Andrew Devine v The Information Commissioner

This is an appeal brought under section 57 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (“FOIA”) against a Decision Notice (“DN”) of the Information Commissioner dated 22 January 2026.

The request concerned the manner in which HM Courts and Tribunals Service (“HMCTS”) evidences receipt of court fees, including payments made via Payment by Account, and sought disclosure of internal cash‑handling guidance.

By a response dated 1 May 2025 the Ministry of Justice (“MoJ”) refused the request pursuant to section 14(1) FOIA on the basis that it was vexatious.

That position was maintained upon internal review and subsequently upheld by the Commissioner.

The issue for determination is whether, in all the circumstances, the request dated 1 April 2025 was properly characterised as “vexatious” within the meaning of section 14(1) FOIA.

Section 14(1) FOIA provides that a public authority is not obliged to comply with a request for information if the request is vexatious.

The Tribunal applies the approach set out in Information Commissioner v Devon County Council & Dransfield [2012] UKUT 440 (AAC), endorsed by the Court of Appeal in Dransfield v Information Commissioner [2015] EWCA Civ 454.

The assessment is a holistic and evaluative one. The central question is whether the request represents a manifestly unjustified, inappropriate or improper use of FOIA.

The factors identified in Dransfield—including burden, motive, value or serious purpose, and any harassment or distress—are tools to assist that overall assessment and are not a checklist. A holistic assessment can be appropriate.

The Tribunal has considered the Grounds of Appeal advanced by the Appellant.

In summary, the Appellant advances five principal grounds:

Mischaracterisation of the request;

Disproportionate reliance on section 14(1);

Inadequate consideration of public value;

Failure to apply section 16 FOIA;

Failure to consider partial disclosure.

In accordance with the principles enshrined through Dransfield the Tribunal has considered the request within the broader context of the Appellant’s dealings with the MoJ.

The evidence discloses a sustained pattern of requests over a significant period of time, characterised by repetition, iterative reformulation and the absence of closure (Bundle A31 §14).

The subject matter varies in form but consistently returns to a central proposition concerning the validity of court processes in the absence of particular forms of documentary proof.

The Tribunal find that the current request forms part of that continuing pattern.

The request cannot properly be viewed in isolation but must be assessed in the context of that prior course of dealings.

The Tribunal is satisfied that the pattern demonstrates persistence, thematic repetition and escalation, such that responses have not resulted in resolution but have instead generated further requests of a similar nature (Bundle A31 §14).

Ground 1 – Mischaracterisation:

The proper characterisation of a request requires consideration of its context as well as its wording.

The evidence demonstrates that the request forms part of a continuing and extensive line of enquiry directed to a settled proposition (Bundle A31 §14).

The Tribunal is satisfied that it is properly characterised as part of an ongoing argumentative use of FOIA.

Ground 2 – Proportionality:

While the individual request may appear limited in scope, the Tribunal must consider cumulative burden.

The evidence demonstrates repeated engagement requiring assessment, clarification and response (Bundle B52 §7–9).

The Tribunal is satisfied that the burden, taken cumulatively, is disproportionate and unjustified.

Ground 3 – Public value:

The Tribunal accepts that the administrative processes of HMCTS may in principle, attract public interest.

However, the incremental value of continued engagement in this case is limited given prior explanations and absence of resolution over a significantly protracted period (Bundle C18 §3).

The Tribunal finds that the Commissioner was entitled to attach reduced weight to public value in context.

Ground 4 – Section 16:

The duty under section 16 arises where it is reasonable to provide advice and assistance.

Where a request is properly characterised as vexatious, iterative refinement is not required.

The evidence shows that prior engagement did not lead to narrowing or resolution (Bundle C18 §3), and further assistance would be unlikely to do so.

Ground 5 – Partial disclosure:

Partial disclosure may in principle be relevant to proportionality.

However, the difficulty in this case lies in the extensive and repetitive nature of the requests rather than their individual scope.

The evidence indicates partial disclosure would not address the underlying pattern or bring matters to a conclusion (Bundle A31 §14).

The Tribunal considers it necessary to address the nature of the use of FOIA in this case.

FOIA establishes an important right of access to recorded information.

On the evidence before us the Tribunal finds:

That the requests are directed towards advancing and testing a fixed proposition rather than obtaining discrete information;

That the requests are iterative and overlapping in nature (Bundle A31 §14);

That the process has developed into sustained argumentation;

That there is no realistic prospect that further responses would bring the matter to a conclusion (Bundle C18 §3).

In these circumstances, the Tribunal unanimously find that the use of FOIA in a holistic assessment has moved beyond its proper statutory purpose and constitutes misuse of the regime.

Drawing these matters together, the Tribunal unanimously find that the request forms part of a pattern that is manifestly unjustified and disproportionate.

The request is therefore properly characterised as vexatious within the meaning of section 14(1) FOIA.

Nothing in this decision prevents the making of focused and proportionate requests for recorded information. What FOIA does not require is the indefinite recycling of a line of enquiry which has reached the point at which further responses would serve no useful or lawful purpose.

That right is not unqualified. Parliament has provided, through section 14, a mechanism by which public authorities are protected from disproportionate and inappropriate use of their resources.

Any party may apply for permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal on a point of law only.

Any such application must be made in writing within 28 days of the date of this decision.