Augustus Harry Awortwi v Information Commissioner

The application is struck out, pursuant to Rule 8(2)(a) of The Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (General Regulatory Chamber) Rules 2009.

On 6^th April 2026, the Applicant made an application on form GRC3 for an order that the Information Commissioner (IC) progress his complaint. 

On 13^th May 2026, the IC applied to strike out his application under Rule 8(2)(a) on the basis that the Tribunal lacks jurisdiction.

In the alternative, the IC invites the Tribunal to strike the application out under Rule 8(3)(c) on the basis that there is no reasonable prospect of success.

Rule 8(2)(a) says that the Tribunal must strike out the whole or a part of the proceedings if the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction in relation to the proceedings or that part of them.

Rule 8(3)(c) says that the Tribunal may strike out the whole or a part of the proceedings if it considers there is no reasonable prospect of the Applicant's case, or part of it, succeeding.

Rule 22(6)(f) provides that the time limit for filing an appeal, in the case of an application under section 166(2) of the Data Protection Act 2018 (orders to progress complaints), is within 28 days of the expiry of six months from the date on which the Commissioner received the complaint.

In this case the complaint was received by the IC on 9^th February 2025.

The time limit for an application to this Tribunal (6 months plus 28 days) was therefore 8^th September 2025.

The application was filed almost seven months out of time.

The Applicant cites the IC’s delay in progressing his appeal as a reason for appealing when he did. He invites the Tribunal to exercise its discretion under Rule 5(3)(a) to direct that the time limit for filing the application be extended. He states that he was awaiting the final response before he filed his application and that it was the content of the final response that triggered the application, because he felt the complaint had been insufficiently investigated.

The purpose of an application under s166, however, is to avoid exactly that. The Tribunal’s power under s166 is to direct that the IC progress a complaint and provide the complainant with an outcome.

By the time the application was filed, the Applicant had received a response to the initial request and the response to a formal review.

His application for an order goes beyond an application for the IC to progress his complaint and the case law set out by the IC in his response to the application is succinct and persuasive in terms of the powers of this Tribunal to make an order. s166 is a provision intended to remedy procedural defects and effect the timely resolution of a complaint. The Tribunal does not have any power to deal with the merits or outcome of a complaint.

The Appellant is not asking the Tribunal to exercise its powers under s166; he is asking the Tribunal to direct the IC to reconsider its decision and investigate his complaint in a different way.

The overriding objective directs me to consider the deal with a case fairly and justly. In particular I have considered my duties to deal with the case in ways which are proportionate to the importance of the case, the complexity of the issues, the anticipated costs and the resources of the parties; to avoid unnecessary formality and to avoid delay.

On balance, extending the time limit to allow an application for an order to progress an investigation which has now been concluded is not a proportionate use of Tribunal time. It is a waste of resources both for the Tribunal and the Respondent and it delays an outcome which is inevitable because the application cannot succeed.

In coming to this decision I have borne in mind the overriding objective.

I do not extend time for the filing of this application. The application is therefore struck out in accordance with Rule 8(2)(a) for lack of jurisdiction.

Even had the time limit been extended, the limited remit of s166 and the fact that an outcome had already been provided to the Applicant means that I find there is no reasonable prospect of the application succeeding. The application is therefore also struck out in accordance with my discretion under the provisions of Rule 8(3)(c).