The Executor of The Estate of Paul Goudman-Peachey v The Commissioners for HMRC

Section 42 provides that SDLT is charged on land transactions. A “land transaction” is defined by s 43 to be “any acquisition of a chargeable interest”. Pursuant to s 43(3), each of those chargeable interests represents a different subject- matter of land, together with any interest, right, or right appurtenant or pertaining to it that is acquired with it:

“43 Land transactions

(1)

In this Part a “land transaction” means any acquisition of a chargeable interest.

(2)

Except as otherwise provided, this Part applies however the acquisition is effected, whether by act of the parties, by order of a court or other authority, by or under any statutory provision or by operation of law.

(3)

For the purposes of this Part—

(a)

the creation of a chargeable interest is—

(i)

an acquisition by the person becoming entitled to the interest created, and

(ii)

a disposal by the person whose interest or right is subject to the interest created;

...

(4)

References in this Part to the “purchaser” and “vendor”, in relation to a land transaction, are to the person acquiring and the person disposing of the subject- matter of the transaction.

(5)

A person is not treated as a purchaser unless he has given consideration for, or is a party to, the transaction.

(6)

References in this Part to the subject-matter of a land transaction are to the chargeable interest acquired (the “main subject-matter”), together with any interest or right appurtenant or pertaining to it that is acquired with it.”

Section 48 defines a “chargeable interest” as follows:

“48 Chargeable interests

(1)

In this Part “chargeable interest” means–

(a)

an estate, interest, right or power in or over land…or

(b)

the benefit of an obligation, restriction or condition affecting the value of any such estate, interest, right or power.

other than an exempt interest …”

Section 49 provides that a land transaction is a “chargeable transaction” if it is not a transaction that is ‘exempt’ from charge. There is no exemption that might be applicable in this case.

Section 55 (1B) sets out the applicable amount of SDLT payable. Section 55(1B) provides that:

“The amount of tax chargeable in respect of a chargeable transaction to which this section applies is determined in accordance with subsections (1B) and (1C).”

Section 55 sets out the amount of tax chargeable on the relevant consideration given for a chargeable transaction, i.e., the chargeable consideration for the transaction. There are differing rates for residential properties and for properties that are wholly or partly non-residential. The section contains two tables. The rate at which SDLT is charged in respect of any land transaction depends on whether the interest acquired is an interest in ‘residential property’, or not.

“Table A” applies “if the relevant land consists entirely of ‘residential property’”.

“Table B” applies “if the relevant land consists of or includes land that is ‘non-residential’ property.”

Section 55(3)(a) defines the “relevant land” as:

“the land an interest in which is the main subject-matter of the transaction.”

Section 43(6) provides that:

“References in this Part to the subject-matter of a land transaction are to the chargeable interest acquired (the ‘main subject matter’), together with any interest or right appurtenant or pertaining to it that is acquired with it.”

Section 116 provides the definition of a “residential property”, as follows:

“Meaning of “residential property”

(1)

In this Part “residential property” means –

(a)

a building that is used or suitable for use as a dwelling, or is in the process of being constructed or adapted for such use, and

(b)

land that is all forms part of the garden or grounds of a building within paragraph (a) (including any building or structure on such land), or

(c)

an interest in or over land that subsist for the benefit of a building within paragraph (a) or of land within paragraph (b) and “non-residential property” means any property that is not residential property.”

In relation to the “notice of enquiry”, para. 12 of Schedule 10, provides, inter alia, for the time-limit for opening an enquiry as being nine months from: (a) the filing date, (b) the date of the return being delivered if after the filing date, or (c) the date of amendment(s) made to a filed return.

Paragraph 23 of Schedule 10 provides for the “completion of an enquiry” by the issue of a closure notice.

The documents for the hearing, set out at para. 9 above, comprised pleadings, correspondence relating to HMRC’s enquiry and appeal correspondence. We heard evidence from the Appellant. We considered the evidence given by the Appellant to be of assistance to us in understanding the background and details regarding the transaction in this appeal (and will return to this evidence later). We derived considerable benefit from hearing the Appellant giving oral evidence. Having heard her evidence, we find her to be a truthful witness who gave her evidence in a clear and straightforward manner, without equivocation. We accept her evidence as representing a truthful and accurate description of the use of the adjoining land to the Property at the time of completion.

We also viewed drone footage of the Property covering the:

It was not suggested, by or on behalf of HMRC, that this footage was not footage of the Estate, or that the images referred to above were not clearly visible in the footage viewed during the hearing.

Ms Man’s submits (in summary) that there are various factors that demonstrate that the Property was entirely ‘residential’; namely that:

Mr Hickey, on the other hand, submits (in summary) that:

At the conclusion of the hearing, we reserved our decision, which we now give with reasons. Our conclusions regarding the key submissions made by the parties are set out in our “Discussion” below.

We have considered any key points of disagreement in determining the facts as set out below.

The following facts were either admitted, accepted or proved:

Woodmancote Place is a large house. At its heart is a timber framed, part stone manor house which was extended in the 18th Century to the south. It also had sizeable additions in the 1920s. It is a Grade II listed building. The main house sits on grounds of approximately 50 acres, which are laid predominantly as parkland. Within these grounds are three lakes that were historically used by anglers to fish carp. It has several outbuildings:

Many of its outbuildings are Grade II listed. The rest of the land extends to 100 acres of agricultural pasture, deer park and ancient woodland. Sales particulars, in March 2017, denote the land split as:

“gardens and grounds with lakes and pasture, about 50 acres and 100 acres of land and cottage available for separate negotiation.”

The documentation further details clearly exceptional equestrian facilities, including stable yard and manége. A map of 50 acres also shows the cottage as a separate purchase.

The Appellant and her husband acquired nine separate Land Registry titles to land under a single contract (as shown in the TR1 – transfer of property), having been run as an equestrian facility, with historical breeding of showjumpers by the Vendor’s family, and a commercial Deer Park. There was also a commercial arrangement with:

When purchased, the Vendor’s family ran the estate as an equestrian facility for breeding showjumpers. A parcel of land was rented to a farmer for maize farming. At the time of purchase of the Property, there was also a commercial Deer Park run by the Vendor. The deer park was established on the land in 2010. The Vendor’s son ran the Deer Park until the land and deer were sold with the Property in 2019. The Appellant and her husband purchased the herd and contracted the existing deer manager to oversee the husbandry of the herd. The Deer Park has at least 17 public footpaths, and is a registered Sussex walk. In the grounds, there is a Saxon Church which was donated to the Parish. This is the public footpath that runs in front of the main house from St Peter’s, and accesses all the other footpaths, which have been established for many decades.

Woodmancote has been a working farm with horses, deer and sheep grazing at various times regularly through each year, despite the ROWL works which temporarily disrupted the horse farming activities. The agricultural activities met the requirements of the Rural Payments Agency (“RPA”), satisfying the claim for ‘Basic Payment’, and for the Environmental Stewardship Scheme in operation at the time.

Land at the Property has been the subject of cable laying works. ROWL is an offshore wind farm. There are legal rights in favour of ROWL. The Vendor had a commercial arrangement with ROWL to enable the supply of power from the wind turbines to run through Woodmancote Place. This arrangement continues for 99 years. ROWL have agreed to pay the Appellant for providing soil and labour required to keep the land from subsiding, and to keep it safe for the sheep to graze.

The “Countryside Stewardship 2021 Mid-Tier Offer” Application Form, filed with the Department for Environment Food & Rural Affairs, shows that significant parcels of land were used for non-residential purposes; predominantly categorised as Grassland relating to Sheep, Rams, Hay fields, Mixed Woodland.

We, therefore, make these material findings of fact.

The Appellant appeals against a Closure Notice issued by HMRC under para. 23 of Schedule 10. The jurisdiction of the FtT is fixed, and defined, by the terms of the Closure Notice, as confirmed by the UT in Daarasp, at [25(7)]. In Shinelock, the UT pointed out that Daarasp had set out ten principles which could be drawn from the leading authorities in relation to the issue of “the matter in question” in a closure notice. Consistent with the decision of the UT in Shinelock, we adopt the summary of the essential workings of the enquiry and closure notice process set out in Daarasp:

“22.

An enquiry, begun by way of an enquiry notice, is concluded by a closure notice. The closure notice comprises two elements:

(1)

A statement of the officer’s conclusions; and

(2)

A statement of what, if anything, must be done to give effect to those conclusions.

23.

The whole point of tax returns and enquiries into them is to ensure that the public interest in taxpayers paying the correct amount of tax is met. To that end, HMRC must have an appropriate ability to examine the return, but the taxpayer must have a fair opportunity to challenge (by way of appeal) either (i) the conclusions of HMRC or (ii) the manner in which those conclusions have been given effect to (by way of amendments to the return) ...

24.

It is important to appreciate that the conclusions of a closure notice are distinct from the amendments that may arise out of those conclusions. Obviously, there is a nexus between the two – the amendments implement the conclusions reached – but they are very different things. The conclusions in a closure notice consist of a statement why the taxpayer’s return is incorrect (if it is), whereas the amendments set out how the return must be corrected in order to give effect to those conclusions. A closure notice must state the officer’s conclusions; and having issued a closure notice, HMRC has no power to amend the relevant return other than to give effect to the conclusions: Bristol & West at [24]; Investec at [51].”

We further adopt the principles set out in Daarasp, at [25], as having been provided by the authorities which have considered closure notices. In this respect, we agree that:

“(5)

It is desirable that the statement by the officer of his conclusions should be as informative as possible: Tower MCashback at [83]; Fidex at [42]. Furthermore, notices are given at the conclusion of an enquiry, and must be read in context. It will be rare for a notice to be sent without some previous indication during the enquiry of the points that have attracted the officer’s attention: Tower MCashback at [84]; Fidex at [42], [45]; Lavery at [37]. That said, a narrowly drawn closure notice – properly construed – cannot be widened by reference to the scope of the enquiry which preceded it: Lavery at [34].

(6)

It is not appropriate to construe a closure notice as if it were a statute: Fidex at [51]; Lavery at [28]. The ordinary rules of construction apply to closure notices, and the question of construction is a mixed question of fact and law: the identification of the relevant circumstances and context in which the document is to be construed is a question of fact, whilst the meaning of the document – construed within that context, as found – is a question of law: Lavery at [36]. Essentially, when approaching the question of construction, it is appropriate to consider how the reasonable recipient of the notice, standing in the shoes of the taxpayer, would have construed it: Lavery at [42].”

We further agree with the UT in Daarasp at [36(4)(c )] that:

“…we must bear in mind that it is perfectly possible for the consequential adjustment in a closure notice itself to be in error, in that it fails to articulate the adjustment required by the conclusion articulated by the officer.”

As the UT decided, the amendment made by the officer needs to be considered, but it does not in itself determine the matter in question where the evidence of a closure notice and its conclusions, as understood by the parties, casts a different light on the nature of the dispute.

The UT decision in Fidex Ltd v HMRC [2015] STC 702 (‘Fidex’) was affirmed in the Court of Appeal in Fidex Ltd v HMRC [2016] STC 1920. At [45], Kitchin LJ set out the following principles:

“45.

In my judgment the principles to be applied are those set out by Henderson J as approved by and elaborated upon by the Supreme Court. So far as material to this appeal, they may be summarised in the following propositions: (i) The scope and subject matter of an appeal are defined by the conclusions stated in the closure notice and by the amendments required to give effect to those conclusions. (ii) What matters are the conclusions set out in the closure notice, not the process of reasoning by which HMRC reached those conclusions. (iii) The closure notice must be read in context in order properly to understand its meaning. (iv) Subject always to the requirements of fairness and proper case management, HMRC can advance new arguments before the FTT to support the conclusions set out in the closure notice.”

The Closure Notice in this appeal arose as a result of HMRC’s conclusion that the Appellant’s purchase of the Property consisted, entirely, of ‘residential’ property, giving rise to additional SDLT of £477,250.

The parties have diametrically opposed views as to what the acquisition in this appeal constituted. Ms Man submits that:

She further submits that there is insufficient evidence to demonstrate there was a separate use of the land - commercial or otherwise - at or prior to the time of completion.

Mr Hickey, alternatively, submits that the acquisition of the interests in land comprised a ‘mixed use’ acquisition, with the result that the ‘non-residential’ property rates in Table B FA 2003 apply. In further amplification of this, he submits that there was the purchase of residential land comprising a single large house and gardens. He adds that a significant proportion is arable land to the north and agricultural land elsewhere comprising of land used for deer and what was a former stud farm. Outside of the curtilage of the residential house and gardens, the balance of the land was, and is, constituted as non-residential land which had been used for animal grazing, plus associated grassland. He adds that the previously existing and continued use of the identifiable land parcels are, and continue to be, non-residential.

We have considered the relevant legislative scheme before turning to the circumstances of this appeal.

The transactional heart of SDLT is reflected in the structure of the taxation set out in FA 2003, which sets out detailed rules for determining when the charge arises on the land transaction. SDLT is charged on the ‘chargeable consideration’ for the transaction; which is generally any consideration in money or money’s worth given for the subject-matter of the transaction, whether directly or indirectly by the purchaser or a person connected with him. Unlike stamp duty, SDLT is a tax on transactions - rather than documents - and is subject to a self-assessment regime. SDLT is charged at a different rate depending on whether the relevant land consists, entirely, of ‘residential’ property (on the one hand); or consists of, or includes, property that is not residential property (on the other). The definition of ‘residential’ property includes “land that is or forms part of the garden or grounds of a dwelling”.

In order to determine the status of land, it is necessary to first establish whether a building - of which the land forms part of the grounds - is a dwelling. If property is not suitable for use as a dwelling, then it cannot fall within s 116.

A key constituent to determining whether a transaction comprises residential property is to establish if a building falls within s 116(1)(a) FA 2003, which provides that:

“(1)

In this Part “residential property” means –

(a)

a building that is used or suitable for use as a dwelling, or is in the process of being constructed or adapted for such use, and

(b)

land that is all forms part of the garden or grounds of a building within paragraph (a) (including any building or structure on such land), or

(c)

an interest in or over land that subsist for the benefit of a building within paragraph (a) or of land within paragraph (b) and “non-residential property” means any property that is not residential property.”

It is clear that a building that is used, or suitable for use, as a dwelling, including the land representing ‘grounds or garden’, and any rights benefiting the building, is ‘residential’ property. Therefore, if it looks like a dwelling and is used or suitable for use as a dwelling, it will meet the terms of s 116(1)(a).

The primary meaning of a ‘dwelling’ remains that in s 116; the wording of which is replicated in other parts of the SDLT code. The term ‘dwelling’ is not defined in the SDLT legislation and, in principle, it therefore has its ordinary meaning. The Shorter Oxford Dictionary defines ‘dwelling’ as:

“2.

a place of residence; a habitation, a house.”

For the purposes of interpreting the scope and application of the SDLT legislation, it is necessary that the legislation is construed “purposively”. The relevant principles are set out in Fanning. In Fanning, at [30] (Peter Jackson, Lewis and Falk LJJ), the Court of Appeal said this:

“30.

The modern approach to statutory interpretation was conveniently summarised by Lewison LJ in Pollen Estate Trustee Co Ltd v HMRC [2013] EWCA Civ 753; [2013] STC 1479 at [24]:

“24.

The modern approach to statutory construction is to have regard to the purpose of a particular provision and interpret its language, so far as possible, in a way which best gives effect to that purpose…”

The general principles of statutory interpretation were explained by Lord Hodge in R (O) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] UKSC 3, [2023] AC 255, at [29] to [32]. The task is to identify the meaning of the words that Parliament has used. Words and passages in a statute derive their meaning from their context. A phrase or passage must be read in the context of the section as a whole, and in the wider context of a relevant group of sections. Other provisions in a statute - and the statute as a whole - may provide the relevant context. They are the words which Parliament has chosen to enact as an expression of the purpose of the legislation and are, therefore, the primary source by which meaning is ascertained. External aids to interpretation must play a secondary role. Explanatory Notes (prepared under the authority of Parliament) may cast light on the meaning of particular statutory provisions.

The correct modern approach to the interpretation of tax statutes is that the court's task, within the permissible bounds of interpretation, is to give effect to Parliament's purpose. In this regard, controversial provisions should be read in the context of the statute as a whole, and the statute as a whole should be read in the historical context of the situation which led to its enactment. In seeking the purpose of a statutory provision, the interpreter is not confined to a literal interpretation of the words, but must have regard to the context and scheme of the relevant Act as a whole. We are required to apply a purposive interpretation to the language of the provision.

In Uratremp, the House of Lords stated that the word ‘dwelling’ has its ordinary meaning, but that in deciding what it means, one has to consider the meaning in the context of the legislation (and on the basis of the facts in a case). The Lords were there addressing the meaning of ‘dwelling’ in the context of s 1 of the Housing Act 1988. Referring to the different statutory contexts that had given rise to “this jungle of judicial glosses on the meaning of dwelling house” (at [14]), Lord Steyn made pertinent observations in relation to statutory construction of this familiar word ‘dwelling’, at [15]:

“The starting point must be that “dwelling house” …is an ordinary word in the English language. While I accept that dictionaries cannot solve issues of interpretation, it nevertheless is helpful to bear in mind that dwelling house has for centuries been a word of wide import. ... In ordinary parlance a bed-sitting room where somebody habitually stays is therefore capable of being described as a dwelling house. So much for generalities. The setting in which the word appears in the statue is important. It is used in legislation which is intended to afford a measure of protection to tenants under assured tenancies. This context makes it inappropriate for the court to place restrictive glosses on the word “dwelling”. On the contrary, as counsel appearing as amicus curiae accepted, the courts ought to interpret and apply the word “dwelling house” in s 1 the 1988 Act in a reasonably generous fashion.”

As Lord Steyn’s exposition has made clear, the meaning of ‘dwelling’ has been given a reasonably generous interpretation in Uratemp due to the purpose of the Housing Act, which is to afford a measure of protection to tenants. It is not to say that there is no intersection in “this jungle of judicial glosses on the meaning of dwelling house” between different statutory contexts; but what is a dwelling in one statutory context cannot be transposed into another directly.

Lord Irvine LC said this:

“Dwelling” is not a term of art, but a familiar word in the English-language which in my judgement in this context connotes a place where one lives, regarding and treating it as home. Such a place does not cease to be a “dwelling” merely because one takes all or some of one’s meals out; or brings takeaway food in to the exclusion of home cooking; or at times prepare some food for consumption in heating devices falling short of a full cooking facility.”

At [31], Lord Millet said this:

“In both ordinary and literary usage, residential accommodation is "a dwelling" if it is the occupier's home (or one of his homes). It is the place where he lives and to which he returns and which forms the centre of his existence.”

The meaning of ‘dwelling’ in the SDLT context intersects with what Lord Millet observed in Uratemp at [30] and [31]: that the words “dwell” or “dwelling” mean the same as “inhabit” and “habitation” or, more precisely, “abide” and “abode”, and refer to ‘the place where one lives and makes one’s home’. Lord Millet continued by saying:

“They [i.e. “dwell” and “dwelling”] suggest a greater degree of settled occupation than “reside” and “residence”, connoting the place where the occupier habitually sleeps and usually eats, ... In both ordinary and literary usage, residential accommodation is a “dwelling” if it is the occupier’s home (or one of his homes). It is the place where he lives and to which he returns and which forms the centre of his existence.”

In Carson (which was a VAT case), the FtT said this, in the context of the meaning of ‘dwelling’ in Group 6, Schedule 8 of the Value Added Tax Act 1994 (‘VATA’):

“in our judgement a dwelling will, as a minimum, contain facilities for personal hygiene, the consumption of food and drink, the storage of personal belongings, and a place for the individual to rest and sleep.”

In the context of the appeal before us, there is no dispute that s 116(1)(a) FA 2003 is satisfied in relation to the building known as “Woodmancote Place” (the main house which was used or suitable for use as a dwelling), and that the garden, tennis courts, swimming pool, lake and woodland fall under the definition of ‘residential’ property. This matter is not in issue between the parties. The Appellant asserts that the transaction consisted of mixed residential and non-residential property because part of the land was not ‘grounds’ of the dwelling, pursuant to s 116(1)(b) FA 2003. This land comprises:

Therefore, the next matter for us to determine is whether the 150 acres of land acquired with the dwelling were ‘garden or grounds’ at the time of purchase of the Property. The approach to be adopted in this respect has been confirmed by the Court of Appeal in Hyman CoA, which confirms that the Tribunal is required to undertake an ‘evaluative exercise’ to determine whether the land in question meets the ordinary meaning of “garden and grounds of a [dwelling]” or “to be occupied or enjoyed with a dwelling”.

Land which forms part of the ‘garden or grounds’ of a building (within s 116(a)) is, specifically, included within the definition of ‘residential’ property. Ms Man submits that the rural features of the Property are typical of a countryside estate, which provides the occupier with a private, self-contained dwelling that provides all of the necessary facilities to provide an active lifestyle. She adds that the land enhances the rural character of the Property, and provides a treasured view. This submission was in reliance on the observations made by the FtT In Goodfellow, at [17], where the FtT determined that the land surrounding the house was:

“very much essential to its character, to protect its privacy, peace and sense of space, and to enable the enjoyment of typical country pursuits.”

Section 116(1)(b) refers to a garden or grounds ‘of’ a dwelling. Section 116 does not, however, spell out what criteria are to be applied for the purpose of establishing the necessary connection.

The definition of ‘garden or grounds’ was considered by the FtT in Hyman FTT, with supporting comments from the UT in Hyman UT (Morgan J and Judge Cannan). It was considered that ‘garden’ and ‘grounds’ are ordinary English words. The UT considered the interpretation of s 116 and said this:

“30.

Section 116(1)(b) refers to 'the garden or grounds of a building' and this is a reference to a building within s 116(1)(a). For present purposes, we can summarise the type of building which comes within s 116(1)(a) as a 'dwelling'. So s 116(1)(b) refers to the garden or grounds of a dwelling.

31.

'Garden' and 'grounds' are ordinary English words. In some cases, it might be helpful to refer to the dictionary definitions of 'garden' or 'grounds' to assist in defining the concept involved. We were not referred to any dictionaries at the hearing of these appeals because it was not suggested that there was any dictionary definition which supported the idea that a piece of land could only be the garden or the grounds of a dwelling if the piece of land was needed for the reasonable enjoyment of the dwelling.

…

33.

Section 116(1)(b) refers to a garden or grounds 'of' a dwelling. The word 'of' shows that there must be a connection between the garden or grounds and the dwelling. The section does not spell out what criteria are to be applied for the purpose of establishing the necessary connection. We note that FA 2003, in a separate definition of 'dwelling' for a specific purpose, refers to 'land occupied and enjoyed with the dwelling as its garden or grounds':.. We were not addressed as to whether the word 'of' is to be interpreted as involving the same degree of connection between the dwelling and the garden or grounds or a different degree of connection. Again, it is not necessary for us to deal with that point to deal with the sole issue raised in these appeals.

…

38… there is no wording in section 116(1)(b) which imposes, or even hints at, a requirement that land can only be a garden or grounds of a dwelling if the land is needed for the reasonable enjoyment of the dwelling. We consider that in the absence of any wording to give effect to the limitation contended for, there is no such limitation on the operation of the provision.”

At [49], the UT gave guidance, as follows:

“49 …Given that 'garden' or 'grounds' are ordinary English words which have to be applied to different sets of facts, an approach which involves identifying the relevant factors or considerations and balancing them when they do not all point in the same direction is an entirely conventional way of carrying out the evaluation which is called for.”

The UT’s decision was upheld by the Court of Appeal in Hyman CoA.

The UT in How UT (Judges Thomas Scott and Brannan) described the evaluative approach to be applied in determining whether land forms part of the grounds of a dwelling, stating at [34] that:

“Neither the Upper Tribunal nor the Court of Appeal in Hyman attempted to give a definition of the word "grounds". Therefore, as the Upper Tribunal held, the correct approach to determining whether land forms part of the "grounds" of a property involves looking at all the relevant facts and circumstances and weighing up the competing factors and considerations, where they point in different directions, in order to reach a conclusion. This is, essentially, an evaluative exercise.”

The UT held, at [46] to [47], that ‘accessibility’ is a factor to be taken into account by the FtT in its evaluative exercise, but difficulty of access, or inability to access an area, does not mean that the land cannot be part of the ‘grounds’ of the dwelling. At [116], the UT adopted the approach suggested in Hyman UT, and endorsed by the Court of Appeal in Hyman CoA, of weighing up all material factors. Having set out the different factors, the UT set out some guidance, at [123]:

“In considering this question, it is important not to divorce from its context the reference by Judge McKeever in Hyman FTT to land ‘being available to the owners to use as they wish’ … The judge was there explaining what she meant by grounds being land which is ‘occupied by the house’, and formed part of her statement, with which we agree, that use need not be active, and nor was it necessary for grounds to be used for ornamental or recreational purposes. Importantly, in that passage Judge McKeever went on to state that it was not fatal that other people might have rights over the land and that ‘a right of way over grounds might impinge on the owners’ enjoyment of the grounds and even impose burdensome obligations on them, but such rights do not make the grounds any the less the grounds of that person’s residence’. Again, we endorse that statement. This approach is in our view consistent with the conclusion in Hyman that it is not necessary for garden or grounds to be needed for the reasonable enjoyment of a dwelling. Since binding authority now establishes that ‘grounds’ are not confined to land necessary for the reasonable enjoyment of a dwelling, it is in our view consistent that third parties may have rights over the grounds or use the grounds, for example under planning or environmental law, without them ceasing to be grounds of the dwelling. Whether or not the land is used for a commercial purpose, which is clearly a relevant factor, is a separate question.”

The FtT had adopted the nine ‘pointers’, listed by Judge Baldwin in Faiers, to be considered when considering whether land forms part of the ‘grounds’ of a building. In Faiers, Judge Baldwin had considered the various cases in which the question of when a particular piece of land can be said to be grounds “of” a dwelling. He said this, at [44]:

“(1)

“Grounds” is an ordinary (albeit a little archaic, at least in the view of some of my fellow judges) English word which has to be applied to different sets of facts. So, in deciding whether a particular piece of land comprises all or part of the “grounds” of a dwelling, it is necessary to adopt an approach which involves identifying the factors relevant in that case and balancing them when they do not all point in the same direction.

(2)

The discussion in HMRC’s SDLT Manual is a fair and balanced starting point for this exercise, but each case needs to be considered separately in the light of its own factors and the weight to be attached to them. Listing them briefly, the factors addressed in the SDLT Manual are: historic and future use; layout; proximity to the dwelling; extent; legal factors/constraints.

(3)

Section 116(1)(b) refers to a garden or grounds “of” a dwelling. The word “of” shows that there must be a connection between the garden or grounds and the dwelling.

(4)

Common ownership is a necessary condition for adjacent land to become part of the grounds of the dwelling, but it is clearly not a sufficient one.

(5)

Contiguity is important; grounds should be adjacent to or surround the dwelling; Hyman.

(6)

One requirement (in addition to common ownership) might be thought to be that the use or function of the adjoining land must be to support the use of the building concerned as a dwelling (Myles-Till). That may be putting the test too high to the extent it suggests that unused land cannot form part of the “grounds” of a dwelling (cp Hyman in the FTT at [62]). Such a requirement must also contend with the decision of the Court of Appeal in Hyman and Goodfellow that it is not necessary, in order for garden or grounds to count as residential property, they must be needed for the reasonable enjoyment of the dwelling having regard to its size and nature.

(7)

In that light, the “functionality” requirement might perhaps be put the other way round: adjoining land in common ownership will not form part of the “grounds” of a dwelling if it is used (Hyman in the FTT at [62]) or occupied (Withers at [158]) for a purpose separate from and unconnected with the dwelling. That purpose need not be (although it commonly will be) commercial (Withers). …”

At [44(9)], Judge Baldwin commented on the level of intrusion into, or alternative use of, an area of land that will be tolerated before it no longer forms part of the grounds of a dwelling as follows:

“At one end of the spectrum, rights of way will generally not have this effect, even when the right is used for a commercial purpose and the existence and exercise of those rights is unconnected with the dwelling. At the other end of the spectrum, the use of a large, defined tract of land (which had historically been in separate ownership) for agricultural purposes by a third party who has rights enabling them to use that land in that way will result in that area of land not forming part of the grounds of a dwelling.”

Similarly, in 39 Fitzjohns, Judge McKeever said this, at [37]:

“(1)

Grounds is an ordinary English word.

(2)

HMRC’s SDLT manual is a fair and balanced starting point (considering historic and future use, layout, proximity to the dwelling, extent, and legal factors/constraints). (3) Each case must be considered separately in the light of its own factors and the weight which should be attached to those factors in the particular case.

(4)

There must be a connection between the garden or grounds and the dwelling.

(5)

Common ownership is a necessary condition, but not a sufficient one.

(6)

Contiguity is important, grounds should be adjacent to or surround the dwelling.

(7)

It is not necessary that the garden or grounds be needed for ‘reasonable enjoyment’ of the dwelling having regard to its size and nature.

(8)

Land will not form part of the ‘grounds’ of a dwelling if it is used or occupied for a purpose separate from and unconnected with the dwelling.

(9)

Other people having rights over the land does not necessarily stop the land constituting grounds. This is so even where the rights of others impinge on the owners’ enjoyment of the grounds and even where those rights impose burdensome obligations on the owner.

(10)

Some level of intrusion onto (or alternative use of) an area of land will be tolerated before the land in question no longer forms part of the grounds of a dwelling. There is a spectrum of intrusion/use ranging from rights of way (still generally grounds) to the use of a large tract of land, historically in separate ownership used by a third party for agricultural purposes under legal rights to do so (not generally grounds).

(11)

Accessibility is a relevant factor, but it is not necessary that the land be accessible from the dwelling. Land can be inaccessible and there is no requirement for land to be easily traversable or walkable.

(12)

Privacy and security are relevant factors.

(13)

The completion of the initial return by the solicitor on the basis the transaction was for residential property is irrelevant.

(14)

The land may perform a passive as well as an active function and still remain grounds.

(15)

A right of way may impinge an owner’s enjoyment of the grounds or even impose burdensome obligations, but such rights do not make the grounds any less the grounds of that person’s residence.

(16)

Land does not cease to be residential property, merely because the occupier of a dwelling could do without it.”

The UT in Suterwalla UT (Judges Greg Sinfield and Ashley Greenbank) approved the summary of sixteen relevant factors drawn from several ‘garden or grounds’ cases, at [18] of its decision.

Section 116(1)(c) requires a connection between an interest or right over land and any building or land within (a) and (b); but the use of the words “subsists for” means that the interest must exist for the benefit of such building or grounds. Rights of others over land does not necessarily stop the land constituting grounds (e.g., a right of way); but at the other end of the spectrum, the use of land for agricultural purposes by a third-party will result in that land not forming part of the grounds of a dwelling.

Land does not constitute grounds to the extent that it is used for a separate (e.g., commercial) purpose. In Hyman FtT, at [62], Judge McKeever said this:

“Land would not constitute grounds to the extent that it is used for a separate, e.g. commercial purpose. It would not then be occupied with the residence, but would be the premises on which a business is conducted.”

The UT referred to this at [14] of its decision in Hyman UT.

Other people having rights over land does not necessarily prevent the land constituting grounds (e.g., a right of way). But on the other end of the spectrum, the use of land for agricultural purposes by a third-party will result in that land not forming part of the grounds of a dwelling: Faiers, at [44]. In Faiers, the presence of a pole and two high-voltage electricity cables crossing a residential property did not create a mixed-use property, despite the electricity distribution network being part of a commercial operation carried on by a third-party.

The cases of Hyman CoA, Myles-Till and Withers are helpful in setting out that it is only land that has a separate purpose, or self-standing function from a dwelling, that can be separated from being ‘grounds’ or ‘garden’; and, therefore, create a ‘mixed-use’ transaction.

In Myles-Till, Judge Citron was considering whether a grass-covered field acquired with - and adjoining - a house and garden in the countryside was part of the house’s ‘grounds’, for the purposes of SDLT. The case contains a useful analysis of the approach to defining “garden or grounds”. In the first instance, the Oxford Dictionary is quoted, as follows:

“an enclosed portion of land of considerable extent surrounding or attached to a dwelling house or other building serving chiefly for ornament or decoration.”

In applying the relevant legislation, Judge Citron said this:

“One must…look at the use or function of the adjoining land to decide if its character answers to the statutory wording in s 116(1) – in particular, is the land grounds “of” a building whose defining characteristic is its “use” as a dwelling. The emphasised words indicate that the use or function of adjoining land itself must support the use of the building concerned as a dwelling. For the commonly owned adjoining land to be “grounds” it must be functionally an appendage to the dwelling, rather than have a self-standing function.”

At [44] to [46], he said this:

“44.

What indicates that a piece of adjoining land has become part of the “grounds” of a dwelling building? Technically, the fact that a dwelling building is sold together with adjoining land, as a single chargeable transaction for SDLT purposes, does not make that adjoining land, necessarily, part of the grounds of the dwelling building: s55 clearly envisages the possibility that the subject matter of a single chargeable transaction will include both residential and non residential land. Common ownership is a necessary condition for the adjacent land to become part of the grounds of the dwelling building – but not, in my view, a sufficient one. To that extent I cannot accept HMRC’s submission that it is sufficient that the adjacent land is available to the owners to use as they wish. One must, in addition, look at the use or function of the adjoining land to decide if its character answers to the statutory wording in s116(1) – in particular, is the land grounds “of” a building whose defining characteristic is its “use” as a dwelling? The emphasised words indicate that that the use or function of adjoining land itself must support the use of the building concerned as a dwelling. For the commonly owned adjoining land to be “grounds”, it must be, functionally, an appendage to the dwelling, rather than having a self-standing function.

45.

This formulation is, I believe, consistent with the analysis in Hyman at [92], provided one reads that paragraph to the end. I accept that the third sentence of [92], read in isolation, looks much like HMRC’s submission in this case about the sufficiency of common ownership, which I have not accepted; but later in the same paragraph the Tribunal stated that land – which I read as land under common ownership and control with the dwelling building – “would not constitute grounds to the extent it is used for a separate e.g. commercial purpose”. I read this as a very similar understanding of the meaning of “grounds” to mine here, in that use for a “commercial” purpose is a good and (perhaps the only) practical example of commonly owned adjoining land that does not function as an appendage but has a self-standing function.

46.

My emphasis on the use or function of the adjoining land, viewed realistically and at the relevant point of time, is supported by the “tree-felling” cases of McInerney and Rockall: it was the use or function of the land that determined whether it was a garden. Quite how the commonly held adjoining land “supports” the dwelling building (in my formulation) will be a matter of fact and degree – ranging from pure ornamentation (simply improving the view from the house) to on-site leisure activities (a horse-riding paddock and stables for use by the housedwellers). I see the HMRC manuals quoted above as, generally, helpful and balanced discussion of the factors indicating whether the adjoining land functions as an appendage to the dwelling or is self-standing.”

The Court of Appeal in Hyman CoA (Lewis, Simler and Snowden LJJ) considered the rationale in Myles-Till.

The case of Withers (Judge Gemmell) concerned a dwelling house and independent annexe surrounded by about 39 acres of gardens, fields and woodlands. A farmer occupied around 20 acres of the property for grazing sheep and a further 5 acres for cutting hay, in return for payment of £800 per year. There was also an agreement with the Woodland Trust, under which it developed around 8.5 acres of woodland on the property. The dwelling was advertised as sitting in landscaped gardens and the fields were hidden from the house. The appellant identified an area of ten to 12 acres surrounding the house which he considered to be the "garden or grounds", and clearly visible from the house. The land subject to the grazing agreement and the Woodland Trust agreement were acquired in stages before coming under common ownership.

At [123] to [126] and [153], Judge Gemmell adopted the reasoning of Judge Citron in Myles-Till, at [44]. The words “of” and “use” indicate that the function of the adjoining land itself must support the use of the building concerned as a dwelling. Judge Gemmell therefore held that the grazing land and Woodland Trust land did not form part of the grounds of the dwelling, and that to be classified as the grounds of a dwelling:

“the use or function of adjoining land itself must support the use of the building concerned as a dwelling.”

The grazing land and Woodland Trust land did not provide that support.

Conversely, in How UT, How Limited argued that the property should have been classified as mixed use because the woodland that was acquired with the property did not subsist for the benefit of the property within s 116(1) FA 2003. The woodland was to the south of the estate and was not readily accessible from the estate. Using the approach suggested in Hyman CoA, the UT found that an extensive area of woodland, for which there was no evidence of commercial exploitation and which offered privacy and security to the dwelling, was part of the ‘grounds’. The UT described the evaluative approach to be applied in determining whether land forms part of the grounds of a dwelling, at [34]:

“Neither the Upper Tribunal nor the Court of Appeal in Hyman attempted to give a definition of the word "grounds". Therefore, as the Upper Tribunal held, the correct approach to determining whether land forms part of the "grounds" of a property involves looking at all the relevant facts and circumstances and weighing up the competing factors and considerations, where they point in different directions, in order to reach a conclusion. This is, essentially, an evaluative exercise.”

The appropriate treatment of land with a residential building, for SDLT purposes, is, therefore, fact-specific. Where a transaction includes land that is not residential property, it is “mixed-use”. The test for residential property is “all or nothing”, meaning that a small element of non-residential use, e.g., rooms of a dwelling house used as a dental surgery, will create mixed use transaction.

When considering whether the Property was wholly residential, or not, all relevant factors must be considered and weighed against each other. No single factor is likely to be determinative by itself. It will be recalled that in Hyman UT, at [49], the UT said this:

“49 …Given that 'garden' or 'grounds' are ordinary English words which have to be applied to different sets of facts, an approach which involves identifying the relevant factors or considerations and balancing them when they do not all point in the same direction is an entirely conventional way of carrying out the evaluation which is called for.”

There is no qualitative limit on the size of the land, nor is there a requirement that grounds be needed for the ‘reasonable enjoyment’ of the dwelling. The Court of Appeal in Hyman CoA said this, at [30]:

“30.

…section 116 is concerned with characterising property either as residential property on the one hand, or non-residential property on the other. That characterisation of property applies generally for the purposes of SDLT; not merely to the availability of one form of relief against tax. Land does not cease to be residential property merely because the occupier of a dwelling house could do without it.”

The balancing exercise must be based on the relevant factors at the time of completion as future use to which the land is put is irrelevant: see Suterwalla, at [48] to [51].

Turning to the circumstances of this appeal:

The Appellant’s position is that the land comprising the various parcels has been used - for at least a decade - for mixed-use. As stated earlier, we had the benefit of hearing the Appellant giving evidence, and we found her to be a credible witness, Moreover, the Appellant’s credibility as a witness was not called into question on behalf of HMRC. We have also had the benefit of considering the documentary evidence, which we also find to be reliable and material to our conclusions below.

We have considered the Chilcroft Heritage Report on the land at Woomancote Place, which was prepared in June 2017 (just before the purchase of the land by the Appellant), and relates to the house and gardens. As can be seen from the report, the house and gardens form a very focused and dense part of the overall parcels of land that were purchased.

A report prepared by Groundsure Agricultural (a third-party independent of the Appellant), was also prepared for the period immediately preceding the purchase of the parcels of land and supports the Appellant’s position on the characterisation of the different parcels of land. The report states, inter alia, that:

“The site comprises predominantly pastoral farmland divided into several fields, with areas of woodland located in the centre, north and the north west. Woodmancote Place is located in the centre west, comprising multiple residential dwellings and ancillary units, with tennis courts to the north. St Peter's Church with an associated graveyard is present in the south west and further residential dwellings with gardens are located in the south east of the plot. Multiple ponds and drains are present throughout the study area... A number of telegraph/electricity poles have been identified on site. It should be noted that features such as these may cause an obstruction to large scale cultivation of that area. The majority of the field boundaries are demarcated with fencing, minor hedgerows and occasional trees. The site lies within the agricultural area of Henfield in West Sussex and within the Low Weald and Pevensey Character Area. The immediate surrounding area has been noted to include further agricultural land in most directions. Brighton Road lies adjacent to the south with further residential dwellings with gardens located beyond. In addition, Blackstone Lane borders part of the eastern site boundary.”

An ariel overview of the land is provided at p. 2 of the report.

The house is substantially surrounded by land, which constitutes fields. These fields have been used for deer and sheep, as well as agricultural use. The land comprising the various parcels has been used, for at least a decade, for mixed-use, and a review of the overall history tends to show that the use has been on such a basis extends back to the original building of property on the land, i.e., it was a farm.

There is also letter, dated 21 June 2020, from the Vendor’s son immediately prior to the sale of the Property to the Appellant. The letter is in the following terms:

“During this time there were equine & farming practices in operation on the property... Part of the equine practice was the production of hay each summer.

The deer park was established in 2010 and I ran the deer park until the land and deer were sold with the property back in 2019. I still help manage the deer commercially with a herd of approximately 200 head.”

A further letter, dated 23 June 2020, from Mr Nigel Scutt who worked as an employee of the Vendor’s family, and then for the Appellant, states:

“Since my tenure at Woodmancote it has been a working farm with horses, deer and sheep grazing at various times regularly through each year even despite the Rampion works which temporarily disrupted the horse farming activities.

Apart from all the farming activities we are obliged by the highways and councils to maintain multiple footpaths which is both time consuming and has required additional specialist farming equipment.”

There is also a letter, dated 8 October 2021, from Ms. Kershaw of CKA Consulting, which explains the commercial use of the land by the prior owner:

“Your home was sold by Mrs Christianne Neilson, a client of mine whom I acted for between 2015 and 2017 in connection with the construction of the Rampion Wind Farm. I agreed terms for the compensation for the cable route running through the farm, this included the payment for the easement together with compensation for the loss of income from the farming activities during the construction period.

In addition to the negotiation with Fisher German Priestner (agent for the Rampion scheme) I also acted for Mrs Neilson on the farming side advising on the Basic Payment Scheme claims submitted to the Rural Payments Agency each year and the ELS (Entry Level Stewardship) Agreement that ran on the farm. The farmland was used for two principal purposes through the tenure of the Neilson family; a deer farm and the breeding of showjumpers. There was also some over winter grazing of sheep from time to time.

The agricultural activities met the requirements of the Rural Payments Agency satisfying the claim for Basic Payment and for the environmental stewardship scheme in operation at the time.”

The authenticity and reliability of these letters and reports has not been called into question by, or on behalf of, HMRC. Having considered the letters against the background facts in this appeal, we are satisfied that we can place reliance on them in determining the use of the Property at the time of completion.

We have found that significant parcels of land at the Property were used for non-residential purposes; predominantly categorised as Grassland relating to Sheep, Rams, Hay fields, Mixed Woodland. There is a long-established history of deer grazing and its commercial exploitation.

Prior to the purchase of the land, the previous owners used the land for commercial deer grazing, as demonstrated by the “Deer Purchase and Management Agreement”, dated 7 January 2019. In her witness statement, the Appellant says this:

“At the time of purchase, there was a commercial deer park run by the son of the owner. We purchased the herd and contracted the existing deer manager to oversee the husbandry of the herd, invoice attached in SDLT Supporting Documents 030723 page 6. The deer park has at least 17 public footpaths and is a registered Sussex walk.”

As stated in the recitals to the Agreement, the Vendor’s son was the Deer Manager who was the owner of over 130 Deer “which are currently located on the Land”; being the land known as Woodmancote Place, Sussex. We have had the benefit of considering the nature and extent of the land used for deer from the Land Registry titles and the Strutt & Parker map. Recital (C) shows that the Appellant purchased the deer from the Deer Manager, and the management of the deer was continued by the Deer Manager. We accept that the land known as the “Deer Park” was being used for non-residential purposes immediately up to the time of purchase, and then the deer were commercially used by the Appellant. In accordance with Clause 5 of the Agreement, its duration was five years.

The management role includes using the deer as a resource for meat (Clause 5.2), and clearing land as may be required for the purposes of ensuring the health and safety of the deer. By virtue of Clause 7, any deer carcasses are permitted to be sold to establishments that distribute venison, and such sale proceeds are used to provide for the deer’s food and any materials used for culling. The Deer Purchase and Management Agreement shows that the appellant was obliged to pay a sum of £30,000, specifically, in respect of deer, following the completion of the sale of the land. The deer grazing has continued following the Appellant’s acquisition of the Property in January 2019. This is demonstrated by the “Deer Farm Tenancy Agreement”, dated 1 March 2020, between Woodmancote Place Limited and the Vendor’s son.

There is a “Sheep Grazing Agreement”, which has an effective date of 1 May 2019. This agreement related to livestock of 200 to 300 sheep grazing throughout the year. The Sheep Grazing Agreement reflects, and formalises the use of the land prior to the purchase of it by the Appellant. Once again, this demonstrates that the relevant land is non-residential where used by the sheep. Whilst the use under this agreement was in May 2019, a short period after purchase of the property, it shows how the land is used and that it is properly classified as non-residential.

We have also found that land at the Property was leased to ROWL and has been the subject of cable laying works. There are legal rights in favour of ROWL. The Vendor had a commercial arrangement with ROWL to enable the supply of power from the wind turbines to run through Woodmancote Place. This arrangement continues for 99 years. The Vendor received a lump sum of £270,000 for access rights. There is a deed of variation which obliges the Appellant to maintain the land for the duration of the lease. The peppercorn rent does not cover the costs for this arrangement.

ROWL have agreed to pay the Appellant for providing tons of soil and the labour that are required to keep the land from subsiding, and to keep it safe for the sheep to graze. The “Compensation Settlement” between ROWL and the Appellant, dated 22 September 2020, is in respect of:

“... soil erosion in Fields 84, 86, 87 and 88 in relation to the cable laying and reinstatement works carried out from 2015 to 2018 in relation to the land shown outlined in red on the attached plan, with a reservation to claim in the future for future disturbance and inconvenience, crop losses and reinstatement to the extent that they arise due to drainage problems and subsidence solely as a result of the cable laying works.”

We are satisfied that the interest conferred on ROWL is a legal easement, which imposes a burden on the Appellant. The reference to “right appurtenant” in s 43(6) FA 2003 is a reference to an easement. Halsbury's Laws of England Real Property and Registration (Volume 87 (2022)) states:

“733.

Easement must be appurtenant.

A person possesses an easement in respect of his enjoyment of some estate or interest in a particular piece of land, and the easement is said to be appurtenant to that land. No one can possess an easement irrespective of his enjoyment of some estate or interest in a particular piece of land, for there is no such thing as an easement in gross. When validly annexed to the land constituting the dominant tenement an easement remains inseparably attached to that tenement so long as the easement continues to exist; the easement cannot be severed from the dominant tenement, nor can estates be created in it apart from the dominant tenement, nor can it be made a right in gross.

An easement which is created for a legal estate is to enure for the benefit of the land to which it is intended to be annexed. Nothing in the Law of Property Act 1925 affects the right of a person to acquire, hold or exercise an easement over or in relation to land for a legal estate in common with any other person, or the power of creating or conveying such an easement.”

Section 187 of the Law of Property Act 1925 provides that:

“Legal easements.

(1)

Where an easement, right or privilege for a legal estate is created, it shall enure for the benefit of the land to which it is intended to be annexed.

(2)

Nothing in this Act affects the right of a person to acquire, hold or exercise an easement, right or privilege over or in relation to land for a legal estate in common with any other person, or the power of creating or conveying such an easement right or privilege.”

The documents before us also include a copy of the “Countryside Stewardship 2021 Mid-Tier Offer Application Form” (filed with the Department for Environment Food & Rural Affairs), which shows that significant parcels of land at the time were used for non-residential purposes, predominantly categorised as Grassland relating to Sheep, Rams, Hay fields, Mixed Woodland. There is also an email from Ms. Copp of AKC (who Farm and Rural Business Advisers). She states, in respect of ‘Woodmancote - Countryside Stewardship Opportunities’, that:

“As the farm is all permanent pasture it limits the options to choose from within the scheme, however I think still worthwhile. Arable land has various cropping alternatives such as bird, nectar, fallow, cultivated plots for ground nesting birds etc which are not available for grassland.”

In relation to the Gardener’s Cottage, if a property is not suitable for use as a dwelling, then it is clear that it cannot fall within s 116. As to the approach to be taken as to whether a property is residential property where it requires repair or renovation, in Mudan (Lewison, Lewis and Holgate LJJ), the Court of Appeal, at [54], said this (in agreement with the UT in Mudan):

“54.

They summarised their conclusions in a lengthy passage at [58] which deserves quotation in full:

“In our opinion, the following points should be considered in determining the impact of works needed to a building on its suitability for use as a dwelling:

…

(2)

Looking at the building as at the effective date, an assessment must be made of the extent to which it has the fundamental characteristics of a dwelling, including the extent to which it is structurally sound. Is it, for instance, a desirable house which has become dilapidated and requires updating, or is it an empty shell with no main roof? Subject to the points which follow, in principle the former is likely to be suitable for use as a dwelling and the latter is not.

…

(5)

If occupation at the effective date would be unsafe or dangerous to some degree (for instance, because the building requires rewiring), then that would be a relevant factor, but would not of itself render the building unsuitable for use as a dwelling.

...

(7)

Applying the principles we have set out, the question for determination is then whether the works of repair and renovation needed to the building have the result that the building does not have the characteristics of a dwelling at the effective date, so it is no longer residential property.”

The Court of Appeal was considering whether SDLT was to be charged at the rates specified in Table A (as modified by para. 1(2) of Schedule 4ZA FA 2003, or Table B in that section. The Gardeners cottage at Woodmancote Place has a separate council tax liability. At time of purchase, it was not used and needed considerable renovations. This matter was not disputed by HMRC.

Having considered all of the information before us, cumulatively, we are satisfied that:

We are further satisfied that:

Having regard to our findings of fact, and having considered the relevant legal principles, the totality of the evidence demonstrates the previously existing (prior to sale) and continued use of the identifiable land parcels are and continue to be non-residential, whilst the house was residential. For all of the foregoing reasons, the non-residential / mixed use property rates apply.

Accordingly, therefore, the appeal is allowed.

This document contains full findings of fact and reasons for the decision. Any party dissatisfied with this decision has a right to apply for permission to appeal against it pursuant to Rule 39 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Tax Chamber) Rules 2009. The application must be received by this Tribunal not later than 56 days after this decision is sent to that party. The parties are referred to “Guidance to accompany a Decision from the First-tier Tribunal (Tax Chamber)” which accompanies and forms part of this decision notice.