Mrs and Mr Chamberlain v Care Inspectorate Wales

First Tier Tribunal Care Standards

The Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Health, Education and Social Care) Rules 2008

2025-01688.EY-W-SUS

2025-01689.EY-W-SUS

Neutral Citation Number: [2025] UKFTT 01517 (HESC)

BEFORE

Tribunal Judge Goodrich

Specialist Member Styles

Hearing by video-link

on 24 and 25 November 2025

Panel deliberations 28 November 2025

BETWEEN:

Mrs and Mr Chamberlain Appellants

-v-

Care Inspectorate Wales

Respondent

Representation

Mrs Chamberlain: Ms Agyekum, of counsel

Mr Chamberlain: Mr Wilson of counsel

Respondent: Mr Edwards, of counsel

Preamble

The panel delivered a short form decision issued on 28 November 2025 in which we confirmed the Respondent’s decisions dated 22 October 2025 and dismissed each appeal. We now provide the panel’s reasoning.

The Appeal

1. By notices dated 4 November and 5 November 2025 each Appellant appeals against the separate decisions made by the Respondent on 22 October 2025 to suspend their individual registrations as childminders for a period of six weeks to 3 December 2025.

2. The right of appeal lies under regulation 45 of the Childminding and Daycare Regulations (Wales) 2010. Each Appellant seeks a direction that the suspension shall cease to have effect. The Respondent resists the appeal and requests that the decisions to suspend registration be confirmed.

Restricted Reporting Order

3. The Tribunal makes a restricted reporting order under Rule 14(1) (a) and (b) of the 2008 Rules, prohibiting the disclosure or publication of any documents or matter likely to lead members of the public to identify any children or their parents.

The Hearing

4. We have before us the main indexed electronic bundle consisting of 988 pages. We need not describe its contents in detail. We were assisted by skeleton arguments from each party.

5. There were no significant difficulties with the video connection at any stage.

6. At the start of the hearing the judge took some time to explain the legal framework to the parties and, in particular, that the Tribunal is not concerned with fact-finding, but with the assessment of risk in the context of the nature, substance and cogency of the allegations made and, if the threshold test is met, the assessment of necessity, justification and proportionality.

7. Although one date has been allocated it became apparent that this would be insufficient. The Tribunal therefore arranged to sit on 25 November 2025 as an additional day.

The Decisions under appeal

The Notice of Decision dated 22 October 2025 addressed to Mr Chamberlain stated:

• “On 22 October 2025, two inspectors arrived at your home to carry out a full inspection of your childminding service. You displayed verbal and physical aggression towards the inspectors in the form of a raised voice and the loud slamming of a door. This behaviour took place in close proximity to two minded children who were present at the premises during the aborted inspection, and who would have been aware of your raised voice and the slamming of the door.

• You demonstrated a lack of co-operation with inspectors on arrival at the property to undertake an inspection. Whilst we acknowledge you stated you were not feeling well at the time, it is of concern that you displayed a reluctance to engage with the inspection visit and initially refused to allow the inspectors access to the premises.

• Despite having completed safeguarding training recently and receiving support from the local authority, you continue to demonstrate a lack of knowledge of safeguarding and understanding of the impact of your behaviour on others.

• The level of aggression you displayed made the two CIW inspectors present, feel threatened by your behaviour. CIW have therefore made the decision to send a referral to Children’s Services.

• Time is needed by CIW to investigate this further and to satisfy itself in relation to your fitness and to establish what steps could be taken to mitigate any risks to children in your care.”

The reason given for the suspension of Mrs Chamberlain was the allegation that on 22 October she failed to demonstrate her ability to safeguard minded children from the risk of harm. The Notice of Decision provided further detail. In summary the Regulator was concerned:

• by Mrs Chamberlain’s lack of transparency in that when asked by inspectors if there were minded children in the house with Mr Chamberlain she told the inspector that there were no children present.

• She was aware that Mr Chamberlain was unwell and had left two children in his care who were of an age where they are entirely reliant on adults to meet their basic needs.

• When inspector were in the premises she witnessed Mr Chamberlain display verbal and physical aggression towards the inspector in the form of a raised voice and loud slamming of a door in close proximity to two minded children who were present at the premises during the aborted inspection, and who would have been aware of Mr Chamberlain’s raised voice and slamming oof the door.

• CIW are not confident of her ability to prioritise the children in her care and to safeguard children from the risk of harm.

The Background and Chronology

8 There is a long history. We summarise the main matters:

i. Mrs Chamberlain was registered as a childminder on 22 September 2004. Mr Chamberlain was registered as a childminder on 8 December 2004. The registered setting is their home.

ii. The full inspection history is set out in detail in the statement of Mrs Williams at paras 10 to 25 (C173-177) and we need not relate this here. On inspection in September 2022 the childminding services provided by the Appellants were rated as “Good”.

iii. On 14 March 2025 Mr Chamberlain’s registration was suspended pending investigation following an allegation that he had assaulted a child in his care. The allegation was that he struck a child behind the ear causing bruising. During this suspension conditions were imposed on Mrs Chamberlain’s registration requiring her not to allow contact by Mr Chamberlain with any minded children.

iv. The outcome of the police investigation was that no further action was to be taken. The Local Authority Designated Officer (LADO) for safeguarding also considered the allegation. The outcome was that the Section 5 Outcome Practitioners Concerns Strategy Meeting found on 29 April 2025 that the allegation was “unsubstantiated”. In safeguarding terms this means that the allegation was neither proved nor disproved. The interim suspension was then lifted on 30 April 2025 by the CIW Securing Improvement and Enforcement panel. The panel decided, and Mr Chamberlain was informed, that a provider meeting and an inspection would be undertaken.

v. In May 2025 Mrs Williams carried out an inspection of the setting. She judged that the service was “Adequate” in Wellbeing, Care and Development, Environment and Leadership and Management. A number of recommendations were made regarding a range of matters, including safeguarding. The report was then issued on 24 June 2025. A challenge was made to certain parts of the report, which we understand was modified in part.

vi. In August 2025 Mr Chamberlain lodged a complaint with CIW about Mrs Williams alleging bias and unfair process.

vii. On 22 October 2025 Mrs Williams and another inspector, Mrs Lerway, sought to conduct an unannounced inspection of the setting. The events of that day led to a decision to suspend the registration of both Appellants and is the subject of the appeals before us.

viii. On 13 November 2025 the Respondent refused to lift the suspension of both Appellants.

ix. On the 6 November 2025, a CIW Securing Improvement and Enforcement panel meeting was convened. The panel decision was to issue Mr Chamberlain a Notice of Intention to cancel his childminding registration as CIW believes the requirements for registration that apply in relation to Mr Chamberlain’s registration are no longer satisfied. The panel decision was to issue a Notice of Intention to cancel the registration of Mrs Chamberlain as CIW are not satisfied that Mrs Chamberlain is able to safeguard children from Mr Chamberlain's unsuitable and unpredictable behaviour. There are no conditions CIW could impose that could mitigate the risk to a sufficient level.

The Legal Framework for Suspension

9 The statutory framework for the registration of childminders is provided under the Children and Families (Wales) Measure 2010 (“the Measure”) provided for regulations to be made dealing with the suspension of a person’s registration. These are the Childminding and Daycare Regulations 2020 (hereafter “the Regulations”) and include:

Power to suspend registration

10. (1) The Welsh Ministers may, in accordance with regulations 41, 42, 43, 44 and 46(8), suspend the registration of any person acting as a child minder or providing day care for children if—

(a) they have reasonable cause to believe that the continued provision of such care by that person exposes, or may expose, one or more of the children cared for by that person to the risk of harm; and

(b) the purpose of the suspension is for one or both of the purposes set out in paragraph (2).

(2) The purposes of the suspension are—

(a) to allow time for the circumstances giving rise to the belief of the Welsh Ministers to be investigated; and

(b) to allow time for steps to be taken to reduce or eliminate the risk of harm.

Rights of appeal

11.(1) Save where the person’s registration has been suspended voluntarily under regulation 46, a person whose registration has been suspended under these Regulations may appeal to the First-tier Tribunal against the decision of the Welsh Ministers—

(a) to suspend that person’s registration;

(b) to refuse to lift that suspension when requested to do so in accordance with regulation 44(2).

(2) Subject to paragraph (3), when determining an appeal under paragraph (1), the First-tier Tribunal may—

(a) confirm the decision of the Welsh Ministers to suspend or, as the case may be, to refuse to lift the suspension;

(b) direct that the suspension is to cease to have effect, and

for the avoidance of doubt, in any case in which the First-tier Tribunal exercises its power under (a) it may also exercise its power under (b) if at the time of making its determination it is satisfied that the conditions for suspension are no longer met.”

12 It is not necessary for the CIW, (or the Tribunal), to be satisfied that there has been actual harm, or even a likelihood of harm, merely that a child may be exposed to a risk of harm. The parties agreed that the definition of “harm” set out in section 31(9) of the Children Act 1989 applies. This provides that harm includes:

“ill-treatment or the impairment of health or development including, for example, impairment suffered from seeing or hearing the ill treatment of another;

“development” means physical, intellectual, emotional, social or behavioural development;

“health” means physical or mental health; and

“ill-treatment” includes sexual abuse and forms of ill-treatment which are not physical.”

13 Suspension may be lifted at any time if the circumstances described in regulation 40 cease to exist. This imposes an ongoing obligation upon the Respondent to continue to monitor whether suspension remains necessary.

14 The powers of the Tribunal are to either confirm the decision or to set it aside. The first issue to be addressed by the panel is whether, as at today’s date, it reasonably believes that the continued provision of childcare by the registered person to any child may expose such a child to a risk of harm (the threshold test).

15 The burden of satisfying us that the threshold test under regulation 9 is met lies on the Respondent. The standard of proof ‘reasonable cause to believe’ falls somewhere between the balance of probability test and ‘reasonable cause to suspect’. The belief is to be judged by whether a reasonable person, assumed to know the law and possessed of the information, would believe that a child may be exposed to a risk of harm.

16 In Ofsted v GM and WM [2009] UKUT 89 AAC at [21] it was said:

“Although the word “significant” does not appear in regulation 9, both the general legislative context and the principle of proportionality suggest that the contemplated risk must be one of significant harm.”

17 Even if the threshold test is satisfied by the Respondent, that is not an end of the matter because the panel must decide whether the decisions are today necessary, justified, and proportionate. The Respondent bears the burden in this regard.

Additional Evidence

18 There were a number of T109 applications before us regarding additional evidence:

• The Respondent: 20 November 2025 regarding a further statement from Susan Williams exhibiting an attendance note made by Ms Dianne O’Rourke of a conversation with a parent (the mother of the two year-old twins who were being minded at the setting on 22 October 2025). The effect of this evidence was that it was considered that Mrs Chamberlain had minded children after 22 October in breach of the suspension order which, if true, is an offence under section 32 (7) of the Measure.

Mrs Agyekum objected to this evidence on the basis that the attendance note was not signed and verified. The allegation could not therefore be tested, and it was deeply prejudicial to Mrs Chamberlain.

• Mr Chamberlain: 21 November 2025, seeking to rely on his further witness statement (dated 20 November 2025) in rebuttal and producing CCTV footage Mr Edwards objected on the basis that the case management directions had not provided for rebuttal statements.

• Mrs Chamberlain: a signed statement dated 21 November 2025 from the mother of the twins to the effect that Mrs Chamberlain had not minded her children since her suspension.

19 We heard various submissions. We decided that all of the above evidence was relevant in the context of the nature of our task, which is that of risk assessment and proportionality as at today’s date, and it was fair to receive the new evidence.

20 The Respondent’s position is that the social services investigation has been completed. The Respondent relies on regulation 40 (2) (b). The Respondent contends suspension is necessary, justified and proportionate to allow time for steps to be taken to reduce or eliminate the risk of harm. The Respondent’s position is that initial steps have been taken in order to eliminate risk because a Notice of Intention to cancel was issued to both Appellants on 6 November 2025. The regulations provided for a period of 28 days for representations before a final decision is made and this has not yet expired. The Respondent contends the threshold test is met and that continuing (interim) protection is proportionate to the risk of harm to minded children.

21 The position of both Appellants is that the threshold test is not met because there is no risk of harm to minded children. Suspension is a draconian measure. The Appellants are fully supported by parents who value their services. It is not appropriate to suspend a registered person pending further decision making and/or the hearing of any future appeals involving substantive decisions. Even if the threshold test is met the decision is disproportionate.

The Witnesses called

22 We heard evidence in the following order. All witnesses adopted their statements as their evidence in chief and were asked questions by the other parties.

Mrs Williams

Mrs Lerway

Mrs Hughes

Mr Chamberlain

Mrs Chamberlain

We will not set out the oral evidence of each witness but will refer to some aspects when giving our reasons.

The Tribunal’s consideration

23 We will not refer to every aspect of the material before us, the skeleton arguments or oral submissions. We have taken all the evidence and submissions before us into account even if we do not specifically refer to every aspect placed before us.

24 We remind ourselves that we are not today involved in finding facts. Our first task is essentially that of a risk assessment as at today’s date in the light of the allegations before us and on the basis of all the evidence before us.

25 We add that whilst in making the decision we stand “in the shoes” of the Welsh Ministers, we are an independent panel making a risk assessment as at today’s date against the threshold set out in Regulation 40.

26 As set out above, the Appellants contend that the events on 22 October do not meet the threshold test. It is submitted that the evidence of Mrs Chamberlain supports that the children could not have heard the verbal dispute between Mr Chamberlain and Mrs Williams. Both Appellants submit vigorously that there is no evidence of substance that the twins were affected, or might have been affected, by what happened. Particular emphasis is placed by Mr Wilson on behalf of Mr Chamberlain to the overall effect that the events of 22 October were bought about by a series of unfortunate events, and to which Mrs Williams had also contributed. It is submitted that the oral evidence supports that the concerns of the inspectors have been embellished or exaggerated.

27 In particular, significant reliance is placed on the submission that the evidence points, at best, to a single incident which must be viewed in the context of the 20-year history and the very substantial evidence as to the satisfaction of parents with the service provided by the Chamberlains.

28 We note that there is a very stark conflict regarding the evidence of Mr and Mrs Chamberlain and that of Mrs Williams and Mrs Lerway but it is not our task to find facts. The assessment of risk is a dynamic process and is informed by the nature, substance and cogency of the oral evidence before us in support of any concerns/allegations or the responses thereto.

29 There are different considerations regarding each appeal, and not least because there is no suggestion that Mrs Chamberlain was verbally or physically aggressive on 22 October 2025. The reality is, however, that although separately registered the Appellants are a husband and wife team, living and working together in the registered setting which is their home.

30 We agree that the threshold test does not involve the risk of harm to inspectors. We also consider that the issues regarding the fact that Mr Chamberlain did not permit entry when first asked do not, in and of themselves, justify a suspension order. We consider that there are important issues regarding the fact that the two year-old twins were left with Mr Chamberlain when he was unwell. However, in our view it is the issue of alleged verbal and physical aggression on the part of Mr Chamberlain that is of key importance in our risk assessment.

31 We recognise the force of the submission made that Mr Chamberlain’s behaviour and attitude on 22 October relates to his “frustration” given the injustice he perceives regarding the “unsubstantiated” allegation in March 2025 and the May 2025 inspection outcome of “Adequate” as opposed to the former rating of “Good”. Mr Chamberlain believes that Mrs Williams is unconsciously biased towards him because he had made a complaint about her. In our view his criticism of the Respondent’s decision that Mrs Williams should be one of the inspectors on the 22 October inspection is not quite to the point when assessing the issue of risk.

32 The overall thrust of the submissions made by Mr Wilson on behalf of Mr Chamberlain, in particular, was that Mrs Williams had played her part in the unfortunate events that morning. Mr Chamberlain effectively said in his evidence: he was entitled to exercise his right to disagree with the inspector in the exercise of his right to freedom of speech, but this has been wrongly interpreted as aggression. It is also strongly submitted that the evidence of Mrs Williams regarding her view of the impact on the children present that morning is exaggerated (“over-egging the pudding”) and based on unreasonable assumptions on the part of Mrs Williams and/or Mrs Lerway that the two-year old twins were exposed to the risk of harm. It is contended that that the children could not have heard Mr Chamberlain’s exchange with Mrs Williams or the door slam because the twins were playing happily and giggling and laughing with Mrs Chamberlain, and with the television on, in the playroom. In his oral evidence Mr Chamberlain agreed that he had a tone in his voice when speaking to the Inspectors but denied that there was any elevated volume. It appears, however, that it was of sufficient volume for his wife to hear him use a swearword to inspectors and to remonstrate with him by calling out “Oi”.

33 The allegation of physical aggression involves the slamming of the door between the kitchen/diner and the hallway which runs along the length of the front room/playroom and leads to the front door. If the inspectors’ evidence is true this was a deliberate and aggressive act on the part of Mr Chamberlain. If the evidence of Mrs and Mrs Chamberlain is true the wind happened to catch the internal door just at the very time that Mr Chamberlain standing face to face with the inspectors said “Patricia, you don’t need to hear this”.

34 We noted that in his statement dated 14 November 2025 Mr Chamberlain said that Mrs Williams said to him on 22 October that he was being verbally aggressive due to his raised voice and that the children could hear. He said in his statement that although their voices (his and Mrs Williams’) were slightly louder than a normal conversation, neither had raised their voice to the level of shouting. He then said (para 27): “I then pushed the dining room door to close it in order to use it as a physical barrier between us and the children who were sat with Patricia in the front room. Unfortunately, because windows and the patio doors were open there was a draught and the door closed shut with a bang.”

35 We noted that Mr Chamberlain demonstrated in evidence that he had put his hand on the door. He was asked by Mr Edwards if it was simply a coincidence that the door slammed at the point he had said to his wife “you don’t need to hear this”? Mr Chamberlain said: “Mrs Lerway was the junior partner. Mrs Williams was trying to edge to the door. I stood my ground. I put my hand out to finger-tip the door frame. I had no intention of slamming the door”. His position is that it was at this very point that the wind caused the internal door to slam shut by itself. Mrs Chamberlain’s position is that she did not see this, but she heard the door slam from the front room and assumed it was the wind that caused this. Mrs Chamberlain told us that this was known to occur and that they used door stop to prevent the risk of injury when any minded child was present. She was unable to explain why a door-stop was not in place that day.

36 We noted that Mr Chamberlain’s own description suggests that Mrs Williams wanted to leave but he “stood his ground”.

37 The Respondent’s case is that the fact that Mr Chamberlain had said “Patricia, you don’t need to hear this” demonstrates his awareness that the altercation could be heard by Mrs Chamberlain. The Respondent also contends that Mrs Chamberlain called out “Oi” when Mr Chamberlain swore at the inspectors which tends to support that she was within earshot.

38 Mrs Williams denied that she was “embellishing the fear factor”. She said that Mr Chamberlain grabbed the door and slammed it. She saw his face. She saw how he grabbed the door. When it was suggested to her that she could not with any confidence suggest that the children had been harmed/exposed to risk of harm she said she could: she left feeling frightened. She said her hands were shaking and her heart was thumping. Asked about confirmation bias she said she would not be making a statement in support of suspension unless it was proper. She had got very few words in with Mr Chamberlain. Her evidence was that from the level and volume of Mr Chamberlain was such there is no way that the children would not have heard. She felt unsafe. She had never experienced that level of anxiety and “feeling threatened” in any situation before.

39 We recognise all the submissions made to the effect that the children saw and heard nothing but were happily playing/watching television and laughing and giggling with Mrs Chamberlain. On the other hand, seasoned and experienced inspectors with years of experience in early years care say that they were frightened by the level of aggression they experienced. Mrs Williams says that when leaving she put her head through to say goodbye to the children and she saw that one of the twins was “wide-eyed” and had a worried look. Her overall concern was that she considers that Mr Chamberlain cannot control himself when he is in a state. She said that both Mr Chamberlain and Mrs Chamberlain did not seem able to see that his behaviour was totally unacceptable in a childcare setting. She denied it was an exaggeration to say that this posed the risk of harm. She said it was a sincere worry.

40 In our view the substance of the evidence before us suggests that Mr Chamberlain’s focus on 22 October 2025 was on his needs, and his need to assert himself when an unannounced inspection visit occurred. We consider that there is apparent substance to the view that his response to the inspectors was not simply because he was unwell that day. There is significant evidence to suggest that he has been unable to come to terms with the “unsubstantiated” outcome regarding the March 2025 safeguarding allegation and is very aggrieved by the outcome of the inspection in May 2025 which he sees as wholly unjustified. He refers to this as “frustration”. In our view there is evidence that suggests that Mr Chamberlain harbours deep anger towards CIW, and towards Mrs Williams in particular. Mrs Williams in her lengthy witness statement described in great detail her concerns regarding the anger directed at her during the feedback session following the May inspection.

41 In our view there is evidence of sufficient substance and cogency to support the allegation that Mr Chamberlain’s behaviour on 22 October when minded children were in the home was verbally and physically aggressive. In our view there is evidence of substance that supports that his interaction with the inspectors on 22 October 2025 was such as to expose minded children to the risk of harm to their emotional and well-being. In our view the substance of the evidence regarding his verbal and physical aggressive behaviour is such that the risk is of significant harm. If what the inspectors say is true Mr Chamberlain’s behaviour was out of control. A child (or a child’s fingers) could have been just the other side of the door which, it is alleged, was slammed shut by him.

42 Mr Chamberlain believes that what happened was not aggression and that a mountain has been made of a molehill. It is not our role to make any findings about the validity of Mr Chamberlain’s view of CIW/ the inspectors. We consider that the evidence regarding the events of 22 October shows that there is substance to the view that Mr Chamberlain has no real insight or understanding of the potential impact of verbal and physical aggression and its potential effects on minded children.

43 Mrs Chamberlain’s oral evidence was that her position was that on 22 October she had not heard, (and has never heard), her husband being angry. She also said what happened on 22 October was due to “frustration.”

44 We noted Mrs Chamberlain’s evidence regarding the telephone call from CIW on 22 October 2025 when she and Mr Chamberlain were informed of the suspension. Mrs Chamberlain’s account in answer to Mr Edwards was that she has not been with her husband at about 6pm when CIW telephoned her regarding the fact that a suspension decision had been made. She appeared very clear and firm in her initial evidence in cross examination that there had been separate telephone calls/conversations: she had not been with Mr Chamberlain when he spoke with CIW. Mr Chamberlain was in the garden, and that she had been in the house with the children with the doors closed when she had been informed of the suspension by CIW in a telephone call to her. However, when then referred to Mr Chamberlain’s account in his witness statement that they had both been present when CIW called, Mrs Chamberlain’s evidence immediately changed. She then said that she and Mr Chamberlain had been together in the conservatory when Mr Chamberlain spoke to Mrs Williams. We noted that Mr Chamberlain said in his oral evidence that when Mrs Williams telephoned he “took the phone off his wife”. Mrs Williams’ account is that Mr Chamberlain starting calling her names, saying that she was “power crazed,” “a nasty woman”, “just had to have things her own way” and she “must have been a very spoilt child”. When asked, Mrs Chamberlain said that the twins had been with her at the conservatory door, playing at her feet. We consider that Mr Chamberlain’s response, albeit over the telephone, was intemperate and inappropriate. In our view the minded children should not have been exposed to this.

45 The events about which Mrs Chamberlain was being asked were only 5 weeks before the hearing. We consider that the change in her oral evidence referred to above raises issues regarding Mrs Chamberlain’s credibility/reliability and also her ability to protect/safeguard minded children. In our view the significance of Mrs Chamberlain’s evidence (as it emerged) is that it shows that there is real substance to the concern that the minded children in the care of Mr and Mrs Chamberlain are not always their first priority, and that children are at risk of being exposed to levels of verbal anger/aggression on the part of Mr Chamberlain in any situation when he feels under pressure or challenged. In our view the significance of the oral evidence before us is that it tends to suggest that levels of anger/aggression shown by Mr Chamberlain may well have been normalised by Mrs Chamberlain.

46 We recognise that there is very significant dispute about all the events of 22 October, and that following a full hearing, different assessment might be reached. However, we are not involved today in making findings regarding disputed facts. We have considered all of the submissions made. In our view the evidence of Mrs Williams and Mrs Lerway appears to be cogent and to have real substance. We consider that the submission that Mrs Williams had made an assumption regarding the exposure to risk to the twins does not address her description of what she felt, as an adult. It also does not address what Mrs Williams said she saw in the face of one of the twins, other than to say that she has exaggerated. Mrs Chamberlain’s evidence was that she heard nothing at all except the kitchen door slam (which she says she assumed was because the wind took it). She denies that she heard her husband swear and also denies that she called out “Oi” to him but this is not disputed by Mr Chamberlain. The overwhelming impression created by her evidence is that there is substance to the contention that, at the very least, she may well be in denial regarding the events that day.

47 Ms Agyekum submitted that the allegation about Mrs Chamberlain’s childminding in breach of her suspension is “spurious”. She made submissions regarding second hand hearsay compared to a first-hand signed statement. As we are not involved in finding facts it is sufficient for us to describe the dispute. On the one hand there is a contemporaneous record said to have been made by Ms O’Rourke, the Team Leader, which relays a conversation on 19 October with the parent regarding the referral to social services that had been made by CIW. It then states:

“….During the conversation, the parent confirmed that their two children have continued to be cared for by Patricia Chamberlain for three days a week since 22 October 2025. She said that this does not take place at Mr and Mrs Chamberlain’s home address, as it is either at her older daughter’s house or another parent has offered their house to be used. The parent hesitated to tell me this, but also stated that it remains her decision about who can care for her children, even though social services had told her that they won’t be able to attend Mr and Mrs Chamberlain’s home for the time being due to the suspension.”

On the other hand, Mrs Chamberlain relies on the signed statement dated 21 November 2025 in which the mother states that she categorically did not say this at all. The twins mother makes the point that she is not a native English speaker and became confused regarding the questions that were put. She said that she had contacted CIW on 20 November to dispute the record of the call which had taken place the previous day. Mrs Chamberlain said in her evidence that the twin’s mother had told her that she had felt bullied by the person she spoke to. She also said in her evidence on 25 November that she had not spoken to the twins’ mother for eight days. This does not appear to make sense because the conversation between the twin’s mother and Mr O’Rourke allegedly occurred on 19 November - just five days before.

48 The relevance of this dispute is that it is one part of the evidence which goes to the Respondent’s position that there is substance to the view that Mrs Chamberlain cannot be trusted to comply with any conditions. It is sufficient to state our view that there is evidence of apparent substance that supports that Mrs Chamberlain has worked in breach of the suspension imposed but we recognise that this is very firmly denied by her and the mother involved. It is in the nature of suspension appeals that it is not our role to make findings of fact or to second guess what the eventual outcome may be in terms of resolution of this dispute. Our assessment is that the issue of whether Mrs Chamberlain worked in breach of her suspension remains an allegation which, if true, is a serious matter.

49 Our overall view regarding the disputed events regarding 22 October 2025 is that there is apparent substance to Respondent’s case that: Mr Chamberlain has little or no insight into the impact of his behaviour and also that, if Mrs Chamberlain has any insight into the impact of her husband’s behaviour, she has not shown it, and/or is unable to act on it. We do, of course, understand her difficulties but the overwhelming impression created by her evidence was that this amounted to simple and serial denials. On any issue of conflict she repeatedly said: “that’s not true”. Her evidence came across as rehearsed and formulaic. This is not, of course, a finding of fact: it simply amounts to an observation regarding the cogency/ substance of her evidence before us.

50 In our view there is cogent evidence that Mr Chamberlain’s behaviour on 22 October 2025 when minded children were in the home was aggressive. In our view there is evidence of substance that supports that his interaction with Mrs Williams and Mrs Lerway on 22 October was such as to pose risk to the well-being of the children present. We recognise the submissions made to the effect that the children saw and heard nothing but were happily playing/watching television and laughing and giggling with Mrs Chamberlain. On the other hand, seasoned and experienced inspectors who also have many years of experience as practitioners in early years care say that they were frightened by the level of aggression they experienced. They each consider that the children would have been affected emotionally.

51 We consider that the substance of the inspectors’ evidence before us, if true, suggests that Mr Chamberlain’s focus on 22 October 2025 was on his needs, and his need to assert himself when an unannounced inspection visit occurred. We consider that there is apparent substance to the view that his response to the inspectors was not simply because he was unwell that day. The evidence supports that he has been unable to come to terms with the “unsubstantiated” outcome regarding the March 2025 safeguarding allegation and is very aggrieved by the outcome of the inspection in May 2025 which he saw as wholly unjustified. Both he and Mrs Chamberlain refer to this as “frustration”. In our view the evidence suggests that Mr Chamberlain harbours deep anger towards CIW, and towards Mrs Williams in particular. When asked by Mr Edwards how he would cope with a future inspection (which will inevitably have to take place if the suspension were lifted) Mr Chamberlain said: “I’ll be able to train myself in the frame of mind that I was unable to do on 22 October”.

52 In our view childminding is a role that presents multiple opportunities for challenge. It is a role that requires, amongst other matters, a patient and steady temperament. Mr Chamberlain’s evidence was that what happened was not aggression and that a mountain has been made of a molehill. We consider that the allegations regarding his conduct are serious. The risk posed by his alleged aggressive behaviour is also a serious matter. We consider that there is real substance to the allegation that on 22 October 2025 he demonstrated angry and aggressive behaviour in circumstances that posed the risk of harm to minded children within the definition of “harm” set out in section 31(9) of the Children Act 1989. We also consider that the evidence regarding the events of 22 October shows that there is apparent substance in the evidence that tends to suggest that Mrs Chamberlain has no real insight or understanding of the potential impact of verbal and physical aggression on the part of her husband and its potential effect on minded children.

53 Our risk assessment is such that we reasonably believe that the continued provision of childcare by Mr Chamberlain and Mrs Chamberlain at the setting to any child may expose such a child to a risk of harm. As we have said, our risk assessment arises in the circumstances that Mrs Chamberlain’s registration is exercised in the home she shares with her husband and she and her husband work together as a team.

54 The Respondent has satisfied us that the threshold is met. The Respondent has also satisfied us that the decisions are in accordance with the law and are necessary to protect the public interest in the protection of the health, safety and welfare of minded children.

55 The Respondent has also satisfied that the interference involved in the decision is justified in pursuit of that legitimate public interest aim, namely, the need to safeguard minded children from the risk of harm. In our view, if the allegations made are true, the risk is one of significant harm.

Proportionality

56 The real issue is proportionality. The exercise of proportionality requires us to balance the risk of harm to minded children at the setting against the interests of the Appellants and the children and families affected. We attach great weight to the protection of minded children from exposure to the risk of harm.

57 We have carefully considered all the matters raised by each Appellants. Suspension is always a very serious matter indeed because of the adverse impact on livelihood, professional reputation and standing. A decision whether or not to suspend is never a decision to be taken lightly.

58 We recognise that Mrs and Mrs Chamberlain have worked together as childminders for over 20 years, as a husband and wife team. We recognise the very serious impact of suspension on the interests of each of the Appellants and have considered their positions separately. Quite apart from the financial impact of the loss of income, Mrs Chamberlain told us of the profound impact of suspension on her health and well-being given her undoubted passion for caring for children. We acknowledge the extremely strong support from parents who are happy with, and trust in, the Appellants’ services, and who are reliant on them. The Chamberlains have strong connections in the community and suspension has reputational impact. There are nine children from seven families for whom they provide childminding. We recognise the impact on families if they are no longer able to use the services of either Appellant. Any suspension order inevitably disrupts the continuity of the care and the established arrangements chosen by families for their children. We bear in mind the significant difficulties that inevitably arise in finding alternative provision, and when vacancies in childminding settings may very well be few and far between. We recognise also that families may well be very hard pressed to find alternative provision which may well be vital to enable them to work. This may well cause significant difficulty in the current economic climate.

59 We balanced Mr Chamberlain’s individual interests and the interests of all others affected against the risk of harm to minded children. In view the risk of harm is such that his personal interests are outweighed by the need to protect children from the risk posed by his aggressive behaviour. We consider that the decision to suspend Mr Chamberlain’s registration is proportionate.

60 We have anxiously considered Mrs Chamberlain’s position which is that she be allowed to continue to mind children in her home under a condition that Mr Chamberlain is not present when she minds children - as she had done in March 2025. There is, however, no provision under the Regulations to enable this panel to impose conditions instead of suspension. The Tribunal’s only power on appeal against a suspension decision is to confirm the decision or direct that the suspension cease to have effect. (As the judge explained during the hearing the Tribunal does have the power to impose conditions (if appropriate) in the event of any appeal against any substantive decision that may be made). Consideration of the prospects that the perceived risk might be capable of being mitigated in a manner short of suspension is, however, a means by which it is possible for the Tribunal panel to mentally cross-check the proportionality of suspension.

61 We have considered all the evidence. In our view, and even leaving entirely to one side the issue regarding Mrs Chamberlain’s alleged breach of the suspension notice, there is significant substance in the concern that Mrs Chamberlain is in denial of the impact of her husband’s behaviour and the risk that this poses to children in her care. In our view the evidence suggests that she was unable to effect any control over Mr Chamberlain’s behaviour on 22 October 2025. There is also substantial evidence that appears to support that she lacks insight. The credibility issues and other parts of her evidence tend to suggest that she has real difficulty in prioritising the interests of minded children, and even her own interests. On the basis of the material before us today we do not have confidence that Mrs Chamberlain has the ability to be sufficiently robust in ensuring that she complies with any condition(s) which the Respondent alone has the power to impose. Looking at the matter in the round we are satisfied on the basis of the material before us today that the decision to suspend her registration is proportionate to the risk against which protection should be provided.

62 Having considered all the material before us, we consider that the need to protect children against the risk of significant harm outweighs the adverse impacts of suspension on each Appellant and the families and children affected by our decisions.

DECISION