or main residence or they are to be treated as so occupying it (see section 259);
their occupation of the living accommodation constitutes the only use of that accommodation; and
rents are payable or other consideration is to be provided in respect of at least one of those persons' occupation of the living accommodation.
But for any purposes of this Act (other than those of Part 1) a building or part of a building within subsection (1) is not a house in multiple occupation if it is listed in Schedule 14.
…
…
In this section–
“basic amenities” means–
a toilet,
personal washing facilities, or
cooking facilities;
“converted building” means a building or part of a building consisting of living accommodation in which one or more units of such accommodation have been created since the building or part was constructed;
“enactment” includes an enactment comprised in subordinate legislation (within the meaning of the Interpretation Act 1978 (c. 30);
“self-contained flat” means a separate set of premises (whether or not on the same floor)–
which forms part of a building;
either the whole or a material part of which lies above or below some other part of the building; and
in which all three basic amenities are available for the exclusive use of its occupants.”
This case is concerned with the standard test. The Building has been considered an HMO by GYBC and the FTT because, among other things, that part of the standard test in s.254(2)(f) is met as the rooms in the Building are accommodation which lacks one or more of the basic amenities, namely cooking facilities.
The first three subsections of s.255 set out the circumstances in which an HMO declaration may be made by a local authority.
If a local housing authority are satisfied that subsection (2) applies to a building or part of a building in their area, they may serve a notice under this section (an “HMO declaration”) declaring the building or part to be a house in multiple occupation.
This subsection applies to a building or part of a building if the building or part meets any of the following tests (as it applies without the sole use condition)–
the standard test (see section 254(2)),
the self-contained flat test (see section 254(3)), or
the converted building test (see section 254(4)),
and the occupation, by persons who do not form a single household, of the living accommodation or flat referred to in the test in question constitutes a significant use of that accommodation or flat.
In subsection (2) “the sole use condition” means the condition contained in–
section 254(2)(d) (as it applies for the purposes of the standard test or the self-contained flat test), or
section 254(4)(e),
as the case may be.”
Mr Gheewalla’s suggestion that the presence of any one of the basic amenities in the rooms is enough for the Building to fall outside s.254(2)(f) and so not meet the standard test can be dealt with briefly. It was rightly rejected by the FTT. It is plainly contrary to the clear language of s.254(2)(f) which refers to the lack of one or more of the basic amenities.
The question as to whether the provision of a microwave constitutes cooking facilities within the meaning of s.254(8) so that all three basic amenities were in fact present in this case requires more careful consideration.
In Uratemp Ventures Ltd v Collins [2001] UKHL 43, the House of Lords overturned the Court of Appeal’s conclusion that cooking facilities were required in order for a room to be a dwelling for the purposes of the Housing Act 1988 and so enjoy the security of tenure afforded by that statute. Lord Millett said this at [57]:
“Moreover such a conclusion would be productive of great difficulties in future cases. It would be necessary to consider just what is sufficient to constitute ‘cooking facilities’. The Victorian bedroom possessed an open grate; the modern one has a power point. What more is required? And why should even this much be necessary to attract security of tenure? The legislative purpose of the Rent and Housing Acts is to protect people in the occupation of their homes, not to encourage them to cook their own meals.”
It is now necessary to tackle this question of some difficulty. It is important to do so in the particular statutory context in which it arises.
Before turning to that context, I should say that, contrary to Mr Gheewalla’s case, the question is not one which has already been decided by the Tribunal in Barker v Shokar. A written note accompanying Mr Gheewalla’s oral submissions cited that decision and purported to quote at a little length from [18] of the judgment to the effect that a microwave satisfied the statutory definition. The problem is that the real [18] of Barker v Shokar says no such thing. Nor does any other part of the judgment in that case. Mr Gheewalla ended up accepting that this misleading use of authority was the product of AI. It is one which illustrates again, in courts and tribunals, the dangers of using AI for legal research without any checks.
Central to the exercise of interpreting statute are the purpose and legislative scheme of the statute – see R (on the application of PACCAR Inc) v Competition Appeal Tribunal [2023] UKSC 28 at [41].
I consider that the overall purpose of this part of the Act, and the immediate function of these definition provisions, both point towards that interpretation of cooking facilities.
The purpose of this part of the Act, and the predecessor legislation, was explained by the Court of Appeal in Global 100 Ltd v Jimenez [2023] EWCA Civ 1243 at [7] and [8].
Part XI of the Housing Act 1985 provided for the regulation of HMOs by local authorities. Nourse LJ in Rogers v Islington London Borough Council (1999) 32 HLR138,140 stated that it is of the greatest importance to the good of occupants that houses which ought to be treated as HMOs do not escape statutory control. In Brent London Borough Council v Reynolds [2002] HLR 15 Buxton LJ identified that Parliament had made special provision for HMOs because of the fact that it was often persons and families most in need of social protection who were obliged to occupy housing that had been designed for occupation by one family but which had been converted for occupation by a number of separate families or individuals. There was reference in the submissions before this court about the statutory policy to ensure a minimum level of standards for housing accommodation.
Part XI of the Housing Act 1985 was replaced by relevant provisions in the Housing Act 2004. The definition of an HMO was altered. It was common ground that this was because the definition of an HMO in the Housing Act 1985 had caught a number of hostels or hotels which were not the intended subject of the legislation.”
The explanatory notes accompanying the Act, being another aid to statutory interpretation (see PACCAR at [42]), speak of the same purpose at [24].
The term HMO applies to a wide range of housing types, mainly in the private rented sector, that young lower-income single people, including some particularly vulnerable and disadvantaged groups, typically occupy. Physical and management standards in HMOs are often low. Current statutory controls on HMOs are confusing and have grown up over several decades.”
This part of the Act is there to protect vulnerable and disadvantaged occupiers such that it is very important that buildings which should be treated as HMOs do not escape statutory control. Given that purpose, in my judgment it is unlikely to have been intended by Parliament that this statutory regulation could be escaped by the simple expedient of plugging in a microwave.
As to the immediate function of the definition provisions in focus in this case, being the basic amenities, that is to distinguish between a room in an HMO on the one hand and a self-contained flat on the other. A building converted into self-contained flats is not, under the Act and unlike under the predecessor legislation, without more an HMO. It falls outside the standard test. It is the basic amenities which are used to discern what is a flat and what is not. Premises are not a self-contained flat as defined by s.254(8) unless “all three basic amenities are available for the exclusive use of its occupants”. And a unit of accommodation will be within s.254(2)(f), being part of the standard test for an HMO, if it is “lacking in one or more basic amenities.”
That immediate function of these definition provisions points, in my judgment, against a microwave amounting to cooking facilities. It is unlikely to have been intended that a room could be turned into a flat simply by plugging in a microwave.
In my judgment, some further support for this interpretation is to be found in considering cooking facilities alongside the other basic amenities with which it is grouped. Both a toilet and washing facilities can be described as characteristics or features of the property. They are part of the property. Not mere contents. That suggests that the phrase cooking facilities is also directed at, or at least more readily met by, facilities which include a feature of the property, not just contents.
I should make clear that my conclusion does not rely on the Regulations. While regulations made under a statute can assist interpretation (see PACCAR at [44]), two factors have meant I have not found the Regulations of any real help in interpreting s.254. First, the Regulations were made on 15 February 2006 whereas the Act was made on 18 November 2004. That distance in time means that it is hard to see them as one legislative exercise. Second, the Regulations do not use the same language as s.254. Paragraph 4 of Schedule 3 to the Regulations, being the provision highlighted by Mr Maddan, refers not to cooking facilities but kitchen facilities. Further, it prescribes standards for HMOs for the purpose of s.65 of the Act, as regulation 8 of the Regulations makes clear. And s.65 is concerned with suitability, rather than the definition of an HMO. Plus that section uses yet different language; s.65 referring to “areas for food storage, preparation and cooking.”
This appeal has been concerned with particular facts. What might be called a full kitchen would clearly be within the meaning of cooking facilities in s.254. There could be little doubt about such a conclusion where there was a worktop for the preparation of food, cupboards for the storage of food as well as for pans, crockery and cutlery, a sink for washing up, and a cooker and hob occupying a dedicated space provided between the kitchen units for it. The further the facts move away from that full kitchen, the harder it will become to describe what is provided as cooking facilities. The particular facts of this case have, in my judgment, moved too far away to be described as cooking facilities. Those facts are that there is no relevant storage, no food preparation area, and just a microwave with fridge and kettle.
It follows that the appeal on this principal ground fails.
Other points
It remains to consider OHIL’s two other points within the scope of the appeal.
First, did the FTT go wrong in finding occupation by persons of the rooms in the Building as their only or main residence? That is part of the standard test by virtue of s.254(2)(c). I consider the FTT’s assessment to be unimpeachable. It reminded itself from Camfield v Uyiekpen [2022] UKUT 234 (LC) that this was an issue of fact which needed to be proved. And then went on to draw an appropriate inference from the evidence. That evidence was that the occupiers had been there for significant periods and, being housed under the homelessness legislation, had no other homes to go to.
Mr Gheewalla’s challenge to the finding rested largely on a failure by the FTT to take into account his booking records, an analysis of which he sought to adduce on the appeal. His analysis apparently showed very much shorter average stays by those occupants placed by local authorities. But this was not a proper complaint. Permission to appeal on the basis of the FTT’s failure to take the records into account was refused by this Tribunal. And there is no permission to adduce the new material represented by the analysis on the appeal. Particularly given the worryingly misleading citation of authority, and that the analysis did not seem to match the evidence before the FTT, I did not anyway trust this new document.
Second, was it unfair for the FTT to decide that the occupation by persons housed under the homelessness legislation at the Building represented a significant use within s.255 of the Act? Mr Gheewalla said that this finding represented some sort of ambush. I do not consider there is anything in this criticism. S.255 and significant use was referred to in the refusal to revoke the declaration (as well as in the original declaration). And it was addressed in GYBC’s evidence before the FTT. Had OHIL wished to raise a substantial contest on this issue as part of its appeal it could and should have done so. That is so even ignoring the presumption in s.260 of the Act of significant use unless the contrary is shown (which presumption was not referred to by the FTT or the parties on the appeal). As recorded by the FTT in the Decision at [61], OHIL did not raise any contest on this issue. It did not argue against the conclusion that this was a significant use of the Building.
For all those reasons, the appeal is dismissed.
His Honour Judge Johns KC
24 November 2025
Right of appeal
Any party has a right of appeal to the Court of Appeal on any point of law arising from this decision. The right of appeal may be exercised only with permission. An application for permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal must be sent or delivered to the Tribunal so that it is received within 1 month after the date on which this decision is sent to the parties (unless an application for costs is made within 14 days of the decision being sent to the parties, in which case an application for permission to appeal must be made within 1 month of the date on which the Tribunal’s decision on costs is sent to the parties). An application for permission to appeal must identify the decision of the Tribunal to which it relates, identify the alleged error or errors of law in the decision, and state the result the party making the application is seeking. If the Tribunal refuses permission to appeal a further application may then be made to the Court of Appeal for permission.