Case Number: TC09721
By remote video
Appeal reference: TC/2025/01355
STRIKE OUT – res judicata – whether appeal against personal liability notice was determined in the course of appeal by company against penalties – whether appeal against personal liability notice was in time
Judgment date: 11 December 2025
Before
TRIBUNAL JUDGE ALEKSANDER
Between
JEYALINGAM BALASINGAM
Appellant
and
THE COMMISSIONERS FOR HIS MAJESTY’S REVENUE AND CUSTOMS
Respondents
Representation:
For the Appellant: Manjeet S Buttar
For the Respondents: Thomas Brown, litigator of HM Revenue and Customs’ Solicitor’s Office
DECISION
Introduction
The form of the hearing was video using the Teams platform. A face to face hearing was not held because it was considered more expedient and cost effective to conduct the hearing remotely. Prior notice of the hearing had been published on the gov.uk website, with information about how representatives of the media or members of the public could apply to join the hearing remotely in order to observe the proceedings. As such, the hearing was held in public.
The documents to which I was referred were included in an electronic bundle of 506 pages. There were a number of documents to which Mr Buttar referred in the course of the hearing, but which were not included in the bundle. Mr Buttar had not asked HMRC to include these documents in the bundle, nor had he submitted a separate bundle to include these documents. As these documents were in hard copy form he was unable to share them on his screen – but he read them out. Mr Brown did not challenge the accuracy of these documents, and I am satisfied, and find, that he was accurate in reading out the content of these documents. In addition, I retrieved from the Tribunal’s archive a copy of the statement of case filed by HMRC in relation to the previous VAT appeal, which had not been included in the bundle. Unfortunately, it was not possible to share my screen with the parties during the hearing, so I was not able to share the text of this with the parties. However, I read extracts from the statement of case to the parties at the hearing.
The hearing was held to consider the application by HMRC that the appeal be struck out on the grounds that the issues arising in this appeal had been previously determined by this Tribunal, and the appellant is therefore barred from raising them again under the doctrine of res judicata. “Res judicata” is Latin for "a matter judged". This doctrine prevents a party from re-litigating any issue already litigated, ensuring the finality of judgments and protecting parties from multiple actions involving the same issues.
During the course of the hearing, it became apparent that there was also an issue as to whether this appeal had been notified to the Tribunal within the relevant time limit.
At the hearing, HMRC were represented by Mr Brown, and Mr Balasingham was represented by Mr Buttar. An interpreter also attended the hearing in order to translate for the benefit of Mr Balasingham.
Background facts
I find the background facts to be as follows.
Mr Balasinham initially started in business in the UK as a sole trader. He later incorporated his business as Sprowston Food and Wine Limited (“Sprowston”). HMRC opened enquiries into the business, both when undertaken by Mr Balasingham as a sole trader, and also when undertaken through Sprowston. Sprowston’s corporation tax liability was settled by agreement with HMRC. However, Mr Balasingham’s liability to income tax under self-assessment and penalties, and Sprowston’s liability to VAT and penalties were not settled by agreement, and went to appeal. HMRC issued Mr Balasingham with a personal liability notice in respect of the VAT penalties. It unfortunate that, for reasons that are not clear, the VAT appeal and the income tax appeal were heard separately by differently constituted tribunal panels.
The chronology of key events is as follows:
On 6 July 2021 Sprowston was assessed to VAT in the amount of £38,192.00 for the periods ended 09/13 to 06/18 inclusive.
On 13 August 2021 Sprowston was issued with a penalty assessment for deliberate inaccuracies in its VAT returns in the amount of £20,837.36. The notice included a statement setting out Sprowston’s rights to request a review or to appeal against the assessment to this Tribunal.
On 13 August 2021, Sprowston was issued with a letter informing it that Mr Balasingham was being issued with a notice making him personally liable to pay the penalty of £20,837.36 for deliberate inaccuracies attributable to him as a company officer.
On 6 September 2021, Mr Balasingham, the sole director of Sprowston, was issued with a penalty liability notice, making him personally liable to pay the penalty of £20,837.36 for deliberate inaccuracies attributable to him. The notice included a statement setting out Mr Balasingham’s rights to request a review or to appeal against the notice to this Tribunal. In the course of submissions, Mr Buttar referred to a personal liability notice having been issued to Mr Balasingham on 13 August 2021. This was not included in the hearing bundle, but it appears that the 6 September 2021 notice must have been a duplicate of the one issued on 13 August 2021.
On 1 September 2021, Mr Balasingham wrote to Officer Harvey (the assessing officer) seeking a review of HMRC’s decision to issue a personal liability notice. A copy of that letter was not included in the hearing bundle. However, it is not disputed that Officer Harvey’s reply dated 21 September 2021 included a statement that there is no right of appeal against a penalty liability notice, but that the taxpayer can seek a review of the underlying VAT assessment and penalties.
Mr Buttar was appointed to represent Sprowston and Mr Balasingham around October 2021 – and one of his first actions was to write to HMRC on 14 October 2021 informing them that he was appealing against all outstanding decisions. He did not file appeals (as regards VAT), nor did he notify appeals (as regards income tax or corporation tax) to the Tribunal.
On 8 March 2022, Mr Buttar wrote to HMRC to accept the offer of a review of the disputed VAT and penalty assessments. Although the offer of a review had been originally accepted by Mr Balasingham on 1 September 2021, it was unclear in that original acceptance as to the decisions for which a review was sought, and in consequence HMRC proceeded on the basis of the 8 March 2022 acceptance. The points in issue as described in the review decision letter were:
whether the assessments for under-declared VAT for periods 09/13 to 06/18 (inclusive) had been calculated in accordance with best judgment, and within the time limits
whether Schedule 24(1) FA07, allowed Officer Harvey to raise penalties for inaccuracies, and if so
whether there is sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the inaccuracies were as a result of deliberate behaviour.
Mr Buttar explained at the hearing that the reason why the penalty liability notice was not included within the scope of the review request was because Officer Harvey had informed Mr Balasingham that the personal liability notice could not be reviewed or appealed.
The review decision letter is dated 1 July 2022. The review officer decided that there were calculation errors in HMRC’s original quantification of the VAT in issue, and as a result of those errors and further representations, the VAT assessment was reduced from £38,192.00 to £26,584.24. As a consequence of the reduction in the VAT assessed, there was a corresponding adjustment to the penalty assessment, reducing it from £20,837.36 to £14,514.56. The review decision letter did not address the penalty liability notice. HMRC did not issue a revised penalty assessment or revised penalty liability notice following the review.
On 30 September 2022, Mr Balasingham filed a notice of appeal against VAT assessments and associated penalties. The appellant is stated on the notice as “Mr J Balasingham, Sprowston Food and Wine Ltd”. The grounds of appeal are:
In a letter dated 20 January 2022 HMRC confirmed if alternative Corporation Tax amounts are agreed, VAT will be adjusted accordingly.
In a letter dated 4 July 2022, in respect the Corporation Tax, HMRC's officer wrote, inter alia, "I will now amend the discovery assessments to revert to the computations to the original figures and will cancel the related inaccuracy penalty. There are no longer any appealable decisions to review regarding Corporation Tax". The officer further added that the appeal has been settled by agreement under Section 54 as permitted by Section 49A(4) of the Taxes Management Act 1970.
In spite of the observations in HMRC's officer's letter mentioned above, the VAT conclusion is still seeking the payment of VAT, as mentioned in the review letter being attached to this appeal.
The VAT appeal was referred to ADR. The record of outcome of the ADR refers to the matters under appeal being as follows:
Tribunal Ref: | VAT Periods | Amount | Date of Decision | Date of Appeal | Decision Appealed |
TC/2022/12064 | 09/13 – 06/18 | £26,584.24 | 06/07/2021 | 30/09/2022 | VAT Assessment under S73(1) VATA94 |
TC/2022/12064 | 09/13 – 06/18 | £14,514.56 | 13/08/2021 | 30/09/2022 | Penalty issued to the company under Sch24 FA2007 Para19(1) |
TC/2022/12064 | 09/13 – 06/18 | £14,514.56 | 13/08/2021 | 30/09/2022 | PLN issued under Sch24 FA2007 Para19(1) |
The parties were unable to settle the appeals by agreement in the course of the ADR, and the dispute therefore proceeded to a hearing before the Tribunal.
The VAT appeal was heard on 30 May 2024 before Judge Rudolf KC and Mr Woodman. At the hearing, Sprowston was represented by Mr Buttar and HMRC were represented by Mr Brown. Written submissions were filed on 7 and 29 June 2024. In a decision released on 15 August 2024 ([2024] UKFTT 747 (TC)), the Tribunal accepted HMRC’s evidence and decided that Mr Balasingham’s behaviour was deliberate, and dismissed the appeal.
A copy of that decision, the written submissions, and the notice of the appeal was included in the hearing bundle, but not HMRC’s statement of case. I had arranged for a copy of the statement of case to be retrieved from the Tribunal’s files. Unfortunately, it was not possible to share my screen with the parties during the hearing, so I was not able to share the text of this with the parties. However, I read extracts from the statement of case to the parties at the hearing. Paragraph 2 of the Statement of Case says as follows:
Introduction
Matters under Appeal:
Value Added Tax (VAT) assessments raised under Section 73(1) of the Value Added Tax Act 1994 (VATA94) for underdeclared VAT on the VAT Returns 09/13 through to 06/18 totalling £26,584.24 after review.
Penalties raised under Schedule 24(1) of the Finance Act 2007 (FA07) for VAT Returns 09/13 through to 06/18 totalling £14,514.56 after review.
The Statement of Case does not address the personal liability notice, nor does it reference any of the legislation or case law relating to personal liability notices.
The income tax appeal (TC/2022/1204) was heard on 7 and 8 October 2024 before Judge McKeever and Mr Bell. At the hearing, Mr Buttar represented Mr Balasingham and Mr Gyasi represented HMRC. In a decision released on 17 October 2024, the Tribunal held that HMRC had not discharged the burden of proving that errors in Mr Balasingham’s tax return had arisen as a result of deliberate behaviour. However, they found that Mr Balasingham’s behaviour had been careless. In consequence they held that discovery assessments were out of time, and only one year (for which a closure notice had been issued) remained in charge. The parties were to reach agreement on the amount of tax and penalties in accordance with the findings of the Tribunal. The appeal was allowed in part. The decision in the income tax appeal was a “short” decision and, with the consent of the parties, did not include the Tribunal’s findings of facts and reasons.
On 21 October 2024, the HMRC issued a notice of amended penalty assessment to Sprowston in the amount of £14,382.04, being the amount of the penalty determined by the review decision and upheld on appeal.
On 25 October 2024, HMRC issued an updated personal liability notice to Mr Balasingham in the amount of £14,382.04 (being the amount of the penalty determined by the review decision and upheld on appeal). Unfortunately, and in contrast to the penalty assessment, the notice incorrectly included a statement of Mr Balasingham’s review and appeal rights, even though the notice related to the amount determined by the review decision and upheld on appeal.
On 25 March 2025, after a review request by the Appellant’s representative, HMRC wrote to Mr Balasingham as follows:
Your representative requested a review of the personal liability notice dated 25 October 2024. As confirmed by Mrs J Harvey in her letter of 20 March 2025, the letter of 25 October 2024 was intended to notify you of the reduction to the personal liability notice dated 13 August 2021, following the conclusion of your appeal to the First Tier Tribunal. Therefore, the letter of 25 October 2024 was not a new appealable decision and should not have referred to review and appeal rights.
The appealable decision was the decision dated 13 August 2021; however, you cannot have a statutory review of a decision that has already been appealed to the tax tribunal. For this reason, no review will be carried out, and the matter will be returned to Mrs J Harvey.
On 25 March 2025, Mr Balasingham filed a notice of appeal in respect of the penalty liability notice issued on 25 October 2024.
On 6 May 2025, following an application for permission to appeal made to the Upper Tribunal, Judge Rupert Jones refused permission for Sprowston to appeal to the Upper Tribunal against the 25 August 2024 decision on VAT and penalties. The application for permission was decided on the papers, and there was no request for an oral re-hearing.
On 22 May 2025, HMRC wrote to Mr Buttar saying that they would allow a late review of the amended personal liability notice.
Issues to be determined
Mr Balasingham is on the horns of a dilemma. If it was the case that the Tribunal decision released on 15 August 2024 correctly upheld the personal liability notice, then the doctrine of res judicata is engaged, and it is an abuse of process for him to re-litigate the issue before the Tribunal. It follows that this appeal must be struck out.
Alternatively, if res judicata is not engaged, as the personal liability notice was issued in 2021, his notice of appeal dated 25 March 2025 is long out of time, and he will need to justify why the Tribunal should extend the time limit for his appeal against that notice.
Res judicata
Mr Brown submits that this appeal should be struck out on the grounds that the issues raised in this appeal were determined by the Tribunal in the decision released on 15 August 2024. Mr Brown submits that the personal liability notice was included in the issues before the Tribunal, and that the Tribunal’s decision is final and is binding on the parties since permission to appeal against that decision was refused. He submits that the doctrine of res judicata and abuse of process apply to prevent these issues being re-litigated.
Mr Brown referred to the following in support of his submissions:
The name of the appellant in the Notice of Appeal is “J Balasingham, Sprowston Food and Wine Ltd” – indicating that both Mr Balasingham personally (in respect of the personal liability notice) and Sprowston (in respect of the VAT and penalties assessments) were the appellants.
The ADR that took place prior to the hearing expressly attempted to reach a settlement on the VAT, penalties, and the personal liability notice – and each of these issues was referenced back to the same Tribunal appeal reference.
The Tribunal’s decision made express reference to the personal liability notice at the following paragraphs (emphasis added):
This is an appeal to the First-tier Tribunal (‘the Tribunal’) by Sprowston against HMRC’s decision to issue (a) revised VAT assessments in the sum of £23,032.00 through VAT periods 09/13 to 06/18, under section 73 (1) of the Value Added Tax Act 1994 (‘VATA’) and (b) penalties for deliberate behaviour in the sum of £14,514.56, under Schedule 24 (1) of the Finance Act 2007 (‘FA’). This was by way of personal liability notice on the sole director of Sprowston.
On 1 July 2021 Officer Harvey concluded that the deliberate penalties should be extended to include an officer’s personal liability. That was because she considered the risks with regards to this case, taking into consideration that Mr Balasingham had not engaged with the VAT check and had not advised HMRC of the change of ownership / sale of the business. Officer Harvey concluded due to the Corporation Tax review it was decided that there had been additional sales to cover expenses and savings accrued. Further that Mr Balasingham was responsible for ensuring information passed to his accountant was accurate, which he failed to do. Mr Balasingham also knew that the underdeclared turnover was being spent personally. Additionally, no reason for the discrepancy has been offered or substantiated and there was a risk that the Mr Balasingham would dissolve the company. There had already been a deregistration for VAT applied for on the basis that the company has ceased trading.
On 13 August 2021 Officer Harvey issued a ‘personal liability notice’ under paragraph 19 (1) of Schedule 24 of the Finance Act 2007 for the penalties which would become due by him if Sprowston failed to pay them.
On 1 September 2021 Mr Balasingham sought an independent review against the personal liability imposition of the penalties by Officer Harvey.
The personal liability notice was entirely properly made in the circumstances outlined.
Mr Brown states that Officer Harvey made a mistake in telling Mr Balasingham in her letter of 21 September 2021 that it was not possible to request a review or appeal against a personal liability notice. It was also a mistake for the amended personal liability notice issued on 25 October 2024 to include a section setting out review and appeal rights – as the notice was issued to reflect the Tribunal’s decision. Mr Brown apologised for these errors. As regards the letter of 22 May 2025 allowing a late review of the amended penalty liability notice, this too was mistaken, and in any event no review could take place once a notice of appeal against the disputed decision had been filed.
Mr Buttar submits that res judicata cannot apply on the following grounds:
Lack of finality.
Lack of jurisdiction.
Decision not on the merits.
Fraud or collusion.
New evidence.
I am in no doubt that the 15 August 2024 decision is final. An application for permission to appeal had been made to, and was refused by, the Upper Tribunal. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal is therefore final.
Mr Buttar did not elaborate in his oral submissions or in his skeleton argument on why ground (d) (fraud or collusion) was engaged. Mr Buttar did not particularise any fraud or collusion that might vitiate the decision, and he did not elaborate on this ground in his oral submissions. In the absence of any evidence before me of any fraud or collusion, I find that neither of these grounds have any basis and are not made out. I would note that the making of an unsubstantiated allegation of fraud or collusion is extremely serious, and could give rise to an application for costs.
As regards ground (c) (decision not on the merits), and ground (e) (new evidence), Mr Buttar referred to the decision of the Tribunal released on 17 October 2024 relating to Mr Balasingham’s income tax appeal. The Tribunal held in that appeal that Mr Balasingham’s behaviour had been careless, and not deliberate. Mr Buttar submits that the underlying issues in relation to both appeals related to the same business – first as carried on by Mr Balasingham as a sole trader, and then subsequently as the sole director and shareholder in Sprowston. Mr Buttar submits that Mr Balasingham’s behaviour in relation to both appeals must have been the same. He submits that the findings reached by the Tribunal in its 17 October 2024 decision amounted to new evidence which would allow the 15 August 2024 decision to be reopened as regards the validity of the finding of deliberate behaviour and the consequential impact on the personal liability notice. He submits that the decision released on 17 October 2024 should take priority over the 15 August 2024 decision as being later in time.
I do not accept this submission. First, these are two separate appeals relating to different taxes, different taxpayers, and different periods. It is entirely possible that whilst Mr Balasingham may have been careless in mixing his business income and expenses with personal income and expenses when acting as a sole trader – mixing the income and expenses of Sprowston (a separate company) with his personal income and expenses when the trade was conducted through a company could amount to deliberate behaviour. Secondly, even if there was evidence before the Tribunal panel hearing the income tax appeal (that was not before the Tribunal panel hearing the VAT appeal) that supported the submission that behaviour was not deliberate – Mr Balasingham would need to demonstrate that the grounds for reopening a judicial decision on the basis of new evidence had been satisfied. These were set out by the Court of Appeal in Ladd v Marshall [1954] 1 WLR 1489. That case prescribed a three-fold test, namely that:
the evidence could not have been obtained with reasonable diligence for use at the original hearing;
the evidence must be such that, if given, it would probably have an important influence on the result of the case, though it need not be decisive; and
the evidence must be such as is presumably to be believed; it must be credible, though not incontrovertible.
There is no suggestion that the evidence before the Tribunal at the income tax hearing on 7 and 8 October 2024 was not available to be presented to the Tribunal at the VAT hearing on 30 May 2024 – and so requirement (i) is not satisfied. As the requirements of the test are cumulative, I do not need to consider requirements (ii) or (iii). The requirements for reopening the 15 August 2024 decision on the grounds of new evidence are not met.
I note also that Mr Buttar consented to the issue of a “short” decision in relation to the 17 October 2024 decision notice (namely a decision notice that did not include even summary reasons) – and if it were the case that there was evidence before that panel to support a decision of carelessness that might undermine the finding of deliberate behaviour in the 15 October 2024 decision, I would have expected Mr Buttar to have requested (as is Mr Bellasingham’s right) a fully reasoned decision.
Mr Buttar did not elaborate in his oral submissions or in his skeleton argument on why ground (b) (lack of jurisdiction) was engaged. Nonetheless I am concerned that the scope of the VAT appeal did not extend to the personal liability notice, and therefore ground (b) is engaged. No reference was made to the personal liability notice in either the notice of appeal or the statement of case. In particular, the statement of case does not address the requirements of paragraph 22, Schedule 41, Finance Act 2008 and the requirement that the deliberate wrongdoing must be attributable to Mr Balasingham. I acknowledge that the ADR is stated to extend to the personal liability notice – but it is not clear whether this is because the personal liability is consequential on the underlying penalty being upheld – or whether the attribution of the deliberate behaviour to Mr Balasingham was in dispute. At [99] to [100] the Tribunal makes findings as to whether the behaviours of Sprowston (acting by Mr Balasingham as its sole director) were deliberate, but these findings are expressed to be in relation to whether the inaccuracies in Sprowston’s VAT returns were careless or deliberate – and not as to whether the inaccuracies should be attributed to Mr Balasingham (although I acknowledge that it must be implicit in these findings that Mr Balasingham was solely responsible for the inaccuracies).
I note that the appellant in the notice of appeal was stated to be “Mr J Balasingham, Sprowston Food and Wine Ltd”, and that findings were made by the Tribunal as to Mr Balasingham’s behaviour. But given that the grounds of appeal did not include anything relevant to the validity of the personal liability notice, I consider that the mention of Mr Balasingham’s name was in essence as part of the address of the appellant, to make sure that correspondence was correctly addressed.
Although the Tribunal had made findings in relation to Mr Balasingham and the validity of the personal liability notice – it is possible to read these as being statements in relation to the automatic consequences of the Tribunal’s finding that there had been deliberate behaviour and that the penalties were upheld. So, for example, had the Tribunal decided to cancel the penalties, or held that the behaviour was not deliberate, then the liability under the personal liability notice would have automatically fallen away.
Although the decision of the Tribunal purports to uphold the personal liability notice – if that notice was not within the scope of the appeal, then that decision can have no validity. I have, with reluctance, come to the conclusion that the scope of the VAT appeal did not extend to the personal liability notice. This is because
Neither the notice of appeal, nor the statement of case refer to the requirements relating to the imposition of personal liability notices, and why those provisions are (or are not) satisfied;
Mr Balasingham is not stated in the title to the decision to be an appellant;
Whilst the Tribunal’s decision sets out in some detail the statutory and case law provisions applying to penalties, it does not set out the corresponding statutory provisions and case law relating to personal liability notices. In particular no reference is made to paragraph 22 Schedule 41, Finance Act 2008. The Tribunal does not address in its decision the requirements that need to be satisfied for a personal liability notice to be validly given by HMRC; and
there is no express finding by the Tribunal of the deliberate behaviour being attributed to Mr Balasingham for the purposes of paragraph 22.
Conclusion
This mean that res judicata is not engaged, and HMRC’s application to strike out on that ground has to be dismissed.
Late appeal
But that is not an end to the story. The personal liability notice was issued on either 13 August 2021 or 6 September 2021. A notice of appeal filed on 25 March 2025 is on any basis out of time.
As the issue of the lateness of the appeal was raised by me in the course of the hearing, and had not been previously considered by either of the parties, I asked the parties whether they were content for the hearing to continue to consider whether an extension of time should be given for the filing of the notice of appeal. Neither party raised any objection nor requested an adjournment.
The hearing then proceeded to consider whether to give permission for this appeal to proceed and for the relevant time limits to be waived.
In reaching my decision, I need to apply the well-known three-fold test in Martland [2018] UKUT 178 (TCC). I also have in mind the decision of the Upper Tribunal in Medpro [2025] UKUT 255 (TCC) in relation to the weight to be placed on the public interest factors expressly mentioned in CPR3.9 in balancing all of the circumstances of the case
Length of the delay
The personal liability notice was issued on either 13 August 2021 or 6 September 2021. The notice of appeal was filed on 25 March 2025. The delay is over four years and six months.
On 14 October 2021 Mr Buttar wrote to HMRC informing them that he was appealing against all outstanding decisions. But he did not take any steps to file appeals (as regards VAT), nor did he notify appeals (as regards income tax or corporation tax) to the Tribunal.
I find that on any basis, there has been a serious and significant delay in the context of a thirty day deadline for making an appeal to HMRC.
The reasons for the default
There have been a series of unfortunate errors by HMRC which Mr Buttar submits explains the delay in filing the appeal. In particular, Officer Harvey stated in her letter of 21 September 2021 that there is no right of appeal against a penalty liability notice. Mr Buttar stated that he and Mr Balasingham relied on HMRC’s statement and for that reason did not pursue an appeal against the personal liability notice.
There was also an error in the personal liability notice dated 25 October 2024. This had been issued to reflect the outcome of the appeal and the fact that the underlying penalty had been previously reduced in the course of a review. Unfortunately, the notice, incorrectly, included a statement of review and appeal rights. This was a mistake, as no review or appeal rights apply – and the fact that review and appeal rights were wrongly stated to be available does not make them available.
There was a further mistake by HMRC in letter of 22 May 2025, when they said that they would allow a late review of the 25 October 2024 personal liability notice. There seems to have been a lack of communication within HMRC, as a different officer had written to Mr Balasingham on 25 March 2025 advising him that the notice of 25 October 2024 was intended to reflect the personal liability following the conclusion of the appeal before the Tribunal, and that it was not possible to conduct a review of a matter that had already been determined by the Tribunal. In any event, once a notice of appeal has been filed (as it was in relation to this appeal on 25 March 2025), a review is no longer possible.
Evaluation of the circumstances
Was there a good reason for the delay?
Whilst HMRC’s series of errors are unfortunate – and Mr Brown apologised for them on behalf of HMRC – I find that they do not provide grounds for allowing a late appeal. Although Officer Harvey may have misinformed Mr Balasingham that he had no appeal rights in relation to the personal liability notice, the notice did set out his appeal rights. Mr Buttar had been appointed to advise Mr Ballasingham, and – and could and should have challenged Officer Harvey as to the contradiction between her letter and the appeal rights as stated in the notice. To the extent that Mr Balasingham relies upon his agent's actions as a reason for the delays, the decision in Katib [2019] UKUT 189 (TCC) at [49] makes it clear that, when considering applications for permission to make a late appeal, the general rules is that failures by an appellant's adviser should generally be treated as failures by the appellant. No reason was given as to why this general rule should be departed from in this case. Mr Balasingham was professionally advised, and Mr Buttar would have been able to advise Mr Balasingham of his appeal rights.
Prejudice to the parties
With regard to the prejudice to the parties, it is clear from case law that, whilst it is not appropriate to conduct an exhaustive analysis of the merits of the substantive appeal, the circumstances should be reviewed to determine if there is clearly a strong case, where there may be greater prejudice to an appellant in refusing permission to appeal.
If I refuse permission to appeal then Mr Balasingham will be unable to challenge the personal liability notice. Mr Brown submits that HMRC would be prejudiced if the appeal were to be allowed to proceed out of time, as they would be required to divert resources to an appeal which they were entitled to consider to be closed.
I find that Mr Balasingham’s prospects of success are exceedingly weak. It is clear from the Tribunal’s findings set out in the decision released on 15 August 2024 that Mr Balasingham was the sole officer of Sprowston, that it was his own behaviour that led to the defaults giving rise to the penalties, and that his behaviour was deliberate. Although the Tribunal did not make any express finding in relation to paragraph 22, I consider that if it had done so, it is inevitable that it would have made a finding that the deliberate behaviour was wholly attributable to Mr Balasingham given that Mr Balasingham was the only director and the other findings made by the Tribunal in relation to his behaviour. It is almost inconceivable that Mr Balasingham would succeed in his appeal if I were to allow it to proceed.
Conclusion
There has been a serious and significant delay. I do not consider that the reasons given for the delay provide a reasonable excuse and, balancing all the circumstances, I do not consider that the prejudice to Mr Balasingham in refusing permission to make a late appeal to HMRC outweighs the other circumstances in the case. As such I should not depart from the starting point that permission to appeal late should not be granted.
I note that the Upper Tribunal decision in Medpro [2025] UKUT 255 (TCC) is being appealed. For the avoidance of doubt, my decision would be the same regardless of the decision in Medpro. That is, given the length of the delay and the lack of good reason for the delay, and noting the limited weight to be placed on the merits of the appeal, the decision would have been the same whether or not particular weight was placed on the public interest factors expressly mentioned in CPR3.9 in balancing all of the circumstances of the case.
Disposition
I dismiss HMRC’s application to strike out the appeal on grounds of res judicata.
However, I refuse to extend the time limit for filing the notice of appeal, and do not grant permission for a late appeal.
It follows that this appeal cannot proceed further.
Right to apply for permission to appeal
This document contains full findings of fact and reasons for the decision. Any party dissatisfied with this decision has a right to apply for permission to appeal against it pursuant to Rule 39 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Tax Chamber) Rules 2009. The application must be received by this Tribunal not later than 56 days after this decision is sent to that party. The parties are referred to “Guidance to accompany a Decision from the First-tier Tribunal (Tax Chamber)” which accompanies and forms part of this decision notice.
Release date: 11th DECEMBE 2025
