Daniel Hill v South Cambridgeshire District Council

This appeal concerns a decision of South Cambridgeshire District Council (the “Council”) dated 30 June 2025 (the “Decision”) under the Assets of Community Value (England) Regulations 2012 (the “Regulations”). The Decision was following a compensation review in connection with a claim for compensation in respect of Mr Hill’s legal fees in relation to a previous unsuccessful appeal in this Tribunal (the “First Appeal”). The First Appeal was against the Council’s decision to list land owned by Mr & Mrs Hill as an Asset of Community Value (“ACV”).

Mr & Mrs Hill purchased land adjacent to 28 Badcock Road, Haslingfield, Cambridge (the “Land”) at auction in October 2023.

The Land was nominated as an ACV by Haslingfield Parish Council on 20 October 2023. The Council subsequently made a determination to list the Land as an ACV on 12 December 2023.

Mrs Hill requested an internal review by the Council of that determination. A review hearing took place on 19 March 2024 and the Council made its decision on that review on 25 March 2024, confirming the listing.

On 19 April 2024, Mr Hill filed a notice of appeal with the Tribunal in relation to the in the First Appeal, which was dealt with under appeal number FT/CR/2024/0001. The First Appeal was unsuccessful and was dismissed on 11 February 2025.

In relation to Mr Hill’s subsequent claim for compensation for his legal fees, the background is as follows:

After filing this appeal, Mr Hill wrote to the Tribunal on 22 August 2025 asking it to add to this appeal a further compensation claim he made between May and July 2025 to the Council in relation to costs for fencing the Land. No formal application was ever made to this effect, but it appears to me that prior to the request no formal determination under Regulation 14 or compensation review was issued which would have given a right of appeal in connection with this claim under Regulation 17. The Tribunal therefore had no jurisdiction to consider the later compensation claim in relation to the fencing. Accordingly, in this appeal, the Tribunal is concerned only with Mr Hill’s claim for compensation in relation to his legal fees for the First Appeal.

The hearing was conducted by Cloud Video Platform. The Tribunal was satisfied it was fair and just to proceed in this way. Mr Hill initially had some connectivity issues, but these were resolved before the hearing started.

The Tribunal considered a bundle of documents prepared by the Council (1406 pages) and, as this was not agreed, a separate bundle submitted by Mr Hill (389 pages) and a supplemental bundle submitted by the Council the day before the hearing (107 pages). The Council also submitted an authorities bundle (730 pages).

As a preliminary issue, the Tribunal needed to decide Mr Hill’s application to substitute the bundle he had prepared for that submitted by the Council. The reason provided by Mr Hill was that although the key documents on which he relied appeared in the Respondent’s bundle as part of the correspondence history, they were not identified and presented as such. Mr Hill’s bundle identified what he considered to be the key documents (in his application he highlighted a number of key points which he considered particularly important) and he submitted that this avoids requiring the Tribunal to search through thousands of pages to locate material documents. From the Tribunal’s perspective, the key point is that the relevant documents need to be before the Tribunal; the way in which they are presented in the bundle or described in the index is not something which carries any weight in the Tribunal’s decision because the Tribunal will read the documents themselves in advance of the hearing. The parties can then make any submissions by reference to documents in a common bundle in order to highlight the points they say are important.

As I had read both bundles, although there was some duplication between them, I decided that it was in the interests of justice for all the material submitted to be before it and accepted both bundles. In reaching this decision, I had regard to the overriding objective, particularly avoiding unnecessary formality and seeking flexibility in the proceedings and ensuring, so far as practicable, that the parties are able to participate fully in the proceedings. I concluded that in Mr Hill’s particular circumstances, it was a reasonable adjustment to allow him to work from the bundle he had prepared. In this decision, where a document appears in both bundles, I have used the page references in the Council’s bundle for ease of location as Mr Hill’s bundle was not paginated.

As Mr Hill’s bundle had not been received prior to the hearing by the Council, due to the size of the file involved, Mr Adamyk took a screen shot of the index to it during the hearing. When a document was referred to during the hearing I provided page numbers for the document in both bundles, ensuring that both parties were looking at the same document in order to be fair to both.

The Council made an application for late evidence, in relation to the witness statement of Ms Emma Dyer dated 9 June 2026. This was not opposed by Mr Hill. As one of the key points on which Mr Hill relies is an oral communication with Ms Dyer, it appeared to me that this late evidence provides information which is relevant to the matters the Tribunal has to decide. Accordingly, I considered it was in the interests of justice to admit it and added it to the bundle.

Mr Hill appealed the Decision to the Tribunal by form GRC1 dated 26 June 2025. At the point of filing this appeal, no compensation review had been undertaken. He said that the Council had breached Regulation 16 by failing to conduct a compensation review. The outcome sought was a direction from the Tribunal that the Council must carry out an internal review or consider the matter itself.

In the absence of a review decision, the Tribunal’s Registrar directed on 1 September 2025 that Mr Hill provide submissions on the law which gives the Tribunal the power to direct the Council to conduct a review and/or why the appeal should not be struck out for want of jurisdiction. Following filing of Mr Hill’s response to this on 31 October 2025, I directed on 21 January 2026 that the matter should proceed as an appeal under Regulation 17 of the Council’s decision not to pay compensation, as it appeared to me that this was Mr Hill’s intention and it was in accordance with the overriding objective to be flexible so as to allow Mr Hill to participate in light of the reasonable adjustments he requires. I note the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to compel the Council to conduct a review under the Regulations.

The Council’s position, set out in its Response dated 18 February 2026, is that the Regulations (particularly 14(3)(b)) limit a claim for compensation in respect of legal fees in relation to an appeal to the First-tier Tribunal to the reasonable legal fees of a successful appeal. The First Appeal was unsuccessful. Therefore, Mr Hill’s legal fees in respect of that appeal do not fall within the Regulations and cannot be the subject of a valid claim for compensation.

Mr Hill replied to the Council’s Response on 7 May 2026. In summary, he raised the following points: 

Mr Hill provided commentary on the proposed list of agreed facts submitted by the Council. This took the form of suggested insertions recording what the Council did or did not accept and is or is not willing to confirm in relation to the ACV listing process and compensation for legal fees. He also made submissions in relation to what the Council is or is not willing to say about the SPOC arrangement, the fencing compensation claim and the moratorium periods, which are not matters for determination by the Tribunal in this appeal.

Regulation 14 of the Regulations relevantly provides:

“(1)

An owner or former owner of listed land or of previously listed land, other than an owner or former owner specified in regulation 15, is entitled to compensation from the responsible authority of such amount as the authority may determine where the circumstances in paragraph (2) apply.

(2)

The circumstances mentioned in paragraph (1) are that the person making the claim has, at a time when the person was the owner of the land and the land was listed, incurred loss or expense in relation to the land which would be likely not to have been incurred if the land had not been listed.

(3)

For the avoidance of doubt, and without prejudice to other types of claim which may be made, the following types of claim may be made— …

(b)a claim for reasonable legal expenses incurred in a successful appeal to the First-Tier Tribunal against the responsible authority’s decision—

(i)to list the land,

(ii)to refuse to pay compensation, or

(iii)with regard to the amount of compensation offered or paid…

(6)

The responsible authority must give the claimant written reasons for its decisions with respect to a request for compensation.”

Regulation 16 provides

“1)

A person who has under regulation 14 made a claim for compensation may ask the responsible authority concerned to review either or both of its decisions, made in response to that claim, as to—

(a)whether compensation should be paid to that person, and

(b)if compensation is to be paid, the amount of that compensation.

(2)

If a request for a compensation review is made in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 2 of Schedule 2, the authority must in accordance with the procedure in Schedule 2 review the decision or decisions of which review is requested.

(3)

Where an authority carries out a compensation review, the authority must give written notification to the person who asked for the review of—

(a)the decision on the review, and

(b)the reasons for the decision.”

Regulation 17 provides that

“Where a local authority has carried out a compensation review, the person who requested the review may appeal to the First-Tier Tribunal against any decision of the authority on the review.”

The procedure for compensation review is set out in Schedule 2 of the Regulations.

We heard oral evidence from Emma Dyer, Development Officer in the Communities Team at the Council. In her oral evidence, in summary, she made the following points:

We also heard oral evidence from Mr Hill. In his evidence, in summary he made the following points: 

The issues before the Tribunal were as follows:

The Council made written submissions on 26 May 2026 in advance of the hearing and expanded on these in the hearing. In summary, the Council made the following points:

In response, Mr Hill also filed further submissions on 7 June 2026. In summary, these raised the following points:

Mr Hill accepts that the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction within the present appeal to determine freestanding claims under the Care Act 2014 or Equality Act 2010, but these matters form part of the factual background concerning fairness, communication, reliance and the Council’s knowledge of Mr Hill’s difficulties during the ACV compensation process.

In a further document filed the day before the hearing, Mr Hill explained that in April 2024, the Council had processed and paid his first legal costs claim. He said that noone from the Council ever told him that some legal costs can be claimed and others cannot. He spent more money because he had been told to get legal advice, asked how to claim legal costs, been told compensation existed and had legal costs. Because of this, he believed his future ACV legal costs would also be recoverable.

The Council argued that under Regulation 16 it is the person who has made a claim for compensation who may ask for an internal review and, under Regulation 17, the person who requested the review is the one who has the right to appeal to the Tribunal. In both instances, the Council argues that this was Mrs Hill. However, it accepted that there is also evidence that on one occasion Mr Hill requested payment and asked for an internal review through an alternative channel.

Mr Hill said that he thought that they had asked to add Mrs Hill to the appeal on 1 June 2026. On looking at the email from Mr Hill’s assistant on that date, this indicated an intention to make a formal application to join Mrs Hill as an appellant, but no such application was made. Mr Hill says this is because the Tribunal did not respond to tell him what the deadline for making such an application was. He said that there had been some confusion in filling in the forms, and that the intention had been that Mr & Mrs Hill would both be appellants.

Given the fact that Mr Hill did make some requests for payment, including an email on 23 March 2026 and requests for an internal review, I am not persuaded that it was more likely than not he was the wrong appellant or that the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction for that reason. In other words, it is more likely than not that Mr Hill was entitled to bring this appeal. In reaching this conclusion, I have had regard to the overriding objective, particularly avoiding unnecessary formality and seeking flexibility in the proceedings and ensuring, so far as practicable, that the parties are able to participate fully in the proceedings.

The parties agree that under section 14(2) there is an entitlement to compensation where the person making the claim has, at a time when the person was the owner of the land and the land was listed, incurred loss or expense in relation to the land which would be likely not to have been incurred if the land had not been listed.

I agree that when taken alone, section 14(2) grants an entitlement to compensation, but this should properly be read as a threshold condition. In other words, if a person has incurred loss or expense as a result of the ACV, then they are entitled to make a claim for compensation. That does not, however, mean they will automatically receive compensation or that they are entitled to the full amount they are claiming.

The difference between the parties is that Mr Hill has read 14(2) as a stand-alone provision which gives an automatic entitlement to compensation in and of itself, whereas the Council has sought to interpret this provision in light of Regulation 14(3)(b) and 14(1). As a matter of how the Tribunal interprets the law, I accept the Council’s argument that a piece of legislation has to be read as a whole, because this is a well-established principle of statutory construction. I also accept their submission that the usual position is that where the legislation contains both general and specific provisions, the specific provisions should be read as modifying the general provisions, so in this case the general entitlement in 14(2) is modified by the other parts of Regulation 14.

The relevant part of 14(1) on which the Council relies is that the amount of compensation to which an owner is entitled is “such amount as the authority may determine”. This gives the Council a discretion as to how much of the cost incurred as a result of the ACV it determines the owner of the land is entitled to. It can determine that the amount of compensation should be the full amount claimed, or equally it can determine that the amount of compensation should be nil. As the law is drafted, it is for the Council in its discretion to decide the amount of compensation and there is no automatic entitlement to any particular amount.

The Council argues that Mr Hill is not entitled to claim legal fees for unsuccessful litigation seeking to dislodge the ACV in the First Appeal because it says that Regulation 14(3) prescribes the claims which may be made, one of which is reasonable legal expenses incurred in a successful appeal to the Tribunal. The Council says that because only two types of claim are set out in Regulation 14(3) then this means that other types of claim are excluded. I disagree with this. The wording of Regulation 14(3) specifies two types of claims that can be made, but it does not state that this is an exhaustive list because it includes the words “without prejudice to other types of claim which may be made”. This in my view contemplates the possibility that other types of claim may be made and makes it clear that the types listed in 14(3) are not exhaustive.

I do consider that had the writers of the legislation intended to include claiming back for unsuccessful appeals, this would be such an unusual circumstance and so at odds with usual practice that they would have needed to specify that this was a type of claim that could be made.

I find that Mr Hill was entitled to put in a claim for compensation on the basis of Regulation 14(2) but that the fact loss has arisen as a result of the ACV process is not an automatic entitlement to payment. Rather it is a threshold that needs to be reached in order to submit a claim for compensation. It is then up to the Council to assess that claim and determine what, if anything should be paid, using its discretion. I discuss this point further below.

The first question to deal with is what Mr Hill was told in the telephone conversation with Ms Dyer in November 2023.

Mr Hill’s submissions contend that in a telephone conversation in November 2023, Emma Dyer on behalf of the Council expressly acknowledged that the ACV legislation was complicated, especially in light of Mr Hill’s learning difficulties, advised him to seek independent legal advice if he struggled and stated that those legal costs would be recoverable under the ACV legislation. He says that she sent him the Council’s ACV guidance afterwards and this talks about compensation for losses caused by an ACV listing; this email appears at page CB B158.

The account of this conversation is contradicted by the witness statement of Ms Dyer dated 9 June 2026. She says that she spoke with Mr Hill by telephone on 14 November 2023. She says that she briefly explained the ACV legislation and the process followed by the Council on receipt of an ACV nomination. She states that at no point did Mr Hill inform her of any learning difficulties and she first became aware of this in May 2026. She emphasises that the Council is unable to provide legal advice on the ACV process and, had she mentioned legal advice, it would have been in the context of telling Mr Hill he would need to seek his own independent legal advice, which is the Council’s standard position on ACV applications. She considers it highly improbable that she mentioned that the costs would be recoverable; that would not have been a decision she could have made or an assurance she could give.

This conversation took place almost three years ago and was not documented contemporaneously. Both parties’ recollection of what was discussed may have been affected by the passage of time and there was evidence before the Tribunal that Mr Hill experiences forgetfulness. I find that given the greater detail in Ms Dyer’s evidence, I prefer her evidence and I give weight to the fact it would have not been within her power to make any representation to Mr Hill as to whether or not his legal fees would be reimbursed. So I find that it was more likely than not that Ms Dyer did not make any representation to Mr Hill that his legal fees would be paid by the Council.

I then turn to the rest of the chronology of Mr Hill’s interactions with the Council on the point. I find that the key facts were as follows:

Taking all of these into account, I am not persuaded that the Council represented to Mr Hill in a way that was clear and unambiguous that the legal fees in respect of the unsuccessful First Appeal would be reimbursed. Even if it had, this would not operate to provide a compensation entitlement under the scheme set out in the Regulations. It was not, in my view, reasonable for Mr Hill, in reliance on the communications from the Council, to have incurred legal fees on the understanding that these would be automatically reimbursed because it had not said that to him.

I note that Mr Hill raises the question of whether his claim for compensation ought to have been treated differently because of the personal difficulties and vulnerabilities he disclosed to the Council. I have not, however, dealt with this in the decision because this is, in essence, an argument that the Council treated Mr Hill unfairly and did not make appropriate adjustments under the Equalities Act 2010, which is beyond the scope of this narrow appeal on compensation.

For completeness, I also deal with the point raised by Mr Hill that the Council paid his legal fees in relation to the internal review of the ACV decision. I agree with the Council’s position that reimbursement of these costs, which were the costs of the determination of the listing itself by the council, not a challenge through appeal to an external body, does not mean that it has to compensate Mr Hill for his legal costs in relation to the unsuccessful First Appeal. I have seen no evidence that the Council communicated to Mr Hill that treating payment of his costs at this stage was a guarantee that any future legal costs of an external appeal would be reimbursed even if the appeal was unsuccessful. The way in which compensation operates under the Regulations is that claims can be made for losses incurred in the ACV process. There is nothing to suggest that because one claim has been successful all future claims will be. I therefore preferred the Council’s position on this.

As I have outlined above, the way in which compensation under the Regulations works is that if a landowner has suffered loss as a result of the ACV process, they are entitled to apply for compensation under regulation 14(2) which the public authority will then assess and determine how much, if any, is payable. The Council has a discretion to determine what compensation is payable, rather than being obliged to pay compensation automatically during the hearing. Regulation 14(3) says that an example of compensation that can be sought includes reasonable legal expenses incurred in a successful appeal.

However, the question of recovering legal fees for an unsuccessful Tribunal appeal is a different one. The usual position in civil litigation (which an appeal to the Tribunal is not) is that the winner is entitled to their costs from the loser. Under the Tribunal’s rules, however, the Tribunal can only award legal costs in very limited circumstances under Rule 10, which essentially are limited to where a party can demonstrate that the other party or its representative behaved unreasonably. This was not raised as an issue in the First Appeal and I do not understand Mr Hill to be saying now that the Council acted unreasonably in its conduct of the First Appeal.

I accept the Council’s argument that if they determined compensation for legal fees for an unsuccessful appeal the precedent this would set would have a number of serious consequences, not least for the public purse. This is because if they did so in one case, then it would be difficult to resist in other cases, which would result in funds needed for the Council’s functions being re-directed to pay the legal fees of anyone bringing action against the Council whether or not this succeeded. Accordingly, I agree with the Council’s argument that it was entitled, when exercising its discretion, to take into account the fact that the First Appeal was unsuccessful.

Mr Adamyk, in his submissions (and, properly, relying on the principle in Pepper v Hart [1993] AC 493 at p640 B-C), referred to a debate in the House of Lords in relation to the ACV Regulations. Baroness Hanham said in that context “Where a local authority considers that compensation should be paid, it is left for the authority to determine how much compensation will be appropriate. The authority should decide how much compensation is fair and proportionate in relation to both loss and expenses, balancing individual rights with community benefit and taking into account all the particular facts of the case…compensation…needs to be light-touch and practical. The proportionate approach is to leave it to be covered by the general duty on the local authority to behave reasonably. Local authorities have such a general duty and can be challenged if they do not fulfil it correctly. They will have to assess how much they should pay.”

Taking into account all the circumstances of this case, including Mr Hill’s vulnerability, the benefit to him as an individual, the benefit to the wider community and the fact that the First Appeal was unsuccessful, I conclude that it was reasonable, fair and proportionate for the Council to have decided that the amount of compensation due to Mr Hill was nil and nothing was payable. For these reasons, I consider the Council’s decision dated 30 June 2025 not to pay compensation to Mr Hill was correct and uphold it.

I therefore dismiss the appeal.