
Taylor House, London
VAT – supplies by holding company to subsidiary – best judgment – direct and immediate link – allowed in part
Heard on: 18-20 May 2026
Further submissions: 14 and 18 August 2026
Judgment date: 26 August 2026
Before
TRIBUNAL JUDGE BLACKWELL
Between
VICTORIA OIL & GAS PLC
Appellant
and
THE COMMISSIONERS FOR HIS MAJESTY’S REVENUE AND CUSTOMS
Respondents
Representation:
For the Appellant: Leslie Allen, instructed by direct access
For the Respondents: Peter Munday, litigator of HM Revenue and Customs’ Solicitor’s Office
DECISION
Introduction
This is an appeal by Victoria Oil & Gas plc (“VOG”) against a decision dated 31 January 2023 and the assessments issued following that decision (the “Assessments”) on 3 April 2023. The total amount of the assessments is £884,049.
The VAT periods in question are those between 01/19 and 07/22, but excluding 01/22. Whilst the officer was initially reviewing VOG’s VAT return for the period 01/22 no assessment has ever been issued in relation to this period: that is not therefore a matter before the Tribunal.
VOG has been in administration since 2 May 2023. The administrators are S&W Partners LLP (“S&W”) (formerly Resolve Advisory Limited).
Agreed Issues
It is agreed between the parties that VOG made supplies for consideration in the course of an economic activity to:
Gaz du Cameroun; and
Gaz du Cameroun SARL (together “GdC”).
Issues in Dispute
The issues in dispute are:
are the assessments best judgment?
is any of the disputed input tax directly and immediately linked to supplies made to GdC?
did VOG only make taxable supplies and, as such, is it entitled to recover all input tax?
Law
The parties in this case did not dispute the relevant law. It is the application of the law to the facts that is in dispute.
Right to recover input tax
At its most basic, the relevant law was recently summarised by Lady Rose in HMRC v Hotel La Tour Ltd [2025] UKSC 46; [2026] STC 32 at [36]:
“(a) Input VAT is deductible if it is directly and immediately linked with taxable economic activity.
(b) That economic activity can either be a specific taxable transaction or, if there is no direct and immediate link with a specific transaction, the link can be with the taxable person’s overall business.
(c) If the inputs are directly and immediately linked with a specific transaction then they will be deductible if that transaction is taxable; if the transaction is exempt or out of scope then the inputs are not deductible.
(d) If the inputs are directly and immediately linked with the taxable person’s overall business, then the inputs are deductible in whole or in part depending on what proportion of that overall business is taxable.
(e) As to how one determines whether the direct and immediate link is with a specific transaction or with the overall business, that is for the national court to decide looking at all the circumstances. The fact that the inputs are of a kind that appear to be consumed by an out of scope transaction does not always mean that they are directly and immediately linked to that transaction.
(f) Generally speaking, the acquisition, holding and sale of shares is not an economic activity.
(g) But where the holder of the shares carries on the economic activity of providing management services to the subsidiary for remuneration, the transaction relating to the shares can be regarded as a permanent and necessary extension of that economic activity and hence is economic activity.”
Here we are not concerned with, as in (g), a transaction in shares. However, more generally, as was noted by Bacon J and Judge Cannan in HMRC v Tower Resources PLC [2021] UKUT 123 (TCC); [2021] STC 1095 (“Tower Resources”) at [72]:
“In Polysar Investments Netherlands BV v Inspecteur der Invoerrechten en Accijnzen [2021] STC 1095 the CJEU confirmed at para 13 that the mere acquisition of financial holdings in other undertakings does not constitute an economic activity, but went on to note at para 14 that ‘It is otherwise where the holding is accompanied by direct or indirect involvement in the management of the companies in which the holding has been acquired …’ That set the foundation for the ruling in Floridienne SA v Belgian State (Case C-142/99) EU:C:2000:623, [2000] STC 1044, [2000] ECR I-9567 at paras 18–19 that direct or indirect involvement in the management of subsidiaries must be regarded as an economic activity where that entails carrying out transactions that are subject to VAT, such as the supply of administrative, accounting and IT services to the subsidiaries.”
It is necessary both that the supplies are made in the course of economic activity that they are for consideration.
Regarding consideration, as Bacon J and Judge Cannan noted in HMRC v Tower Resources PLC [2021] UKUT 123 (TCC); [2021] STC 1095 (“Tower Resources”) at [52]:
“It is well established that, for the purposes of art 2(1) PVD, there must be a direct link between the service supplied and the consideration received: Lebara Ltd v HMRC (Case C-520/10) EU:C:2012:264, [2012] STC 1536, para 27. This direct link may be broken if there is no more than a ‘vague intention to levy an unspecified charge, at some undefined time in the future’ by way of consideration for services supplied by a parent company to its subsidiaries: Norseman Gold plc v Revenue and Customs Comrs [2016] UKUT 69 (TCC), [2016] STC 1276 [(“Norseman Gold”)] at [94] and [119]–[121].”
Regarding supplies being made in the course of economic activity, Bacon J and Judge Cannan said in HMRC v Tower Resources:
“the existence of a supply for consideration does not give rise to a presumption that the supply constitutes an economic activity. Rather, it is necessary to examine the objective circumstances in which the goods or services are supplied: Wakefield College v HMRC [2018] EWCA Civ 952, [2018] STC 1170, at [53] and [55].
[68] The overarching test has been expressed in different ways in the case-law. Picking up on the language of art 9(1) PVD (and its predecessors), some cases refer to the question of whether the supply is made for the purposes of obtaining income on a continuing basis: see eg Wakefield at [54]. As the CJEU explained in Landesanstalt für Landwirtschaft v Götz (Case C-408/06) EU:C:2007:789, [2007] ECR I-11295, para 18, a different way of putting the same point is to ask whether the activity ‘is permanent and is carried out in return for remuneration which is received by the person carrying out the activity’. That formulation has been applied in various subsequent judgments of the CJEU, including Commission of the European Communities v Finland (Case C-246/08) EU:C:2009:671, [2009] ECR I-10605, para 37, MVM Magyar Villamos Mŭvek Zrt v Nemzeti Adó- és Vámhivatal Fellebbviteli Igazgatóság (Case C-28/16) EU:C:2017:7, [2017] STC 452, para 25 and Marle Participations SARL v Ministre de l’Économie et des Finances (Case C-320/17) EU:C:2018:537, [2018] STC 1904, para 22.
[69] However the test is expressed, what is important is that there is not a checklist of factors that must be considered in each case; rather, it is for the court to assess the relevant facts of each case: Wakefield at [59].”
Best judgment assessment
VATA 1994 requires a “best judgment” assessment: s. 73(1) VATA 1994.
There is a two-stage process to be followed in considering a VAT assessment raised by HMRC in cases such as this. First, it must be established whether the assessment was made “to the best of their judgment”. The burden lies on the taxpayer to establish that it was not. If that hurdle is passed, the burden then lies on the taxpayer to demonstrate that the assessment raised by HMRC is excessive. In Van Boeckel v Customs and Excise Commissioners [1981] STC 290, 292-3 Woolf J (as he then was) said, in respect of the precursor provision in s 31(1) of Finance Act 1972:
“the very use of the word ‘judgment’ makes it clear that the commissioners are required to exercise their powers in such a way that they make a value judgment on the material which is before them. Clearly they must perform that function honestly and bona fide. It would be a misuse of that power if the commissioners were to decide on a figure which they knew was, or thought was, in excess of the amount which could possibly be payable, and then to leave it to the taxpayer to seek, on appeal, to reduce that assessment.
Secondly, clearly there must be some material before the commissioners on which they can base their judgment. If there is no material at all it would be impossible to form a judgment as to what tax is due.
Thirdly, it should be recognised, particularly bearing in mind the primary obligation, to which I have made reference, of the taxpayer to make a return himself, that the commissioners should not be required to do the work of the taxpayer in order to form a conclusion as to the amount of tax which, to the best of their judgment, is due. In the very nature of things frequently the relevant information will be readily available to the taxpayer, but it will be very difficult for the commissioners to obtain that information without carrying out exhaustive investigations. In my view, the use of the words ‘best of their judgment’ does not envisage the burden being placed on the commissioners of carrying out exhaustive investigations. What the words ‘best of their judgment’ envisage, in my view, is that the commissioners will fairly consider all material placed before them and, on that material, come to a decision which is one which is reasonable and not arbitrary as to the amount of tax which is due. As long as there is some material on which the commissioners can reasonably act then they are not required to carry out investigations which may or may not result in further material being placed before them.”
In C A McCourtie v Customs and Excise Commissioners [1992] Lexis Citation 802 Dr A N Brice, sitting as a judge of the VAT Tribunal, noted that:
“In addition to the conclusions drawn by Woolf J in Van Boeckel earlier tribunal decisions identified three further propositions of relevance in determining whether an assessment is reasonable. These are, first that the facts should be objectively gathered and intelligently interpreted; secondly, that the calculations should be arithmetically sound; and, finally, that any sampling technique should be representative and free from bias.”
In Rahman (trading as Khayam Restaurant) v Customs & Excise Commissioners (No 2) [2002] EWCA Civ 1881; [2003] STC 150, Chadwick LJ gave the following guidance:
“The approach which tribunals should adopt on appeals under s 83(p) of the 1994 Act
[42] In the final paragraph of his judgment in Rahman (No 1) [1998] STC 826 at 840 Carnwath J drew attention to the dangers of ‘an over-rigid adherence to the two-stage approach’. He said:
‘I do not wish to diminish in any way from the importance of guidance given by Woolf J [in the Van Boeckel case] to Customs officers as to how to exercise their best judgment when making assessments. However, when the matter comes to the tribunal, it will be rare that the assessment can justifiably be rejected altogether on the ground of a failure to follow that guidance. The principal concern of the tribunal should be to ensure that the amount of the assessment is fair, taking account not only the commissioners’ judgment but any points raised before them by the appellant.’
I respectfully agree with those observations.
[43] It is inherent in the structure of the legislation that a taxpayer can challenge, on an appeal under s 83(p) of the 1994 Act, both the fact that an assessment under s 73(1) of the 1994 Act has been made and the amount of that assessment. There will be cases where the power to make an assessment ought not to have been exercised; because the pre-conditions to the exercise of the power (failure to make returns; failure to keep documents or afford facilities for verification; incomplete or inaccurate returns) were not satisfied. I suspect that those cases will be rare; but the tribunal can address them if and when they arise. There will also be cases where it is apparent on the face of the material before the tribunal that the power to assess has not been exercised in accordance with the ‘best judgment’ requirement; for example, where the commissioners have not taken into account information which was made available to them by the taxpayer before the assessment was made, or can put forward no basis upon which the assessment can be supported. Again, I suspect that those cases will be rare.
[44] In the usual case the tribunal will have the material before it from which it can see why the commissioners made the assessment which they did; and may have further material which was not available to the commissioners when the assessment was made. In such cases, as it seems to me, a tribunal would be well advised to concentrate on the question ‘what amount of tax is properly due from the taxpayer?’ taking the material before it as a whole and applying its own judgment. If that leads to the conclusion that the amount of tax properly due is close to the amount of the assessment, the tribunal may well take the view that it would be a sterile exercise to consider whether the commissioners exercised best judgment in making their assessment. The tribunal has power ‘on an appeal against a decision with respect to any of the matters mentioned in section 83(p) [of the 1994 Act]’ to give a direction specifying the correct amount of the tax due; and where such a direction is given the assessment has effect as an assessment of the amount specified in the direction (see s 84(5) of the 1994 Act).
[45] It is in cases where the amount of tax found by the tribunal to be properly due is substantially different from the amount assessed by the commissioners that the tribunal may think it appropriate to investigate why there is that difference; and to seek an explanation. That investigation may—but, often (as in the present case) will not—lead to the conclusion that the commissioners did not exercise best judgment in making their assessment. The tribunal may take the view, in such cases, that the proper course is to discharge the assessment. But even in cases of that nature, as it seems to me, the tribunal could choose to give a direction specifying the correct amount—with the consequence that the assessment would have effect pursuant to s 84(5) of the 1994 Act. It could not be criticised for doing so. The underlying purpose of the legislative provisions is to ensure that the taxable person accounts for the correct amount of tax.”
In Pegasus Birds Ltd v Customs and Excise Commissioners [2004] EWCA Civ 1015; [2004] STC 1509 both Carnwath LJ (at [22]) and Chadwick LJ (at [84]) emphasised that a best judgment would be made where the officer made an “honest and genuine attempt” to make a reasoned assessment. Even in cases where there was no best judgment, the Court of Appeal suggested (at [23]-[28] and [90]) that it was open to the Tribunal not to discharge the assessment but to specify the correct amount, as Chadwick LJ also suggests in the passage quoted above. Carnwath LJ noted (at [29]) that:
“Even if the process of assessment is found defective in some respect applying the Rahman (2) test, the question remains whether the defect is so serious or fundamental that justice requires the whole assessment to be set aside, or whether justice can be done simply by correcting the amount to what the tribunal finds to be a fair figure on the evidence before it. In the latter case, the tribunal is not required to treat the assessment as a nullity, but should amend it accordingly.”
Carnwath LJ also noted (at [38]) that any allegation of dishonesty or other wrongdoing against those acting for the Commissioners should be stated unequivocally and that the allegation and the basis for it should be fully particularised.
Chadwick LJ accepted, at [75], that an assessment made on behalf of the Commissioners by an officer who had, consciously or unconsciously, ‘closed his mind’ to any material which did not fit his case, would not be an assessment of an amount due to the best of their judgment.
In Karoulla (trading as Brockley’s Rock) v HMRC [2018] UKUT 255 (TCC) Judges Herrington and Scott cited with approval the summary of “best judgment” by Judge Scott in Fio’s Cash and Carry Ltd v HMRC [2017] UKFTT 346 (TC) where he said:
“14. In considering an appeal against an assessment under section 73(1), the approach to be adopted was set out in two Court of Appeal decisions, Rahman and Pegasus Birds. The law was more recently summarised by the Upper Tribunal in Mithras (Wine Bars) Limited v HMRC [2010] UKUT 115(TCC).
15. The first stage is for the tribunal to consider whether, at the time such an assessment was made, it was made to the best judgment of the Commissioners. At this stage, the tribunal’s jurisdiction is akin to a supervisory judicial review jurisdiction. As stated by Chadwick LJ (as he then was) in Rahman (at [32]):
‘In such cases...the relevant question is whether the mistake is consistent with an honest and genuine attempt to make a reasoned assessment of the VAT payable, or is of such a nature that it compels the conclusion that no officer seeking to exercise best judgment could have made it. Or there may be no explanation; in which case, the proper inference may be that the assessment was indeed arbitrary’.
16. Chadwick LJ observed (at [43]) that instances of a failure to exercise best judgment would be rare. As he stated at [36]:
‘...But the fact that a different methodology would, or might, have led to a different—even to a more accurate—result does not compel the conclusion that the methodology that was adopted was so obviously flawed that it could and should have had no place in an exercise in best judgment.’
17. Where the tribunal is satisfied that the Commissioners have used their best judgment in making the assessment, the second stage for the tribunal is to consider whether the amount assessed is correct. As Mithras makes clear, in relation to this second stage the tribunal has a full appellate jurisdiction. It can therefore consider all available evidence, including material not available to HMRC at the time when the assessment was made, in substituting its own judgment as to the correct amount of the assessment.
18. The courts have emphasised that in most appeals against a best judgment assessment the tribunal’s focus should be on determining the correct amount of VAT. As Carnwath LJ stated in Pegasus Birds (at [38]):
‘The tribunal should remember that its primary task is to find the correct amount of tax, so far as possible on the material properly available to it, the burden resting on the taxpayer. In all but very exceptional cases, that should be the focus of the hearing, and the tribunal should not allow it to be diverted into an attack on the Commissioners’ exercise of judgment at the time of the assessment.’”
Hearing
I heard from:
Officer Babita Hargun;
Ms Chane Greenslade, a former employee of VOG
Miss Sabrina Choudhury, an employee of S&W.
As Ms Greenslade was unwell on the first day it was agreed by the parties, and the Tribunal, that Officer Hargun would give her evidence first.
With the agreement of both parties, I permitted supplementary questions to be asked in chief of the witnesses. A witness statement should ordinarily be capable of standing as the witness’s evidence in chief. However, I accepted that, in this appeal, limited supplementary questions were useful in clarifying factual matters and in assisting the Tribunal to determine the correct amount of tax properly due. That approach is consistent with the venerable principle that the object of the appeal process is to ensure, so far as possible, that the correct amount of tax is collected.
I permitted supplementary questions because both parties consented and because I was satisfied that the questions would assist the fair disposal of the appeal. However, parties should not assume that such supplementation will ordinarily be permitted. Witness statements should be prepared so that they are complete, clear and capable of standing as the witness’s evidence in chief.
I found each of them to be a straightforward witness. They answered questions directly and appeared to be doing their best to assist the Tribunal. I accept that their evidence was honestly given. However, a number of the relevant events occurred several years before the hearing. It is unsurprising that there were limits to what the witnesses could now recall. I have therefore assessed their oral evidence in the light of the contemporaneous documents and have placed particular weight on the documents where there is any uncertainty of recollection.
During Officer Hargun’s evidence it became clear that she had brought notes into the witness box. I am satisfied that this arose from a genuine misunderstanding. I do not find that there was any attempt to mislead the Tribunal or to give evidence other than from her own recollection. The point arose early in her evidence and was dealt with at that stage. I therefore do not consider that it materially undermines the reliability of her evidence. It is, however, a matter which may identify a need for further training or clearer guidance for officers giving evidence in Tribunal proceedings.
Arguments of the parties
VOG’s case
VOG submits that the assessments should be discharged because they were not made to best judgment and, in any event, substantially overstate the amount of input tax which was irrecoverable. VOG’s primary case is that it was, throughout the relevant period, a fully taxable business. It made supplies of management and administrative services to Gaz du Cameroun outside the scope of UK VAT but with a right to recover input tax. VOG says HMRC accepts that such supplies were made, and that this distinguishes the present case from cases in which a holding company has been unable to demonstrate any taxable economic activity.
VOG argues that HMRC’s assessment methodology was fundamentally flawed because HMRC failed first to carry out a direct attribution exercise. VOG says that direct attribution is required before any residual apportionment or partial exemption calculation is undertaken. It submits that HMRC instead applied a blanket percentage reduction based on staff time, without properly considering whether particular items of input tax were directly and immediately linked to taxable supplies made to GdC. VOG contends that this produced an artificial result which treated dormant or largely inactive subsidiaries as if they required the same level of management resource as GdC, the group’s only substantial trading and revenue-generating business during the relevant period.
VOG’s alternative case is that, even if it was not entitled to recover all input tax as a fully taxable business, most of the disputed input tax was directly attributable to supplies made to GdC. In particular, VOG relies on the legal costs relating to the RSM arbitration, the Fotso dispute, insurance and well-related disputes, and other litigation connected with GdC’s business and the Logbaba project. VOG says those costs were incurred in connection with the income-producing activities of GdC, were intended to be recharged to GdC, and formed part of the cost base of the management and administrative services supplied by VOG to GdC. The fact that administration or the outcome of litigation affected the timing of recharges does not, VOG submits, break the direct and immediate link.
VOG also submits that input tax relating to the Kermerkol litigation is recoverable. It says that Kermerkol had previously been a producing asset, that the subsequent litigation arose because production was frustrated by events outside VOG’s control, and that the costs either related to intended taxable activity or were recharged to Therium, the litigation funder. VOG further relies on the later sale of rights connected with the litigation as supporting the conclusion that the expenditure was connected with taxable or recoverable economic activity.
Finally, VOG submits that HMRC’s approach was inconsistent with earlier HMRC checks in which repayment claims had been released despite substantial input tax being claimed on legal fees. VOG says that, had HMRC properly considered the documents provided and applied direct attribution, the assessments would have been reduced to, at most, a small amount of residual overhead VAT. VOG maintains that even that residual VAT was recoverable because its business was wholly taxable.
HMRC’s case
HMRC submits that the appeal should be dismissed. HMRC accepts that VOG made supplies of management services to Gaz du Cameroun and Gaz du Cameroun SARL (“GdC”), and that input tax properly attributable to those supplies is recoverable. However, HMRC says that VOG has not shown that it made, or intended to make, taxable supplies for consideration to its other subsidiaries during the relevant periods.
HMRC’s case is that VOG’s intention to charge subsidiaries other than GdC was conditional, speculative and unenforceable. HMRC says that charges were only contemplated if those subsidiaries became productive and commercially successful. There was no service agreement fixing the nature or value of the alleged services, no invoices to those subsidiaries, and no evidence of any enforceable obligation to pay. HMRC therefore submits that there was no legal relationship involving reciprocal performance and no direct link between any services said to have been provided and any consideration received or receivable.
HMRC relies on the distinction between a holding company which merely holds shares and one which is involved in management activities for remuneration. It submits that, in relation to subsidiaries other than GdC, VOG was not carrying on an economic activity. Any activity in relation to those subsidiaries was not carried out for consideration and did not amount to taxable supplies, or supplies outside the United Kingdom which would have been taxable if made here. On that basis, HMRC says the related input tax was non-business or was not attributable to taxable supplies.
HMRC also disputes VOG’s contention that the disputed input tax can be recovered by direct attribution. HMRC says that VOG did not provide sufficient evidence to trace particular costs directly to supplies made to GdC. In relation to the Therium litigation funding arrangements, HMRC submits that the agreement showed Therium funding litigation costs incurred by VOG, not VOG making supplies to Therium. Accordingly, HMRC says there was no direct and immediate link between the input tax incurred on those costs and any taxable supply by VOG.
As to best judgment, HMRC submits that Officer Hargun made an honest and reasonable assessment on the information available. She accepted recovery where she considered supplies to GdC had been evidenced, but was unable to identify and trace costs directly to those supplies. HMRC says that she therefore reasonably adopted an apportionment methodology based on VOG’s own invoices and staff time information, and that the resulting assessments were not arbitrary, punitive or outside the range of best judgment.
HMRC further submits that earlier repayment checks did not amount to a final determination of VOG’s VAT position and did not prevent HMRC from later assessing, including for period 07/19, once further information had been obtained during Officer Hargun’s enquiry.
Finding of Fact
Best Judgment
I turn to the question whether the assessments were made to the best of HMRC’s judgment.
I make the following findings of fact in relation to the assessment process.
On 28 March 2022 Officer Hargun began a pre-repayment credibility check into VOG’s VAT repayment claim for period 01/22. On 30 March 2022 she wrote to VOG requesting information to verify that claim. The request was directed to Ms Chane Greenslade, VOG’s finance manager.
On 19 April 2022 Ms Greenslade responded. She described VOG’s business activity as that of a head office for a corporate group, performing legal and statutory requirements required for Alternative Investment Market listed companies. Officer Hargun had queried why VOG had not reported sales on its VAT returns for the preceding four years. Ms Greenslade explained that revenue was generated by VOG’s wholly owned subsidiary, Gaz du Cameroun.
On 21 April 2022 Officer Hargun asked further questions. On 9 May 2022 Ms Greenslade replied that VOG was a parent company and was not itself a revenue-generating entity. She stated that VOG did not make taxable supplies and that it was funded by equity fundraising, loan notes, or distributions of free cash reserves from its producing asset in Cameroon, held by Gaz du Cameroun SA. She also stated that there was no service agreement between VOG and the group subsidiaries.
Ms Greenslade was VOG’s Financial Controller and was responsible, among other matters, for VAT returns and intercompany billing, but she was not a VAT specialist. I accept that her early statements to HMRC that VOG did not make taxable supplies were made in that context and were intended to convey that VOG did not charge UK VAT on its invoices to overseas group companies. They were nevertheless statements made by VOG’s finance officer in response to HMRC’s enquiries, and Officer Hargun was entitled to take them into account when deciding what further evidence was required.
On 11 May 2022 Officer Hargun wrote again, explaining that if VOG was not making taxable supplies it should not be registered for VAT.
A Teams meeting was requested by Ms Greenslade on 16 May 2022 and took place on 19 May 2022. The meeting was attended by Officer Hargun, Ms Greenslade and Mr Rob Collins, a director of VOG. At that meeting, VOG explained that its subsidiaries held oil and gas assets in the form of licences which they sought to explore, exploit and produce revenue from. The group’s activities started with Russian and Kazakhstan assets. However neither of these had produced revenue, in Kazakhstan due to a stolen licence which is the subject of litigation. At present 75% of directors’ time is spent on working on behalf of the Cameroon branch (although the corrections by Mr McCrindle suggested this was not in their capacity as directors of VOG, but as the subsidiaries’ directors). Also on 19 May 2022 Mr Collins sent Officer Hargun a diagram of the group’s corporate structure.
On 15 June 2022 Ms Greenslade informed HMRC that Mr Steve McCrindle of Haines Watts had been appointed to assist with the enquiry. On 29 June 2022 Mr McCrindle wrote to HMRC and advanced a different analysis from that previously provided by Ms Greenslade. He stated that input tax was recoverable because VOG made supplies outside the scope of UK VAT with a right to recover, and that VOG issued invoices for those supplies. He explained that the only revenue-generating group company at that time was Gaz du Cameroun SA, and that VOG made management and administration charges to it. He also stated that, when an asset reached the production stage, VOG made management and administration charges to the relevant group company. Significant parts of his letter state:
“There is only one revenue generating group company at present, Gaz du Cameroun SA and VOG makes management and administration charges to/invoices it.
VOG has incurred significant expenditure in litigating the stolen Kermerkol licence, owned by Victoria Energy Central Asia LLP (incorporated in Kazakhstan) and it is hoped that this licence will produce significant revenue when the litigation is completed.
VAT Analysis:
As mentioned above, VOG has a group of companies around the world that hold oil and gas assets at various stages of evolution. As is normal in the oil and gas industry, it financially supports all of these companies until they are productive. It is always intended that the companies/assets are productive, otherwise why would it buy and financially support them. It is therefore inherent in all it does that it intends to make supplies of management and administration services to all of its group companies. Such supplies will be taxable supplies when made to UK companies and outside the scope of UK VAT when made to non-UK companies. Sometimes these intended supplies will be frustrated, either, because the asset acquired is not as good as anticipated or through, for example, political instability – the Russian invasion of the Ukraine being currently in point.
Where a group company does become productive and so makes supplies, VOG issues invoices for management and administrative services. These happen to [be] outside the scope of UK VAT presently. That said, these supplies also carry the right to recover attaching input tax and are therefore, outside the scope of UK VAT with recovery (so called OSr supplies). VOG issues invoices for these supplies.” [my emphasis]
I find that this response was significant. It clarified that VOG did contend for input tax recovery on the basis of supplies outside the UK with a right to deduct. However, it also supported Officer Hargun’s understanding that management charges were made only once an asset or subsidiary had reached production. It did not provide evidence of contemporaneous charges to subsidiaries other than GdC, nor did it identify any enforceable agreement fixing what those other subsidiaries were obliged to pay, when, or by reference to what calculation. It did however suggest that services were being provided to the companies that were not, yet, productive.
On 30 June 2022 Officer Hargun asked for further information. That included all sales invoices issued in the relevant period, the agreements between VOG and each of the companies in the group, and an explanation of how VOG calculated taxable supplies to group companies. On 13 July 2022 she asked for further information, including bank statements evidencing payments received from group companies and an explanation of how VOG financed other subsidiaries within the corporate group.
Mr McCrindle initially responded on 12 July 2022, enclosing six sales invoices, the loan agreement between GdC and VOG and the following explanation of how the charge to GdC was calculated:
“These calculations are attached to the invoices at 1. above, as applicable. You will find an analysis of the GDC Logbaba invoice Dec21 the best/easiest for your purposes, as it includes both a direct and indirect calculations therein. The 90% recharge of IT to GDC Logbaba is calculated on the basis that VOG Plc has 4 employees in London and GDC have 40 employees that receive IT support by the NewCMI outsourced IT provider. GDC Matanda is charged locally by GDC Logbaba for any services, which are provided locally.”
On 26 July 2022 Mr McCrindle provided copies of finance and loan agreements and explained that VOG financed its activities through funds from trading and shareholder investment. Officer Hargun reviewed the loan agreements and bank statements. The bank statements showed a transfer of euros to Gaz du Cameroun. Her conclusion from the material provided was that VOG was making taxable supplies to Gaz du Cameroun, but that there was no sufficient evidence of supplies for consideration to the other subsidiaries.
On 29 July 2022 Officer Hargun wrote to Mr McCrindle setting out her understanding. She accepted that VOG made taxable supplies to Gaz du Cameroun. She did not accept that VOG made taxable supplies to the other subsidiaries. In support of that view she referred to Norseman Gold and to the absence of evidence that management services were supplied on terms giving rise to a direct link between the services and any consideration payable.
On the same date Mr McCrindle immediately responded:
“Input tax is recoverable that has a direct and immediate link to taxable supplies or intended taxable supplies. VOG Plc has demonstrated that it has intended taxable supplies in respect of the ‘active’ companies, some being frustrated by the stolen licence, which is being earnestly and heavily litigated some because, prior to revenue production, there is an ‘exploration/development’ stage all oil and gas businesses must go through.
Stating that VOG Plc can only recover input tax in connection with Gaz du Cameroun SA’s activities is analogous to saying that no business can recover VAT incurred as input tax on Research & Development activities or where trading is suspended whilst litigation takes place or indeed, where a business had everyone Furloughed during Covid lockdown.”
This again suggests that VOG was making supplies, albeit not for consideration, to subsidiaries in the group other than GdC.
On 1 August 2022 Officer Hargun again wrote to Mr McCrindle explaining her proposed restriction of input tax. Her reasoning was that there was no firm intention to charge the other subsidiaries because charging depended on the successful exploration of oil and gas by those subsidiaries. She considered that VOG had not charged those subsidiaries, had no firm intention to do so in the period in question, and had not shown a direct and immediate link between services supplied and consideration. She accepted that supplies had been made to GdC, but not to the other subsidiaries, which were not active.
Between 1 August 2022 and 30 January 2023 Officer Hargun chased Mr McCrindle regularly for a substantive response. When responses were received, the explanation was that he had not heard back from VOG. I accept Officer Hargun’s evidence that, by the end of January 2023, she had not received the further information she had requested and considered that she had to proceed on the material available to her.
On or about 31 January 2023 HMRC issued a letter explaining the proposed best judgment calculation (the letter is dated 31 January, but the covering email appears to have been sent on 30 January.) The letter stated that HMRC had not received evidence supporting VOG’s input tax claims for periods 01/19 to 10/22. It also stated that, because VOG was only making taxable supplies to GdC, input tax would be restricted to reflect that.
The calculation used by Officer Hargun was based on the information which VOG had provided, namely the “direct charges salaries and wages of affiliates” analyses attached to two sales invoices to GdC dated 31 December 2021. Those analyses set out staff time percentages for five employees. Officer Hargun added the percentages on the two analyses, producing totals of 235% and 469%, giving 704%. She divided that by 12 months, producing 58.66%, and then divided that figure by five employees, producing 11.73%, which she rounded up to 12%. She treated 12% as the average time spent by employees in the management and administration of GdC, which she had accepted as the only revenue-generating group company to which taxable management charges were made.
The schedule applied that 12% recovery rate to the input tax claimed in each period. The schedule included period 01/22, but no assessment for that period is before the Tribunal. The assessments now in issue comprise the assessment for period 01/19 and the later assessments for the other assessed periods, totalling £884,049.
On 20 February 2023 VOG went into administration.
On 29 June 2023 VOG requested a review. On 14 July 2023 further information was provided in support of that request. VOG argued that most of the VAT incurred attached to supplies to GdC, including legal fees which had not yet been recharged, and that administration had frustrated VOG’s intention to recharge those costs. Specifically, the letter stated:
“Gaz du Cameroun SA (BVI) and Gaz du Cameroun SA (Cameroon branch) is one legal person and additionally, one taxable person for UK VAT purposes.
The operating and concession agreements of the revenue generating Logbaba oilfield is all registered with the BVI – this is the ‘revenue generating group’.
The vast majority, circa 90% plus, of the purchase transactions which VOG Plc has claimed VAT on relates to costs incurred and charged to the Gaz du Cameroun SA (Cameroon branch). Per the quote above: “…this proportion of input tax that VOG is allowed to claim…”.
However, most of the rest of the purchase transactions on which VOG Plc has also claimed VAT on are costs incurred on legal fees charged to Gaz du Cameroun (BVI). This HMRC contends is not recoverable for the reasons set-out in the quote above. However, as mentioned, Gaz du Cameroun SA (BVI) and Gaz du Cameroun SA (Cameroon branch) is one legal person and additionally, one taxable person for UK VAT purposes. They are not separate subsidiaries. HMRC already accepts that VOG Plc has provided management and administrative services to Gaz du Cameroun SA and has charged Gaz du Cameroun SA for these services. This makes its supplies within the scope of VAT. It also means that the VAT incurred on these legal fees is fully-recoverable.
Regarding the quoted case of Norseman Gold, this is not in any way analogous with VOG Plc’s circumstances. Norseman is centred on management services provided to subsidiaries without charge, whereas HMRC already accept that VOG Plc makes supplies to Gaz du Cameroun SA and is entitled to recover VAT incurred attaching to these supplies.
I believe that HMRC has erred, or rather is confused, in believing that Gaz du Cameroun SA (BVI) is a different legal person (or subsidiary) to Gaz du Cameroun SA (Cameroon branch), but it is not.
While VOG Plc has other subsidiaries, it doesn’t incur many day to day costs relating to those, maybe the odd courier charge every few months. Additionally, management do not spend much time on these basically dormant entities.”
The last paragraph of the quoted passage again suggests that some costs are being incurred in relation to subsidiaries other than GdC and some time is being spent on those other subsidiaries.
On 29 September 2023 HMRC upheld the assessments in the review conclusion letter. That letter includes the following:
“The sales invoices itemise such things as IT billing, flights and courier costs but don’t itemise any of the supplies mentioned on the purchase invoices.
Officer Hargun has looked at the individual purchase invoices and cannot link any of the supplies received to any of the sales invoices. I consider that to be correct.
The further information provided on 14 July 2023, was considered by Officer Hargun and she considered that there was no new evidence and nothing to support the statements made. The legal fees mentioned were considered to be ‘significant expenditure in litigating the stolen Kermerkol licence, owned by Victoria Energy Central Asia LLP’ as mentioned in previous correspondence.
There has been no clear link demonstrated between the supplies received and the supplies made.”
There were then two ADR meetings, on 16 May 2024 and 4 July 2024. At the first ADR meeting Officer Hargun was told of litigation relating to GdC which, on her evidence, had not previously been clearly drawn to her attention. She was also told about the Kazakhstan/Kermerkol litigation and the role of Therium as litigation funder. She reviewed invoices to Therium which described reimbursement of pre-arbitration costs. Her conclusion was that the material did not evidence a supply by VOG to Therium, and that the funding agreement indicated that Therium was providing funding to VOG rather than receiving supplies from VOG. At the second ADR meeting no further new information was provided which changed her view.
Conclusion on best judgment
Turning to the question of best judgment, the question at this stage is not whether the assessment was necessarily the most accurate assessment that could now be made on all the evidence that is now before the Tribunal. The question is whether, at the time it was made, HMRC made an honest and genuine attempt to arrive at a reasoned assessment on the material then available.
I find that Officer Hargun did so. She had repeatedly requested information. She had been told initially that VOG did not make taxable supplies. She was later told, through VOG’s adviser, that VOG did make supplies outside the scope with a right to recover, but that the only revenue-generating group company at that time was GdC, to which management and administration charges were made. She was however told that supplies were made to other group companies – although this was backtracked on in later correspondence.
Officer Hargun had invoices and staff time analyses relating to GdC. She had not been provided with equivalent invoices, service agreements, payment evidence or other material showing comparable taxable management charges to the other subsidiaries. No explanation had been given as to how such a small proportion of employees’ time was apparently spent on GdC work but almost all the input tax related to GdC. Nor had she been provided with sufficient information, before assessment, to enable her to identify and trace particular costs directly to taxable supplies to GdC. Indeed, before the ADR meeting the only litigation she was aware of was the stolen licence, that would not appear to relate to GdC.
In those circumstances Officer Hargun was entitled to accept that VOG made taxable supplies to GdC and to allow a proportion of input tax by reference to the best evidence she had of staff time spent on GdC. She was also entitled to reject full recovery where VOG had not demonstrated that the balance of the input tax was attributable to taxable supplies, or to supplies outside the United Kingdom which would have been taxable if made here. The 12% figure was derived from VOG’s own documents. It was not invented, punitive, or arbitrary. It was rounded in VOG’s favour.
I do not accept that the failure to carry out a fuller direct attribution exercise before assessment means that the assessments were not made to best judgment. Officer Hargun could only attribute directly where she had adequate evidence to do so. The material available to her did not permit the direct attribution exercise for which VOG now contends. HMRC was not required to undertake an exhaustive reconstruction of VOG’s position or to do the evidential work which VOG had not done. The assessment may necessarily have involved approximation, but that is inherent in an assessment made to best judgment in circumstances where the taxpayer has not provided adequate supporting material.
The later provision of further explanation at ADR and before the Tribunal does not demonstrate that the original assessments were not made to best judgment. Later material may be relevant to the Tribunal’s separate task of determining the correct amount of tax properly due. It does not of itself show that Officer Hargun acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, or other than in good faith when she made the assessments on the material before her.
I specifically note that the itemisation of the claimed input VAT that VOG relied on before the Tribunal was set out in an email of 11 September 2024. The information in that email was therefore provided after both the assessment and the internal review.
For those reasons, I find that the assessments were made to the best of HMRC’s judgment. They were based on material before Officer Hargun, namely VOG’s own invoices and staff time analyses. Officer Hargun fairly considered the material provided, sought further information over a sustained period, accepted recovery where she considered taxable supplies to GdC had been evidenced, and adopted a rational apportionment methodology in the absence of better evidence. The assessments were therefore not invalid for want of best judgment.
Direct and immediate link
Having found that the assessments were made to best judgment, it remains necessary to consider the separate question whether the assessments are excessive. At this stage the Tribunal is not confined to the information available to Officer Hargun when the assessments were made. The Tribunal must consider the evidence as a whole and determine, so far as possible, the amount of input tax properly recoverable.
The starting point is that HMRC accepts that VOG made supplies of management and administration services to GdC. Those supplies were made to an entity outside the United Kingdom. If made in the United Kingdom, they would have been taxable supplies. They were therefore supplies outside the scope of UK VAT with a right to recovery under section 26(2)(b) VATA 1994.
We heard in evidence from Ms Greenslade how VOG was remunerated by GdC for those services. Essentially, the charge comprised three components:
costs directly attributable to GdC’s operations in Cameroon but paid for by VOG;
an indirect parent company overhead (“Indirect PCO”) calculated based on a sliding scale percentage of the total sum of the operating costs and capital expenditure of the Logbaba Project in Cameroon. This PCO was a compensatory charge billed to GDC to offset head office costs including rent, rates, and other professional and administrative department costs; and
a direct parent company overhead (“Direct PCO”), which was essentially a monthly management fee, calculated by reference to each VOG employee’s wage and the amount of time they spent in any month directly in relation to GdC.
These costs were paid through GdC incurring indebtedness under an inter-company loan account. Under the terms of that loan the debt was due on demand.
A table itemising the VAT reclaimed in the periods 01/19 to 01/23 appears in the hearing bundle. That table is not a schedule of the assessments under appeal. In particular, it includes input tax claimed in periods 01/22, 07/22 and 01/23, none of which is before the Tribunal. The table nevertheless formed the basis of VOG’s evidential case as to the nature of the expenditure. It contains the following descriptions and aggregate amounts:
Cost recharged to GDC £196,431
Cost charged to Therium litigation fund £47,658
Corporate head office cost £354,856
PCO & Management fees charges to GDC
Legal - Corporate £86,615
Legal - Georges Fotso £95,137
Legal - MCBL £3,065
Legal - RRLP £675
Legal - RSM UNCITRAL £288,608
Legal - RSM vs GDC 2016 £104,452
Legal - Weatherford arbitration £1,181
Legal - Well dispute £7,584
The amounts in that table cannot be treated as the amounts presently in dispute within each category. They include periods which are not before the Tribunal and are amounts of input tax claimed before application of the 12% recovery allowed by HMRC. The table is therefore relevant to the character of the expenditure, but it does not enable the Tribunal to calculate directly any monetary reduction that may be required to the Assessments.
Ms Greenslade compiled this information from sources including VAT returns and recharges sent to GdC. She could not recall when she had compiled the figures. She also emphasised that she was neither a lawyer nor a director of the company, so was not fully informed regarding the nature of all the litigation.
Ms Greenslade gave in evidence the following descriptions of these costs, in summary, adopting her numbering:
These were costs directly re-charged to GdC;
This was litigation on the Kermerkol (Kazakhstan) litigation. The invoices should have been invoiced to Therium. But Addleshaw Goddard LLP had invoiced VOG. VOG paid, reclaimed the input VAT and then invoiced Therium. Subsequent invoices were made directly to Therium. The litigation concerned the stolen Kermerkol licence, owned by Victoria Energy Central Asia LLP (incorporated in Kazakhstan). The litigation funder is a company named Therium (based in Jersey).
These were head office costs such as rates, IT and telephones and general overheads.
These are legal costs relating to the head office in London.
Georges Fotso was a consultant and legal advisor at GdC who had a commission arrangement and there was a dispute about this arrangement. The litigation was essentially about his pay.
Mansion Central Brokers worked on an insurance claim relating to Well 108, a GdC well where there was a blow up/explosion.
Radio Resources is a company owned by Jim Ford. Mr Ford was also a former director of GdC who “signed himself” a favourable royalty agreement between GdC and Radio Resources. The litigation concerned that royalty agreement.
RSM is an operating partner of GdC with regard to the Logbaba Project. VOG owns 57%, RSM owns 38% and the government owns 5%. RSM are highly litigious and the relationship with GdC is highly fractious. The dispute concerns GdC, since RSM does not have any relations with any other subsidiaries.
This is a similar dispute to (8).
Weatherford were a secured creditor during the drilling of the Logbaba Project. The dispute relates to this but Ms Greenslade could not recall the details.
This concerns an insurance claim regarding a well dispute with GdC. Ms Greenslade could not recall the details.
All the legal costs that related to GdC were initially paid by VOG, and then eventually recharged by way of invoice to GdC, with payment being made through an increase of liability in the inter-company loan account. Although the payment to the lawyers was made immediately the recharging was often postponed until the legal matter had concluded. This was because if a claim was successful then the losing party would sometimes be liable for the costs and so there would be no need to on-charge them.
Dealing with these items in turn:
Conclusion on direct and immediate link
Where a direct and immediate link has been shown
The costs falling within category (1), namely those costs which were paid by VOG and subsequently recharged to GdC, have the requisite direct and immediate link with VOG's taxable economic activity. The evidence showed that these expenses were incurred specifically in connection with the management, administration and operation of GdC's business in Cameroon. They formed part of the costs which VOG passed on to GdC under the charging arrangements described by Ms Greenslade and were therefore cost components of the services which VOG supplied to GdC for consideration. They were not general shareholder expenses incurred merely by reason of VOG's status as a holding company. Rather, they were costs incurred in order to provide remunerated management and administrative services to GdC. Applying the principles summarised in Hotel La Tour, the immediate link is therefore with the supplies made by VOG to GdC rather than with VOG's shareholding in that company. The related input tax is accordingly recoverable.
I am also satisfied that the litigation and dispute-resolution costs falling within categories (5) to (11) have the requisite direct and immediate link with VOG's supplies of management and administration services to GdC. The evidence establishes that they were incurred in relation to matters affecting GdC's business and assets, including disputes concerning contractual rights, royalty arrangements, insurance claims, well operations and the conduct of business partners and consultants involved in the Logbaba project. The management and oversight of those disputes formed part of the services which VOG provided to GdC in its role as management service provider.
I accept Ms Greenslade's evidence that legal costs of this nature were initially paid by VOG and then recharged to GdC through the existing charging arrangements, ordinarily by way of entries to the inter-company loan account once the outcome of the dispute was known. The fact that the recharge was sometimes delayed pending resolution of the underlying proceedings does not alter the character of the expenditure. The costs were incurred for the purpose of managing and protecting GdC's business and were treated by VOG as costs ultimately borne by GdC. In economic terms they formed part of the cost base of the management and administration services supplied by VOG to GdC.
Looking at the objective character of the transactions, these legal expenses were not incurred merely because VOG was the shareholder of GdC. Nor were they costs of holding investments as such. They were incurred in the course of VOG's remunerated activity of providing management and administrative services to GdC and were cost components of those supplies. I therefore conclude that the direct and immediate link is with VOG's supplies to GdC rather than with its shareholding in that company. The input tax relating to categories (5) to (11) is accordingly recoverable.
Where a direct and immediate link has not been shown
I reach a different conclusion in relation to category (2), which concerns costs described as charged to the Therium litigation fund. On Ms Greenslade’s evidence, those costs related to the Kermerkol litigation concerning the Kazakhstan licence owned by Victoria Energy Central Asia LLP. They were not costs incurred in relation to GdC’s business, the Logbaba project, or the management and administration services supplied by VOG to GdC. They therefore cannot be brought within the same analysis as the GdC litigation costs in categories (5) to (11).
Nor am I satisfied that the subsequent invoicing to Therium establishes a taxable supply by VOG to Therium. The Tribunal was provided with an incomplete copy of the Litigation Funding Agreement, from which entire pages had been omitted. It was Miss Choudhury’s evidence that this redaction was deliberate. As HMRC was a creditor of VOG, the administrators considered it improper to provide HMRC with more information than was provided to other creditors.
The terms of the Litigation Funding Agreement before the Tribunal require Therium to fund the litigation. The material before the Tribunal does not establish any reciprocal obligation on VOG to make a supply to Therium. There is no documentary evidence that VOG has supplied anything to Therium.
VOG has not established that it made any supply to Therium, there is no direct and immediate link between the VAT incurred and supplies made by VOG.
At the hearing Ms Choudhury gave evidence that VOG’s claim in the Kermerkol litigation had been sold as part of the liquidation. However, there was no suggestion that VOG contemplated selling the claim when the payment to Addleshaw Goddard was made. Accordingly there is no direct and immediate link between that payment and the subsequent sale.
Whilst VOG’s skeleton argument suggests (at [55]) that VOG had previously made supplies to Kermerkol, there is no evidence to support that it had made any taxable supplies. Indeed, the evidence of Ms Greenslade was that no management charges had been made to any other subsidiaries and that she was unsure what the position would be if other subsidiaries became productive.
I also do not accept that categories (3) and (4) are recoverable in full due to a direct and immediate link. Category (3) is described as “corporate head office cost” and category (4) as “legal - corporate”. On Ms Greenslade’s evidence, the head office costs included matters such as rates, IT, telephones and general overheads, while the corporate legal costs related to the London head office. Those descriptions do not demonstrate that the costs were incurred specifically for the purpose of making supplies to GdC. They are, on their face, general corporate costs of VOG.
I accept that some part of VOG’s head office function was used in making management and administration supplies to GdC. That is why HMRC accepted that VOG made taxable supplies to GdC and allowed input tax recovery by reference to a proportion of staff time. However, the evidence does not establish that all of VOG’s head office and corporate legal expenditure was a cost component of those supplies. VOG remained the parent company of a wider corporate group. It had corporate obligations, holding company functions, and responsibilities connected with subsidiaries and assets other than GdC. The fact that GdC was the only revenue-generating subsidiary does not prove that all corporate expenditure was incurred for the purpose of supplies to GdC.
I therefore find that categories (3) and (4) are not directly and immediately linked in full to VOG’s taxable economic activity. They are general overheads of the business as a whole. VOG has not discharged the burden of showing that the input tax on those categories is recoverable in full.
In the absence of evidence supporting a more reliable attribution of these general costs, VOG has not discharged the burden of showing that the proportion allowed by HMRC is insufficient. The allowance already made in respect of categories (3) and (4) will therefore remain undisturbed. The only argument that VOG has made is that the input tax is recoverable in full because it only made taxable supplies: however I reject that for the reasons given in the following section.
Did VOG only make taxable supplies and, as such, is it entitled to recover all input tax
I accept Ms Greenslade’s evidence that, during the relevant period, GdC was the group’s only revenue-generating asset. However, it does not follow that supplies were only being made to GdC and therefore the whole of the overall business was taxable.
In evidence Ms Greenslade admitted that there were courier costs relating to certain of the other subsidiaries.
We also know that VOG paid for certain parts of the Kermerkol litigation relating to a subsidiary other than GdC.
I also accept the submissions of HMRC that getting the other subsidiaries to the point of production and maintaining their assets would have required time and resources of VOG. The corporate structure diagram shows an extensive network of such other subsidiaries. Indeed, this is somewhat implicit in the breakdown of time which was used by HMRC for their apportionment calculation.
For these other services there was no consideration received, and no remuneration or expectation thereof. Ms Greenslade’s evidence was clear that she did not know whether any charge would be made if the other subsidiaries had ever made a profit. No taxable management services were provided to these other subsidiaries. This was not economic activity.
It follows that VOG is not entitled to recover all its input tax on the basis that the whole of the overall business was taxable. VOG is therefore entitled to deduct residual input tax only to the extent that the expenditure is attributable to its taxable economic activity. VOG has not provided evidence from which the Tribunal could determine that a greater proportion of those residual costs was attributable to its taxable economic activity.
Conclusion
The appeal is allowed in part, to the extent that VOG is allowed to recover amounts allowed in paragraphs [82] to [85] above.
This is a decision in principle for the reason given at [77]. If the parties are unable to agree the consequential figures after the release of this decision, either party may apply to the Tribunal for determination of the amount by which the Assessments are to be reduced. Any such application must identify the matters remaining in dispute and be accompanied by a period-by-period calculation and a bundle containing all relevant invoices, which must be cross-referred to in the period-by-period calculation.
Right to apply for permission to appeal
This document contains full findings of fact and reasons for the decision. Any party dissatisfied with this decision has a right to apply for permission to appeal against it pursuant to Rule 39 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Tax Chamber) Rules 2009. The application must be received by this Tribunal not later than 56 days after this decision is sent to that party. The parties are referred to “Guidance to accompany a Decision from the First-tier Tribunal (Tax Chamber)” which accompanies and forms part of this decision notice.
Release date:
26 August 2026