Serenity Housing Service Ltd v Ofsted

Serenity Housing Service Ltd (“the Appellant”) appeals against Ofsted’s (“the Respondent”) Notice of Suspension, dated 2 December 2025 to suspend the registration of Tulip House Children’s Home under s. 14A Care Standards Act 2000 (“CSA 2000”). The Notice of Suspension was issued under s.20B CSA 2000.

This hearing was listed in accordance with the directions of Judge Khan dated 19 January 2026 after considering the Respondent’s application dated 15 January 2026. This hearing is to consider whether to extend time for the appeal to be made, the completed appeal form and Notice of Decision having been received by the tribunal on 13 January 2026

This was a remote hearing. The form of remote hearing was by video. The documents that we were referred to are in the electronic hearing bundle (75 pages).

The Appellant was represented by one of its directors, Keneisha Foreman, and by its Responsible Individual, Anne-Marie Davies

The Respondent was represented by Toby Buxton. There was an observer from the Respondent, Jack Taylor. He did not play any part in the proceedings.

The Tribunal makes a restricted reporting order under Rule 14(1) (a) and (b) of the 2008 Rules, prohibiting the disclosure or publication of any documents or matter likely to lead members of the public to identify any service users in this case so as to protect their private lives.

On 25 November 2025, Ofsted received information about significant safeguarding concerns relating to a child living at the home as well as further safeguarding concerns. It is not necessary for the purposes of this decision to set those concerns out in full. In the appeal documentation, the Appellant recognises there was a “significant safeguarding shortfall” and notes that a member of staff was suspended and that changes have since been implemented. The Appellant disputes some but not all of what is set out in the Notice of Suspension and has provided some context in the appeal documentation.

The Notice of Suspension was delivered by courier to the registered address of the Appellant company on 2 December 2025. The Appellant says that because this was the registered office address and not the home itself, the notice was not actually received until 5 December 2025.

The appeal was submitted by email timed at 11:35pm on 13 January 2025.

We have adopted the legal framework as set out in the Respondent’s submissions.

Section 21(2) CSA 2000 states:

There is no statutory provision providing for a potential extension of the 28 day period set out in s.21(2) CSA 2000 and The Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Health, Education and Social Care Chamber) Rules 2008 do not contain any powers to extend this time limit – Rule 5(3)(a) allows for an extension of time but only where it does not conflict with the provision of another enactment containing a time limit.

However, the Respondent accepts that the time limit is not absolute.

The Supreme Court decision in Pomiechowski & Ors v District Court of Legunica Poland [2012] UKSC 20 established that an absolute statutory time limit for an appeal must be read in a manner consistent with Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights and therefore that a relevant judicial body must have a discretion to extend time in certain circumstances. Lord Mance stated:

Pomiechowski was applied in a regulatory context by the Court of Appeal in R (on the application of) Adesina & Ors v Nursing and Midwifery Council [2013] EWCA Civ 818 and Lars Stuewe v Health and Care Professionals Council [2022] EWCA Civ 1605. In the latter case, Carr LJ stated at paragraphs 52-54:

Accordingly, in considering whether to permit an appeal to proceed out of time, the tribunal must consider whether the circumstances are exceptional, taking into account all the relevant factors.

S. 37 CSA 2000 provides (as relevant):

We took into account all the evidence that was presented in the bundle and at the hearing. We heard evidence from Ms Foreman and Ms Davies at the hearing. The following is a summary of the evidence that was presented at the hearing (or in written documents) and in no way is it meant to reflect everything that was said or written.

Ms Foreman said she had not received the Notice of Suspension because it was sent to the Appellant’s registered address rather than the home itself. She said the Appellant had difficulty preparing the appeal because they did not have clear communication from the different agencies involved and were waiting formal notification from the Local Authority Designated Officer (“LADO”). She said that this included an external safeguarding concern and the Appellant did not want to submit an appeal before it was confirmed who could investigate. She described it as not simply delay but due to oversight concerns and a lack of due diligence. Ms Foreman emphasised the late appeal was not for a tactical reason but because they wanted to make sure they put the right things in the appeal and did not prejudice any police investigation.

Ms Foreman said that they had limited information about the suspension when it was received and that the information was incomplete. Asked about what information was not contained in the Notice of Suspension, Ms Foreman explained they had not been sure about the police investigation and were waiting to hear back from LADO as to whether they could investigate themselves. As such, Ms Foreman said, the Appellant was not able to provide a proper appeal case. Asked about whether the internal investigation had now completed, she said it had but confirmed it had not when the appeal was submitted. She said they had been concerned about bringing an appeal that might be misleading and noted they did not have the benefit of legal advice.

Ms Davies supported what Ms Foreman said. She said she had been mindful they were leaving it late to appeal and acknowledged that serious safeguarding issues had been raised. She said they had wanted to be able to demonstrate that the Appellant had addressed the concerns raised before submitting the appeal and did not want to prejudice any police investigation, adding that there was some uncertainty over whether the police would be investigating the home itself.

Ms Davies explained she had phoned up the Tribunal Office on the number given in the suspension letter because she was unsure about whether the 28 days period given in the letter was working days. She said she phoned and spoke to someone in the tribunal office but could not recall their name. She could not recall exactly what she was told on the call but said that from what she understood, the 28 days only meant working days. She confirmed she did not contact the Tribunal in writing and had not received any written advice. Asked when the telephone conversation took place, Ms Davies said she was not sure but confirmed it was in the new year. She recalled it as a quick and brief conversation where they did not go into the details of the case.

Mr Buxton on behalf of Ofsted made his submissions. He argued that the Notice of Suspension had been validly served on 2 December 2025 because the bundle contained proof of delivery on that day. In the alternative, he said that even if the Tribunal was minded toconsider 5 December to be the date of service, then the appeal was still out of time. He drew a distinction between the date of service and exceptionality and said that there may be cases where a delay in the notice being considered could impact on exceptionality but it could not change the date of service if it had been served in accordance with the requirements.

Addressing the difficulties raised on behalf of the Appellant, Mr Buxton argued that it was unclear why these would have prevented an appeal being made. He noted the desire not to make an incomplete appeal but stressed that an appeal did not need to be perfectly formed when it was first made. In relation to the intended meeting with Kelly Marchmont, Mr Buxton acknowledged it had not happened because it had been overtaken by events.

On the question of the appeal time limit, Mr Buxton referred the Tribunal to the Notice of Suspension, stressing that the 28-day period was in bold. He acknowledged that Ms Davies might have been given unhelpful information on the telephone and noted that the call might have gone through to someone who was unfamiliar with Care Standards. However, he said this did not amount to exceptional circumstances, saying it could be possible to see it if this was the only potential source of information but it was not, the time limit was clear in the Notice of Suspension. He characterised the circumstances as the Appellant choosing not to make the appeal until later. In so far as this was based on a misunderstanding that did not amount to exceptionality.

Ms Foreman responded, emphasising that this had not been a tactical decision, they had been trying to make the best choice about how to do the appeal. She stressed that the Appellant did not have the benefit of legal advice and said they therefore would not have known the length of time they had to appeal. She disagreed with Mr Buxton’s argument that 28 days could not be interpreted differently and argued that they could not bring the appeal until they had considered the information from the LADO and police. She described the appeal as late by a couple of days and urged the Tribunal to consider the financial and reputational damage to the Appellant of not being able to challenge the suspension.

In response to a question about any future suspensions, Mr Buxton confirmed this would be a different right of appeal. This appeal – and this hearing – only related to the current suspension due to expire on 23 February 2026.

We took into account all the evidence that was included in the hearing bundle and presented at the hearing. This includes the Appellant’s and Respondent’s evidence.

We accept that the Notice of Suspension was properly served on the Appellant on 2 December 2025 when it was delivered by courier to the registered office of the Appellant. The evidence of actual receipt displaces the rule in s.37(3) about deemed service three days after posting. Whilst we accept that the Notice of Suspension may not have come to the attention of Ms Foreman or Ms Davies until 5 December 2025, that does not mean the Notice of Suspension was not served until that date. We also note that the appeal form submitted by the Appellant states that the decision was received on 2 December 2025.

S. 21 CSA 2000 provides that no appeal may be brought more than 28 days after notice is served. Therefore the deadline for the appeal was 30 December 2025. It was not in dispute before us that the 28-day period referred to in s. 21 is calendar days, rather it was argued that the Appellant had been proceeding under a misunderstanding that the 28-day period was only business days (such that the time limit would have then expired on 14 January 2026).

As set out above, in order for the discretion to extend time for an appeal to arise, there must be “exceptional circumstances”. This is a high bar and equates to a situation where “to deny a power to extend time would impair the very essence of the right of appeal”.

In support of the argument for exceptional circumstances the Appellant argues:

Considering the Appellant’s arguments in turn:

None of these arguments amount to exceptional circumstances for the reasons given above. The Appellant’s right to appeal has not been impaired and the Appellant was not prevented from having a meaningful opportunity to bring the appeal in time.

We also acknowledge that the Notice of Suspension was received shortly before the Christmas period which would have meant considering and preparing a timely appeal is likely to have been more difficult than at other times of the year due to the additional bank holidays. However, that does not amount to an exceptional circumstance.

Having concluded that none of these points (either individually or taken together) amount to exceptional circumstances, the discretion to extend time to admit the appeal does not arise. Accordingly, the appeal will not be admitted out of time and is therefore dismissed.

The Appeal is dismissed.

The final hearing on 12 February 2026 is vacated.