The Commissioners for HMRC v Andrew O’Brien

This is an appeal brought by Mr O’Brien, the Appellant, against a discovery assessment dated 20 November 2013, made under s.29 of the Taxes Management Act 1970 (“TMA 1970”), for the tax year ending 5 April 2010 in the amount of £6,560.80.

It is HMRC’s case that the liability arises from payments of employment income made by Edge Consulting Limited (“ECL”) to the trustees of the Edge Consulting Limited Employee Benefit Trust (“ECL EBT”), which are deemed redirected earnings of the Appellant, chargeable at the point of their redirection.

HMRC contend that the Appellant participated in a tax avoidance scheme with ECL known colloquially as a “contractor loan scheme” during the tax year in question. The scheme ostensibly worked by converting what would otherwise be employment income into loans from an offshore trust. As part of his employment with ECL, the Appellant was remunerated for the services supplied by him to an end user/ users via intermediaries, and that remuneration was then paid to the Appellant by way of a combination of salary and loan payments. The theory was that such loans would not be taxable as employment income.

HMRC contend the Appellant received £33,020 in loan payments from the ECL EBT, which were referrable to his employment during the tax year 2009/10. That figure had been taken from the P11D for 2009/10 submitted by ECL. HMRC submit that the loans from the ECL EBT are earnings, as defined in section 62 of the Income Tax (Earnings and Pensions) Act 2003 (“ITEPA 2003”), and thus liable to income tax.

On 20 November 2013, following commencement of a contractor loan assessment project, HMRC issued a notice of assessment to the Appellant under s.29 of TMA 1970 for the tax year ended 5 April 2010 (‘the Discovery Assessment’). HMRC submit that the assessment raised, which brings into charge a liability of £6,560.80 for untaxed employment income of £33,020, has been validly imposed.

The Appellant opposes the assessment. Several grounds are raised in his skeleton argument and witness statement. In summary, these grounds can be stated as follows:

We have had the benefit of a substantial bundle of documents for this hearing (a main bundle and a supplemental bundle), together with skeleton arguments from both parties.

We have also considered the witness statement of the Appellant (undated but which he confirmed had been filed on 11 July 2025), and the witness statement of Officer Lesley Stopp, dated 11 October 2017, Officer Andrew Finch dated 5 April 2018, and Officer Rita Flynn dated 22 May 2025. The Appellant and Officer Rita Flynn gave oral evidence.

There is little dispute over the facts of the Appellant’s involvement with the tax planning scheme involving ECL and the ECL EBT. For the purposes of this appeal, we set out the salient facts as we have found them, as follows.

HMRC have been investigating and challenging contractor loan schemes since the early to mid-2000’s. These schemes involve the taxpayer providing services to a UK employer, but via the medium of a contract of employment with an offshore entity. The taxpayer is employed by that offshore entity, who pays the taxpayer a modest salary under deduction of tax and National Insurance, whilst the balance and far greater proportion of the income attributable to the taxpayer’s services is provided to the taxpayer either by the offshore employer or by an offshore trust, by way of a loan. Taxpayers may have reported the loan as giving rise to a taxable benefit in their tax returns, but generally did not self-assess the loan as taxable income.

According to Officer Stopp’s witness statement, she commenced work on the contractor loan scheme project in October 2012. Shortly after being told how the scheme worked, she came to the conclusion that the loans received by scheme users were taxable as income and there would accordingly be a loss of tax from scheme users. There were thousands of users of these contractor loan schemes, and it was clear from her statement, and that of Officer Finch, that HMRC were up against enquiry windows. HMRC therefore prioritised opening enquiries in relation to those windows which were still open, before raising discovery assessments for other tax years.

In April 2013, having first prioritised opening enquiries in relation to windows which were still open, Officer Stopp’s team moved to make assessments for the 2009/2010 tax year (which is the tax year relevant to this appeal).

There is no dispute that the Appellant was a user of a contractor loan scheme marketed by ECL during the year of assessment subject to this appeal. The background concerning ECL can be summarised as follows:

As explained by Officer Finch in his witness statement, it was not until 2012 that HMRC had broadly agreed an appropriate challenge to contractor loan schemes and a strategy approved. Consideration was given to opening a very large number of enquiries, and issuing a very large number of discovery assessments to scheme users where HMRC were out of time to issue enquiry notices.

As explained by Officer Stopp in her witness statement, a discrete team was set up under her management to facilitate the required assessments. Officer Stopp provides detailed evidence on the training provided to those HMRC officers, and the processes they used to raise discovery assessments against users of the contractor loan avoidance schemes.

Officer Flynn confirmed in her witness statement that the ECL scheme was included in this programme of work, which led to the discovery and assessment issued to the Appellant. Officer Flynn also exhibited copies of HMRC’s control spreadsheets that recorded the steps in the processes outlined in Officer Stopp’s witness statement, and which recorded the specific steps undertaken in the Appellant’s case.

As explained by Officer Stopp and Officer Flynn, there were broadly three steps involved in issuing discovery assessments to users of the schemes, described as Standard Working Instructions (“SWIs”). These are as follows:

HMRC’s records show that the Appellant commenced his employment with ECL on 1 October 2009. That information derives from and is confirmed in the P14 records for 2009/2010, submitted to HMRC by ECL as his employer at the time.

The Appellant’s self-assessment tax return for the tax year 2009/2010 was received by HMRC on 21 November 2011. That tax return showed two sources of employment income:

The P11D details submitted by ECL for the Appellant showed that the total loan received during the tax year 2009/10 was £33,020, with “Benefit In Kind” stated as £216.

We accept the evidence of Officer Flynn that when the Appellant’s tax return for 2009/2010 was received on 21 November 2011, the project team led by Officer Stopp had not yet been assigned to the contractor loans work, as this did not occur until October 2012. Indeed, it is clear from the evidence of Officer Stopp that her team did not commence work on raising assessments against scheme users for the tax year 2009/2010 until sometime in April 2013.

We also accept the evidence of Officer Flynn that once this work had commenced, on 30 July 2013, the Appellant’s tax return was reviewed and an insufficiency of tax was discovered by Officer Sandra Price, which corresponded with step 2 of the SWI. Her initials are “SLP” and this is recorded in the control spreadsheet.

On 20 November 2013, Officer Ros Fisher issued a notice of assessment (“the Discovery Assessment”) under s29 TMA 1970 for the year 2009/2010 on behalf of Officer Stopp. This corresponded with step 3 of the SWI. The date the assessment was issued is also recorded in the control spreadsheet.

On 15 January 2014, the Appellant appealed the Discovery Assessment, HMRC having agreed to extend the time for the appeal to 31 January 2014.

In his appeal letter, the Appellant stated that “I believe that Extra Statutory Concession A19 applies to this underpayment and that it should be written off”, and that if HMRC did not agree, they were required to set out a reason explanation why, and detailed and quantified explanations for how the underpayment arose. He further stated that he had “recently been advised Edge Consulting was running a registered DOTAS scheme during my time in their employment”, and sought the date of registration.

On 13 February 2014, HMRC wrote to the Appellant to confirm that the liability of £6,560.80 had been postponed pending the outcome of the appeal and setting out in detail the basis for why HMRC believed that the Appellant owed additional tax in relation to the ECL arrangement.

There are then gaps in the chronology and some delay in the progression of this appeal. The exact reasons for this were not delved into by the parties, but we note that there were related proceedings concerning similar contractor loan schemes during this period, in cases such as Hoey v HMRC [2022] EWCA Civ 656 and RFC 2012 plc (formerly the Rangers Football Club plc) v Advocate General for Scotland [2017] UKSC 45.

We understand that there were also settlement discussions between the parties, although we have not, rightly, been made privy to the terms, given that those discussions are “without prejudice”.

On 15 March 2019, the Appellant wrote to HMRC to state that whilst the P11D forms submitted to HMRC by ECL for the tax year 2009/10 (and 2010/11) were “bona fide documents, providing the complete details of contractor loans received at that time”, HMRC’s assessments were incorrect as they had ignored the loan amount outstanding at the beginning of the year. The Appellant contended that the total disguised remuneration loan shown on the P11D forms should be the “end of year loan minus the beginning of the year loan”.

On 26 August 2022, HMRC wrote to the Appellant to state that ECL was a disguised remuneration scheme and that HMRC did not believe it was appropriate for the end users of his services to account for any tax due. This effectively was HMRC using its discretion under s.684(7A)(b) TMA 1970 to disapply the PAYE regulations, such that the liability to pay tax on the employment income became the Appellant’s.

On 3 January 2024, HMRC wrote to the Appellant setting out their view of the matter under appeal and offered the Appellant a statutory review of the decision.

On 31 January 2024, the Appellant accepted the offer of a review of the decision.

On 13 March 2024, HMRC issued their review conclusion letter to the Appellant, upholding the Discovery Assessment issued.

On 12 April 2024, the Appellant submitted his notice of appeal to the Tribunal.

The issues that we need to consider are:

The standard of proof is the ordinary civil standard, this being the balance of probabilities.

The relevant legislation is set out in the appendix to this decision.

We have considered all the documentation provided to us, as summarised above. The Appellant and Officer Flynn gave oral evidence and were cross-examined. We have reflected carefully upon their evidence.

The parties should be assured that we have considered all their relevant points, and if we do not deal specifically with a particular point, that does not mean that they were not considered in the round when we reached our decision.

Whilst not specifically raised as an issue by the Appellant, we make it clear for the purposes of our decision that we find the loans received by the Appellant from the ECL ETB are employment income under the provisions of ITEPA, and are subject to income tax.

We do so because the burden of establishing that the Discovery Assessment is valid is predicated on the basis that the Appellant’s self-assessment in his tax return for 2009/2010 is insufficient, in that it does not assess the loans to income tax. The assessment has therefore been issued to make good that insufficiency. The assessment can only therefore be valid if the loans are employment income.

HMRC say that the loans reflect earnings which were redirected to the ECL EBT by the Appellant’s employer, ECL, and which would, in the absence of such re-direction, have been paid to the Appellant under deduction of PAYE income tax and NICs.

The Supreme Court decision in Rangers is authority that the charge to income tax on that employment income arises at the point at which that “salary” is redirected from the appellant to the EBTs. The relevant extracts from Rangers are set out below:

“[41]      As a general rule, therefore, the charge to tax on employment income extends to money that the employee is entitled to have paid as his or her remuneration whether it is paid to the employee or a third party. The legislation does not require that the employee receive the money; a third party, including a trustee, may receive it…

[58]   In summary, (i) income tax on emoluments or earnings is due on money paid as a reward or remuneration for the exertions of the employee; (ii) focusing on the statutory wording, neither s 131 of ICTA nor s 62(2)(a) or (c) of ITEPA, nor the other provisions of ITEPA which I have quoted (except s 62(2)(b)), provide that the employee himself or herself must receive the remuneration; (iii) in this context the references to making a relevant payment ‘to an employee’ or ‘other payee’ in the PAYE Regulations fall to be construed as payment either to the employee or to the person to whom the payment is made with the agreement or acquiescence of the employee or as arranged by the employee, for example by assignation or assignment; (iv) the specific statutory rule governing gratuities, profits and incidental benefits in s 62(2)(b) of ITEPA applies only to such benefits; (v) the cases, to which I have referred above, other than Hadlee, do not address the question of the taxability of remuneration paid to a third party; (vi) Hadlee supports the view which I have reached; and (vii) the special commissioners in Sempra Metals (and in Dextra) were presented with arguments that misapplied the gloss in Garforth and erred in adopting the gloss as a principle so as to exclude the payment of emoluments to a third party.

[59]   Parliament in enacting legislation for the taxation of emoluments or earnings from employment has sought to tax remuneration paid in money or money’s worth. No persuasive rationale has been advanced for excluding from the scope of this tax charge remuneration in the form of money which the employee agrees should be paid to a third party, or where he arranges or acquiesces in a transaction to that effect”.

We find as a fact that the Appellant participated in the ECL scheme and that the loans he received from the ECL EBT during the 2009/2010 tax year in effect replaced the salary to which he was entitled as a reward for his services to clients or end users.

The appellant was liable to a charge to income tax under the provisions of ITEPA at the time at which that salary was redirected from his employers, ECL, to the ECL EBT, irrespective of whether the loans were intended to be repaid, and whether they were actually paid or not (in this case, there is no suggestion that the loans for 2009/2010 have been repaid). The tax point arose before the loans were made and/ or repaid.

The Appellant’s tax return for 2009/2010 does not disclose the loans received from the ECL EBT during that period as taxable income. There was therefore an insufficiency of tax reported in that tax return. The basic prerequisite for the making of a valid discovery assessment is therefore established.

However, we must now proceed to consider whether HMRC has established that one of two conditions is satisfied.

The first condition is set out in s.29(4) TMA 1970 and concerns fraud or negligence on the part of the taxpayer or someone acting on his behalf. HMRC do not rely on this first condition.

Instead, HMRC rely on the “hypothetical officer” condition, which is set out in s29(5) TMA 1970 and reads as follows:

“The second condition is that at the time when an officer of the Board–

(a)

ceased to be entitled to give notice of his intention to enquire into the taxpayer’s return under section 8 or 8A of this Act in respect of the relevant year of assessment; or

(b)

…the officer could not have been reasonably expected, on the basis of the information made available to him before that time, to be aware of the situation mentioned in subsection (1) above”.

Pursuant to s.29(6), for the purposes of subsection (5) above, information is made available to an officer of the Board if—

“(a)

it is contained in the taxpayer's return under section 8 or 8A of this Act in respect of the relevant year of assessment (the return), or in any accounts, statements or documents accompanying the return;

(b)

it is contained in any claim made as regards the relevant year of assessment by the taxpayer acting in the same capacity as that in which he made the return, or in any accounts, statements or documents accompanying any such claim;

(c)

it is contained in any documents, accounts or particulars which, for the purposes of any enquiries into the return or any such claim by an officer of the Board, are produced or furnished by the taxpayer to the officer …; or

(d)

it is information the existence of which, and the relevance of which as regards the situation mentioned in subsection (1) above—

(i)

could reasonably be expected to be inferred by an officer of the Board from information falling within paragraphs (a) to (c) above; or

(ii)

are notified in writing by the taxpayer to an officer of the Board.”

Therefore, the s.29(5) condition is only satisfied if the hypothetical officer could not have been reasonably expected to be aware of the actual insufficiency on the basis of the information made available to him by the taxpayer or on his behalf, that information being defined in s.29(6) TMA, before the closure of the enquiry window.

We were referred by HMRC to the principles set out in the Upper Tribunal decisions in Clive Beagles v HMRC [2018] UKUT 380 and HMRC v John Hicks [2020] UKUT 12. In Beagles, the Upper Tribunal said this:

“99.

The leading cases on the application of s29(5) are now Hankinson, Lansdowne andSanderson. We were referred to these cases by the parties. We will refer predominantly to the decision of the Court of Appeal in Sanderson and the leading judgment of Patten LJ as in it he set out a summary of the relevant principles which incorporates relevant extracts from the decisions in the other cases. The relevant passage is at [17] to [23] of his judgment.  We will not set it out in this decision.

100.

We endeavour to summarise the principles that we derive from Patten LJ’s judgment as follows:

(1)

The test in s29(5) is applied by reference to a hypothetical HMRC officer not the actual officer in the case. The officer has the characteristics of an officer of general competence, knowledge or skill which include a reasonable knowledge and understanding of the law.

(2)

The test requires the court or tribunal to identify the information that is treated by s29(6) as available to the hypothetical officer at the relevant time and determine whether on the basis of that information the hypothetical officer applying that level of knowledge and skill could not have been reasonably expected to be aware of the insufficiency.

(3)

The hypothetical officer is expected to apply his knowledge of the law to the facts disclosed to form a view as to whether or not an insufficiency exists (Moses LJ, Lansdowne [69]; Patten LJ, Sanderson [23]).

We agree therefore with Mr Firth that the test does assume that the hypothetical officer will apply the appropriate level of knowledge and skill to the information that is treated as being available before the level of awareness is tested. The test does not require that the actual insufficiency is identified on the face of the return.

(4)

But the question of the knowledge of the hypothetical officer cuts both ways. He or she is not expected to resolve every question of law particularly in complex cases (Patten LJ, Sanderson [23], Lansdowne [69]). In some cases, it may be that the law is so complex that the inspector could not reasonably have been expected to be aware of the insufficiency (Moses LJ, Lansdowne [69]; Patten LJ, Sanderson [17(3)]).

(5)

The hypothetical officer must be aware of the actual insufficiency from the information that is treated as available by s29(6) (Auld LJ, Langham v Veltema [33] [34]; Patten LJ, Sanderson [22]). The information need not be sufficient to enable HMRC to prove its case (Moses LJ, Lansdowne [69]).” but it must be more than would prompt the hypothetical officer to raise an enquiry (Auld LJ, Langham v Veltema [33]; Patten LJ, Sanderson [35]).

(6)

As can be seen from the discussion in Sanderson (see [23]), the level of awareness is a question of judgment not a particular standard of proof (see also Moses LJ in Lansdowne [70]). The information made available must “justify” raising the additional assessment (Moses LJ, Lansdowne [69]) or be sufficient to enable HMRC to make a decision whether to raise an additional assessment (Lewison J in the High Court in Lansdowne [2011] STC 372 at [48]).

101.

Applying those principles to the facts of the present case, the question is whether from the information in and accompanying the return, a hypothetical officer could not reasonably have been expected to be aware of the insufficiency”.

In Hicks,the Upper Tribunal said this:

“194.

In our judgment, section 29(5) requires that a taxpayer should make sufficient disclosure in order to enable an officer to make an informed decision whether an insufficiency existed sufficient to justify, in the words of Moses LJ [in Lansdowne at [69]], the exercise of the power to make an amendment to the return. We respectfully agree with Moses LJ that the possibility should remain open that mere factual disclosure may not, in some cases involving complex issues of law, be sufficient.

195.

The purpose of section 29(5) is to strike a balance between the protection of the revenue, on the one hand, and the taxpayer on the other. The taxpayer is protected against a discovery assessment provided adequate disclosure has been made. The disclosure must be from the sources referred to in section 29(6) (as amplified by section 29(7)). HMRC are protected because they can raise a discovery assessment if adequate disclosure has not been made.

196.

It seems to us that section 29(5) focuses primarily on the adequacy of the disclosure by the taxpayer. What constitutes adequate disclosure for the purposes of section 29(5) will vary from case to case. It depends on the nature and tax implications of the arrangements concerned and not on the assumed knowledge (or lack of knowledge) of the hypothetical officer. The obligation is on the taxpayer to make the appropriate level of disclosure as befits a self-assessment system.

197.

In a relatively simple case, where the legal principles are clear, it would be sufficient for a taxpayer simply to give a full disclosure of the factual position. The return must also make clear what position the taxpayer is adopting in relation to the factual position (e.g. whether a receipt was not taxable or whether a claim for relief was being made).

198.

But there may be other cases where the law and the facts (and/or the relationship between the law and the facts) are so complex that adequate disclosure may require more than pure factual disclosure: namely some adequate explanation of the main tax law issues raised by the facts and the position taken in respect of those issues.

199.

Plainly, the greater the level of disclosure, the greater the officer's awareness can reasonably be expected to be. If a disclosure on a tax return includes all material facts and, in complex cases, an adequate explanation of the technical issues raised by those facts and the position taken in relation to those issues, it would be reasonable to expect an officer to be aware of an insufficiency. What constitutes reasonable awareness is linked to the fullness and adequacy of the disclosure - the expertise of the hypothetical officer remains that of general competence, knowledge or skill which includes a reasonable knowledge and understanding of the law.

200.

In argument before us Mr Nawbatt came close to suggesting, as we understood it, that a hypothetical officer could not be expected to understand complex or specialist areas of tax law. We disagree. If the disclosure (factual and technical) is adequate in the circumstances of the case, a hypothetical officer can reasonably be expected to be aware of an insufficiency even in a complex case or one involving specialist technical knowledge. If the disclosure is inadequate then it is fair that a hypothetical officer could not reasonably be expected to be aware of an insufficiency in such a case. That is the balance that section 29(5) strikes”.

The focus on s.29(5) is on the quality of the taxpayer’s disclosure and whether it clearly alerts the hypothetical officer to the insufficiency. The validity of the assessment must also be judged solely from the information listed in section 29(6). The issue is whether the information could, or should, have alerted an officer to the actual insufficiency. The hypothetical officer is not to have attributed to him knowledge of any further information that he might have obtained if he had made further enquiries.

We have also had regard to the observations of the First-tier Tribunal in Sheth v HMRC [2023] UKFTT 368 (TC), in which the Tribunal stated that the bar for making a discovery is very low, and simply means that the relevant officer must come to a conclusion or find out from the evidence before him/ her that there is an insufficiency in the return. This must be a new conclusion. We agree.

The statutory information for the 2009/2010 tax year is the Appellant’s tax return. We accept HMRC’s submission and the evidence of Officer Flynn that a hypothetical officer could not reasonably have known of the actual insufficiency in that tax return. Very little information is provided in that return in respect of the ECL scheme, and in particular, the payments from the ECL EBT. There is no disclosure beyond inclusion of the employment reference with ECL and the modest salary paid to the Appellant. We accept HMRC’s contention that this reference to ECL as employer, and the modest salary paid, were key elements of the scheme’s design which sought to convey in a self-assessment return that all relevant employment income had been declared, when in reality, only a minimal portion of the total employment income had been declared, with the remaining sums received by the taxpayer disguised as ‘loan’ payments from the ECL EBT.

There was no mention in the tax return of the fact that the Appellant would not realistically be required to repay the loans as part of the ECL scheme. This was an important omission and was a key component of the scheme.

There was also no mention in the tax return of the DOTAS scheme reference for ECL. Whilst we accept that the Appellant was not aware of the DOTAS registration or scheme reference number, the point remains that no reference number for ECL was provided in the return. Furthermore, notwithstanding the absence of a scheme reference number in the return, even if the hypothetical officer was aware that ECL was DOTAS registered, that does not amount to adequate disclosure. It would not have made the hypothetical officer aware of the actual insufficiency.

We also agree with HMRC that the return would in fact have been more misleading than helpful to the hypothetical officer, given that the benefit in kind element for the loan is declared and taxed (and that BIK element accords with the P11D which had been filed by ECL). In our view, this reasonably leads to a view that there was no suggestion of an insufficiency.

We therefore find as a fact that there was a valid discovery and that HMRC has met the condition in s29(5) TMA 1970.

We have had regard to the evidence of Officer Stopp and Officer Flynn as to the process followed by HMRC in making the Discovery Assessment in this appeal.

In particular, we note the formula and examples set out by Officer Stopp in her witness statement (at paragraphs 60 – 62) for calculating the amount of the loan received by a scheme user for each tax year if there was a P11D form. We have also considered the document exhibited to her statement headed “Contractor Loan Assessments 2009/2010 and 2010/11 Loan Benefit from ECS SW1” dated 29 July 2013 (p. 160 of the document bundle). Under Scenario 2, an example is given of a P11D with a start date during the tax year. In that scenario, the loan amount received for that tax year is the whole amount recorded at “close”.

The Appellant’s P11D for 2009/2010 as provided to HMRC by ECL is also in the bundle. The Appellant has confirmed in one of his letters to HMRC that the P11D supplied by ECL is bona fide. The P11D in the bundle was also discussed during the hearing and was confirmed by the Appellant to be correct.

We find that the loans received by the Appellant for the 2009/2010 tax year amounted to £33,020, for these reasons:

We find that the amount assessed by HMRC is therefore correct.

If there has been an overpayment made by the Appellant for the 2009/2010 tax year, that will need to be addressed separately by the Appellant with HMRC. That is not a matter for this Tribunal.

The fact that the Appellant was not aware that ECL was a tax avoidance scheme when he became employed by them and when he submitted his return is not relevant to the issues of the validity of the Discovery Assessment and whether the amount assessed is correct.

We have no jurisdiction to consider whether HMRC have acted outside the scope of extra-statutory concession A19 (“ESC A19”). This is a discretionary concession and as such falls outside of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction.

We also do not have any jurisdiction to consider complaints regarding conduct or delay on the part of HMRC in respect of resolving this appeal. The First-tier Tribunal has no inherent or free-standing judicial review or supervisory jurisdiction: HMRC v Hok Ltd [2012] BTC and Birkett (t/a Orchards Residential Home) v HMRC [2017] UKUT 89 (TCC). Our jurisdiction is to decide whether the Discovery Assessment is valid and whether the Appellant has been overcharged. We have determined those issues, as above.

For the reasons set out above, the appeal is dismissed.

This document contains full findings of fact and reasons for the decision. Any party dissatisfied with this decision has a right to apply for permission to appeal against it pursuant to Rule 39 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Tax Chamber) Rules 2009. The application must be received by this Tribunal not later than 56 days after this decision is sent to that party. The parties are referred to “Guidance to accompany a Decision from the First-tier Tribunal (Tax Chamber)” which accompanies and forms part of this decision notice.