Case Number: TC09660
In public by remote video hearing
Appeal reference: TC/2024/02231
INCOME TAX – contractor loan scheme – application to strike out – jurisdiction? – yes - reasonable prospect of success? – no – appeal struck out
Judgment date: 10 October 2025
Before
TRIBUNAL JUDGE NIGEL POPPLEWELL
Between
PATRICK BROWN
Appellant
and
THE COMMISSIONERS FOR HIS MAJESTY’S REVENUE AND CUSTOMS
Respondents
Representation:
For the Appellant: In person
For the Respondents: Mr Daniel Hopkins litigator of HM Revenue and Customs’ Solicitor’s Office
DECISION
INTRODUCTION
This decision deals with HMRC’s application (“the strike out application”) dated 26 September 2024 to strike out the appellant’s appeal against the conclusions reached by HMRC and reflected in a final closure notice dated 15 September 2023, in which they concluded that the appellant’s employment income for the tax year 2010/2011 had been understated by £43,899 (“the closure notice”). Additional income tax of £9,753.60 is therefore due.
It is HMRC’s view that the appellant participated in a “contractor loan” scheme pursuant to which the appellant was remunerated for the services which were actually supplied to an end user via intermediaries; and that remuneration was paid by way of a combination of salary and loan. Tax and national insurance contributions have been paid on the salary element but not on the loan element. HMRC say that the entirety of the sums received by the appellant is taxable on the basis that payments made by the end user to an intermediary and then by way of a loan to the appellant constitute redirected earnings.
In their view, too, the appellant’s grounds of appeal do not bring the appellant within the jurisdiction of the tribunal. Alternatively, the appellant’s case has no reasonable prospects of success.
The appellant does not seriously challenge his involvement with the scheme nor the manner in which he was remunerated for the services which he supplied to the end user. It is his view (in a nutshell) that he received advice that the scheme was both legitimate and effective, and that it is wholly wrong that HMRC, having opened an enquiry in 2012 should have taken so long to have concluded it. Furthermore, he cannot understand why HMRC encouraged him to bring an appeal yet now say that the grounds of that appeal are unmeritorious.
I have considerable sympathy with the appellant’s position. However, for the reasons given later in this decision, I have granted the strike out application.
THE LAW
The relevant law is set out in the Appendix. Words and phrases defined therein bear the same meanings in the body of this decision.
THE EVIDENCE AND THE FACTS
I was provided with a substantial bundle of documents (including authorities). Mr Brown gave oral evidence on which he was cross-examined by Mr Hopkins. I found him to be a reliable and truthful witness and I accept his evidence in all respects. From this documentary and oral evidence, I make the following findings:
In September 2010 Mr Brown was considering starting work as a consultant/construction project manager and sought professional advice and guidance on how to structure the provision of those services.
His accountants advised him that there might be opportunities to reduce his tax burden by entering into a contract with a service provider (for example AML - see below) who would manage client invoicing and payments to him as well as dealing with his tax affairs.
It was Mr Brown’s evidence, which I accept, that the administrative services which were supplied by AML were of considerable importance to him and was as much a reason for using them as was any tax saving.
Furthermore, although AML had produced marketing material concerning the details of the scheme (to which I was taken by Mr Hopkins) it was Mr Brown’s evidence, which again I accept, that such material was not brought to his attention by either AML or his accountants before Mr Brown participated in the scheme.
However, he did accept that by participating in the scheme his effective tax rate was essentially reduced from 40% to 20%.
The way in which the scheme worked was as follows.
The contractor (in this case Mr Brown) entered into a contract of employment with an offshore employer, AML. Mr Brown’s contract was not available but he did not deny that it was similar if not identical to those contracts which I was shown as part of the bundle. The contract specifies an hourly rate of pay and other clauses one would expect in an employment contract. It also refers to an “Employee Handbook” the terms of which are deemed to be incorporated into the relationship between AML and the contractor/employee.
AML also entered into a contract with the end user to supply the contractor’s services to that end user (the “contract for services”). In the case of Mr Brown, the contract is between AML and Accor Afrique and provided that AML would supply the services of Mr Brown between November 2010 and February 2011 at a daily rate of €1,200 for that 74-day period, the total price being €88,800. Substantiated expenses would also be reimbursed.
An offshore trust (“the trust”) was established by an entity associated with AML.
The end client paid AML under the terms of the contract for services. AML then paid the contractor (Mr Brown) a salary based on national minimum wage or a small fraction of the full commercial earnings. That amount was paid under deduction of PAYE and National Insurance. In the case of Mr Brown, the amount of employment income recorded in his tax return for the tax year 2010/2011 was £2,516.
The balance of the amount payable under the contract for services (less an amount to cater for AML’s administrative fees) was then paid by AML to the offshore trustees, who then lent either all or a large proportion of that amount to the contractor.
It is not clear to me, as I did not have Mr Brown’s employment contract, whether his right to that balance was set out in the contract. However, I infer from the evidence, (namely the marketing material from AML, and a letter dated 26 July 2010, which concerns another AML employee in which AML indicate to a mortgage provider that the employee had a contract of service under which the remuneration of £98,000 was to be provided via salary and taxable loan awards) that AML was contractually obliged to pay to Mr Brown that balance by way of a combination of direct salary and indirect contributions to the trust. Indeed, Mr Brown did not gainsay that he had such a contractual entitlement.
The P11D submitted by AML for the relevant tax year records a loan made on 14 February 2011 with a closing balance amount of £43,899 (“the loan”). It is this figure that HMRC have used as the basis for the closure notice.
On 20 November 2012 HMRC opened an enquiry into Mr Brown’s self-assessment tax return for the 2010/2011 tax year and asked him for further information concerning the amounts received by him in connection with his engagement with AML.
A letter dated 22 January 2013 signed by Martin Rissbrook, the finance director of AML Tax (IOM) Ltd, records that the total of the loans made to the appellant in the 2010/2011 tax year was £43,898 and that on 17 May 2011, the same amount of those loans was repaid.
HMRC wrote to the appellant on 4 February 2013 indicating that they would then review the information supplied.
But it was not until 9 August 2022 that HMRC wrote to the appellant in connection with this matter, and that letter talked about his use of a disguised remuneration scheme, and that it was not appropriate to recover underpaid tax from the end user; and so HMRC intended to recover income tax on payments that the appellant had received in connection with the scheme, from him.
This was followed up, on 15 September 2023, with the closure notice against which the appellant appealed on 26 September 2023. On 21 December 2023 HMRC set out their view of the matter (the “view of the matter letter”) and offered a review which was accepted by the appellant on 19 January 2024 and followed up by him three days later with the provision of further information. The reviewing officer upheld the closure notice, and on 26 March 2024, the appellant appealed to the tribunal.
DISCUSSION
Submissions
In summary Mr Brown submitted as follows:
It was HMRC who suggested that he should appeal against the closure notice. So, it now seems wrong that they are suggesting that he has no grounds for that appeal. If they thought he had no grounds for appeal, then why did they offer him the opportunity to appeal in the first place.
There is no justification for HMRC saying that the tribunal has no jurisdiction in relation to his appeal.
He accepted that he had received a tax benefit, but the main reason for using AML was administrative given that he was working overseas and needed someone to deal with his tax affairs.
He believed AML and his accountants when they said that the scheme “worked”. He believed them when they said that the loan was not taxable.
The Rangers decision was released after the tax year under consideration.
HMRC have been guilty of inordinate delay. The first letter he received was in 2012, and it is incredible that in 2025 the matter is still being discussed. This delay was not something which was properly considered by HMRC and in particular by the reviewing officer.
Every time that he has dealt with HMRC, he has dealt with a different officer. His case has been handled inconsistently and there have been errors in documents that he has received.
The loan was repaid and thus there is no liability to tax on it.
The retrospective application of the loan charge legislation in 2016/2017 is relevant to his position yet no mention has been made about it by HMRC other than to state in the review letter that it was outside the scope of the review.
Furthermore, HMRC should have collected any employment tax from the employer (i.e. AML) rather than from himself. They should have exercised their discretion to do so in his favour.
In relying on professional advice, he has behaved reasonably and he should not be penalised for the arrangements which he believed to be effective when he entered into them.
In summary Mr Hopkins submitted as follows:
The effect of the decision in RFC 2012 plc (formerly the Rangers Football Club plc) v Advocate General for Scotland [2017] UKSC 45 (“Rangers”) is that the payments made by the employer to the trust were Mr Brown’s redirected earnings and thus taxable as employment income at the point of that redirection irrespective of whether the loan was repaid or not. The amount of those redirected earnings is the amount of the loan the evidence for which is in the P11D form submitted by AML.
The decision in Hoey v HMRC [2022] EWCA Civ 656 (“Hoey”) is authority for the proposition that this tribunal has no jurisdiction to consider HMRC’s discretion to impose any tax on Mr Brown rather than the employer.
In truth Mr Brown’s case is more akin to a complaint about being treated unfairly than evidencing substantive grounds for opposing the closure notice. This tribunal has no jurisdiction to consider unfair treatment. That is a matter for judicial review or a complaint to HMRC.
The fact that there has been a delay does not give Mr Brown a ground for appeal. Again, this is something which should be pursued by way of a complaint rather than via the tribunal.
There is no justification in the complaints made about the statutory review process which was undertaken wholly properly.
The application of the loan charge legislation is not relevant to this appeal.
The appellant’s reliance on others, and in particular his accountants and AML is not a ground of appeal which falls within the tribunal’s jurisdiction. If Mr Brown believes that he was misled by his advisers, then it is for him to take action against those advisers.
It is for the appellant to show that the closure notice overcharges him, and he has produced no evidence that such is the case.
Accordingly, the appellant’s grounds of appeal are not within the jurisdiction of the tribunal and thus his appeal should be automatically struck out. Alternatively, the appellant’s case has no reasonable prospect of success and should be struck out on that basis.
My view
I do not agree with Mr Hopkins that I must strike out the appeal because the tribunal does not have jurisdiction. Whilst I accept that certain elements of the appellant’s case are not within the ambit of the tribunal (for example the general submission of unfairness, or reliance on his advisers) there are two aspects of his case which are clearly within the tribunal’s jurisdiction; namely his challenge to the technical basis of the closure notice on the ground that he has repaid the loan, and secondly that (not quite as cogently explained by the appellant as this) HMRC have been guilty of inexcusable and inordinate delay which renders it impossible for him to have a fair trial.
I am not, therefore, prepared to strike out the appellant’s appeal for want of jurisdiction. However, for the reasons given below, I consider that there are no reasonable prospects of the appellant’s case or part of it succeeding.
Turning first to his challenge to the technical basis of the closure notice (“the technicalchallenge”). This is brought on the basis that the loan should not be subject to income tax on the basis that it was repaid, and even if tax was due, it should be recovered from the employer.
As regards the first element, HMRC say that the loan reflects earnings which were redirected to the trust by the appellant’s employer (AML). And that Rangers is authority that the charge to income tax on that employment income arises at the point at which that “salary” is paid by AML to the trust.
I agree. The relevant extracts from Rangers are set out below:
“[41] As a general rule, therefore, the charge to tax on employment income extends to money that the employee is entitled to have paid as his or her remuneration whether it is paid to the employee or a third party. The legislation does not require that the employee receive the money; a third party, including a trustee, may receive it…
[58] In summary, (i) income tax on emoluments or earnings is due on money paid as a reward or remuneration for the exertions of the employee; (ii) focusing on the statutory wording, neither s 131 of ICTA nor s 62(2)(a) or (c) of ITEPA, nor the other provisions of ITEPA which I have quoted (except s 62(2)(b)), provide that the employee himself or herself must receive the remuneration; (iii) in this context the references to making a relevant payment ‘to an employee’ or ‘other payee’ in the PAYE Regulations fall to be construed as payment either to the employee or to the person to whom the payment is made with the agreement or acquiescence of the employee or as arranged by the employee, for example by assignation or assignment; (iv) the specific statutory rule governing gratuities, profits and incidental benefits in s 62(2)(b) of ITEPA applies only to such benefits; (v) the cases, to which I have referred above, other than Hadlee, do not address the question of the taxability of remuneration paid to a third party; (vi) Hadlee supports the view which I have reached; and (vii) the special commissioners in Sempra Metals (and in Dextra) were presented with arguments that misapplied the gloss in Garforth and erred in adopting the gloss as a principle so as to exclude the payment of emoluments to a third party.
[59] Parliament in enacting legislation for the taxation of emoluments or earnings from employment has sought to tax remuneration paid in money or money’s worth. No persuasive rationale has been advanced for excluding from the scope of this tax charge remuneration in the form of money which the employee agrees should be paid to a third party, or where he arranges or acquiesces in a transaction to that effect”.
As regards timing, and relevance of subsequent payments by and to the trust, the Inner House held at [61] of Advocate General of Scotland v Murray Group Holdings Ltd [2015] CSIH 77 that:
“It follows that the existence of the trust arrangements and the loans made by trustees to the employee in question were irrelevant to the question of whether there was a redirection of earnings. The redirection of earnings occurred at the point where the employer paid a sum to the trustee of the Principal Trust, and what happened to the moneys thereafter had no bearing on the liability that arose in consequence of the redirection”.
I have found as a fact that the appellant participated in this contractor loan arrangement. He was an employee of AML who supplied his services to the end user. He was entitled to be paid a salary and other benefits by AML as a reward for those services. The work which he undertook was delivered directly to the end user, and payments made by the end user to AML reflected those services. It was contractually agreed between Mr Brown and AML that, subject to a deduction for administrative costs, the amount payable by the end user would be paid to Mr Brown by way of a mixture of salary and benefits from the trust, to which AML would contribute the balance which had not been paid to Mr Brown by way of salary. Both the salary and the balance payable to the trust were payable because of Mr Brown’s exertions as an employee and it was thus employment income. At the moment, therefore, that AML paid the balance to the trust, a tax point arose. At that moment the payment to the trust became “redirected earnings” on which employment tax was due and payable.
This is the case whether or not any subsequent loan by the trust to the appellant was made, and if so whether it was repaid. What happens “downstream” of the payment to the trust does not affect the taxability of the payment to the trust in the first place.
Furthermore, I accept on the authority of Hoey that I have no jurisdiction to consider the exercise of HMRC’s discretion to visit the tax charge on the appellant rather than on AML.
I need to consider whether this technical challenge has a realistic, as opposed to a fanciful, prospect of success. Regrettably for Mr Brown, I do not think that it does. My view is that this ground of appeal has no reasonable prospect of succeeding. In coming to this conclusion, I do not need to conduct a mini trial. Nor do I think that there is any further evidence which Mr Brown could adduce which would assist him if this matter went to a full trial. The technical challenge is “bad in law”. I should therefore grasp the nettle and deal with it at this stage.
However, Mr Brown has another string to his bow. It is that he will not get a fair trial because of the inordinate and inexcusable delay by HMRC (the fair trial challenge”).
Such an abuse of process is something which can be considered by the tribunal (see Nuttall vHMRC [2022] UKFTT 192 (“Nuttall”)).
In Nuttall at [23] it is clear that if, because of HMRC’s delay, a taxpayer has been prejudiced in pursuing his appeal because, for example, relevant evidence has been lost, then a hearing could be unfair to the taxpayer without some remedy from the tribunal.
As set out at [30] of Nuttall “the real question is whether HMRC’s delay has led Mr Nuttall to suffer any prejudice in pursuing his appeal”.
Mr Brown has not made any submissions about the prejudice to his case which HMRC’s delay has caused. He has not submitted, for example, that by virtue of the delay, it has not been possible to collect evidence which is relevant to his appeal.
To my mind, even though the delay between February 2013 and August 2022 is inordinate, and HMRC’s failure to provide any form of update to the appellant (broadly speaking they were pursuing the Rangers and Hoey litigation) might be considered inexcusable, I do not think that the appellant’s appeal has been prejudiced by that delay. It seems to me that he is in exactly the same position now as he would have been if he had pursued his appeal in, say, 2014. It might be possible at that stage to have sought evidence from AML, but in truth I suspect it would have been unlikely that they would have provided any relevant witness evidence, and indeed the contractor loan arrangements which are at the heart of the technical challenge, and which are set out above, are accepted as accurate by Mr Brown. I cannot see what additional evidence might have assisted him had it been available in 2014 and which is not available today.
My conclusion on the merits of the fair trial challenge is the same as regards the merits of the technical challenge. His prospects of succeeding in the fair trial challenge are fanciful and not realistic. There is no further evidence that I can see that might be produced at a trial which might bolster this ground of appeal and improve its chances of success.
I should add, for completeness, that none of the other grounds of appeal (for example unfairness, reliance on advisers, or HMRC’s encouragement to bring an appeal) have sufficient merit as to warrant this matter going forward to trial. They, too, have no reasonable prospects of succeeding.
I have taken the view that I should grasp the nettle and deal with this appeal at this stage. It would be wrong to permit this appeal to go further and take up time and cost when the appellant’s chance of success is fanciful. The appellant’s case has no reasonable prospect of success.
DECISION
I therefore grant the strike out application and declare that the appellant’s appeal is struck out pursuant to Rule 8(3)(c).
RIGHT TO APPLY FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAL
This document contains full findings of fact and reasons for the decision. Any party dissatisfied with this decision has a right to apply for permission to appeal against it pursuant to Rule 39 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Tax Chamber) Rules 2009. The application must be received by this Tribunal not later than 56 days after this decision is sent to that party. The parties are referred to “Guidance to accompany a Decision from the First-tier Tribunal (Tax Chamber)” which accompanies and forms part of this decision notice.
Release date: 10th OCTOBER 2025
APPENDIX
STRIKE OUT
The F-tT Rules
1. The relevant Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Tax Chamber) Rules 2009 (the “Rules” each a “Rule”) are Rules 2 and 8.
2. Rule 2(3) requires me to give effect to the over-riding objective when exercising any power under the Rules. The over-riding objective, as set out in Rule 2(1), is as follows:
“The overriding objective of these Rules is to enable the Tribunal to deal with cases fairly and justly”.
3. Rule 8 deals with strike out:
8. Striking out a party’s case
(1) …
(2) The Tribunal must strike out the whole or a part of the proceedings if the Tribunal-
(a) does not have jurisdiction in relation to the proceedings all that part of them; …
(3) The Tribunal may strike out the whole or a part of the proceedings if—
(a) the appellant has failed to comply with a direction which stated that failure by the appellant to comply with the direction could lead to the striking out of the proceedings or part of them;
(b) the appellant has failed to co-operate with the Tribunal to such an extent that the Tribunal cannot deal with the proceedings fairly and justly; or
(c) the Tribunal considers there is no reasonable prospect of the appellant’s case, or part of it, succeeding.
(4) The Tribunal may not strike out the whole or a part of the proceedings under paragraphs (2) or (3)(b) or (c) without first giving the appellant an opportunity to make representations in relation to the proposed striking out…
(5) …
(6) …
(7) This rule applies to a respondent as it applies to an appellant except that –
(a) A reference to the striking out of the proceedings must be read as a reference to the barring of the respondent from taking further part in the proceedings…
Case law
4. The legal principles which I must consider have been neatly set out in the Upper Tribunal in The First De Sales Limited Partnership and others v HMRC [2018] UKUT 396:
Approach to applications to strike out - legal principles
31 At [30] of the decision, the judge applied the summary of principles set out by the Upper Tribunal in HMRC v Fairford Group plc [2014] UKUT 329; [2015] STC 156 (‘Fairford Group plc’). The Upper Tribunal held (at [41]) that:
“In our judgment an application to strike out in the FTT under r 8(3)(c) should be considered in a similar way to an application under CPR 3.4 in civil proceedings (whilst recognising that there is no equivalent jurisdiction in the FTT Rules to summary judgment under Pt 24). The tribunal must consider whether there is a realistic, as opposed to a fanciful (in the sense of it being entirely without substance), prospect of succeeding on the issue at a full hearing, see Swain v Hillman [2001] 1 All ER 91 and Three Rivers [2000] 3 All ER 1 at [95], [2003] 2 AC 1 per Lord Hope of Craighead. A ‘realistic’ prospect of success is one that carries some degree of conviction and not one that is merely arguable, see ED & F Man Liquid ProductsLtd v Patel [2003] EWCA Civ 472, [2003] 24 LS Gaz R 37. The tribunal must avoid conducting a ‘mini-trial’. As Lord Hope observed in Three Rivers, the strike-out procedure is to deal with cases that are not fit for a full hearing at all”.
32. It was common ground that the application should be considered in a similar way to an application under CPR 3.4 in civil proceedings (whilst recognising that there is no equivalent jurisdiction in the FTT Rules to summary judgment under Part 24).
33. Although the summary in Fairford Group Plc is very helpful, we prefer to apply the more detailed statement of principles in respect of application for summary judgment set out by Lewison J, as he then was, in Easyair Ltd (t/a Openair) v Opal Telecom Ltd [2009] EWHC 339 (Ch) at [15]. This was subsequently approved by the Court of Appeal in AC Ward & Sons v Caitlin Five Limited [2009] EWCA Civ 1098. The parties to this appeal did not suggest that any of these principles were inapplicable to strike out applications.
i) The court must consider whether the claimant has a ‘realistic’ as opposed to a fanciful prospect of success: Swain v Hillman [2001] 1 All ER 9;
ii) A realistic’ claim is one that carries some degree of conviction. This means a claim that is more than merely arguable: ED & F Man Liquid Products v Patel [2003] EWCA Civ 472 at [8];
iii) In reaching its conclusion the court must not conduct a ‘mini-trial’: Swain vHillman;
iv) This does not mean that the court must take at face value and without analysis everything that a claimant says in his statements before the court. In some cases it may be clear that there is no real substance in factual assertions made, particularly if contradicted by contemporaneous documents: ED & F Man Liquid Products v Patel at [10];
v) However, in reaching its conclusion the court must take into account not only the evidence actually placed before it on the application for summary judgment, but also the evidence that can reasonably be expected to be available at trial: Royal Brompton Hospital NHS Trust v Hammond (No 5) [2001] EWCA Civ 550;
vi) Although a case may turn out at trial not to be really complicated, it does not follow that it should be decided without the fuller investigation into the facts at trial than is possible or permissible on summary judgment. Thus the court should hesitate about making a final decision without a trial, even where there is no obvious conflict of fact at the time of the application, where reasonable grounds exist for believing that a fuller investigation into the facts of the case would add to or alter the evidence available to a trial judge and so affect the outcome of the case: Doncaster Pharmaceuticals Group Ltd v Bolton Pharmaceutical Co 100 Ltd [2007] FSR 63;
vii) On the other hand it is not uncommon for an application under Part 24 to give rise to a short point of law or construction and, if the court is satisfied that it has before it all the evidence necessary for the proper determination of the question and that the parties have had an adequate opportunity to address it in argument, it should grasp the nettle and decide it. The reason is quite simple: if the respondent's case is bad in law, he will in truth have no real prospect of succeeding on his claim or successfully defending the claim against him, as the case may be. Similarly, if the applicant’s case is bad in law, the sooner that is determined, the better. If it is possible to show by evidence that although material in the form of documents or oral evidence that would put the documents in another light is not currently before the court, such material is likely to exist and can be expected to be available at trial, it would be wrong to give summary judgment because there would be a real, as opposed to a fanciful, prospect of success. However, it is not enough simply to argue that the case should be allowed to go to trial because something may turn up which would have a bearing on the question of construction: ICI Chemicals & Polymers Ltd v TTE Training Ltd [2007] EWCA Civ 725.
Income Tax (Earnings and Pensions) Act 2003 (“ITEPA”)
5. Section 1 ITEPA imposes an income tax charge on “employment income”. Section 6(1) ITEPA provides that the charge to tax on employment income is a charge to tax on, inter alia, general earnings.
6. Section 7(1) ITEPA states that “employment income” means (a) earnings within Chapter 1 of Part 3 (s.62); (b) any amount treated as earnings; and (c) any amount that counts as employment income. Section 7(3) ITEPA provides that “General earnings” means, inter alia, earnings within Chapter 1 of Part 3 (s.62 ITEPA).
7. Section 9(1) and (2) ITEPA provide that the amount of general earnings charged to tax is the net taxable earnings for the year. Section 13(1) identifies that the person liable to tax on employment income is the taxable person identified in Section 13(2). Section 13(2) identifies the taxable person, in relation to general earnings as the person to whose employment the earnings relate.
8. Section 15(1) and (2) ITEPA provide, in relation to UK resident employees, that the full amount of any general earnings which are received in a tax year is an amount of “taxable earnings” from the employment in that year.
9. Section 18 ITEPA defines the time when an amount of general earnings is received for the purposes of ITEPA. So far as relevant general earnings are received at the earliest of the time when payment is made of or on account of the earnings and the time when a person becomes entitled to payment of or on account of the earnings.
10. Section 62 ITEPA defines “earnings” as:
(1) This section explains what is meant by “earnings” in the employment income Parts.
(2) In those Parts “earnings”, in relation to an employment, means—
(a) any salary, wages or fee,
(b) any gratuity or other profit or incidental benefit of any kind obtained by the employee if it is money or money's worth, or
(c) anything else that constitutes an emolument of the employment.
(3) For the purposes of subsection (2) “money's worth” means something that is—
(a) of direct monetary value to the employee, or
(b) capable of being converted into money or something of direct monetary value to the employee.
(4) Subsection (1) does not affect the operation of statutory provisions that provide for amounts to be treated as earnings (and see section 721(7)).
11. Section 684(7A) ITEPA provides that nothing in the PAYE regulations may be read… as requiring the player to comply with the regulations in circumstances in which an officer of Revenue and Customs is satisfied that it is unnecessary or not appropriate for the payer to do so.
