Parwinder Gill v The Commissioners for HMRC

On 26 August 2022, HM Revenue & Customs (“HMRC”) issued Mr Gill with a Personal Liability Notice (“PLN”) of £1,825,818.08 for VAT periods 01/15 to 06/19 inclusive, on the basis that deliberate inaccuracies in VAT returns made by PS Gill Construction Ltd (“PSGCL”) were attributable to Mr Gill as an officer of that company.

That decision was upheld on statutory review, and on 2 December 2022, Mr Monk of TM Sterling Ltd (“TMS”), on behalf of Mr Gill, filed a Notice of Appeal with the Tribunal.

In accordance with Rule 11 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Tax Chamber) Rules 2009 (“the Tribunal Rules”), the Tribunal and HMRC therefore communicated only with TMS (and not with Mr Gill) and sent that firm multiple letters and emails. However, between 7 March 2023 and 13 January 2024, TMS did not respond to any of those many communications.

On 22 November 2023, Judge Bailey issued an “Unless Order”, directing that Mr Gill’s appeal be struck out unless by 6 December 2023, he complied with the direction to file witness evidence. No response was received and the appeal was struck out on 7 December 2023. In February 2024, HMRC wrote to Mr Gill saying he was now required to pay the £1,825,818.08. Mr Gill was “shocked” as he had not heard anything from TMS and had assumed the hearing had been delayed by a post-Covid backlog at the Tribunal.

On 13 February 2024, TMS filed a reinstatement application which relied on Mr Gill’s medical conditions. No evidence was filed about the reasons why TMS had failed to inform Mr Gill of the Tribunal’s directions, including the Unless Order.

Mr Monk of TMS attended the hearing to represent Mr Gill, but Mr Gill himself did not attend. Ms Goldring, who represented HMRC, rightly raised the question as to whether TMS were conflicted. I considered whether to adjourn the hearing to allow Mr Gill the opportunity to instruct new advisers, but for the reasons set out at §90 below, decided not to do so.

In deciding his application, I considered the relevant case law, in particular Martland v HMRC [2018] UKUT 0178 (TCC) (“Martland”), Katib v HMRC [2019] UKUT 189 (TCC) (“Katib”), and Uddin v HMRC [2023] UKUT 99 (TCC) (“Uddin”), In Katib, the Upper Tribunal (“UT”) held that “failures by a litigant’s adviser should generally be treated as failures by the litigant”. In Uddin, the UT held that:

“Why the adviser failed and how they led their client to continue to rely on them is not relevant to the Martland analysis, unless the client can show that they did whatever a reasonable taxpayer in that situation would have done (which would generally be to make sufficient efforts to keep tabs on the adviser and make sure that matters were on track).”

The Tribunal warned of the strike out on 6 October 2023; the Unless Order followed on 22 November 2023, and the appeal was struck out on 7 December 2023. On 2 October 2023, Mr Gill had been hospitalised with end-stage renal failure and in the same month, his wife was seriously injured in a car accident. In December 2023, Mr Gill was diagnosed with heart failure.

In my judgment, during the period from 6 October to 7 December 2023, the reasonable taxpayer in Mr Gill’s position would not be keeping tabs on his adviser to make sure the appeal was on track, as the UT put it in Uddin. He would be focused entirely on his life-threatening medical conditions and his wife’s health following the car accident. This was therefore a case where the failings of the adviser should not be laid at the door of the litigant. Having applied the case law and considered all relevant circumstances, I allow the reinstatement application.

The Tribunal was provided with a main bundle of 183 pages and a supplementary bundle of 69 pages. HMRC filed witness evidence from Officer Jacqueline King and Officer Kate Trigg. Both worked within HMRC’s Targeted Enforcement Recovery Unit (“TERU”) which was responsible for collecting Mr Gill’s debt. Officer Trigg gave evidence about her communications with Mr Gill’s daughter, Jagjeet (“Ms Gill”) after the appeal was made. Officer King gave evidence about her communications with Mr Gill and Ms Gill after the appeal was struck out. By an email dated 2 June 2025, Mr Monk informed the Tribunal and HMRC that none of the evidence within those witness statements was challenged and it is therefore accepted.

Despite the Tribunal’s direction that the parties were to file witness evidence by 25 April 2024, no witness evidence was filed on behalf of Mr Gill. The hearing was then listed and postponed twice for the reasons explained later in this Decision. On 13 March 2025, when allowing the second postponement application, Judge Poole issued directions which included the following (emboldening in original):

“The Appellant is advised that the Tribunal will at the hearing require detailed evidence of the reasons for the Appellant’s failures to comply with the Tribunal’s directions which led to his appeal being struck out in the first place. A written account of those reasons, signed by the Appellant and delivered to both the Tribunal and HMRC at least 3 weeks before the hearing date, would assist his case greatly. If the Appellant also relies on the evidence of others (for example his representative), including any further medical evidence, all such evidence should be delivered to the Tribunal and HMRC by the same time.”

On 18 June 2025 the hearing was relisted for 8 July 2025. On 23 June 2025, HMRC emailed Mr Monk and copied the Tribunal, referring to the hearing date and then saying (again, emboldening in original):

“We also refer to Direction 5 of the Tribunal’s directions dated 13 March 2025, which provided the Appellant with an opportunity to submit a written account of reasons explaining the failure to comply with previous Tribunal directions. The Tribunal noted that such an account ‘would assist his case greatly’. This written account was to be provided at least 3 weeks before the hearing. To date, we have not received this account.

We therefore invite the Appellant to provide both us and the Tribunal with the written account by close of business on Wednesday, 25 June 2025, to allow us sufficient time to consider and, if necessary, respond to it in our Skeleton Argument.

For completeness, we also note that Direction 5 required the Appellant to serve any evidence on which he intends to rely - including further medical evidence or evidence from his representative - at least 3 weeks before the hearing. As no such evidence has been served, we proceed on the basis that the Appellant does not intend to rely on any further evidence.”

On 25 June 2025, Mr Monk filed and served Mr Gill’s “account of reasons” which was in terms his witness statement. No documentary evidence was attached, either in relation to his medical conditions or his relationship with TMS.

As noted above, Judge Poole had directed that “if the Appellant also relies on the evidence of others (for example his representative)”, that evidence was to be filed and served at least three weeks before the hearing. Mr Monk did not provide a witness statement explaining what had happened (or not happened) between filing the Notice of Appeal and the reinstatement application, and no related documentary evidence was provided.

The reinstatement application and TMS’s skeleton argument (filed and served a week before the hearing) contained various assertions about the role played by Mr Monk/TMS. As Ms Goldring pointed out, and as Mr Monk accepted, those assertions were not evidence, and some were inconsistent with the evidence which was before the Tribunal. I return to this issue at §§70ff.

In her skeleton argument, also filed and served a week before the hearing, Ms Goldring set out some of the evidential issues which would be raised in her cross-examination of Mr Gill, and then stated, in bold “The Respondents require Mr Gill to attend to give evidence regarding the account recently provided on 25 June 2025”. As explained below, see §81ff, Mr Gill did not attend the hearing.

Ms Goldring asked the Tribunal to place no weight on his witness statement, except to the extent that it was supported by documentary evidence. I agree that as a result of Mr Gill’s failure to attend, HMRC were unable to cross-examine him on key aspects of his evidence. I also agree that it would be unfair to place weight on the aspects of the evidence in his witness statement which Ms Goldring had put in issue, except to the extent that it was corroborated by other documentary or witness evidence. Ms Goldring asked in the alternative that I draw an adverse inference from Mr Gill’s failure to attend, but it was not necessary for me do so.

On 1 July 2025, Mr Monk emailed HMRC to say that Mr Gill wished to file witness evidence from Ms Gill, and asked that HMRC not object to that evidence being provided late. HMRC replied by return, saying they were unable to provide a substantive response without seeing the witness statement. No such statement was ever filed or served.

At the hearing, Mr Monk said that, having reviewed Ms Gill’s witness statement, it simply echoed that given by Mr Gill and he had decided not to seek the Tribunal’s permission to admit it late.

On the basis of the evidence before the Tribunal, I make the findings of fact set out below. I make further findings later in this decision; where I do so, they are identified as such.

Mr Gill was and remains the sole shareholder of PSGSL. That company operated as a subcontractor providing labour to various contractors and was registered with the Construction Industry Scheme (“CIS”). In the period between 01/15 and 06/19, tax of £5,903,646.39 was deducted and paid over to HMRC under the CIS by contractors in respect of supplies from PSGCL.

HMRC compared the grossed-up sales figure (based on the CIS returns) with PSGSL’s VAT returns, and decided the company had underdeclared its supplies for VAT purposes. On 16 February 2022, HMRC issued PSGSL with a VAT assessment of £3,477,749 for periods 01/15 to 06/19. On 1 June 2022, Weightmans, a leading law firm, wrote to HMRC on behalf of Mr Gill requesting detailed particulars and supporting documentation to enable Mr Gill to respond.

On 26 August 2022, HMRC issued PSGCL with a penalty under FA 2007, Sch 24 para 1 of £1,825,818.08 for the same VAT periods. On the same day, HMRC issued Mr Gill with a PLN of the same amount under FA 2007, Sch 24 para 19 on the basis that the deliberate inaccuracies in the VAT returns were attributable to Mr Gill as an officer of PSGCL. The decision was upheld on statutory review, and on 2 December 2022, a Notice of Appeal was filed with the Tribunal against the PLN. The Notice of Appeal said that the representative was

“Nathaniel Monk

T M Sterling Ltd.”

The grounds of appeal were that Mr Gill had not acted deliberately, and in particular:

“HMRC’s ‘Penalty Explanation’ letter, dated 22nd July 2022, offers very little insight in support of its assertion that the purported loss of tax was brought about as a result of deliberate behaviour – and certainly not to the extent required to discharge the burden of proof…”

Meanwhile, in September 2022 Mr Gill was diagnosed with anxiety and depression. He also suffered from Type 2 diabetes and in 2015 had a transient ischemic attack. In October 2022, he was diagnosed with autistic spectrum disorder.

On 17 January 2023, Mr Gill filed his 2021-22 SA return which stated that he was working on a self-employed basis for (a) Gravesend Construction with turnover of £52,519, and (b) for St Lewis Design, with turnover of £14,000. Mr Gill later confirmed to Officer King that he had been working as a consultant to both companies. His SA return contains boxes which ask for details of an agent; these were left blank, and I make the reasonable inference that Mr Gill did not use an agent when completing the return.

During February 2023, Mr Gill’s mother passed away; she had lived with Mr Gill for 62 yearsand he was “utterly devastated” by her death.

On 10 February 2023, Ms Sharron Hobbs of HMRC’s Solicitor’s Office emailed the Tribunal and TMS to notify them that she was acting for HMRC in relation to Mr Gill’s appeal.

On 17 February 2023, Mr Gill provided HMRC with authority to communicate with Ms Gill on “all matters”. On 1 March 2023, Ms Gill called Officer Trigg to confirm that Mr Gill had made an appeal to the Tribunal; she explained that Mr Gill’s mother had died; asked for any hearing to be adjourned in consequence and also asked about the possibility of a payment plan were he to lose the appeal.

As at the date of that call, Officer Trigg had not been informed about the appeal, and on 7 March 2023, she emailed Ms Gill, asking her to provide the Tribunal reference number and any related information. Ms Gill contacted Mr Monk, who provided her with the reference number and he also said:

“HMRC currently has 60 days from 4th February 2023 to provide its Statement of Case and we will be sure to inform you as soon as we receive this. I look forward to speaking with you in due course.”

On 8 March 2023, Ms Gill forwarded that information to Officer Trigg. On 4 April 2023, HMRC filed their Statement of Case with the Tribunal, and copied TMS. Ms Hobbs then tried to contact TMS by phone to discuss draft directions, but received no response. On 6 April 2023 she sent TMS an email in which she stated that she had tried to contact the firm by phone but it had not been answered. She then continued:

“As a starting point I propose that we agree to dispense with the requirement to serve a List of Documents [“LoDs”], and that by no later than 5 July 2023 the Respondents shall serve all witness evidence. I look forward to hearing from you soon regarding the above proposal, and liaising with you to see if we can agree further directions.”

There was no response from TMS. On 25 April 2023, Ms Hobbs emailed again, saying:

“I have tried over a few weeks to contact you by telephone, email and voicemail, to see if we can agree directions in this case, but there has been no response. I have drafted the attached proposed directions. Please let me know your views on the proposed directions. If I have not heard from you by 5pm on Friday 26th April 2023, I will apply to the Tribunal by email (and copy you in), and invite them to make the attached directions. I look forward to hearing from you shortly.”

There was again no response from TMS. On 28 April 2023, Ms Hobbs applied to the Tribunal to dispense with the standard direction for LoDs, saying that she had contacted TMS “for their views regarding the application, but no response has been received from them”, and copying TMS.

On 6 June 2023, the Tribunal agreed to dispense with the LoDs, and issued directions for the appeal to proceed to a hearing. These directions included the following:

TMS did not copy those directions to Mr Gill. On 3 August 2023, Mr George Azzopardi of HMRC’s Solicitor’s Office emailed TMS inviting that firm to register with HMRC’s Secure Data Exchange Service (“SDES”). No reply was received. Mr Azzopardi followed up with a second email on 16 August 2023, saying that TMS needed to register with the SDES before it could be used to serve HMRC’s witness evidence.

In the days leading up to 18 August 2023, Ms Hobbs tried again to contact TMS by phone to discuss amending HMRC’s Statement of Case, but the phone was not answered, and the voicemail message said that it was not possible to leave messages.

On 18 August 2023, HMRC applied to the Tribunal to amend their Statement of Case, and on the same day, filed and served their witness evidence in compliance with the Tribunal’s directions. TMS was copied on the application and the witness evidence.

TMS were due to file and serve witness evidence on behalf of Mr Gill by 15 September 2023, but no witness evidence was filed or served. On 29 September 2023, Ms Hobbs emailed the Tribunal, copying TMS, saying:

“The Respondents complied with direction 1 regarding ‘Respondents Witness Statements’ on 18 August 2023.

The Appellant has not complied with direction 2 regarding ‘Appellant’s Witness Statements’, which was due to be complied with by 15 September 2023.

As a result of the Appellant’s non-compliance with direction 2, the Respondents are not currently in a position to comply with direction 3 regarding ‘Listing Information’ which was due to be complied with today, 29 September 2023.

The Appellant’s Representative has not responded to previous correspondence sent to them by the Respondents regarding proposed applications and service of the Respondents’ evidence.

The Respondents await further directions from the Tribunal.”

On 6 October 2023, the Tribunal sent a letter addressed to Mr Monk at TMS, which said (my emphasis):

“The Tribunal refers to the Directions sent on 6 June 2023, a copy of which is enclosed.

The Tribunal does not appear to have received notice that your witness statement(s) were served in compliance with Direction 2, which were due on 15 September 2023.

It is important that each party to an appeal discloses in advance to the other party the evidence of the witnesses on which they rely, so that both parties can properly prepare for the hearing. If, therefore, you do not comply within 14 days with the direction to provide statements by your witnesses, a Judge may issue a direction which may lead to the striking out of the appeal on the basis that your failure to disclose the evidence on which you rely is unfair to the other party.

Please remember that where an appellant intends to rely on his or her own evidence, a witness statement by the appellant must still be provided.

You should now immediately provide your witness statement(s) (with an application for the witness statements to be admitted out of time) or tell the Tribunal (if correct) that you are not calling any witnesses to give evidence.”

Meanwhile, on 2 October 2023, four days before that chaser letter was sent to TMS, Mr Gill was taken to hospital by emergency ambulance and diagnosed with end stage renal failure and Covid. On 6 October 2023, he was discharged to his home with antibiotics.

On 19 October 2023, Mr Gill was readmitted to hospital, where a scan confirmed chronic kidney disease and he was given dialysis. He was discharged on 24 October 2023 with a requirement to receive dialysis three times a week.

During October, Mrs Gill and Ms Gill visited Mr Gill in hospital, and on the way home their car was in a collision with a speeding vehicle and Mrs Gill was seriously hurt.

On 16 November 2023, Ms Hobbs emailed the Tribunal, copying TMS, to say that there had still been no compliance by the Appellant with the direction to file witness statements. On 22 November 2023, Judge Bailey issued an “Unless Order” which was sent to TMS and copied to HMRC. It read (emphasis in original):

“The Appellant having failed to comply with the Directions issued on 6 June 2023 to provide his witness statements by the due dates or at all and having failed to reply to the letter from the Tribunal dated 6 October 2023 within the times stipulated therein or at all the Tribunal DIRECTS that:

UNLESS the Appellant no later than 5pm on 06 December 2023

1.

confirms in writing to the Tribunal an intention to proceed with the appeal, and

2.

complies with the Directions issued on 6 June 2023 to provide his witness statements and, at the same time, makes an application to be permitted to comply out of time,

then these proceedings WILL be STRUCK OUT without further reference to the parties.”

TMS did not copy the Unless Order, or the warning letter of 6 October 2023, to Mr Gill.

In December 2023, Mr Gill was diagnosed with heart failure and was reviewed by a cardiologist. At or around this time, his dialysis was increased to four times a week.

There was no compliance with the Unless Order, and in accordance with its terms, Mr Gill’s appeal was automatically struck out on 7 December 2023.

On 5 January 2024, Mr Gill filed his SA tax return for the year 2022-23. This declared self-employment income of £48,365 from “various cash jobs”. As in the previous year, the boxes which asked for details of an agent were left blank, and I make the reasonable inference that he did not use an agent when completing this return.

On 8 January 2024, the Tribunal wrote to Mr Monk at TMS informing him that the appeal had been struck out. The text of the letter says:

“You do not appear to have complied with the Directions (copy enclosed) and therefore, in accordance with these Directions, and rule 8(1) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Tax Chamber) Rules 2009, this appeal was automatically struck out on the day after the date specified in these directions.

You have the right to apply for the proceedings to be reinstated but such an application must be made in writing and received by the Tribunal within 28 days from the date of this letter. Such an application should be supported by reasons, including an explanation of why the direction was not complied with.”

TMS did not inform Mr Gill of the strike out. On 7 February 2024, Officer King wrote to Mr Gill, saying that as his appeal had been struck out, he was now required to pay HMRC £1,825,818.08, being the amount of the PLN.

That letter arrived on Saturday 10 February 2024. Mr Gill tried repeatedly to contact TMS but could not get a response. He called Officer King three times on Monday morning (during a dialysis session) and finally got through at 9.10am. He told Officer King that he had paid TMS a lump sum “at the beginning” followed by weekly payments which came to an end in August 2023, and that he had not heard from TMS since then. Mr Gill said he had no assets and would be unable to pay the PLN, and would face bankruptcy. He called Officer King again at 9.37am to say he had called TMS “100 times and has not been able to contact them”.

At 10.46am the same day, Ms Gill emailed Officer Trigg, saying:

“We received a letter dated 7th February requesting payment be made immediately. On the letter it stated the appeal had been struck out because directions of 6/6/2023 and 22/11/2023 had not been complied with. However
we were quite shocked seeing this letter as we had not received anything and nothing from those dates. We were still waiting for the appeal date? Also we have tried to contact TM Sterling and unfortunately we have not been able to get through to them. We are not sure if the letters were sent to them but normally my dad does receive copies of everything? We would be very grateful if you could kindly call me on [number] at your earliest convenience, please. As we really did want the chance for an independent review and chance to appeal.”

The following day at 13.04 Mr Gill and Ms Gill called Officer King to say they had spoken to TMS and would be lodging a reinstatement application. Ms Gill said that “there had been a breakdown in communication” with TMS and as they had not heard from that firm, they had assumed that “due to Covid there was a backlog” in arranging the hearing. On the same day, 13 February 2024, TMS submitted the reinstatement application.

On 20 March 2023, HMRC objected to the reinstatement of Mr Gill’s appeal. On 28 March 2024, the Tribunal issued directions for the hearing of the reinstatement application. Direction 1(3) was that, by 25 April 2024, “both parties shall send or deliver to the other party and the Tribunal the witness statement of any person on whose evidence that party intends to rely upon at the hearing of this appeal”. HMRC filed the witness statements of Officers Trigg and King in compliance with that direction. No evidence was filed on behalf of Mr Gill.

On 26 June 2024, the hearing of Mr Gill’s reinstatement application was listed to take place on 23 July 2024; TMS were directed to complete and return a Video Hearings form to allow the Tribunal Service to arrange the video hearing. TMS did not respond, and on 11 July 2024, the Tribunal sent a chaser letter.

On 19 July 2024, TMS applied for the hearing to be postponed for three months, on the basis that it had not been possible to take instructions from Mr Gill. TMS said that the instructions were required:

“so that we may fully understand matters pertaining to the original breakdown in communication which lead to us being unable to fulfil our initial instruction – the underlying case to which this reinstatement application relates. This is, in our view, a matter which is of significant importance to the strength of Mr Gill’s reinstatement application.”

TMS went on to say that Mr Gill “had recently been admitted into intensive care” and attached a letter from his GP saying that Mr Gill “does not feel well enough to attend on the grounds of his poor physical and mental health”, and copies of hospital notes about the admission. HMRC did not object, and on 19 July 2023, Judge Blackwell postponed the hearing.

TMS did not update the Tribunal or HMRC at the end of the three month period, and on 13 November 2024, Ms Hobbs emailed the Tribunal, copying TMS, asking for “clarity as to the status of the case”.

On 29 November 2024, the Tribunal wrote to the parties requiring the provision of dates to avoid within two weeks, following which the hearing was relisted for 17 March 2025. On 17 February 2025, TMS emailed Ms Hobbs and Mr Azzopardi saying that Mr Gill was too unwell to attend the hearing, and asking whether HMRC would object to a further postponement.

On 4 March 2024, Ms Hobbs responded, raising a number of issues, including the age of the underlying appeal; the failure to comply with the directions and the lack of any information about a date by which a hearing might take place. She also asked that TMS provide an up-to-date letter from the GP saying whether Mr Gill would be able to attend a hearing at all, and as to any adjustments which might be required if the hearing was listed to be heard by video.

An hour after that email was sent, Mr Monk applied for the second postponement, copying HMRC and asking for a three month stay in proceedings. He said he was currently in contact with Mr Gill’s family in order to obtain the GP letter requested by HMRC; that this “may take several days to obtain” and he would “of course make this available to the Tribunal and HMRC as soon as possible”.

The Tribunal asked HMRC for their view on this second postponement application, and HMRC said they did not object, providing that the up-to-date GP letter was provided together with information about Mr Gill’s current state of health; his prognosis, and the basis for the three-month period of the stay.

On 13 March 2025, Judge Poole postponed the hearing and issued Directions, which were preceded by the following text:

“I note that HMRC provided a response to the Application on 7 March 2025, which I have considered. On my instructions, the Tribunal staff telephoned the Appellant’s representative to enquire about the additional medical evidence referred to at the end of the Application, and spoke to him on 10 March but were informed that no further evidence could yet be provided as
he had not yet been able to speak to the Appellant’s daughter. I am informed that nothing further has been heard by the Tribunal. I note that there has been a previous postponement at the Appellant’s request on medical grounds, which was not objected to by the Respondents. That hearing was supposed to take place in July 2024.

In view of the obviously serious and worsened nature of the Appellant’s medical issues, however, and the fact that there is clearly an acute episode occurring at present, I am prepared to allow the Application, but he should realise that it is extremely unlikely that any further postponements will be granted unless any application is supported by written medical evidence.”

The Directions required the parties to provide dates to avoid and also included the following text. This was set out earlier in this decision, but is repeated for ease of reference. The emboldening is in the original.

“The Appellant is advised that the Tribunal will at the hearing require detailed evidence of the reasons for the Appellant’s failures to comply with the Tribunal’s directions which led to his appeal being struck out in the first place.

A written account of those reasons, signed by the Appellant and delivered to both the Tribunal and HMRC at least 3 weeks before the hearing date, would assist his case greatly. If the Appellant also relies on the evidence of others (for example his representative), including any further medical evidence, all such evidence should be delivered to the Tribunal and HMRC by the same time.”

HMRC contacted TMS on three occasions asking whether TMS required Officers Trigg and King to attend the hearing, but TMS failed to respond; the firm also failed to provide dates to avoid. On 12 May 2025, HMRC asked the Tribunal to issue a direction requiring TMS to reply. The Tribunal wrote to Mr Monk on 22 May 2025, requiring a response within seven days. On 2 June 2025, TMS confirmed that there were no dates to avoid and they did not require HMRC’s witnesses to attend the hearing. On 18 June 2025, the hearing was relisted for 8 July 2025.

On 23 June 2025, HMRC emailed the Tribunal and Mr Monk; the email included the following paragraphs (again, emboldening in original):

“We also refer to Direction 5 of the Tribunal’s directions dated 13 March 2025, which provided the Appellant with an opportunity to submit a written account of reasons explaining the failure to comply with previous Tribunal directions. The Tribunal noted that such an account “would assist his case greatly.” This written account was to be provided at least 3 weeks before the hearing. To date, we have not received this account.

We therefore invite the Appellant to provide both us and the Tribunal with the written account by close of business on Wednesday, 25 June 2025, to allow us sufficient time to consider and, if necessary, respond to it in our Skeleton Argument.

For completeness, we also note that Direction 5 required the Appellant to serve any evidence on which he intends to rely—including further medical evidence or evidence from his representative—at least 3 weeks before the hearing. As no such evidence has been served, we proceed on the basis that the Appellant does not intend to rely on any further evidence.

We would welcome receipt of the written account by Wednesday, 25 June 2025. If we do not hear from the Appellant by that date, we will proceed to finalise and file our Skeleton Argument and hearing bundles accordingly.”

By an email timed at 23.22 on 25 June 2025, and, Mr Monk filed and served Mr Gills’ “written account”. Mr Monk said that the delay was due to Mr Gill having to attend hospital for dialysis treatment.

On 24 June and 27 June, HMRC contacted TMS about the hearing bundles, but received no response.

On 1 July 2025, in accordance with Judge Poole’s Directions, HMRC filed and served their skeleton argument, drafted by Ms Goldring. In relation to Mr Gill’s “written account” the skeleton says (emboldening in original):

“This comprised Mr Gill’s account of his medical issues and other events in his life. There was no evidence specific to the reasons for failing to comply with directions which led to the appeal being struck out in the first place. Further, no evidence was served to suggest the Appellant relied on the evidence of others, for his example his representative and no further independent medical evidence was served. The Respondents require Mr Gill to attend to give evidence regarding the account recently provided on 25 June 2025. By way of example, the Respondents wish to explore the inconsistencies noted as to the date instruction ceased. The Respondents note the general comment in (SB/67) that the personal and health issues meant that he “could not even think of dealing with any other matter” and wish to explore this in relation to the non-compliance in this case. The Respondents note that no further medical evidence has been served in accordance with direction 5 of 13 March 2025. See also the Respondents’ email 7 March 2025 requesting up to date medical evidence regarding fitness to attend. In In the absence of this, it is anticipated that Mr Gill intends to attend the hearing and can give evidence.”

Mr Monk served a skeleton argument on the same day, in compliance with the Directions. The submissions there set out as to the reasons for the failure relate entirely to Mr Gill’s medical conditions.

I find as a fact on the basis of the foregoing, that between 7 March 2023 and 13 January 2024 TMS did not respond to any correspondence, whether from HMRC or from the Tribunal, despite numerous communications having being sent to the firm during that period by both HMRC and the Tribunal.

Neither HMRC nor the Tribunal communicated with Mr Gill. That was because they were following Rule 11(4) of the Tribunal Rules. That Rule is headed “representatives” and so far as relevant reads:

“(1)

A party may appoint a representative (whether a legal representative or not) to represent that party in the proceedings.

(2)

…

(3)

Anything permitted or required to be done by a party under these Rules, a practice direction or a direction may be done by the representative of that party, except signing a witness statement.

(4)

A person who receives due notice of the appointment of a representative—

(a)

must provide to the representative any document which is required to be provided to the represented party, and need not provide that document to the represented party; and

(b)

may assume that the representative is and remains authorised as such until they receive written notification that this is not so from the representative or the represented party.”

I also find as facts that after the Notice of Appeal was filed with the Tribunal, Mr Monk/TMS did not:

The basis for TMS’s first postponement application was that the firm was seeking to “fully understand” the reasons for the “breakdown in communication” with Mr and Ms Gill; Mr Monk added that this was “a matter which is of significant importance to the strength of Mr Gill’s reinstatement application”. However, no subsequent application was made to file and serve witness evidence or documents relating to that issue, and there is no reference to it in TMS’s second postponement application.

When Judge Poole allowed that application, he also gave further time for a witness statement to be filed and served by TMS, see §63. That gave the firm the opportunity to explain the reasons for their failures to comply with the Tribunal’s directions and/or for their failure to inform the Tribunal that they were no longer representing Mr Gill (which would have meant that the Tribunal would communicate directly with him, so he would have been aware of the directions and the Unless Order). But no witness statement or related documents were filed.

The only evidence before me was the following:

On the basis of that evidence, I find as facts that:

As noted at §15, the reinstatement application and TMS’s skeleton argument contained various assertions about the role played by Mr Monk/TMS. As Mr Monk accepted at the hearing, that was not evidence.

However, for completeness I record that the reinstatement application said that after February 2023, TMS “received no communication from Mr Gill and representation in respect of the case ceased”, and that “this instruction ceased in March 2023”. However, the skeleton, said that:

“T M Sterling continued to hold authority to act and reasonably awaited contact – this encompassed a period after our original instruction ceased as a result of the absence of adequate instructions and associated funds.”

The skeleton is thus inconsistent with the reinstatement application, and with Mr Gill’s evidence that (a) he was in contact with the firm in August 2023, which was around two months after the directions had been issued, and (b) he had paid TMS all the money required by that firm, making a final payment in that month and (c) he had tried to contact TMS (which would not be the position if they were no longer instructed).

In addition, the statement that the instruction “ceased” is also inconsistent with:

HMRC had made it clear via Ms Goldring’s skeleton argument, filed seven days before the hearing, that they required Mr Gill to attend the hearing to be cross-examined on his “written account” which stood as his witness statement. However, when the hearing began at 10am, the only persons present were Mr Monk and a colleague from the same firm. Mr Monk said he had sent an email to the Tribunal explaining the reasons; a short adjournment was directed so that I and HMRC could locate that email.

It had been sent at 21.43 the day before the hearing, and included the following:

“I confirm that Mr Gill will not be attending tomorrow's hearing (8th of July).
Having further discussed Mr Gill's health with his daughter this evening, Mr Gill's health is such that he is simply unable to participate in the hearing.

Whilst I understand that the Tribunal may reasonably require medical evidence by way of a doctors' letter further outlining Mr Gill's current ill health, I am informed that this may take up to 2 weeks to obtain.

As all parties are aware, proceedings have already been postponed on the basis of Mr Gill's significant ill health - in part consisting of heart failure and end stage kidney failure. We no not believe that there will now be any significant improvement in Mr Gill's condition.

As such, and on the basis that Mr Gill recently provided a ‘written account’ as directed by the Tribunal, we do not propose to postpone matters any further and intend to proceed with the hearing in Mr Gill's absence.”

Mr Monk confirmed orally that no adjournment was being sought. Ms Goldring said that HMRC also considered it was in the interests of justice to continue with the hearing. However, as I explained to the parties, I had the following concerns:

Ms Goldring’s skeleton argument included the following sentence

“the Respondents note that TM Sterling are currently representing the Appellant which suggests that they do not consider there to be any conflict of interest.”

On the basis of the evidence before the Tribunal, and taking into account the failure of TMS to provide any witness or documentary evidence as to why they had not complied with the Tribunal’s directions, together with the fact that the appeal had been struck out because of that compliance failure, it was clearly possible that TMS were conflicted. As a result, I directed a short adjournment and asked a Tribunal clerk to contact Ms Gill to confirm as a preliminary point whether she and her father had been aware of today’s hearing. The clerk spoke to Ms Gill and summarised the conversation in an email, which said:

“ Mr Gill had received the letter notifying him of the hearing.

 Mr Gill is too ill to attend; he has been advised by doctors to avoid stress due to a weak heart and is currently sleeping.

 They [Mr and Ms Gill] did advise the rep that he was too ill to attend.

 Originally the daughter did want to attend, but there was some confusion between them and the rep due to the bundles being issued and them thinking there was no need etc.

 If needed the daughter could attend.

 The daughter asked to be kept informed either way.”

When the hearing reconvened, I read that email to the parties. I said that one option would be to adjourn the hearing to allow Mr and Ms Gill to consider whether to instruct a different firm, and for the Tribunal at a subsequent hearing to consider any further submissions together with evidence about the relationship between TMS and Mr Gill during the relevant period. I gave Mr Monk and Ms Goldring time to consider that option, but on reconvening they both said that they would leave it for me to decide.

Rule 2(2) of the Tribunal Rules provides:

“Dealing with a case fairly and justly includes—

(a)

dealing with the case in ways which are proportionate to the importance of the case, the complexity of the issues, the anticipated costs and the resources of the parties;

(b)

avoiding unnecessary formality and seeking flexibility in the proceedings;

(c)

ensuring, so far as practicable, that the parties are able to participate fully in the proceedings;

(d)

using any special expertise of the Tribunal effectively; and

(e)

avoiding delay, so far as compatible with proper consideration of the issues.”

There is a tension in this case between:

Rule 2(2) does not set out the only factors a Tribunal must consider: it begins (my emphasis) “Dealing with a case fairly and justly includes”. One relevant extra factor here is whether Mr Gill was aware that his representative, TMS, may be conflicted.

Having considered those factors, I decided it was not in the interests of justice to adjourn the hearing, for the reasons set out below.

The appeal was struck out under Rule 8(1), which reads:

“The proceedings…will automatically be struck out if the appellant has failed to comply with a direction that stated that failure by a party to comply with the direction would lead to the striking out of the proceedings...”

Rule 8 then provides:

“(5)

If the proceedings…have been struck out under paragraphs (1)…the appellant may apply for the proceedings…to be reinstated.

(6)

An application under paragraph (5) must be made in writing and received by the Tribunal within 28 days after the date that the Tribunal sent notification of the striking out to the appellant.”

The Tribunal’s notice informing TMS on behalf of Mr Gill that the appeal had been struck out was dated 8 January 2024. The time limit for a reinstatement application was therefore 6 February 2024. The application was filed on 13 February 2024, so was a week late. However, Rule 5(3)(a) gives the Tribunal power to extend that time limit. TMS did not ask the Tribunal to use that power, but Ms Goldring said that HMRC were “neutral” about the issue.

Taking into account the short period of delay, and in particular that Mr Gill was unaware of the strike out until he received HMRC’s letter on Saturday 10 February 2024, I find that it is in the interests of justice to allow the reinstatement application to be made late.

I first explain the approach set out in the case law, and then apply that case law to the facts of Mr Gill’s application.

In Dominic Chappell v the Pensions Regulator [2019] UKUT 0209 (TCC) (“Chappell”) at [86] and [93], the UT held that in considering an application for reinstatement following striking out for failure to comply with an Unless Order, a tribunal should apply the approach set out in Martland, save that it should “generally take no account of the strength of the applicant’s case” unless that case was “unanswerable”, and should, in assessing the seriousness of the breach of an unless order, consider previous breaches of directions/rules that led to the making of the unless order, see [95]-[99] of that judgment.

In Martland at [37],the UT set out Rule 3.9 of the Civil Procedure Rules (“CPR”), which reads:

“(1)

On an application for relief from any sanction imposed for a failure to comply with any rule, practice direction or court order, the court will consider all the circumstances of the case, so as to enable it to deal justly with the application, including the need –

(a)

for litigation to be conducted efficiently and at proportionate cost; and

(b)

to enforce compliance with rules, practice directions and orders.”

The UT then considered Denton v TH White Limited [2014] EWCA Civ 906 (“Denton”) and BPP v HMRC [2017] UKSC 55 (“BPP”). The UT said:

“[40] In Denton, the Court…took the opportunity to ‘restate’ the principles applicable to such applications as follows (at [24]):

‘A judge should address an application for relief from sanctions in three stages. The first stage is to identify and assess the seriousness and significance of the “failure to comply with any rule, practice direction or court order” which engages rule 3.9(1). If the breach is neither serious nor significant, the court is unlikely to need to spend much time on the second and third stages. The second stage is to consider why the default occurred. The third stage is to evaluate “all the circumstances of the case, so as to enable [the court] to deal justly with the application including [factors (a) and (b)]”.’

[41] In respect of the ‘third stage’ identified above, the Court said (at [32]) that the two factors identified at (a) and (b) in Rule 3.9(1) ‘are of particular importance and should be given particular weight at the third stage when all the circumstances of the case are considered.’”

The UT noted at [42] that the Supreme Court in BPP had implicitly endorsed the approach in Denton, and also confirmed at [26] that “the cases on time-limits and sanctions in the CPR do not apply directly, but the Tribunals should generally follow a similar approach”. At [43]the UT said:

“The clear message emerging from the cases – particularised in Denton and similar cases and implicitly endorsed in BPP – is that in exercising judicial discretions generally, particular importance is to be given to the need for ‘litigation to be conducted efficiently and at proportionate cost’, and ‘to enforce compliance with rules, practice directions and orders’. We see no reason why the principles embodied in this message should not apply to applications to admit late appeals just as much as to applications for relief from sanctions, though of course this does not detract from the general injunction which continues to appear in CPR rule 3.9 to ‘consider all the circumstances of the case’.”

At [44] the UT set out the following three stage approach by way of guidance to this Tribunal:

The first stage is to establish the length of the delay and whether it is serious and/or significant.

The direction for the Appellant to file witness evidence required compliance by 15 September 2023. Despite the Tribunal’s warning letter and the Unless Order, there was no compliance and the appeal was struck out almost three months later, on 7 December 2023. I find that this was a serious delay, which persisted despite the issuance of the Unless Order.

In R (oao Hysaj) v SSHD [2015] 1 WLR 2472 at [51] the Court of Appeal said that “significant” was to be understood “in the sense of having an effect on the proceedings”, and continued at [54]:

“Of course, the applicant may in some cases be able to satisfy the court that the delay, although substantial, has not had any practical effect on the course of the proceedings, but the longer the delay, the less likely it is that he will be able to do so…One reason for limiting the time for filing a notice of appeal is to promote finality in litigation. Parties need to know where they stand. Delay of the kind that occurred in this case undermines that objective.”

Here, the proceedings could not continue until the Tribunal and HMRC had received Mr Gill’s witness evidence, or had been told that no witness evidence would be filed. That is because the extent and nature of witness evidence affects the length of the hearing, and because the availability of any witness has to be considered when the parties provided dates to avoid. The delay was thus significant as well as serious.

There were two possible reasons for the delay: Mr Gill’s health conditions and TMS’s failures to reply to the directions and other correspondence from the Tribunal.

There is no doubt that Mr Gill was seriously ill. Mr Monk submitted that this was the reason for the delay. However, I disagree. It is clear from Mr and Ms Gill’s communications with HMRC in January 2024 that they were unaware of the direction to provide a witness statement. In particular, had they been sent a copy of the Tribunal’s reminder letter of 6 October 2024 and/or a copy of the Unless Order, I am in no doubt that they would have instructed TMS to ask for an extension of time, given the state of Mr Gill’s health, and it is inconceivable that an extension would not have been granted.

Instead, the reason for the failure to comply was that TMS:

In other words, the reason why there was no compliance with the directions and the Unless Order was because Mr Gill had relied on TMS.

In Hytec Information Systems v Coventry City Council [1997] 1 WLR 666 (“Hytec”), the Court of Appeal considered a similar issue: whether a case should be struck out for breach of an “unless” order that was said to be the fault of the representative. Ward LJ, giving the leading judgment, said:

“Ordinarily this court should not distinguish between the litigant himself and his advisers. There are good reasons why the court should not: firstly, if anyone is to suffer for the failure of the solicitor it is better that it be the client than another party to the litigation; secondly, the disgruntled client may in appropriate cases have his remedies in damages or in respect of the wasted costs; thirdly, it seems to me that it would become a charter for the incompetent…were this court to allow almost impossible investigations in apportioning blame between solicitor and counsel on the one hand, or between themselves and their client on the other. The basis of the rule is that orders of the court must be observed and the court is entitled to expect that its officers and counsel who appear before it are more observant of that duty even than the litigant himself.”

In Katib,the UT applied the principles in Martland to a case where the appellant, Mr Katib had been deceived and misled by his adviser, a Mr Bridger. When that case was before the FTT, that Tribunal had found as a fact that Mr Bridger had given “extraordinary” advice, including that Mr Katib:

“should cease to be a man by making a declaration to that effect to enable Mr Bridger to communicate to the world that the Appellant was dead, that there was plenty of time to deal with an enforcement notice as the Bills of Exchange Act governed the counting of the time limit to do so.”

The FTT had also found that “Mr Bridger misled the Appellant as to what steps were being taken and needed to be taken to challenge the personal penalty notices”; told him that matters were in hand and there was no need to be concerned, and had also told Mr Katib that he had the expertise to deal with the issue, see [8] of the UT judgment.

However, the UT nevertheless held that reliance on Mr Bridger did not provide a good reason for the delay in Mr Katib’s appeal, saying at [49] (their emphasis):

“We accept HMRC’s general point that, in most cases, when the FTT is considering an application for permission to make a late appeal, failings by a litigant’s advisers should be regarded as failings of the litigant.”

The UT returned to the same issue at [54], saying:

“It is precisely because of the importance of complying with statutory time limits that, when considering applications for permission to make a late appeal, failures by a litigant’s adviser should generally be treated as failures by the litigant.”

The UT then cited the passage from Hytec set out above, and continued at [56] by concluding that the correct approach in Mr Katib’s case was:

“…to start with the general rule that the failure of Mr Bridger to advise Mr Katib of the deadlines for making appeals, or to submit timely appeals on Mr Katib’s behalf, is unlikely to amount to a ‘good reason’ for missing those deadlines when considering the second stage of the evaluation required by Martland.”

This was followed by the following comment at [58]:

“…the core of Mr Katib’s complaint is that Mr Bridger was incompetent, did not give proper advice, failed to appeal on time and told Mr Katib that matters were in hand when they were not. In other words, he did not do his job. That core complaint is, unfortunately, not as uncommon as it should be. It may be that the nature of the incompetence is rather more striking, if not spectacular, than one normally sees, but that makes no difference in these circumstances. It cannot be the case that a greater degree of adviser incompetence improves one’s chances of an appeal, either by enabling the client to distance himself from the activity or otherwise.”

In deciding that little weight be given to Mr Katib’s reliance on his adviser, the UT also took into account that Mr Katib should have noticed “warning signs”, including direct contact from HMRC in the form of enforcement action, which “should have alerted him”, and the UT concluded Mr Katib was “not without responsibility in this story”.

In the subsequent case of Uddin, the taxpayer alleged that he had been misled by his adviser. The UT stated at [30]:

“A client will always rely on their advisers, but their adviser’s failings are still laid at their door. Why the adviser failed and how they led their client to continue to rely on them is not relevant to the Martland analysis, unless the client can show that they did whatever a reasonable taxpayer in that situation would have done (which would generally be to make sufficient efforts to keep tabs on the adviser and make sure that matters were on track). Mr Uddin lost because he did not demonstrate more than a cursory interest in what was (not) going on, he had not done what a reasonable taxpayer in his position would be expected to do…”

It follows from this case law that the Tribunal should not normally find that a person’s reliance on his adviser provides a good reason for delay. Ms Goldring submitted that the facts of Mr Gill’s case did not take him outside that normal range, emphasising that:

I agree with Ms Goldring that the normal position is that the reasonable taxpayer will check with his adviser, and that Mr Gill did not do so. However, as the UT said in Uddin, I am required to consider what a reasonable taxpayer in Mr Gill’s position would have done.

The directions were issued on 6 June 2023; Mr Gill made contact with TMS in August, but was not told about the directions or provided with a copy. No further contact was then made. The question is thus whether the reasonable taxpayer in his position would have contacted TMS during the period from August 2023 to December 7 2023, when the appeal was struck out.

The first part of that period was from the date of Mr Gill’s contact in August to the date of his admission to hospital on 2 October. I was not provided with the date of Mr Gill’s contact with TMS: if it was at the end of August, the period was a month; if at the beginning, the period was two months. Either way, it was relatively short.

The key period was between 2 October 2023 and 7 December 2023. The Tribunal sent out the warning letter on 6 October 2023; the Unless Order followed on 22 November 2023, and the appeal was struck out on 7 December 2023.

Four days before that period began, Mr Gill had been admitted to hospital on an emergency basis and diagnosed with end stage renal failure and Covid; he was on dialysis initially three times a week, with this being increased to four times in December; in the same month, he was diagnosed with heart failure. In addition, Mrs Gill was seriously injured in a car accident during October.

Although Ms Goldring referred to the filing of the tax return on 5 January 2024 and the call with HMRC on 12 February 2024, both took place at least a month after the deadline for compliance with the Unless Order.

In my judgment, the reasonable taxpayer in Mr Gill’s position would not be keeping tabs on his adviser to make sure the appeal was on track, as the UT put it in Uddin. He would be focused entirely on his life-threatening health conditions and the consequences of his wife’s car accident.

I find that it was reasonable of Mr Gill not to contact TMS between August and 2 October (because the period was short), and it was also reasonable for him not to make contact between 2 October 2024 and 7 December 2023. This is thus is a case where the facts are distinguishable from those considered in Katib and Uddin.

The third stage in the Martland approach is to consider all the circumstances, and then to carry out a balancing exercise.

Significant weight must be placed as a matter of principle on the need for statutory time limits to be respected. This was described as “a matter of particular importance” in Katib;the same point is made in Martland at [46]. Here, the delay was almost three months. However, there was a good reason for the delay.

Parts of the UT’s judgment in Katib were set out earlier in this decision, including their finding at [56] that in the context of the second Martland stage, reliance on advisers is unlikely to amount to a “good reason” for missing the statutory deadlines. The UT continued in the same paragraph:

“…when considering the third stage of the evaluation required by Martland, we should recognise that exceptions to the general rule are possible and that, if Mr Katib was misled by his advisers, that is a relevant consideration.”

However, the UT went on to find that, for the same reasons as those relating to the second stage, the behaviour of Mr Katib’s adviser had no “real weight” at the third stage. In evaluating this factor in Mr Gill’s case, I find that it was reasonable for him to rely on TMS for the same reasons as set out at §119 to §126, and accord that factor considerable weight.

If Mr Gill’s reinstatement application does not succeed, the PLN will become final, and he will owe HMRC £1,825,818.08. He is also likely to face bankruptcy, as he told Officer King would be the position. Those are, however, the inevitable consequences of a person with few or no assets losing the opportunity to challenge an HMRC decision at the Tribunal, and I accord them little weight.

Mr Gill has serious physical health conditions and suffers from anxiety and depression. It is reasonable to assume that his health will worsen if the PLN becomes final as the result of losing this application. I accord that factor some weight.

If permission were to be given, HMRC would have to divert resource to prepare for the appeal and attend the hearing. Those are resources which could be used to ensure that other taxpayers were paying the correct amount of tax.

One of the factors on which the Tribunal must place particular weight is that litigation is to be conducted efficiently and at proportionate cost, see Martland at [44] cited above. The PLN relates to periods 01/15 to 06/19, already between ten and six years ago, so it is likely to be more time-consuming and difficult for HMRC to collate and review all the relevant evidence. However, the PLN itself was issued on 26 August 2022 and the Notice of Appeal was filed on 2 December 2022. The time and effort required by HMRC and the Tribunal Service will only be slightly greater than had there been compliance with the directions, so the weight to be ascribed to this factor is in consequence lower.

In Chappell,the UT held that in reinstatement applications, the Tribunal should “generally take no account of the strength of the applicant’s case” unless that case was “unanswerable”. This is a PLN, where the burden rests on HMRC; Mr Gill appealed on the basis that he had not acted deliberately, and Ms Goldring did not submit that HMRC’s case was “unanswerable”. I have thus not taken the merits into account in my assessment of the circumstances.

If Mr Gill’s application were to be allowed, the resulting appeal and related procedural issues will take the time of the Tribunal Service and the judiciary. That time would otherwise be spent on the appeals of other Tribunal users.

Once the circumstances have been identified, they must be balanced.

In doing so, I am required by Denton and Martland to place particular weight on the need (a) to enforce compliance with statutory time limits and (b) to conduct litigation efficiently and at proportionate cost. In relation to the former, Mr Gill failed to comply with the directions for three months and this was serious and significant; however, there was a good reason for that delay. In relation to the latter, reinstating the appeal will take HMRC’s time and that of the Tribunal Service, but little more than would have been required had the appeal not been struck out.

There is prejudice to Mr Gill if he loses this opportunity of appealing to the Tribunal because he will lose his chance of challenging the PLN; he is likely to face bankruptcy, and his health is likely to deteriorate further. There is some prejudice to HMRC and to appellants in other cases for the reasons set out above.

The factors in favour of allowing the application, in particular Mr Gill’s good reason for failing to comply, outweigh the factors on the other side of the scales. Permission to reinstate is therefore granted.

This document contains full findings of fact and reasons for the decision. Any party dissatisfied with this decision has a right to apply for permission to appeal against it pursuant to Rule 39 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Tax Chamber) Rules 2009. The application must be received by this Tribunal not later than 56 days after this decision is sent to that party. The parties are referred to "Guidance to accompany a Decision from the First-tier Tribunal (Tax Chamber)" which accompanies and forms part of this decision notice.