M v Ofsted

This is an appeal against the decision made by Ofsted on 10 March 2025 under Section 68 of the Childcare Act 2006, to cancel the registration of the Appellant to provide childcare on domestic premises on both the compulsory and voluntary parts of the Childcare Register.On broad terms the decision was taken on the grounds that the Appellant no longer meets the requirements for registration and she is no longer considered suitable to be a childminder.

The Appellant is a registered as a childminder on domestic premises at a specific location in Newcastle-upon-Tyne. The Appellant has been so registered with Ofsted since 16 January 2013.

The Respondent is the Office for Standards in Education, Children’s Services and Skills (Ofsted) and is the regulatory authority for childcare providers. Amongst other matters, Ofsted’s role is to establish whether the person registered continues to meet the requirements for registration under the Regulations made pursuant to the Childcare Act 2006 and remains suitable for registration.

In summary, Ofsted issued a Notice of Intention (NOI) to cancel registration on 29 January 2025. The Appellant duly lodged her representations/objections on 28 February 2025. Mr Gill, Early Years Senior Officer, responded to the objections by letter dated 10 March 2025.

The essential reasons given were that:

“Ofsted believes that you do not understand your role and responsibilities in all aspects of the Statutory Framework for the early years foundation stage (EYFS), including safeguarding and what this entails. You are unable to take appropriate steps to keep children safe, including meeting the requirements of the EYFS and ensuring that children are cared for in a safe environment

Ofsted has significant concerns about your capacity to meet the requirements of the EYFS. We believe that you do not take allegations seriously and consistently deny that an incident took place at your home on 16 October 2024. Both children involved in the incident consistently say that the incident did happen. We do not believe that you will ensure children’s safety and safeguard them in the event of any allegations or potential abuse.”

The letter then went on to provide give detailed reasoning under a number of headings regarding notification to Ofsted: information about possible knives; discrepancies in who was where in the home; concerns regarding safeguarding and the Appellant’s honesty.

In summary the Appellant contends the decision to cancel registration is not a proportionate regulatory response. Insufficient weight has been given to her extensive experience as a childminder, the isolated nature of this alleged incident; the measures taken by her to protect children from harm and the evidential issues surrounding the alleged incident. In light of the steps taken by her, including no longer childminding the two children involved in the alleged incident, the perceived risk to children is significantly reduced. The Appellant then set out her position under a number of headings. By way of summary particular points include the incident could not have occurred. Her role as a childminder spans over 10 years. She has a solid foundation including a substantial history of good compliance with regulations. The setting has come a long way from inadequate to requires improvement. The last two consecutive inspections rated the setting as Good. She fully understands her role and the obligations and requirements of registration. She relies on testimonials from satisfied parents, and has acted as a foster carer for the City Council. She believes that the incident has not been fully investigated or assessed. Ofsted has presumed it happened as alleged by Child A.

It had already been agreed that two children should be identified as child A and B. However, it appeared to the panel that the family connections might be such that it might be necessary to anonymise the identity of all adults, including all the Appellant’s witnesses, in order to prevent identification of other children to whom reference might well be made. We considered this issue in private session pursuant to our powers under rule 26. As the result of that enquiry a more complete picture of the biological relationships between various adults emerged, some of which had not been previously apparent. It was agreed that the names of all individuals mentioned in the evidence should be anonymised so as to protect the interests of the children involved.

Accordingly, we therefore made a restricted reporting order under Rule 14(1) (a) and (b) of the 2008 Rules, prohibiting the disclosure or publication of any documents or matters likely to lead members of the public to identify any children to whom reference was likely to be made. That order continues.

Consistent with that order we have now decided that we will not set out any addresses/locations and will identify the schools to which we refer as the “secondary school” or “the primary school”.

The legal framework for the registration and regulation of childminders is to be found in Part 3 of the Childcare Act 2006 (“the Act”).

Section 32 of the Act provides for the maintenance of two childcare registers. The first register (“the Early Years Register”) includes “other early years providers” registered to provide early years childcare for children (from birth to the age of five years) for which registration is compulsory. The second register is “the General Childcare Register”. This is divided into two parts: A register which contains those providers registered to provide later years childcare for children aged between 5 and 8 years for which registration is compulsory (“the compulsory part”). A register which contains those providers registered to provide later years childminding/childcare for children aged over 8 years for which registration is voluntary (“the voluntary part”).

Section 68 of the Act provides for the cancellation of a person’s registration in certain circumstances. Section 68(2) provides that Ofsted may cancel registration of a person registered on either part of the General Childcare Register, if it appears:

The prescribed requirements for Later Years registration are provided for by Part 1 of Schedule 2 of the Childcare (General Childcare Register) Regulations 2008 and include that:

The prescribed requirements for “other childcare providers” are provided for by Part 1 of Schedule 5 of the Childcare (General Childcare Register) Regulations 2008 and include that:

The right of appeal against the decision lies under section 74 of the Childcare Act 2006. This provides that (as applicable):

“74 Appeals 

(1)

…..a registered person may appeal to the Tribunal against the taking of any of the following steps by the Chief Inspector under this Part—

…..

(e)

the cancellation of registration.

…..

(4)

On an appeal the Tribunal must either—

(a)

confirm the taking of the step…..or

(b)

direct that it shall not have, or shall cease to have, effect.

(5)

Unless the Tribunal has confirmed the taking of a step mentioned in subsection (1)… (e) or the making of an order under section 72(2) cancelling a person's registration, the Tribunal may also do either or both of the following—

(a)

impose conditions on the registration of the person concerned;

(b)

vary or remove any condition previously imposed on theregistration.”

The Respondent bears the burden of proving the facts and matters on which it relies, including the core allegation that the Appellant is unsuitable. The standard of proof is the balance of probabilities.

The burden of establishing that cancellation is in accordance with the law, and is necessary and justified and in pursuit of a legitimate public interest aim lies on the Respondent. The ultimate issue of proportionality (if that stage is reached) calls for a judgement to be made regarding the balance of competing interests. The Respondent bears the persuasive burden in this regard.

We had received an indexed and paginated bundle (882 pages pdf) which we had read in advance. We had also received and read the parties’ lengthy skeleton arguments. The Scott Schedule (SS) sets out the broad contentions made and the Appellant’s responses. Essentially, the matters on which the Respondent relied in the decision under appeal are mainly denied.

Both parties had made separate applications to rely on further witness statements. Neither party opposed the application of the other side regarding the supplementary witness statements. We agreed that it was in the interests of the overriding objective that we should receive the additional witness statements and documents provided with the application of each party. These are included in a first supplementary bundle of 78 pages pdf which we refer to as SB1.

Apart from the witness statements the Respondent sought to rely on further documents regarding the full regulatory background which had not been included in the bundle. This included documents - such as the actual notification of a significant incident to Ofsted made by the Appellant in October 2024, and the Appellant’s representations to the Respondent’s NOI to cancel. We were informed that the latter was opposed by the Appellant on the basis that the response to the NOI was legally privileged. Sensibly, the Appellant did not pursue this argument. The Appellant’s response to the NOI is plainly relevant and was written in open correspondence. The fact it was provided by the solicitor then instructed does not confer legal professional privilege. It was common ground that the documents in the further bundle were known to each side.

We decided that the contents of the further supplementary evidence bundle (identified as supplementary bundle 2 (SB2)) before us were relevant to the issues and it was fair that we should receive it. We required a handwritten index to be provided for immediate purposes. We directed that the additional documents and index should be provided to the Tribunal administration with a view to the further supplementary documents being uploaded to Sharepoint. This duly occurred. The additional electronic bundle consists of 153 pages pdf.

The Appellant requested that her husband Mr DM, who was there to support her, be allowed to cross examine the witnesses on her behalf. Mr DM said that he felt that Mrs M might be overwhelmed and may not be able to express herself effectively. We rose to enable the parties to liaise so as to agree a rough plan of layout of the house and new evidence. When the hearing resumed Mr DM said that the outcome of the appeal may impact on him. He said that, if he was not given the chance to “acquit myself well”, he would find that unfair.

We had concerns about Mr DM taking on an advocacy role and, in particular, about his reasons he gave. He is a witness in the appeal and is not the registered person. From what we had seen it did not appear to us that Mrs M would be unable to ask appropriate questions herself. We decided that the more appropriate course was that Mrs M should conduct her appeal with her husband supporting her, and that we would ensure that appropriate breaks were taken before cross examination of any of the Respondent’s witnesses. As it turned out the timings were such that, with some adjustment to the running order, Mrs M was able to prepare questions overnight for the key witnesses. During the hearing it was clear to us that Mrs M had prepared structured notes of her questions in advance and she was well able to question the Respondent’s witnesses. Generally, we took more breaks than is usual. We also accommodated every request made by the Appellant for a break during the course of the evidence.

When the time came for the Appellant’s case, and with her agreement, the judge took each witness to the relevant witness statements which were adopted by them as the truth. The judge then asked some introductory/supplemental questions before Mr Saigal cross-examined

According to Ofsted’s records the inspection history is as follows:

In broad summary Ofsted’s concerns in relation to the Appellant’s suitability, and hence the reason for cancellation of her registration as a childminder on domestic premises, fall into three broad categories:

The Appellant’s overall position is that she disputes the facts and matters on which the Respondent relies and maintains that cancellation is not justified and/or is unfair and/or disproportionate.

With the agreement of the parties we heard oral evidence as follows:

Mr Duncan Gill, Early Years Senior Officer, had provided two witness statements. He had been present on the visit with Mrs Popeon 27 February 2024. He was also the decision maker. He attended the hearing throughout. The Appellant said on 2 October that she did not wish to cross examine Mr Gill essentially because her points of challenge had been made to the main witnesses. Further, the Appellant did not call GB to support her character testimonial because Mr Saigal made clear that he had no questions for this witness, and her evidence would be considered by the Tribunal on this basis.

We have taken into account all of the testimonials/references before us which speak highly to the positive experience of parents regarding the Appellant’s care, and also their opinion of her character. We have taken this evidence into account when considering the matters we have to decide.

It is common ground that we are required to determine the matter de novo and to make our own decision on the evidence as at today’s date. This includes consideration of new information or material that was not available at the date of decision which is relevant to the decision made. It is open to any appellant in any given case to rely on evidence to show that the facts were not as alleged and/or to dispute alleged breaches and/or to contend that opinions or views reached were wrong and/or mistaken and/or unjustified and/or that the issues have since been addressed. It is also open to any appellant to show that, whatever the past, there has been a change since the decision made such that the decision to cancel is no longer in accordance with the law and/or is not necessary or proportionate.

The redetermination in this appeal includes consideration of all of the evidence provided by both sides in this appeal, as well as the oral evidence which has now been subjected to cross-examination over a number of days. We have taken into account the character references before us which speak to the positive experience of parents regarding the Appellant’s childcare, and her character, and have weighed this in the balance. We have considered all of the evidence and submissions before us as a whole. We will not set out all the oral evidence but will refer to parts of it and submissions made when giving our reasons. If we do not refer to any particular aspects of the written or oral evidence and/or submissions it should not be assumed that we have not taken these into account.

The key requirement that underpins the statutory framework is that the provider “is suitable”. The concept of suitability embraces an evaluation of matters such as honesty, integrity, reliability, openness, transparency, insight, as well as attitude to the regulator and other agencies. It also embraces the issue of trust and confidence.

As we have said, Mrs M has been registered since 2013 to provide childminding services in domestic premises at the registered location. We are not called upon to decide whether the address with which we are concerned was, by 2024, properly to be regarded as domestic premises and we do not do so. However, the basic facts regarding the family composition and the living arrangements need to be understood in order to evaluate some of the evidence.

Mrs M is married to Mr DM. Together they have four children who, in ascending order, were aged as follows in October 2024:

In or about 2023 the family bought a house in a different area in Newcastle but the house that is the registered location was retained. For ease of reference we will refer to the house purchased in 2023 as the “new house”. On the evidence before us, at the time with which we are concerned, Mr DM and the children lived at the new house. Mrs M lived there too but would also live/stay at the registered setting/address, sometimes with children she was minding overnight, and sometimes not.

The parties were agreed on the rough plan of the registered setting and some further aspects were clarified:

We refer to paragraph 25 above. Whilst the above history is not disputed, the reality is that the Appellant does not agree that some of the past enforcement actions taken by Ofsted (i.e. even prior to 17 October 2024) were justified. In particular, she takes issue with the regulatory actions taken by Ofsted as a result of the visits on 27 February 2024 and 22 March 2024. It is therefore necessary to consider some of these matters, and not least because they provide some background context to the Appellant’s response to the events of 16 October 2024.

It is important to emphasise that in the general scheme of regulation the fact that, at any given point in time, a provision was in breach of the requirements which resulted in regulatory action such as a WRN or a NTI, is but one factor. Breaches of the EYFS and related enforcement taken may often be a reflection of “a moment in time” and may well be effectively remedied and/or otherwise addressed to the satisfaction of the Respondent and/or the Tribunal. The overall aim of the regulations is to ensure that the welfare requirements are being/will be met and that the provider is suitable. However, a history of past concerns is a matter of legitimate concern when considering the issue of suitability. Past breaches and the responses to enforcement action (i.e. WRNs, NTI s and/or warnings) are capable of illuminating the extent to which the provider has the willingness and/or capacity to embed and sustain improvement.

There was an incident in March 2024 when the Appellant’s child PM, then aged 11, took a knife into the secondary school she then attended. There is no reason to doubt that PM did so for reasons that she thought were justified - namely for protection/to warn others off. Mrs M emphasises that PM was being bullied at school. She is highly critical of the secondary school. She considers that her child was let down by the school and that the school failed to address PM’s needs. The fact is that this was a serious safeguarding incident. It should have been reported by Mrs M to Ofsted in line with the requirements of the EYFS because it raised an issue as to whether minded children might be at risk in the home: the child-minding setting in which PM would be present at times. Mrs M did not, however, inform Ofsted that this event had occurred.

The Respondent only became aware of the above incident because it received an email from the LADO on 19 Feb 2024. Ms Pope visited the Appellant to discuss this on 27 Feb 2024 as well as the fact that the Appellant had not notified Ofsted that a referral has been made in 2022 regarding the referral of PrM to Early Help). It is a requirement of the EYFS statutory framework under 3.86 that Ofsted be notified of any significant event which is likely to affect the suitability of any person who cares for, or/is in regular contact with, children on the premises on which childminding is provided.

During the regulatory visit on 27 February 2024, it also came to light that the Appellant had taken on a new assistant (Mrs AS) but she had not carried out sufficient checks to ensure that she was a suitable person. It is a requirement of the EYFS under 3.10 that childminders must ensure that any person who has regular contact with children must also be suitable. A Notice to Improve (NTI) was issued to the Appellant with the following requirement: ‘to ensure that recruitment procedures for new assistants satisfy you that they are suitable to come into regular contact with children, such as seeking references that include their character and past work. The tenor of Mrs M’s explanation to Mrs Pope regarding the absence of references regarding the suitability of Mrs AS to work for the Appellant was that, for various reasons, it was difficult to obtain references. It emerged at the start of the hearing that Mrs AS is, in fact, the sister-in-law of the Appellant. She is married to the Appellant’s brother, Mr TM. This had never been disclosed to Ofsted prior to this hearing. In our view it should have been. The employment of a relative is not necessarily inappropriate but, in the interests of transparency, the facts should be made plain – and not least because it provided an explanation as to why the Appellant had not been concerned regarding the absence of references.

Notwithstanding the breaches of the EYFS regarding the lack of notification to Ofsted regarding PM having taken a knife into school in March 2024, as well as the earlier lack of notification in 2022, Ofsted listened to what Mrs M said about the lessons she had learned and how she would address the risks in future. Specifically, in relation to the knife incident, her proposals involved a knife safe and a padlocked gate to prevent access to the kitchen area by children. Mrs M had also attended a course on knife awareness. Mrs Pope noted that Mrs M had assured her that PM would not be unsupervised in the home. Mrs Pope and Mr Gill considered that it would be disproportionate to take further enforcement action given the steps taken to address future risk.

On 22 March 2024 Ofsted received a further concern about the Appellant, this time from the police who had been alerted by the school that on a visit to the setting at around 9.45am by a family hub worker. Children could be heard within the property but no one was answering the door. The police arrived at around 10am and Mrs M had turned up in the meantime. The police reported that there were six children under the age of 5 years left with an assistant, which the police knew would be a concern to Ofsted as the regulator. Mrs M’s position was that she had to attend a meeting at PM’s secondary school and that this was an emergency. She relies on para 3.46 of the EYFS statutory framework. Her case is that the EYFS permitted this level of ratio as a exception because four of the children were siblings and the other two were the children of the sole childminder. We noted that Mrs AS provided a statement by way of email on 20 March 2025 stating that four of the children she looked after were siblings. Mrs M relies on documentation to the effect that the parents of each child had agreed in writing to the arrangement. This appears to be at odds with the suggestion that the need for Mrs M to be absent was an “emergency” meeting (regarding the exclusion of PM from secondary school) In our view parental consent cannot, in any event, negate the fact that this was a breach of EYFS regarding ratios. Under para 3.43 a maximum of six children under the age of eight may be cared for but provides that, of these, a maximum of three may be under five and there should only be one child under one.

. The police readily, and correctly, appreciated the fact that six children under five years with one childminder was a cause for concern. One only has to ask the obvious question: what would happen if there was a fire requiring emergency evacuation? How could one CM assistant safely evacuate six children under five years?

In our view the decision made by Mrs Pope on 27 March 2024 to issue a Welfare Requirements Notice “to ensure that staff ratios are not exceeded particularly when leaving children in the sole care of an assistant” was more than reasonable and certainly proportionate. The fact that the Appellant still contends that her actions in leaving Mrs AS with six children was justified tends to suggest that she still does not understand the EYFS requirements and does not understand the need to safeguard the safety and wellbeing of children at all times.

The impact of this matter has also to be viewed in the context that the single childminder (Mrs AS) left in charge of 6 children under 5 had only been in post for a few weeks. It also emerged in Mrs M’s oral evidence that the four children (other than AS’s children) were not, in fact, all siblings which was the exception that Mrs M had sought to rely on (but which did not apply in any event).

Mrs M had spent the night of 15 October 2024 at the registered address along with child B. Child B is related to Mrs M: she is her biological niece. Her father, Mr PM is Mrs M’s half-brother.

The Appellant’s case is that Mr DM and BM, PM and DM arrived at the setting (i.e. from the new house), at 6am.

In very broad terms at this stage, child A made an allegation at school on 16 October 2024 that, whilst at the childminder’s that morning, child B had threatened him with a knife and made threats to harm others at school.

Child A and B go to the same primary school and were both in year 6, albeit in different classes. There is active dispute about what was said, when and by whom and/or what weight can be attached to the accounts given by the school and/or by child A and/or child B.

Before we turn to the detail of the evidence we should say straightaway that, in our view, the truth of the allegation that child B had made threats to harm child A or others at school on 16 October 2024 at the setting is not, in itself, determinative of the core issues we have to decide. We say this because in our view a key issue is the response of Mrs M to the allegation made by child B in the context that we need to consider her understanding of safeguarding and her ability to safeguard the children in her care. In our view, irrespective of the truth or reliability of the allegation made, the response by the registered person is of significant importance. This is because it is a fact of life that incidents that raise safeguarding concerns can and do occur in (or in association with) any registered setting. In simple terms, the core issue is whether the regulator can have trust and confidence that the registered person understands the safeguarding issues involved and is able to, and will address, the concerns raised in an open and transparent manner.

There is very significant dispute about the events of 16 October 2024. In particular, the Appellant makes very trenchant criticisms of the primary school, and, to a lesser extent, the LADO. Our role is not, however, to conduct a generalised critique of the various agencies involved but to consider the reliability of the evidence before us and to make findings on the evidence.

In our view it is always important to consider the records of what was alleged to have been said at the time or closer to the events in issue. Experience shows that memory can be unreliable so consideration of any records made near to events are always important. Of course, there might be various reasons why the content of a contemporaneous/near contemporaneous verbal or written account may not, in itself, be reliable. This includes the risk of misunderstanding given any language barriers that might be involved. This is particularly relevant when considering accounts said to have been given by both children and others, at or nearer the time, for whom English is a second or additional language. Our task is to consider all the evidence in the round and to decide what weight, if any, we attach to various accounts given and why.

Mrs M’s case is that the alleged incident could not have occurred because she “had safeguarding in place.” Firstly, because knives are kept in the knife safe in the kitchen area. Children do not have access to the knife safe code. Children also do not have access to the actual kitchen area because there is a locked gate that prevents this. Secondly, her evidence, (supported by Mr DM), is that her husband was always present in the kitchen downstairs and she was also there. Her essential position, supported by Mr DM, is that the alleged incident simply could not have happened, or that, if any incident occurred at all, it must have been with a plastic Samurai sword in circumstances where they did not see, hear or notice it.

Staff at the school each made entries on the child protection online management system (CPOMS). We have studied the accounts given in the sequence in which they were recorded. According to the records made:

At 15.00: the class teacher (“the teacher”) recorded that child A said that at the childminder’s that morning Child B “got a knife and then said she was going to kill him, other children and school teachers”. Child A said that he was worried about this and did not know what (child B) would do. The teacher recorded that he spoke with child A and B together in the corridor. Child B denied that she had said anything to child A that morning. The teacher then asked child A what had happened. He reiterated what he had already told him. Asked if this was true child B said No.

The teacher referred the matter to Mrs Day. We find that she made an entry on CPOMs at 15.44 which includes the following:

We noted that in her oral evidence Mrs Day said that she had spoken to each child separately before speaking with them together. She also said that the children were in the same room at the time they drew their pictures but they were distant to each other. Mrs Day’s oral evidence was that when child A saw what child B had drawn he said “no way”.

In our view the probabilities are that the account recorded by Mrs Day of what Mrs M said, after she (Mrs M) had heard what Child A and Child B had to say, was a reliable reflection of Mrs M’s response at that time. The fact that Mrs M said she would check at home tends to suggest that she was then accepting the possibility that a knife had not been locked away. It appears to us that Mrs M’s position changed at some stage after she left the school.

A particular point taken by Mrs M in this appeal is that she contends that Mrs Day did not speak to the parents before she released both children back into her care. In this regard she relies on the separate emails from the parents of each child to the effect that they had picked up their children from the setting.

The Appellant’s overall point is the children would not have been released into her care if it was the case that the allegation was taken seriously by the school. Mrs M considers that the only plausible reason why Mrs Day released the children to her on 16 October is that she was satisfied with the explanation she had given regarding her safeguarding procedures. In our view, this illustrates a fundamental misunderstanding in the Appellant’s approach to safeguarding. It is not for the recipient of any safeguarding allegation to decide what has or has not happened. In our view it is clear from the evidence of Mrs Day that, having consulted with the IRS, she informed the LADO of the allegation that day.

On 16 October 2025, the Appellant sent an email to Ofsted as follows:

“16/10/2024, I was informed by [the primary school] that my niece who attends the same school is alleged to say words of harm to another child whom I occasionally provide childcare. My niece told the school that it was only a joke and not intended to hurt anyone. The matter was dealt with the school. My niece currently lives with her parents in [location given].” (sic)

We note in passing that this account did not state that the allegation was that the incident had occurred in the setting. i.e. it did not state where “the words of harm” had been said.

The obvious point is that the Appellant did not inform Ofsted that a knife was involved. She referred only to “words of harm”. The Appellant has given different explanations for this. These include the following: in her reasons for appeal she accepted that she failed to mention the knife that was allegedly involved: she was not seeking to minimise the incident or trying to hide information from Ofsted but had wanted to make her initial notification as soon as possible. She had every intention of expanding on the incident when Ofsted responded and got in contact with her to discuss the notification. In the SS she said she “forgot to mention the alleged knife”. When asked by Mrs Pope on 21.11.24 she said that she knew the incident did not happen.

Mrs M’s oral evidence to us was that she intended the email to be “a quick notification”. She also said that when she sent the email she was busy with minded children but this did not appear to make sense given that the email was sent at 21.01 hours on 16 October. On her own evidence, she did not have any minded children staying with her that evening, the last minded child having left at 17.00 hours. She then said she had drafted the email when she was busy with minded children but had sent the draft without checking it. She said that, of her own children, she had her own children (BM, M and DM) with her that evening.

In our view none of these explanations readily account for the fact that Mrs M did not make any mention of a knife in the email she sent to Ofsted on 16 October. Irrespective of any other lack of clarity, this was a glaring omission. Full information could have been achieved in very few words.

We find that the Appellant knew this was the allegation because she heard the allegation from child A at the school and had heard child B admit this. Further, we noted that the Appellant’s notification to Ofsted (which refers to “words of harm” which were a “joke” and “not intended to harm anyone”) is not consistent with the Appellant’s overall case that child A was not to be believed, and that child B was unable to understand what she was being asked or to express herself.

We find that Mrs M did not provide a frank and candid account of the allegation to Ofsted. She knew what the allegation was because this had been stated by child A and admitted by child B in her presence. We find that she deliberately omitted reference to the knife so as to try and avoid any scrutiny of the incident by Ofsted.

It was only by reason of the LADO’s email dated 17October that it was appreciated by Ofsted that the “allegation” involved threats with a knife to another child and to others. The Respondent made the decision to suspend the Appellant’s registration on an interim basis pending further investigation.

The Appellant was informed of the suspension, by phone at 16.57 hours on 18 October 2024, by Mrs Miriam Caldecott, EYRI. Her account in her witness statement is that on hearing that she was suspended, Mrs M immediately became verbally aggressive and shouted down the phone that this was “all lies and it was discrimination and racism” and repeated this over and over.

We accept Mrs Caldecott’s evidence that she contemporaneously recorded the conversation. Mrs M said to her: ‘the child went to school and told them the other child had a knife, the child had a plastic knife, a bread knife’. She said ‘the child can do things like this, I don’t have a knife. The school has stated this. The boy has lied. I have taken all the knives away. The knife was a kid’s plastic knife from IKEA, the coloured ones that is what I use.” She further stated: ‘the African boy is telling lies, this is discrimination and racism, he never wanted to come to me’.

Mrs Caldecott’s evidence is that due to Mrs M’s continual shouting she had to repeatedly remind Mrs M of the Ofsted Code of Conduct. In the event Mrs Caldecott considered that there was no useful purpose in continuing with the call and she ended it at 17.12 hours. Mrs M’s oral evidence was that she was not shouting but that Mrs Caldecott was not listening to her.

At 20.44 hours the same day the Appellant sent an email to Ofsted in which she said:

“I categorically deny that there was a child threatened with a knife under my care. All knives I use stay in a locked safe, OFSTED is aware of this I did not mention specific details of the allegations because the school never shown me the evidence.” (sic) I 175

On 19 October, the Appellant sent a written account to Ofsted by email. Thisincluded the following:

“9.

(In response to Mrs Day’s inquiry on 16 October as to whether B was aware of the incident with PM)… in fact it is (the sister of A’s friend [L]) who wrote a witness statement against PM about the [secondary school] incident, because they were in the same class. [A] could have known PM’s circumstances that way.

“10.

[A] later told us that he did not report the matter to the childminder or her assistants because he felt that he was not in danger but went on to report the matter to his teacher that he was threatened with a knife by child B s grossly irrational and inconsistent.

11.

Again the fact that he refused to disclose to the childminder that he was allegedly threatened by a knife by [B] is highly suspicious and questionable.

12.

it is not the first time that [A] has falsely made allegations against someone. He reported his mum to school for alleged abuse later social services found the mum innocent.

13.

[B] and her brother…came from Zimbabwe recently February 2024, obviously her level of English is very limited and could not express herself sufficiently….

15.

my conclusion is that [A] never wanted to come to my setting from the beginning, in fact he did not want to be separated from his close friend [L]…” (sic)

On 23 October 2024 Ms Dani Taylor, EYRI, carried out a visit to the childminding premises to monitor the suspension. The record of the visit shows that the Appellant alleged that she was being discriminated against ‘because this has happened before’ (i.e. referring to the previous suspension in late 2023). The Appellant and Mr DM told Ms Taylor that they were confused by the reports from school that child A had said that the knife was ‘this big’ and the Appellant made a gesture of about a foot long. Mr DM showed Ms Taylor a plastic Samurai sword which they said was a Halloween prop from a supermarket, and suggested this might be the one as it is the only knife this size on the property.

On 21 November 2024, Mrs Pope carried out a suspension monitoring visit to the Appellant’s home and to discuss the notification that the Appellant had made to Ofsted. When asked why the Appellant did not include the knife in her report to Ofsted, the Appellant stated that this was because she “knew” it did not happen, that she and her two assistants were present at the childminding address that day; the child that had allegedly been threatened with the knife had not mentioned anything to any of them. The Appellant said that the size of knife alleged would suggest a toy Samurai sword her husband had bought for Halloween.

When asked how the Appellant would ensure this incident did not happen again, the Appellant’s husband and assistant Mr DM replied that ‘that kind of child will lie.’ The Appellant and her husband went to say that child A was a ‘troublesome child’ and ‘when they used to sit him with other kids, he would hit them’. Amongst other matters Mr DM said they suspected that child A may have ADHD. The Appellant repeated that child B did not understand what was being asked of her by the Headteacher in relation to the knife, as she has a language barrier.

The Appellant was asked by Mrs Pope where she and her assistants were while the two children were in the kitchen. The Appellant said that “DM and AS were taking care of the babies. That the Appellant was there, and AS was there. At no time did they hear any quarrel” We consider that this was interpreted by Mrs Pope as a statement that Mr DM and Mrs AS were in the living room with the babies but, bearing in mind the risks regarding language, we are not satisfied that this is necessarily a reliable conclusion. The actual words recorded are as consistent with Mr DM being in the kitchen/diner with one baby and Mrs AS being in the living room with her own baby (and her other young child) and/or another baby (or babies).

During her visit on 21 November 2024 Mrs Pope asked to see the attendance register for 16 October. The actual document is not before us but the following appears from the records she made regarding that document at the time:

“[E ] - 8 months arrived 7.30am - 3pm. [Child A] aged 10 arrived 7.15 - 4.30pm. NM explains normally drop off at 8.34am. [Child B] is not recorded on there. Did not record assistants present. [ M] 8 am - 5.30pm aged 1 year. DM states that [AS] was looking after the babies. 5 ch present in the morning before school. LP discussed with NM that she should record when her assistants are present as this would demonstrate that she is meeting staff to child rations. To also record the assistant’s baby when she is present and her niece [child B]. NM agreed”

We noted that in her oral evidence Mrs M said that baby M was not there on 16 October and that the entry re baby M seen (by Mrs Pope) had been made because she had pre-written the register. However, there was no mention of this on 21 November when events were much more recent. We noted also that Mrs Pope referred to the need to record Mrs AS’s baby but did not refer to Mrs AS’s older child. We consider that the observation “5 ch present in the morning before school” is not therefore an accurate conclusion because a combination of the Childcare Sign in form/ and the explanation provided on 21 November was that baby E, child A, child B and baby M were present (prior to departure of some children to school) to which the twochildren of Mrs AS should have been added. That makes 6 minded children at or after 8 am.

We noted also that at Mrs Pope’s visit on 14 January 2025 the Appellant stated that she had been in the kitchen with the children along with her assistant Mr DM and she only went out temporarily when a baby arrived, collected him from the front door, and put them in a highchair in the kitchen. Mr DM said that there were [A], [B], Mrs AS’s two children “and there were two other children.” He said in terms “[AS] was in the living room with her two children and two other children”. A and B were in the kitchen. He did not see any other children come into in the kitchen. He said that his own children were in the kitchen. On any basis this makes six minded children. We noted that Mr DM was saying then that Mrs AS was looking after four children in the living room.

In our view what is notable is that on 21 November the Appellant had said that “DM and [AS] were taking care of the babies.” Very soon after DM said that “[AS] was looking after the babies.”

A different attendance register (Childcare Sign In form), also dated 16/10/24, was produced by the Appellant during the hearing (in the context of her cross examination of Mrs Pope. This was received for its own sake whilst the panel sought to understand the Appellant’s case. For ease of reference, we refer to this as the “new” Childcare Sign In form (i.e. to reflect the fact it was new evidence).

We noted that the new Childcare Sign In form was dated 16/10/24. It set out the details of all of the children that the Appellant told us had attended on that date, and it included her own children as well as the children of Mrs AS. In cross-examination Mrs M said that she had written this document during one of the breaks during the hearing. She said she had used a blank form which she had with her. It finally emerged that the Appellant’s case was that this document was a reconstruction of what the form should have recorded that day. Curiously, it gave times of arrival for the first two children named to the minute: 7.32 and 9.01. In our view the particularity of this detail was very strange if this document had been prepared on the basis that the Appellant suggested. We noted that the second child, named T, had not been mentioned on 21 November when, as we find, the actual Childcare Sign In form relied on by the Appellant on 21 November had been seen by Mrs Pope. We found the Appellant’s evidence to regarding these matters was, to say the least, very unsatisfactory indeed.

We consider that the most reliable evidence of the minded children present on 16 October is the record made by Mrs Pope on 21 November which was based on the Childcare Sign In form she had been given by Mrs M (such as it was). This was supplemented by information given by the Appellant that day. Mrs Pope did not seek or retain a copy of the form. Mrs M said that she still has that document at home, but it was not produced before us.

Mr DM adopted his written statement. This was undated but he said that it was written when “we appealed to Ofsted”. We take this to refer to when the Appellant had provided representations/objections to the NOI i.e. 28 February 2025. Mr DM signed this statement before us. The overall effect of his statement was that he was in the kitchen all morning until the children left to go to school and did not witness any untoward incident between child A and child B. The import of his evidence is that such an incident could not have happened because he would have heard or seen it.

In his oral evidence Mr DM said that when Mrs M returned with the children later that afternoon on 16 October he learnt from her that child A had alleged at school that child B had threatened him with a knife. He told us that when he and child A were standing at the entrance to the kitchen/dining room he asked child A “can you describe the knife?” Mr DM said that child A said that child B threw the knife “over there” pointing in the direction of a three-tiered cupboard (designed in step wise fashion) in the hallway to the left of the entrance to the living room. He said that he then saw that there was a toy Samurai sword on top of the cupboard. He said he did not ask child A whether this toy sword was the item that child B had thrown, although child A was still standing next to him at this point. Asked why he did not do so, he could not say. We will return to consider the weight we attach to his evidence in due course.

In our view other relevant facts are that the children of Mrs M and Mr DM (BM, PM and DM then aged 8, 12 and 19 respectively) were also at the setting. It is to be noted that little or no information had been contained in any of the statements of the Appellant or Mr DM as to who had been looking after the needs of their own children. We noted that Mr DM had told Mrs Pope that his children were downstairs in the kitchen having breakfast but this is not consistent with Mrs M’s evidence. We noted also that the only furniture in the diner area was a table and four chairs.

At the start of the hearing it was apparent to the panel from documents in the bundle that PM and DM have autism but we were aware that DM, aged 19, was with his siblings on 16 October. A natural working assumption was that DM, an adult, was looking after his siblings whilst his father and mother were looking after the minded children.

On the face of the statements that were before us it had appeared that the only attention that had been required for Mrs M’s own children was that Mrs M took up chips for their breakfast. Mrs M confirmed in her oral evidence that she had done this.

It emerged during Mrs M’s evidence that DM, aged 19, has severe autism and is non-verbal. His needs are such that he had, in the past, attended a special school. Mrs M said that the features of his autism are such that he will suffer “meltdowns” from time to time. Having previously attended a special school, in October 2024, DM was attending a college and was due to be collected by taxi that morning.

The significance of the above is that the overall picture regarding who was with whom, where and when in the setting/home left out a very important part of the equation: the presence of the Appellant’s own children, and the extent to which they needed care and attention.

Mrs M said in cross examination that she went upstairs from time to time. We noted her oral evidence that her children were able to come downstairs as and when they wished because it is their home. If the picture presented by her is accurate, her own children, despite their individual needs, did not require any attention (over and above being provided with breakfast and their school lunches being prepared) during the time with which we are concerned.

In our view, commonsense and life experience inform us that on 16 October this was likely to have been very busy and challenging household. On 16 October by 8am there were in the house (at a minimum): 2 babies aged 1 year, 1 child aged 3, three children under 11, 2 children under 16 (both of whom have autism), and an adult of 19 years with severe autism. In summary: 9 dependent children/young persons, three of whom were babies/under five years, and three of whom had special needs. In our view this could be expected to present a range of demands/challenges, and not least in the run up to the departure of most children/young persons present to other venues (excepting the babies): to nursery (BlM) and/or primary school (children A and B, BM) and/or secondary school (PM) and, in DM’s case, to college which he attends three days a week on Mondays to Wednesdays. We take note that 16 October 2024 was a Wednesday.

On the Appellant’s evidence before us from the time of her arrival at 8 am, Mrs AS, as a paid childminding assistant, was only tasked with and/or involved with the care of her own two children aged 1 and 3 years in the living room (until BlM aged 3 left for nursery at about 8.45am). That means that on the Appellant’s own case, she and Mr DM had to deal with the needs of all other children/young persons described above, including DM.

There is no evidence as to the time of the alleged incident. For the sake of completeness, the numbers/ ages of the children in the house in the period prior to the arrival of Mrs AS and her own two children at 8 am was (at least): one baby under one year, 2 children aged 10, and the Appellant’s own children aged 8, 12 and 19, all of whom have autism.

We consider that the essential assertion made by the Appellant and Mr DM that if anything untoward had ever occurred between child A and B they would have seen or heard it is, at best, unreliable.

We noted that on 21 November 2024 Mr DM said to Mrs Pope: “when we heard about the knife this time we knew were in trouble.” (pdf 458)

Much has been said by Mrs M (and by Mr DM when speaking to Mrs Pope) regarding on the reliability of child A and child B, in pursuit of the Appellant’s position that this incident simply could not have happened/did not happen.

Mrs Stead, the Pastoral Lead at the primary school spoke to Child A and B separately on 17 October. We accept that she did so in order to check their well-being and she made contemporaneous notes as to what each child said which are before us. The accounts given by each child are consistent with what each child had said the day before. In particular child B said she took a knife out of the drawer, that she told child A she would kill him, the children and the teachers. She again said it was a joke.

The role of the local authority designated officer (the LADO) is set out in Working together to safeguard children (2018) (Chapter 2 Paragraph 4) and is governed by the local authority duties under section 11 of the Children Act 2004. The LADO does not conduct investigations directly: the role is to oversee the multi-agency process. The LADO’s role is not to investigate, or to find facts, but to consider whether a safeguarding allegation has, or has not, been substantiated in the light of the information before her. The Appellant contends that the LADO’s view that the allegation was substantiated is wrong. Since our task is that of redetermination this point falls away. We have the benefit of a great deal more evidence than was available to the LADO - quite apart from the fact that evidence before us has been tested in a judicial process.

The other point made by the Appellant is that the LADO should have requested an investigation by the police. In our view there is nothing in this point. Again, irrespective of any view that the police may or may not have reached, the fact is that part of our role is to determine what happened on 16 October on the balance of probabilities.

As noted above there was a referral to MASH which resulted in a social care investigation regarding child B in the area in which she lived. Ms MacMahon, the social worker in the MASH team involved, spoke to Mrs GM and Mr PM, the mother and father of child B in November 2024 (see school record at I 51). Mrs GM had said that nothing like this had ever happened before. They said that they had challenged Mrs M regarding the knives and that she had told them they were always kept locked away. They said that child B had initially told her parents she did not do it but had cried and cried and then admitted to doing it. Mrs GM had wanted to apologize to the staff and the other child but the social worker advised against this. The letter from Ms MacMahon to the LADO dated 3 December 2024 (item G supplementary bundle) includes that child B “had confirmed she did fetch a knife from within the carer’s address-it is understood to have been a bread knife and threatened another child when frustrated. She has since been very apologetic and spoken to as to the rights and wrongs by her parents.”

We noted that the father to child B, Mr PM, is a half-brother to the Appellant. Whilst we have been provided with an email from B’s mother confirming that her child was collected from school by Mrs M on 16 October, there is no other first-hand evidence before us from the parents of child B.

By way of overview, our assessment of the Appellant’s evidence is that she repeatedly tended to fail to answer the question posed. Her very lengthy responses tended to go off at tangents. We recognised that this could be due to any number of reasons, including the fact that English is an additional language for her, as well as the stress of giving evidence in proceedings that will determine her future in the provision of childcare. The judge had explained to the Appellant at the start of her evidence, that she should try and focus on the question asked and do her best to answer that question. The judge also explained to the Appellant at the outset, and reminded her on occasions, that the risk of not focussing on the question was that it might appear that she was trying to avoid answering the question.

The overall impression we formed was that the Appellant was very determined to respond to questions at length and in her own way, but without focus on the actual question asked. We considered that the fairest course was to recognise and accommodate the Appellant’s apparent difficulty in answering the immediate question. We therefore afforded the Appellant very ample time and opportunity to explain her perspective in full. We ensured that regular breaks were taken throughout.

The Appellant has challenged the ability of child B’s ability to understand what she was asked and to express herself in the English language. The professional opinion of teachers regarding child B’s abilities has been roundly challenged by the Appellant who placed reliance upon the child B’s SATs results in summer 2025. This led the Respondent to adduce evidence regarding child B’s workbook and this, in turn, led a dispute as to whether the workbook produced in fact belonged to child B.

In our view, the key point is that if child B did not obtain the knife from the kitchen, threaten child A with the knife and threaten to harm other children and teachers, it is very striking that she did not tell her parents that. We noted also that the Appellant relies on an email from Mrs GM to confirm that she had picked up her child on 16 October but she did not set out any parental concerns regarding the extent of child B’s understanding or her ability to express herself.

In her witness statement dated 24 May 2025 the Appellant in the context of dealing with the events on 16 October said:

In our view if this had been said by Child B “that afternoon” (which we find refers to 16 October) then Mrs M would surely have mentioned it in the statement she sent to Ofsted on 18 October 2025. On the evidence before us the first mention of the plastic toy sword by Mrs M and Mr DM was to Ms Taylor on 23 October 2024. We find that Mrs M had told Mrs Caldecott on 18 October that “the child had a plastic knife- a bread knife. I don’t have a knife….The boy has lied. The knife was a kid’s plastic knife from IKEA, the coloured ones that is what I use.”

This is inconsistent with the account in the Appellant’s witness statement dated 24 May 2025 that child B had told her in the afternoon of 16 October the whole thing was a joke and that she had played with the plastic toy sword that morning in the hallway.

Having seen and heard the Appellant give evidence and having taken into account all the disadvantages of giving evidence in an additional language, we conclude that we cannot rely on her evidence in any material respect. In our view she was evasive in her evidence. We consider that the same pattern of evasion and obfuscation, when asked simple questions, was also evidenced in the contemporaneous notes made by Mrs Pope where the Appellant frequently did not give straightforward answers to simple questions asked but went onto a different topic. We find that in her statement dated 24 May 2025 (which she signed and adopted before us) she provided a false and untruthful account regarding an alleged conversation with child B.

We consider that the evidence shows that the Appellant’s overall response to the legitimate concerns during the regulatory process has been to blame and castigate others. During her oral evidence she was highly critical of Mrs Day’s evidence stating that she had made records that were not true, and had added things as well. She was also highly critical of Mrs Pope saying that during her visits she was trying to “fit people around to fit her narrative”. In essence everyone else is at fault or is to be criticised. In summary Child A is a liar and Child B did not understand what she was being asked. The school was at fault and had behaved in a discriminatory manner (although the basis for an allegation of discrimination by the school is unclear and was not put to Mrs Day or Mrs Stead). We noted that Mrs M had repeatedly alleged that Ofsted behaved in a discriminatory manner. She said this many times to Mrs Caldecott when she telephoned Mrs M to advise her of the suspension on 18 October and also said this to Ms Taylor on 23 October.

We noted that in the appeal hearing itself the Appellant drew back from her allegations of racial discrimination against Ofsted and directed her anger to the school.

In her second witness statement (undated but sent on 10 July 2025) the Appellant alleged that there has been collusion and bias between Ofsted and the school in the provision of witness statements provided by the school. In our view these allegations have no merit.

We consider that the evidence of Mrs Day, Mrs Scott, the LADO and Mrs Stead was relatively straightforward. Each witness endeavoured to answer questions to the best of their ability. That said, we have attached greater weight to the actual records made at or near the time rather than those answers which appeared to be based on memory.

We consider that Mrs Caldecott and Mrs Pope were reliable and conscientious witnesses. In our view Mrs Pope approached her role with conspicuous patience and fairness. In our view the regulatory history overall showed that Appellant had been afforded considerable latitude. The notion that Mrs Pope was ill-disposed towards the Appellant is, in our view, fanciful. We place particular weight on the records each made at the time as reliable evidence as to what was said and by whom. However, as shown above, when considering the records we actively considered the possibility of genuine misunderstanding and/or misinterpretation of what was said.

We were very unimpressed by Mr DM’s evidence. In our view the account he gave in his oral evidence regarding his conversation with child A regarding the item thrown “over there” simply did not ring true. It had not been mentioned in the statement he made in February 2025. In that statement he had said only that he had asked child A why he (A) did not tell him of the threat with a knife.

We noted that, when speaking to Mrs Pope on 21 November, he had been very active in seeking to discount the account of child A by reference to adverse comments about his behaviour/character, and by the suggestion that they felt that child A may have ADHD. We consider that he has no proper understanding of safeguarding.

As set out above Mrs AS is the sister-in-law of the Appellant. Mrs AS wrote two emails dated 5 February 2025 and 20 March 2025 (J140 and 141) which formed the basis of her evidence in chief. When asked questions, her responses began with very long gaps indeed, and the answers Mrs AS then gave largely did not address the question asked. She was a very unimpressive witness. The overwhelming impression created was that she was unwilling to answer any questions in case it might harm the interests of the Appellant or her own. We attach little weight to her evidence.

The Appellant has given many and various accounts to seek to explain why she did not mention that the allegation involved threats with a knife. We have found that the fact that the Appellant omitted to mention that a knife was involved in her email to Ofsted on16 October was because she was seeking to avoid scrutiny by Ofsted. Her email to Ofsted and her subsequent account on 18 October were not frank, candid or honest. We do not accept her evidence that her failure to refer to the alleged involvement of a knife was because she “forgot” or because she wanted to give an initial account as soon as possible and expand on it when Ofsted contacted her.

We also find that the events on and since 16 October have shown that the Appellant’s mode of operation in response to the legitimate issues of concern raised has been to seek to avoid responsibility. In our view there is a clear pattern that she has sought to avoid scrutiny, or any consequences, by generally seeking to attribute blame to others.

We find that the Appellant’s account in her witness statement dated 24 May 2025 regarding her conversation with child B regarding the toy Samurai sword was untruthful.

We consider that there is also considerable force in Mr Saigal’s submission that the Appellant has sought to effectively “trample over” all before her in order to protect her own interests.

In our view, a particularly disturbing feature of the Appellant’s evidence before us is the attack she made on the credibility and character of child A. She also sought to undermine the understanding and autonomy of child B.

We are mindful that the outcome of inspection in 2022 and in 2024 was that the provision was “good”. Inspection outcomes are, however, a reflection of judgements made on the day. This much is shown by the fact that between the two positive inspections, regulatory action was required. In any event, experience informs us that, even in a setting where provision has been judged to be good, safeguarding incidents can (and do) arise and the response by the registered person may reveal significant issues. On 16 October 2024 a serious safeguarding allegation had been made. Had the seriousness of the allegation been acknowledged by Mrs M the outcome may have been different. Instead, the Appellant has focussed her efforts on denying the possibility that the incident had ever occurred by attacking the credibility and reliability of everyone who was involved. In our view her response to what each child said was, and remains, disturbing. The Appellant’s evidence as a whole shows that she has no real understanding of what safeguarding is or what it involves. In our view the manner in which Mrs M approached the issues after she left the school shows that her entire focus has been on the protection of her own interests. We have found that her notification to Ofsted on 16 October was not frank, candid or honest. Further, we find the Appellant and Mr DM have put forward a false and untruthful narrative regarding the toy plastic sword in continued efforts to avoid the potential consequences involved for the Appellant’s registration.

The Respondent has satisfied us that it is more likely than not that on 16 October child B did obtain a bladed, and metal, knife from the kitchen at the setting and made threats to harm child A and other children and teachers at school. As serious as this incident was, as we have said, it is the Appellant’s attitude to the fact of the allegation that illuminates the issue of her suitability to be a registered childminder. Mrs M contends that it is disproportionate to cancel her registration on the basis of an “isolated” (alleged) incident. She contends that the “perceived risk” to children is significantly reduced because the children involved are no longer minded by her. In our view this shows a startling lack of insight or understanding. Her core attitude is that safeguarding incidents are the fault of children, and she bears no responsibility.

We find that her response to this incident shows that she does not have any real understanding of what is involved in safeguarding. Given our findings we have no confidence that she would recognise and/or act on any incident arising that might require referral.

Mrs M contends that the proposed installation of CCTV will reduce the risks. In our view CCTV is not likely to reduce the risks of any safeguarding incident occurring: at best it may simply provide evidence in future as to what has, or has, not occurred. (This is dependent, however, on a number of operational factors under the control of the setting.) Further, CCTV does not reduce the need for adequate supervision of children at all times.

In any event, the core matter is our conclusion that the Appellant cannot be trusted to safeguard the interests of children in her care. We have also found that she cannot be trusted to be candid, frank and honest with the regulator.

The Respondent has satisfied us on the balance of probabilities that the Appellant is not suitable to be registered as a childminder.

We find that:

Section 74 precludes the imposition of conditions in the context of a finding of unsuitability. For the avoidance of any doubt, we should say that for the reasons we have given, we do not accept that the Appellant has the ability, or could be trusted, to sustain any change/improvement under conditions. She is unsuitable to remain registered.

We have balanced the impact of the decision upon the Appellant and all concerned against the public interest. We consider that the facets of the public interest engaged far outweigh the interests of the Appellant and all those affected, including Mr DM, Mrs AS, and the families affected. In our view the decision to cancel registration was (and remains) reasonable, necessary and proportionate.